Opinion issued August 11, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-26-00260-CV
SEAN PRICE, Appellant
V.
NATASHA CLAYBORN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 308th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2025-82421
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant challenges two post-divorce orders regarding the parties’ former
marital residence, both signed on June 4, 2024: (1) an Order Granting Petition for
Enforcement of Property Division and (2) an Order Appointing Receiver. On
November 6, 2025 – over a year after these orders were signed – appellant filed what he called a petition for bill of review in the trial court. Appellant contends that the
challenged orders conflict with the parties’ Mediated Settlement Agreement, as
incorporated into the August 11, 2023 Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. The trial
court denied relief, and appellant appealed. Appellee now moves to dismiss, arguing
that appellant’s purported bill-of-review appeal is an untimely appeal from the postjudgment orders. We agree and dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
A bill of review is an independent equitable action asking a trial court to set
aside a final judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by ordinary motions for
new trial or appellate remedies. See In re D.L.S., No. 05-08-00173-CV, 2009 WL
1875579, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). To obtain a
bill of review, a petitioner must show: (1) a meritorious claim or defense to the cause
of action alleged to support the judgment; (2) which the petitioner was prevented
from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party; and (3)
unmixed with any fault or negligence of the petitioner's own. Id. Although appellant
here labeled his trial court filing a bill of review, “[w]e look to the substance of a
plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of the
title given to it.” See Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659
S.W.3d 424 (Tex. 2023).
We conclude that the record does not support construing appellant’s motion
to vacate as a bill of review. Appellant is not advancing a theory that, if vindicated,
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would result in the trial court setting aside the parties’ August 11, 2023 Agreed Final
Decree of Divorce. Rather, he argues that the June 4, 2024 post-decree enforcement
and receivership orders violate the decree’s terms. Far from asking that the decree
be vacated, he contends that it should be enforced according to his interpretation and
that the post-judgment orders are inconsistent with it.
Accordingly, appellant’s purported bill of review was, in substance, a motion
to set aside the June 4, 2024 post-judgment orders, the denial of which is not
independently appealable. See id. (substance of motion controls); see also Fazzolari
v. Fazzolari, No. 01-26-00019-CV, 2026 WL 1139715, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); Anassi v. Office of the Att’y Gen. of
Tex., No. 01-21-00296-CV, 2021 WL 4733235, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Oct. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that denials of motions to set aside
a judgment are not independently appealable).
Even if we construe the notice of appeal as a direct appeal of the June 4, 2024
orders – an order appointing a receiver is an appealable interlocutory order –
appellant filed his notice of appeal on March 18, 2026, well-after the deadline. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. We therefore
lack jurisdiction under any construction of appellant’s appeal.
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Accordingly, we grant appellees’ motions to dismiss and dismiss the appeal
for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Any pending motions
are dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams, Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.
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