Opinion issued August 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00155-CV
DANIEL WELTIN, ESQ., Appellant
V.
HOMEPORT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 56th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 24-CV-0094
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a suit brought by Homeport Insurance Company in
Galveston district court in its third effort to claw back insurance proceeds paid to
one of the defendants, Veronica Gray-McRae, and her attorney, Daniel Weltin, in settlement of a Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LWHCA) 1 claim
adjudicated in a federal administrative proceeding in California. Homeport learned
information that led it to believe it had been defrauded, so it appealed to undo the
settlement and then brought a separate suit in California state court against Veronica
and Weltin to recoup the insurance payments.
After Veronica moved to Texas, Homeport brought this suit against her and,
after Weltin appeared as additional defense counsel, named him as a defendant.
Weltin filed a special appearance and a TCPA motion to dismiss. The TCPA motion
was denied by operation of law, and the trial court later signed an order denying
Weltin’s special appearance.
In four issues, Weltin complains of error in the denial of his TCPA motion
and challenges the trial court’s order denying his special appearance.
We reverse and render judgment dismissing Homeport’s claims against
Weltin for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
Daniel Weltin, an attorney with the Law Offices of Daniel Weltin, a California
law firm, represented Veronica in a federal administrative claim filed in California
seeking benefits under the LHWCA following the on-the-job injury and eventual
death of her partner, Anthony McRae, in 2020.
1
33 U.S.C. §§901–950.
2
In 2022, Veronica settled her claim with McRae’s former employer and its
insurer, Homeport. The settlement, which was approved by an administrative law
judge, included an award of $15,000 in statutory attorney’s fees to the Law Offices
of Daniel Weltin. Weltin’s representation of Veronica in these proceedings and the
proceedings themselves took place exclusively in California.
After learning that McRae had filed for divorce from Veronica in 2009 and a
default judgment of divorce was on file in Alameda County, California, Homeport
filed a motion in the administrative proceeding to set aside the settlement and sued
Veronica and Weltin in California state court (the California suit) to undo the
settlement based on fraud and other theories. The California court granted Weltin’s
motion under the state anti-SLAPP statute and dismissed Homeport’s claims against
Weltin with prejudice. Homeport appealed the dismissal.
Veronica moved to Texas, and Homeport brought the underlying suit against
her in the Texas trial court based on the same facts and allegations as the California
suit. After Weltin appeared as additional defense counsel in this suit, Homeport
amended its petition to add Weltin as a party, bringing claims against him for
conversion and unjust enrichment. The claims for conversion and constructive trust
brought against Weltin in this suit are substantially the same as those raised in the
California suit.
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Weltin filed a special appearance and, subject thereto, a motion to dismiss
under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). In his special appearance,
Weltin argued that that he was not subject to specific jurisdiction because the alleged
conduct that serves as the basis for Homeport’s claims against him all occurred in
California and he had no contact with Texas concerning the subject matter of the
underlying suit.
Welton also asserted that he was not subject to general jurisdiction. He
attested that he was licensed to practice law in Texas in 2017 but has no office or
employees in Texas and did not practice law in Texas until he appeared as additional
defense counsel in the underlying suit. He has not been physically present in Texas
since 2019. And from 2019 until the representation of the defendants in this case,
Weltin held an exemption from the State Bar of Texas based on his status as an outof-state attorney who did not practice law in Texas. Weltin maintained that his
licensure, standing alone, was not a continuous and systematic contact that could
support personal jurisdiction over him in Texas.
In its response to Weltin’s special appearance, Homeport claimed that Weltin
entered a general appearance when he appeared as an additional attorney and thus as
an officer of the court in the underlying suit. According to Homeport, Weltin was
subject to general jurisdiction because he purposefully availed himself of the
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privilege of doing business in Texas by representing the defendants in this suit and
by continuously maintaining a license to practice law with the State Bar since 2017.
In his TCPA motion to dismiss, Weltin argued that the claims against him
were based entirely on his representation of Veronica in the LHWCA claim and thus
were protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. And Homeport could not show
by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each element of its conversion
and unjust enrichment claims against Weltin. Alternatively, those claims were barred
by res judicata and California’s litigation privilege.
Homeport, in its response, asserted that it presented prima facie evidence of
its claims and Weltin’s affirmative defenses failed.
Weltin’s TCPA motion was denied by operation of law on February 13, 2025.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a). Weltin timely appealed the denial, which
automatically stayed proceedings in the trial court. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 51.014(a)(12), (b). Nonetheless, the trial court signed an order denying
Weltin’s special appearance on March 31, 2025. Weltin objected to the validity of
the order but also timely appealed it.
Order of Issues on Appeal
In his appeal, Weltin challenges both the denial of his TCPA motion to dismiss
and the trial court’s order denying his special appearance. He urges us to first address
his challenge to the denial of his TCPA motion. Because the trial court signed the
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order denying the special appearance after the TCPA motion was denied by
operation of law and while the trial court proceedings were stayed pending his
interlocutory appeal of that ruling, Weltin argues that the special appearance ruling
was voidable and rendered void by his timely objection. Yet he has not waived his
special appearance and has fully briefed the jurisdictional issue.
“To render a binding judgment, a court must have both subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the parties.” Spir Star
AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010). For this reason, Texas trial courts
are required to hear and determine any motion to challenge jurisdiction before
hearing any other plea or pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2). And as for Texas
appellate courts, it would violate constitutional principles if we were “to address the
merits of cases without regard to whether courts have jurisdiction.” Rusk State Hosp.
v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012), quoted in Tex. Right to Life v. Van Stean,
702 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Tex. 2024). “The fundamental rule is that the court may not
reach the merits if it finds a single valid basis to defeat jurisdiction.” Rattray v. City
of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023). “As a corollary, the court may not
move to the merits if even one jurisdictional argument remains unresolved.” Id. at
869.
In Van Stean, the Texas Supreme Court declared that addressing the merits of
the defendant’s TCPA motion before considering whether the plaintiff had standing
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“risk[ed] the rendition of an unconstitutional advisory opinion.” 702 S.W.3d at 353.
The high court held that the court of appeals, which had affirmed the trial court’s
denial of the TCPA motion, “erred by failing to address standing,” even though the
defendant, a non-governmental party, could not appeal from the denial of its plea to
the jurisdiction. See id. at 352, 355.
Applying Van Stean’s guidance here, we begin with Weltin’s special
appearance appeal.
Special Appearance
A. Standard of Review and Procedure
Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
a question of law we review de novo. LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d
341, 346 (Tex. 2023); Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558
(Tex. 2018). But courts often must resolve questions of fact in resolving this question
of law. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 346. When, as here, the trial court did not issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law, all relevant facts that are necessary to support
the judgment and supported by evidence are implied. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at
558. We presume that the trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its ruling.
Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 871–72.
The parties bear shifting evidentiary burdens of proof in a special appearance.
Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559. The plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead
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allegations sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Id. We
consider allegations both in the plaintiff’s petition and in the plaintiff’s response to
the special appearance. See Predator Downhole Inc. v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 504
S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). If the plaintiff
meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonresident defendant to negate all
bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at
559. “Because the plaintiff defines the scope and nature of the lawsuit, the
defendant’s corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in
the plaintiff’s pleading.” Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658
(Tex. 2010).
The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or a legal basis. Id.
at 659. Jurisdiction can be negated on a legal basis by showing that “even if the
plaintiff’s alleged facts are true, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish
jurisdiction.” Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559 (quoting Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659).
Jurisdiction can be negated on a factual basis by presenting evidence that the
defendant’s “contacts with Texas fall short of purposeful availment.” Id. (quoting
Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659). If the nonresident defendant produces evidence negating
personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Predator Downhole, 504 S.W.3d at 402.
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B. Personal Jurisdiction
Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
when (1) the long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due process
guarantees. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558. The long-arm statute is satisfied by a
defendant doing business in Texas, including by contracting with a Texas resident
where either party is to perform the contract in Texas; by committing a tort in Texas;
or by recruiting Texas residents directly or through an intermediary located in Texas.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042. Because the long-arm statute extends
personal jurisdiction “as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process
will allow,” the statute is satisfied if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with federal due process. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569,
575 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China
Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)). Before a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant must have “certain
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Int’l
Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)). “Minimum contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction when
the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
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activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.’” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)). In determining whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Texas, courts consider three factors:
First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the
contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous,
or attenuated . . . . Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit,
advantage or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.
Id.. A defendant’s activities “must justify a conclusion that the defendant could
reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court.” Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at
558. (quoting Retamco Operating, 278 S.W.3d at 338). A defendant’s contacts with
a forum state may give rise to either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Id.
General jurisdiction requires that the nonresident defendant’s “affiliations with the
state are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the
forum State.” Id. at 565 (quoting TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016)).
Specific jurisdiction arises when the plaintiff’s causes of action against the
nonresident defendant arise from or relate to the defendant’s purposeful in-state
activities. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 576. A specific jurisdiction analysis focuses on
the relationship between the forum, the defendant, and the litigation. Old Republic,
549 S.W.3d at 559. The contacts must be both purposeful and substantially
connected to the operative facts of the litigation. Id. at 559–60; Moki Mac, 221
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S.W.3d at 585. The operative facts of the litigation are those facts that “will be the
focus of the trial, will consume most if not all of the litigation’s attention, and the
overwhelming majority of the evidence will be directed to that question.” Moki Mac,
221 S.W.3d at 585; Fuji Elec. Co. v. Perez, 615 S.W.3d 508, 520 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
Because Homeport had the initial burden to allege a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction, we consider its pleadings first. Homeport’s pleadings asserted two
grounds to support general personal jurisdiction over Weltin: (1) Weltin’s entry of
appearance as defense counsel constituted a general appearance in the case and
(2) Weltin’s status as a member of the Texas bar and an officer of the court, and his
representation of the defendants, constituted continuously and systematically doing
business in Texas.
In arguing the first ground, Homeport emphasized that an attorney appears not
only as a party’s fiduciary but also as an officer of the court. Homeport did not,
however, cite to any legal authorities to support its view that an attorney’s
appearance in this role is the same as appearing in a lawsuit as a party. The Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure do not support Homeport’s view. The rules applicable to
general and special appearances specify that they apply to parties; they mention
attorneys only to make clear that a party-client may appear through them. Rule 120,
“Entering Appearance,” explains that a defendant may enter an appearance, either
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“in person, or by attorney, or by his duly authorized agent.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120; see
also TEX. R. CIV. P. 7 (“Any party to a suit may appear and prosecute or defend his
rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court.”). Under Rule 120a,
“any party either in person or by attorney” may make a special appearance “for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of
the defendant on the ground that such party or property is not amenable to process
issued by the courts of this State.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.
A few weeks before Homeport named him as a party, Weltin notified the trial
court that he was representing the defendants as additional counsel. In doing so, he
submitted to the trial court’s authority as an officer of the court, making him
answerable for any breach of professional or ethical duties occurring in the course
of representing his client before the trial court. See generally Webster v. Comm’n for
Lawyer Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 505–06 (Tex. 2024); Comm’n for Lawyer
Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 430-31 (Tex. 1998). This is not the same as
conceding that he personally was amenable to service of process in the underlying
suit and does not constitute a general appearance by a party.
In its remaining ground, Homeport asserts that Weltin’s Texas law license and
his representation of the defendants in the underlying suit support general
jurisdiction. The undisputed evidence shows that Weltin obtained a license to
practice law in Texas in 2017 when he was considering moving to Texas, but he
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never had any offices or employees in Texas, never maintained any trust account in
Texas, and did not litigate any lawsuits in Texas until he entered his appearance to
represent the defendants, one of whom he represented both in the administrative
proceedings in California and the California suit. That Weltin held a Texas law
license, without more, is not enough to support a finding of general jurisdiction. See
Equity Trust Co. v. Hebert, No. 09-04-122-CV, 2004 WL 2474845, *6 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The holding of a license to sell securities in
Texas, without more, does not suffice to establish general jurisdiction.”); see also
Int’l Turbine Serv., Inc. v. Lovitt, 881 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1994, writ denied) (finding no general jurisdiction over nonresident defendant that
held Texas insurance license and performed less than 0.2% of its business in Texas).
Homeport also relies on Weltin’s representation of the defendants in the
underlying case, but that representation is not relevant to determining whether
general jurisdiction exists over Weltin. The appropriate time period for assessing
contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction ends at the time suit is filed.
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Tex. 2007).
Weltin’s activities in the trial court on behalf of his clients do not support
Homeport’s assertion of general jurisdiction.
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For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Weltin’s special
appearance. And because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Weltin, any
ruling on his TCPA motion is a nullity.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Weltin’s special appearance and
render judgment dismissing the claims against Weltin for lack of jurisdiction. All
pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Clint Morgan
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.
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