Opinion issued August 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00747-CR
DAKARI JAHI LENEAR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 179th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1723781
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Dakari Jahi Lenear, appeals from his murder conviction for the
killing of his wife, Rhonda Lenear. He contends the trial court erred in denying his
motions to suppress a live recording of the events surrounding Rhonda’s death
obtained from a pink Samsung cell phone recovered next to Rhonda’s hand, in the marital home. In seeking to suppress that live recording, Appellant challenges both
the seizure of the phone and the subsequent search of the phone. We reject both
challenges.
First, the seizure. Assuming for these purposes that Appellant has standing to
challenge the seizure of the cell phone from the marital home,1 we nevertheless
conclude that the officers lawfully seized the cell phone under the plain view
doctrine. The police officers were lawfully inside the residence, with a warrant
allowing them to be there. The phone was in plain view next to Rhonda’s hand (still
actively recording), the officers had lawful access to it, and its incriminating
character was immediately apparent.
Second, the search. Also assuming for these purposes that Appellant has
standing to challenge the subsequent search of the phone, we nevertheless conclude
that this record presents no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The hallmark of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Here, the record supports the officer’s
reasonable belief, based on all facts known to him at the time (including that the
phone found by Rhonda’s hand was still actively recording when the police arrived,
and it had visibly been recording for three hours), that Rhonda’s mother—who then
1
Whether a defendant has standing for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is not a
jurisdictional question. See Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 411 (2018).
2
gave the officers that phone’s passcode, enabling them to access Rhonda’s
recording—consented to the search.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting
The underlying facts are undisputed. On May 19, 2021, Appellant shot and
killed his wife Rhonda in their home.
At the time of the shooting, Rhonda was audio-recording on a pink cell phone.
The recording captured the events preceding the shooting, the gunshots, and the
aftermath. The phone was still recording when the officers later entered the home
with a warrant.
Immediately following the shooting, the couple’s teenaged daughter, Kari,
called 9-1-1 and reported that her father had just shot her mother. Police officers
arrived, and Appellant surrendered. Officers entered the home to conduct a welfare
check and found Rhonda deceased; she had suffered significant blood loss and
apparent gunshot wounds.
Later that day, police obtained a warrant to search the residence. During the
search, officers found a cell phone next to Rhonda’s hand—still recording—and
seized it. Police subsequently accessed and listened to the audio recording of the
shooting. Appellant was indicted for murder.
3
B. Motion to Suppress Hearing
Appellant filed two motions to suppress the live-recording evidence obtained
from the cell phone, arguing that the police acquired that evidence in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.2 First, he challenged the seizure of the phone under the
residence search warrant, arguing that no probable-cause nexus supported seizure of
the phone. Second, he challenged the later search of the phone, arguing that the
police conducted the search without a warrant or an applicable exception to the
warrant requirement. The trial court held a hearing on the motions to suppress.
Investigator Crain of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office testified at the
hearing. Crain explained that he was notified of the homicide investigation and
informed that a search warrant was needed before investigators could enter and
process the scene. He therefore prepared and obtained a warrant to search the
residence.
Crain testified that when law enforcement initially arrived, Appellant was
holding a camouflage cell phone. After Appellant was detained, investigators
collected that phone.
2
Appellant also argued below that the evidence was acquired in violation of Article
I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution and Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Appellant does not assert those arguments here and focuses only on the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because he does not
separately brief an argument under the Texas Constitution or Article 38.23, we focus
our analysis on the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 38.1(i); Young v. State, 563 S.W.3d 325, 329 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).
4
Crain testified that upon entering the home, he observed a pink Samsung cell
phone “lying next to the victim’s hand.” He could see from the cell phone’s screen
that the phone was actively recording. He also saw that the audio recording was three
hours long, and the cell phone had only 13% battery remaining.
Crain testified that he confirmed the pink Samsung phone belonged to
Rhonda. He further explained that Rhonda’s mother gave the phone’s passcode to
another officer. Crain used the passcode provided by Rhonda’s mother to access the
phone and extract the audio recording of the offense. Crain testified that he believed
Rhonda’s mother had implicitly consented to him accessing and downloading the
phone’s contents at issue under the circumstances.
The parties’ daughter, Kari, also testified. Kari testified that her mother’s
phone was “a Samsung with a pink case on it” and that her father’s (the Appellant’s)
phone “was also a Samsung but it had like a camo[uflage] case on it.” Kari testified
that her mother’s phone was passcode-protected and that she (Kari) gave the
passcode to her grandmother (Rhonda’s mother) to give to law enforcement.3 When
asked whether Appellant used her mother’s phone, Kari replied, “Not - - not really,
no.” Kari further testified that Appellant used his own Samsung phone.
The defense did not call any witnesses. The only evidence produced by
Appellant was his declaration stating that he “managed the family’s cell phone
3
There is no evidence that law enforcement knew this fact at the time of the search.
5
accounts, including paying the bills” and that “Rhonda and I did not have a
premarital agreement designating any separate property.”
During the hearing, the parties stipulated that Appellant and Rhonda were
married. The State conceded it had no tracing evidence showing separate-property
funds were used to purchase the pink Samsung phone. The State also conceded, for
purposes of the hearing, that the phone was community property.
C. The Trial Court’s Denial of Appellant’s Motions to Suppress
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motions to
suppress. As to the seizure of the pink Samsung phone from the marital home, the
trial court concluded that the seizure was proper and covered by the search warrant;
the court further explained that “the phone [was] in plain view and [was] on
recording,” circumstances that “support the reasonableness for them to seize the
phone.”
As to the search, the trial court concluded that Appellant did not have standing
to challenge the search of the cell phone. The court concluded that he had not met
his burden to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the phone.4
4
The trial court addressed Appellant’s asserted community property interest in the
phone solely in connection with a privacy inquiry. It then concluded that Appellant
did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone. The trial court
did not delve into the question of whether, under the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and a property-based view, Appellant would have standing (or not) in
light of Appellant’s property argument and the State’s concession that the phone
was community property. See infra pp. 9–11.
6
The trial court determined that Appellant had “some personal connection to the
phone” because Appellant “managed the family’s cell phone accounts including
paying the bills,” but that this alone did not establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The trial court noted that the cell phone was protected by a password, it was
pink, and it was Rhonda who was using the cell phone.
The trial court later memorialized its oral findings into written findings of fact
and conclusions of law, including, in relevant part:
29. Once Investigator Crain entered the residence, he observed a
cellular phone lying next to the victim’s hand (the complainant’s pink
Samsung cell phone) and he collected the phone pursuant to the search
warrant.
30. Investigator Crain testified the complainant’s pink Samsung cell
phone was lying face up where the screen of the phone was visible and
was actively recording the sounds from within the room. He further
observed the time stamp on that recording was right at three hours.
31. Investigator Crain collected the complainant’s pink Samsung cell
phone, and noticed the phone had a password and it was locked.
32. Thr[ough]out his investigation Investigator Crain learned that when
Defendant was detained, the Defendant had a camouflage phone with
him.
33. Investigator Crain testified that he learned that[,] within two hours
of the recovery of the complainant’s pink Samsung phone, the
complainant’s mother provided deputies a passcode to get into what he
believed was the complainant’s phone.
34. Investigator Crain testified he believe[d] that after the
complainant’s mother provided the password to the deputies, he had
implicit consent from the complainant’s mother to download the phone.
***
7
41. [Kari], the Complainant’s and Defendant’s daughter, testified that
the pink Samsung cellphone belong[ed] to the complainant and the
complainant used her phone.
42. [Kari] further testified the camouflaged cell phone was the
Defendant’s phone and that he used that phone.
43. [Kari] further testified she was aware of the complainant’s phone
passcode, and that she gave it to her grandmother, for her grandmother
(the complainant’s mother) to give it to the investigators.
(Citations omitted.)
DISCUSSION
Because Appellant’s challenges to the seizure and subsequent search of the
phone fail under Texas law, we affirm. We address each in turn.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Armstrong v. State, 713 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App.
2025). “At the hearing on the motion, the trial court is the sole factfinder and judge
of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.” Id.
Therefore, we afford “almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of
historical facts that the record supports.” State v. Pettit, 713 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2025). We defer to the trial court’s findings as to historical facts unless
they are unsupported by the record. See id.; State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667
(Tex. Crim. App. 2023). However, we review de novo legal questions and mixed
questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Espinosa,
8
666 S.W.3d at 667; see also Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496, 515 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2022) (specifying de novo review for “application-of-law-to-fact questions that
do not turn on credibility and demeanor”).
We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences “in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling,” and we must uphold the trial court’s ruling “if
it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under a theory of law
applicable to the case.” Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667. We may reverse only if a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone
of reasonable disagreement, or if the trial court misapplied legal principles to the
factual disputes and credibility issues as resolved. See Armstrong, 713 S.W.3d at
902; State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
B. Standing
We start by briefly addressing standing. The Fourth Amendment protects
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects[ ]
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights” and “may not be vicariously asserted.” Kothe
v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting source omitted).
A criminal defendant seeking to suppress evidence “must show that ‘his own
Fourth Amendment rights were infringed by the search or seizure which he seeks to
challenge.’” United States v. Beaudion, 979 F.3d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation
9
modified and emphasis in original) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395,
403 (2018)). Courts call this requirement “standing.” Id. In this context, standing is
not jurisdictional; it is part of the Fourth Amendment analysis. Byrd, 584 U.S. at 411
(“Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth
Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be
addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment
claim.”).
Here, as to the seizure of the phone from the marital home, the trial court
appears to have assumed standing and moved on to the merits, where Appellant’s
claim failed. We do the same below.
As to the search of the phone, in concluding that Appellant lacked standing,
the trial court addressed Appellant’s property argument solely in connection with a
privacy inquiry and concluded that Appellant did not establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone.5
Under current law, one can theoretically establish a Fourth Amendment
interest through a privacy-based approach or a property-based one. See Beaudion,
979 F.3d at 1097 (“A defendant can establish this personalized interest in one of two
ways. First, he may object to the physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected
5
See, e.g., Beaudion, 979 F.3d at 1099, for a helpful explanation of relevant law on
privacy.
10
area in which he has a property interest. And second, he may object to government
action that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.”
(citation modified) (first citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), then
citing Byrd, 584 U.S. at 405)).
In Byrd, the United States Supreme Court explained that “recent Fourth
Amendment cases have clarified that the test most often associated with legitimate
expectations of privacy, which was derived from the second Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), supplements, rather than
displaces, ‘the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth
Amendment.’” Byrd, 584 U.S. at 403–04 (emphasis added) (quoting source
omitted). And in Chatrie v. United States, the Court reaffirmed that a traditional
property-based approach remains viable. 146 S. Ct. 2193, 2204–05 & n.5 (2026)
(noting that “sometimes the privacy and property approaches will ‘align’”—and
“when such an alignment of the two approaches occurs, then all the better”).
In any event, we need not address Appellant’s standing arguments because,
even assuming Appellant had standing, his challenge to the search fails on the merits.
See Byrd, 584 U.S. at 411. So, we assume standing and proceed to the merits.
11
C. Seizure: The record supports affirming the denial of the motion to
suppress as to the seizure; the police officers lawfully seized the cell phone
under the plain view doctrine.
Assuming Appellant has standing to challenge the seizure of the cell phone
from the couple’s marital home, we nevertheless conclude that the officers lawfully
seized the cell phone under the plain view doctrine.6
Under Texas law, the plain view doctrine authorizes a warrantless seizure
when three requirements are met:
(1) the police officer must lawfully be where the object can be plainly
viewed;
(2) the incriminating character of the evidence in plain view must be
immediately apparent to the police officer; and
(3) the police officer must have the right to access the evidence. See State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Keehn v. State, 279
S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); accord Gomez-Aldana v. State, 712
S.W.3d 731, 735–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.).
All three requirements are satisfied here.
First, the record shows—and Appellant does not meaningfully dispute—that
the officers were lawfully inside the residence, with a valid warrant to search the
6
Because the seizure of the physical phone was independently valid under the plain
view doctrine, we need not address Appellant’s additional argument that the warrant
affidavit did not establish probable cause to seize the cell phone.
12
home. Nor does he dispute (and the record shows) that the phone was located in the
authorized search area in plain view, lying next to Rhonda’s hand.
Moreover, the record further shows that the incriminating character of the
phone was immediately apparent. In this context, “immediately apparent” does not
mean “quickly apparent”; rather, it means that the incriminating character of the item
must be apparent “without the necessity of any further search.” State v. Dobbs, 323
S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The standard requires probable cause to
associate the item with criminal activity, not actual knowledge that the item is
evidence of a crime. See id.; Gomez-Aldana, 712 S.W.3d at 737; see also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (under plain view doctrine, “probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the
officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items
may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime” (citation
modified)).
The trial court found that when Investigator Crain entered the residence, he
observed the pink Samsung cell phone next to Rhonda’s deceased hand, face up, and
actively recording sounds from within the room. The court further found that the
recording reflected approximately three hours of elapsed time. These findings are
supported by the record and are entitled to deference. See Pettit, 713 S.W.3d at 839.
13
On this record, an officer of reasonable caution could conclude that a phone
lying next to a murder victim’s hand and visibly recording (and having recorded for
three hours) events inside the room likely contained evidence of what had just
occurred there. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. Texas courts have upheld plain view
seizures of electronic evidence when the device’s incriminating value was externally
apparent from the surrounding facts. See, e.g., Gomez-Aldana, 712 S.W.3d at 736–
37 (upholding plain view seizure of surveillance video where the incriminating value
of the recording was immediately apparent because the detective knew an individual
had been stabbed, the defendant was the suspect, and the video visually depicted the
defendant with the weapon); Stocker v. State, __ S.W.3d __, __, No. 14-21-00412-CR, 2025 WL 1033949, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2025, pet.
granted) (upholding warrantless seizure of a cell phone under plain view where
officers knew homicide detectives wanted the phone in connection with a murder
investigation).
Accordingly, even assuming Appellant had standing to challenge the seizure
of the phone, the officers lawfully seized the phone under the plain view doctrine.
They were lawfully inside the residence, the phone was in plain view next to the
victim’s hand, the officers had lawful access to it, and its incriminating character
was immediately apparent from its visible status as an actively recording device at
the homicide scene. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
14
D. Search: The record also supports affirming the denial of Appellant’s
motion to suppress as to the search of the phone (through which the police
obtained the live recording).
We likewise affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s search-based motion
to suppress Rhonda’s audio recording. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and based on all of the facts known to
Investigator Crain at the time, the record supports the conclusion that Crain
reasonably believed Rhonda’s mother had the authority to and did consent to law
enforcement’s search of the phone under the circumstances.
A warrantless search is ordinarily unreasonable, but a search conducted
pursuant to voluntary consent is one of the “well-defined” exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Consent
may be given either by the person whose property is searched or by a third party who
possesses actual or apparent authority over the place or thing to be searched. See
State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Hubert v. State, 312
S.W.3d 554, 560–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “A person’s consent to search can be
communicated to law enforcement in a variety of ways, including by words, action,
or circumstantial evidence showing implied consent.” Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d
454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
We focus on apparent authority here. “Even if actual authority does not exist,
consent may be validly obtained from an individual with apparent authority over the
15
[item at issue].” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177, 188 (1990)). If a police officer reasonably believes that a “third party purporting
to provide consent has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched,
apparent authority exists,” rendering the search reasonable. Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at
561 (citing Illinois, 497 U.S. at 186).
The test for apparent authority is objective: “would the facts available to the
officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
consenting party had authority over the premises [or thing searched]?” Limon, 340
S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Illinois, 497 U.S. at 188). “The reasonableness of apparent
authority depends on ‘widely shared social expectations’ . . . .” Gonzalez v. State,
608 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d) (quoting Limon, 340
S.W.3d at 756–77). “A third party has apparent authority to consent to a search if,
based on objective appearance and reasonable assumption, that person appears to
exercise control and authority over a thing or place to be searched.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
“The State must prove actual or apparent authority by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 757. We emphasize that the hallmark of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness; after all, the text of the amendment itself focuses on
reasonableness. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784,
795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
16
reasonableness.”). Whether an officer’s reliance on consent is reasonable is a
question to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Hubert,
312 S.W.3d at 560.
Courts have applied apparent authority principles to digital devices, holding
that third‑party consent and apparent authority extend to cell phones. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gardner, 887 F.3d 780, 783–84 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he third-party
consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the same, just
like other essential ‘effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment.”).
Applying this law, we conclude that the record supports the conclusion that a
man of reasonable caution would believe, under all the facts known to Investigator
Crain at the moment, that consent was satisfied. Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756. In other
words, the facts available to him at the time would warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that Rhonda’s mother had authority to consent (and did consent)
to the search of the phone at issue. See id.
Several circumstances support that conclusion. Start with facts known to
Crain about the pink phone at issue. As the trial court found, and as Crain testified,
when officers arrived, Appellant was holding a camouflage cell phone (not the pink
phone found next to Rhonda). As to the pink phone, Crain testified that when he
arrived at the homicide scene, he observed a pink cell phone lying next to Rhonda’s
hand. Crain observed that that phone was actively recording, and the recording had
17
been running for three hours; the recording reasonably appeared likely to contain
evidence of events surrounding the homicide. As the trial court found, Crain
reasonably believed the pink cell phone belonged to Rhonda.
The circumstances confronting Crain were notable. The record supports a
reasonable inference that Rhonda activated the recording while she was alive to
make a record of what transpired for others to later hear. It is reasonable to infer that
Rhonda wanted others to see the recording. The recording continued for three hours,
and the phone remained actively recording until the police (including Crain) arrived
at the scene and saw the phone lying next to her. Rhonda’s children were gathered
outside the residence while the situation was happening.
Next, the events immediately following the homicide further informed Crain’s
understanding. Crain testified that Rhonda’s mother—her intimate family
member—then provided the recording pink phone’s passcode to an investigator,
who then provided it to Crain. As the trial court reasonably found, Rhonda’s mother
provided the police the passcode “to get into” the phone.
From Crain’s perspective, these circumstances reasonably supported an
inference that Rhonda intentionally activated the recording capturing the events to
be accessed by others. Then, Rhonda’s mother voluntarily provided investigators
with the correct passcode to her deceased daughter’s phone—the very phone that
had been actively recording the events surrounding Rhonda’s death. Nothing in the
18
record suggests that Rhonda’s mother attempted to limit law enforcement’s use of
the passcode or otherwise restrict access to the device such that they could not obtain
the recording at issue. Quite the opposite.
Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Crain to believe that this
record reflects consent by Rhonda’s mother. Again, consent can be shown through
conduct and circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 458 (implied
consent may be shown through conduct and circumstantial evidence); see also
Gomez-Aldana, 712 S.W.3d at 734–36 (officers lawfully viewed a
home-surveillance video by consent where defendant’s wife guided officers to the
surveillance system and assisted them in accessing the recording); United States v.
Bermel, 88 F.4th 741, 746 (8th Cir. 2023) (officers reasonably inferred consent
where family member turned over video camera, officers announced they intended
to examine it, and family member did not object).
Moreover, on the unique facts available to Crain at the time here, the record
supports Crain’s reasonable belief that Rhonda’s mother had apparent authority to
consent to the search at issue. Courts have recognized that family members or close
associates who possess, unlock, use, or otherwise demonstrate access to a digital
device may furnish apparent authority for officers to rely upon, depending on the
circumstances. In Gonzalez, for example, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that officers could reasonably believe the defendant’s wife had apparent authority
19
over a passcode-protected iPad when she “brought the iPad from her family’s home
and entered the iPad’s passcode” to display its contents to police. 608 S.W.3d at 106
(“It was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Gonzalez’s wife had the
authority to disclose the contents of the iPad to the police.”).
Similarly, in Gardner, the Sixth Circuit found apparent authority to consent
to the search of a cell phone; there, the consenting party knew the phone’s passcode
and provided that passcode to the police (in that case, the party also possessed the
phone at the time of the search and used it). 887 F.3d at 784–85; see also United
States v. Wright, 838 F.3d 880, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2016) (desktop computer); United
States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2016) (similar); cf. Smith v.
State, 530 S.W.2d 827, 832–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (homicide victim’s surviving
spouse had “sufficient relationship to the premises and effects” after victim’s death
to consent to search of victim’s residence), overruled in part on other grounds by
Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
This case too, with its particular facts, satisfies the reasonableness test. As
explained, based on the facts known to Crain at the time, Rhonda’s mother was not
a stranger, landlord, or mere bystander. She was the victim’s mother, a close family
member, who supplied the passcode enabling the officers to access the recording.
Nor was this just a phone that happened to be sitting on the premises (or a phone
near Rhonda with unknown contents). Rhonda, the victim, had apparently activated
20
the recording on her phone to preserve a contemporaneous account of the events that
culminated in her death. From Crain’s view, and under these circumstances,
Rhonda’s mother demonstrated a concrete connection to the phone by supplying the
correct passcode to the police. And, as the trial court found, which was supported,
Rhonda’s mother did this so the officers could “get into” the phone (and thus access
the recording).
Under these circumstances, and consistent with “widely shared social
expectations,” an objectively reasonable officer could conclude that Rhonda’s
mother had authority to authorize access to the phone—and to the recording that her
daughter created immediately before her death (which was the subject of the motion
to suppress). In Gonzalez, the wife’s knowledge and use of the passcode reasonably
conveyed authority to consent. 608 S.W.3d at 105–06. So too here. Here, Rhonda’s
mother’s ability to unlock her daughter’s phone, coupled with the surrounding
circumstances, reasonably signaled to Crain that Rhonda’s mother consented and
had authority to do so. See id.; see also Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756–77 (apparent
authority turns on whether the officer’s belief is objectively reasonable in light of
the circumstances and social expectations).
Appellant argues that even if Rhonda’s mother had authority to consent, her
consent could not override his refusal under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103
(2006). But Appellant does not argue, nor does the record show, that officers asked
21
Appellant for permission to search the pink cell phone, much less that Appellant
expressly refused consent to search that device. So that caselaw is inapposite.7
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and
considering the facts known to Investigator Crain at the time, the record supports the
conclusion that Crain reasonably believed Rhonda’s mother consented to law
enforcement’s access at issue to the phone and possessed apparent authority to do
so. See Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756; Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 560–61. Accordingly, the
officers acted pursuant to a reasonable belief in valid consent when they accessed
the phone using the passcode Rhonda’s mother supplied and obtained the recording
7
Appellant also contends that the warrantless search violated Article 18.0215 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. But Appellant did not raise that complaint in the trial
court, so it is not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Resendez v.
State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Griffin v. State, __
S.W.3d __, __, No. 05-24-00987-CR, 2025 WL 3619439, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Dec. 12, 2025, pet. ref’d) (defendant failed to preserve complaint under
Article 18B.354 because his trial objection challenged the warrant generally and did
not alert the trial court to the alleged statutory deficiency). Moreover, Article
18.0215 does not apply here. By its plain terms, the statute governs the search of a
person’s cell phone conducted “pursuant to a lawful arrest.” See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 18.0215(a); Martinez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 30, 36 n.12 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2024, pet. ref’d) (explaining that Article 18.0215 “applies to a search of a
person’s cell phone in the search-incident-to-arrest scenario” and did not apply there
because “the phone was not searched incident to [defendant’s] arrest”); see also
State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (under Article
18.0215, “to search a person’s cell phone after a lawful arrest, a peace officer must
submit an application for a warrant to a magistrate” (emphasis added)). Here,
officers did not search the cell phone at issue pursuant to Appellant’s arrest; rather,
as discussed, they recovered the phone from the homicide scene after discovering it
next to Rhonda’s hand; they later searched it pursuant to their understanding of her
mother’s consent. See Martinez, 689 S.W.3d at 35–36 & n.12.
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that is the subject of the motion to suppress. The trial court did not err in denying the
motion to suppress as to the search. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jennifer Caughey
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Johnson, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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