[Cite as State v. Clapsaddle, 2026-Ohio-3161.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HARDIN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 6-26-11
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
OPINION AND
DUSTIN RAY CLAPSADDLE, JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2026 1007 CVH
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 17, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Bradley P. Koffel for Appellant
Morgan S. Fish for Appellee
Case No. 6-26-11
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dustin Ray Clapsaddle (“Clapsaddle”), appeals
the February 23, 2026 judgment entry of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas
denying his petition for postconviction relief. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from a sexual assault that took place on or about
January 18, 2019. At the time of the sexual assault, Clapsaddle was a teacher and
the victim, T.M., was a 17-year-old student in Clapsaddle’s government class during
her junior year of high school. T.M. did not report the sexual assault until three
years later.
{¶3} On August 16, 2023, the Hardin County Grand Jury indicted Clapsaddle
on Count One of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), (B), a first-degree felony;
Count Two of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(7), (B), a third-degree
felony; Count Three of gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(1), (C)(1), a fourth-degree felony; and Count Four of kidnapping in
violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), (C)(1), a first-degree felony. On August 23, 2023,
Clapsaddle appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty to the counts
alleged in the indictment.
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{¶4} The case proceeded to jury trial on June 25-28, 2024. Prior to voir dire
examination of prospective jurors, the following exchange took place regarding plea
negotiations.
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, since the last time we were
here, we did extend an offer at the defendant’s request for plea
negotiations. It’s my understanding, I guess, since we’re here today,
that that’s been rejected. But we would ask that that be read into the
record and rejected on the record, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and read it into the
record the offer that’s on the table.
[THE STATE]: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. HORD: I object. I don’t think it’s relevant.
THE COURT: Well, read it into the record.
[THE STATE]: Thank you, Your Honor.
We had extended an offer to allow a plea of guilty to Count 2,
a charge of sexual battery, a felony of the third degree, with the
balance of the indictment and specifications dismissed. Knowing that
he would pay court cost, cost of prosecution, a potential fine, have no
contact with [T.M.], we would not oppose a PSI. He was entitled to
some jail credit. And that the parties had no joint sentencing
recommendation and each side was free to make any arguments as to
the disposition and sentencing recommendation, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Defense counsel, I don’t care
which one of [you] want to respond to my questions. One of you need
to.
Is that what you understood the offer of the State to be[?]
MR. RATLIFF: Correct, Your Honor.
We presented this to the defendant and he declined.
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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Clapsaddle, I’m going to talk
to you directly very briefly. Did you hear what the State said they
offered you to get you to plead in this case to avoid the trial?
[CLAPSADDLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you have plenty of time to discuss
that with your attorneys?
[CLAPSADDLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: Did they review with you the potential
outcomes of going to trial, both from the possibility of going to trial,
be found not guilty on some or all of the charges, and the possibility
of going to trial and being found guilty on some or all of the charges?
[CLAPSADDLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: Did they go through with you the
penalties, including the maximum penalties, of what you might
receive if you accepted this offer, as well as the whole range of
possibilities if you go to trial and lose on one or more charges?
[CLAPSADDLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you at this point satisfied with the
services that your attorneys have rendered to you?
[CLAPSADDLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: Have they kept you informed as to the
status of your case?
[CLAPSADDLE]: They have.
THE COURT: Have they answered any and all questions
that you’ve had about your case so far?
[CLAPSADDLE]: They have.
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THE COURT: Does that include any questions that you
may have had about the plea offer?
[CLAPSADDLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, are you satisfied with my
inquiry concerning the plea offer?
[THE STATE]: The State is, Your Honor.
MR. RATLIFF: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. HORD: Yes, Your Honor.
(June 25, 2024 Interview Tr. at 19-22).
{¶5} After jury selection and opening statements, the State presented its casein-chief and T.M. testified about the sexual assault as follows:
That night, she attended a basketball game at the high school as a
cheerleader. Clapsaddle attended the game too. After T.M. left the
game, she found a note on her car’s windshield that said, “Meet me at
the church.” T.M. realized the note was from Clapsaddle and drove
to the church, where she got in Clapsaddle’s car. He then drove them
to his house because he indicated he had something for her. Upon
arriving there, Clapsaddle said he would be right back, but he did not
return to the car. After a few minutes, T.M. wanted to go home so she
went inside Clapsaddle’s house and saw him sitting on the living room
couch watching television.
According to T.M., Clapsaddle told her to follow him while he
retrieved the item he had for her. So she followed Clapsaddle into his
bedroom. When they got there, Clapsaddle showed her a memorabilia
area and they talked. T.M. testified that she got an uncomfortable
feeling, with Clapsaddle engaging in touching her arm and back,
“things that were making [her] uncomfortable that . . . could’ve
potentially led into something [she] didn’t want it to lead into.” (Trial
Tr. at 373-374). T.M. then said she had to go and turned to leave the
room. Clapsaddle—who T.M. indicated was significantly larger than
her physically—came around her from behind, shut the door, and
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placed his hand on the doorknob. T.M. testified she felt scared and
knew she could not leave the room even though she wanted to leave
in order to get out of the situation. Apart from Clapsaddle putting his
hand on her back before he had shut the door, she could not recall
specifically where he touched her. Clapsaddle pushed her down on
the bed, with T.M. lying face down and crying, and Clapsaddle
“proceeded to do whatever he wanted.” (Id. at 374). T.M. testified
that her “body shut down,” Clapsaddle took off her pants, he had sex
with her (penetrating her vagina with his penis), and it hurt. (Id. at
376-379). Afterward, Clapsaddle walked T.M. out to his car, acted
like nothing happened, and drove her back to her car without saying
anything about the incident.
State v. Clapsaddle, 2025-Ohio-4904, ¶ 2-3 (3d Dist.).
{¶6} Clapsaddle testified in his own defense at trial. Clapsaddle denied
having any type of sexual relationship with T.M. Clapsaddle denied ever meeting
T.M. at a church, picking her up in his car, and driving her to his house. Clapsaddle
also denied ever restraining T.M. of her freedom or kidnapping her. When asked if
any of the allegations against him are true, Clapsaddle replied, “No.” (Trial Tr. at
1128).
{¶7} On cross examination, Clapsaddle was asked, “[Y]ou testified here
today, that you never had sex with [T.M.], correct?” (Id. at 1186-1187). Clapsaddle
responded, “Correct.” (Id. at 1187). Clapsaddle was further asked, “You did not
have sex with her in your home when she was a student?” (Id.). Clapsaddle replied,
“Never.” (Id.).
{¶8} On June 28, 2024, the jury found Clapsaddle guilty on all four counts.
The trial court merged all counts except the GSI count. The State elected to proceed
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to sentencing on the rape count. The trial court sentenced Clapsaddle to nine years
in prison for rape and 12 months in prison for GSI. The trial court ordered that the
sentences be served consecutively for an aggregate prison term of ten years.
{¶9} On October 22, 2024, Clapsaddle appealed the trial court’s judgment of
sentence. In that direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Clapsaddle, 2025-Ohio-4904, at ¶ 71 (3d Dist.).
{¶10} On January 8, 2026, Clapsaddle filed a petition for postconviction
relief claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
Specifically, Clapsaddle alleged that the performance of his trial counsel was
deficient for failing to advise him of (1) the elements of the offenses, (2) the benefits
of pretrial plea negotiations, (3) the risks of proceeding to trial, and (4) a plea offer
extended by the State. In support of his petition, Clapsaddle submitted his own
affidavit containing the following relevant averments:
4. I met with Mr. Hord at the very beginning of the case, prior to
turning myself in. At that meeting, I told Mr. Hord that I had engaged
in sexual conduct with [T.M.] and that no force was used. I told him
that the relationship ended and that [T.M.] came to my home on more
than one occasion. Mr. Hord took notes during that meeting.
9. No one ever discussed plea bargaining with me in any
meaningful way. I was never advised of a written plea offer from the
State, I never saw the written plea offer (Ex. A), nor did my counsel
ever discuss with me potential resolutions without a jury trial.
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10. I was never advised of the risks of proceeding to trial such as
the jury instruction on the definition of force, consecutive sentencing,
mandatory prison term for rape.
14. At no point did either Mr. Hord or Mr. Ratliff explain my right
to remain silent or the risks of testifying at trial. I was never advised
how my testimony could be used against me or how crossexamination would likely unfold, particularly in light of the fact that
counsel knew I had engaged in sexual conduct with [T.M.].
15. Shortly before trial, I received a very brief phone call from
Rocky Ratliff stating that the State was offering to drop the charges
other than sexual battery. I had no idea this was reduced to writing
nor did he explain to me what it meant.
19. Had I been competently advised of the law, the evidence, the
realistic likelihood of conviction, and the sentencing exposure I faced,
and with other counsel, I would have very likely accepted a plea
resolution to sexual battery rather than proceed to trial on rape,
kidnapping, gross sexual imposition and sexual battery.
(Doc. No. 1; Clapsaddle Aff.).1
{¶11} The petition also included affidavits from Clapsaddle’s trial counsel,
Terry L. Hord and Rocky Ratcliff, refuting Clapsaddle’s allegations. Notably, Mr.
Hord’s affidavit avers that “[a]t no time, has Dustin Clapsaddle or his parents ever
stated to me or anyone else in my presence that Dustin was guilty of anything.”
(Doc. No. 1; Hord Aff. at ¶ 13). Similarly, Mr. Ratliff’s affidavit attests, “I have
1
We note that even though Clapsaddle’s affidavit references an exhibit A—presumably the State’s written plea offer—the record before us does not include such exhibit.
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never at any time had a conversation with Mr. Clapsaddle or his family where either
one stated that Mr. Clapsaddle was guilty of anything.” (Doc. No. 1; Ratliff Aff. at
¶ 19). Mr. Ratliff’s affidavit further attests that “when the offer was presented to
Mr. Clapsaddle, he outright refused to accept said offer and continually denied his
guilt.” (Id. at ¶ 14). Both affidavits state that trial counsel advised Clapsaddle of
the ramifications of a jury trial and all potential outcomes, and that Clapsaddle
consistently maintained his innocence and wanted to proceed to jury trial.
{¶12} On February 23, 2026, the trial court denied Clapsaddle’s petition.
The trial court determined that an evidentiary hearing was not required because
Clapsaddle “failed to provide credible evidence to support his allegations in favor
of post-conviction relief.” (Doc. No. 8). “[Clapsaddle] chose to proceed to trial;
this choice will not be overturned in view of the substantial consequences for his
conviction.” (Id.).
{¶13} On March 20, 2026, Clapsaddle filed a notice of appeal, raising three
assignments of error for our review. We will address the assignments of error
together.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred and abused its discretion by denying,
without an evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective
under Missouri v. Frye by failing to communicate and
competently explain the State’s written May 24, 2024 plea offer.
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Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred and abused its discretion by denying,
without an evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s petition on his claim
that trial counsel was ineffective under Lafler v. Cooper by giving
deficient plea-stage advice that caused rejection of a materially
more favorable plea.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred and abused its discretion by rejecting
Appellant’s sworn affidavits and resolving contested, extrarecord credibility questions on the pleadings.
{¶14} In all three assignments of error, Clapsaddle argues that the trial court
improperly denied his petition for postconviction relief without first holding an
evidentiary hearing. In particular, Clapsaddle alleges that his trial counsel was
deficient for failing to show him the “written plea offer” and for failing to
competently advise him regarding the offer. (Appellant’s Brief at 8). According to
Clapsaddle, “counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient and caused rejection.”
(Id. at 10). Clapsaddle argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing since
“[t]he record does not conclusively refute [his] account.” (Id. at 9).
Standard of Review
{¶15} “We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction
relief, including the decision whether to afford the petitioner a hearing, under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 38. An abuse of
discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
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Analysis
{¶16} Petitions for postconviction relief are governed by R.C. 2953.21. State
v. Costell, 2021-Ohio-4363, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). “‘Any person convicted of a criminal
offense who claims that there was a denial or infringement on his rights to such a
degree as to render the judgment void or voidable may file a petition for postconviction relief.’” Id., quoting State v. Gaddy, 2021-Ohio-637, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.),
citing R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a).
{¶17} “In order to grant a hearing on a timely postconviction petition, the
trial court must ‘determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief.’” State
v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2953.21(D). In relevant part, R.C.
2953.21(D) provides:
Before granting a hearing on a petition . . . the court shall determine
whether there are substantive grounds for relief. In making such a
determination, the court shall consider, in addition to the petition, the
supporting affidavits, and the documentary evidence, all the files and
records pertaining to the proceedings against the petitioner, including,
but not limited to, the indictment, the court’s journal entries, the
journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court reporter’s
transcript.
Thus, a petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing simply because he has
filed a petition for postconviction relief. State v. Lewis, 2019-Ohio-3031, ¶ 11 (3d
Dist.). Rather, to warrant a hearing, a petition must present substantive grounds for
relief. Id. “A petition presents substantive grounds for relief when it contains
allegations that are sufficient to state a constitutional claim and the files and records
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of the case do not affirmatively disprove the claim.” (Emphasis added.) State v.
Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, ¶ 24.
{¶18} Moreover, a petition for postconviction relief does not provide a
petitioner a second opportunity to litigate his conviction. Costell at ¶ 18. Under the
doctrine of res judicata,
“a final judgment of conviction bars the convicted defendant from
raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that
judgment, any [claim] that was raised or could have been raised by
the defendant at the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction
or on an appeal from that judgment.”
Blanton at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180 (1967). However,
when a petition presents a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and relies on
evidence outside the record that could not have been adjudicated in a direct appeal,
the ineffective-assistance claim is not barred by res judicata. Blanton at ¶ 38. See
also State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114 (1982) (“Generally, the introduction in an
R.C. 2953.21 petition of evidence dehors the record of ineffective assistance of
counsel is sufficient, if not to mandate a hearing, at least to avoid dismissal on the
basis of res judicata.”).
{¶19} To merit an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective-assistance claim, “a
petitioner ‘must proffer evidence which, if believed, would establish not only that
his trial counsel had substantially violated at least one of a defense attorney’s
essential duties to his client but also that said violation was prejudicial to the
[petitioner].’” Blanton at ¶ 31, quoting Cole at 114. In the context of a plea offer,
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trial counsel can be deemed ineffective when, aware of the offer, they either fail to
inform the client of the offer or encourage the client to reject the offer based on
incorrect advice. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012). “To show prejudice
from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected
because of counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a
reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been
afforded effective assistance of counsel.” Frye at 147.
{¶20} In this case, Clapsaddle’s petition presented allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel related to the State’s plea offer. In his affidavit, Clapsaddle
averred that he told his trial counsel that he “had engaged in sexual conduct with
[T.M.] and that no force was used.” (Doc. No. 1, Clapsaddle Aff. at ¶ 4). Clapsaddle
further averred that—but for the deficient performance of his trial counsel—he
would have accepted the plea offer and entered a plea of guilty to sexual battery.
Since Clapsaddle proffered evidence outside the record in the form of affidavits to
establish his ineffective-assistance claim, it must be determined whether that
evidence, if believed, presents substantive grounds for relief. Blanton, 2022-Ohio3985, at ¶ 32-33.
{¶21} Here, the trial court determined that Clapsaddle failed to present
credible evidence to establish his ineffective-assistance claim. The trial court found
that Clapsaddle failed to demonstrate any deficiency in the performance of his trial
counsel or that the outcome of the criminal trial proceedings would have been any
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different. In reaching its decision, the trial court considered the supporting
affidavits together with the entirety of the record and found that “the affidavits are
not consistent with the trial record; indeed, they frequently are significantly different
than the trial record.” (Doc. No. 8). The trial court further found that “the credibility
of affiants is negated, especially due to their inherent interest in the outcome of the
petition.” (Id.). See State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 284 (1999) (“The trial
court may, under appropriate circumstances in postconviction relief proceedings,
deem affidavit testimony to lack credibility without first observing or examining the
affiant.”).
{¶22} On appeal, Clapsaddle argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing. According
to Clapsaddle, “[w]here sworn affidavits describe private attorney-client
communications and the responding affidavits do not squarely refute them, the
credibility contest must be resolved through testimony.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9).
We disagree.
{¶23} As previously stated, “[i]n order to grant a hearing on a timely
postconviction petition, the trial court must ‘determine whether there are substantive
grounds for relief.’” Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2953.21(D).
In determining whether the petition states a substantive ground for
relief, the trial court must consider the entirety of the record from the
trial proceedings as well as any evidence filed by the parties in
postconviction proceedings. If the record on its face demonstrates
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that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, then the trial court must
dismiss the petition.
(Emphasis added.) Bunch at ¶ 24. “A petition presents substantive grounds for
relief when it contains allegations that are sufficient to state a constitutional claim
and the files and records of the case do not affirmatively disprove the claim.”
(Emphasis added.) Blanton, 2022-Ohio-3985, at ¶ 24.
{¶24} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Clapsaddle’s petition without a hearing. Even
though Clapsaddle avers in his supporting affidavit that—had he been competently
advised by trial counsel—he would have accepted the State’s plea offer and entered
a plea of guilty to sexual battery, the files and records of this case affirmatively
disprove this claim. Blanton at ¶ 24. Significantly, Clapsaddle testified at trial that
he never had a sexual relationship with the victim. Further, he continued to profess
his innocence at sentencing as follows:
The crimes I’ve been accused of are things I never would think about
doing to someone, not in a million years. It’s not who I am. It’s not
how I was raised. Your Honor, you’re seeing an innocent person here
today, and I hope that weighs heavy on your decision.
(Oct. 7, 2024 Tr. at 35). We further conclude that the trial court’s finding that
Clapsaddle failed to provide credible evidence to support his ineffective-assistance
claim is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Calhoun at 285 (stating
that “a trial court may find sworn testimony in an affidavit to be contradicted by
evidence in the record by the same witness, or to be internally inconsistent, thereby
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weakening the credibility of that testimony”). Accordingly, Clapsaddle’s first,
second, and third assignments of error are overruled.
{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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