LAW.coLAW.co

Andrew Wood George v. Ashley Wood George, Jr. and Alyson Hadju

2026-08-13

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Opinion issued August 13, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-26-00740-CV

ANDREW WOOD GEORGE, Appellant

V.

ASHLEY WOOD GEORGE, JR. AND ALYSON HADJU, Appellees

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 203232

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant moves to extend the deadline for filing his notice of appeal. Because

we conclude the challenged order is not appealable, we lack jurisdiction over the

appeal. We therefore deny the motion as futile and dismiss the appeal.

Appellant challenges an order issued by the probate court on June 17, 2026.

The order grants in part and denies in part appellant’s motion to transfer and

consolidate related proceedings. Specifically, the probate court transferred

appellant's separate Freestone County lawsuit to the probate court as a proceeding

related to the estate but declined to transfer a pending Freestone County partition

suit.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 17, 2026, within the thirty-day

deadline applicable to appeals from final judgments but outside the deadline

applicable to interlocutory appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. Appellant also filed a

motion seeking an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. See id. 26.3.

Appellees respond that any extension would be futile because the order is not

appealable.

Absent a timely notice of appeal from a final judgment or an appealable

interlocutory order, or a valid extension of the applicable deadline, this Court lacks

jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1, 26.1, 26.3. Generally, appeals may be taken

only from final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195

(Tex. 2001).

The June 17 order is not final. “A judgment is final for purposes of appeal ‘if

and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court,

regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final

2

judgment as to all claims and all parties.’” Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge,

422 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d

191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001)). The June 17 order neither disposes of all parties and

claims before the court nor states with unmistakable clarity that it is final. The

probate proceeding remains pending and the transferred Freestone County lawsuit

remains pending.

The June 17 order is also not an appealable interlocutory order. In probate

proceedings, an interlocutory order on a discrete issue is appealable only if either (1)

a statute expressly declares that phase of the proceeding final and appealable, or (2)

the order disposes of all parties or issues for which that particular phase of the

proceeding was brought. See De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006).

Neither Chapter 34 – nor any other statute the Court was able to find – declares an

order granting or denying a Chapter 34 transfer appealable. Courts considering

similar orders have consistently concluded that they are not appealable. See, e.g.,

Estate of Rosborough, No. 05-25-00486-CV, 2026 WL 565844, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 27, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal from probate court

order transferring venue under Estates Code section 34.001 for lack of jurisdiction);

In re Estate of Aguilar, 435 S.W.3d 831, 833 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no

pet.) (same); Grounds v. Lett, 718 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ)

3

(holding probate court orders concerning transfer and jurisdiction were interlocutory

and unappealable).

Nor does the order dispose of all parties or issues in a discrete phase of the

probate proceeding. The order merely determines where related litigation will

proceed. Further proceedings are necessary before any substantive rights are

adjudicated. Accordingly, the order is not appealable.

Because the June 17, 2026 order is not appealable, we lack jurisdiction over

this appeal. Although appellant has demonstrated circumstances that would

otherwise support an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, granting such relief

would be futile because no appeal lies from the challenged order. See Rhodes v.

Aikens, No. 05-19-00047-CV, 2019 WL 1146713, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.

13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, appellant's motion for extension of time is denied, and the appeal

is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

PER CURIAM.

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan.

4