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William Kenneth Ball v. the State of Texas

2026-08-13

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Opinion issued August 13, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-25-00761-CR

WILLIAM KENNETH BALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 149th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 100924-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, a seconddegree felony punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment. The trial court

deferred a finding of guilt and, in accordance with the parties’ plea bargain

agreement, placed appellant on community supervision for seven years.

The State later filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision

and adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated his community supervision terms.

Appellant pleaded true to the State’s allegations and executed a waiver of his right

to appeal in exchange for the State's recommendation that punishment be assessed

at four years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision,

adjudicated him guilty, and, consistent with the State's recommendation, assessed

punishment at four years’ confinement. The trial court certified both that appellant

had waived the right of appeal and that this was a case in which he had no right of

appeal. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) restricts a defendant’s right to

appeal in a plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ART. 44.02. But that rule does not restrict a defendant's right to appeal from a

proceeding adjudicating guilt following deferred adjudication community

supervision. See Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

Nevertheless, this case involves a separate agreement in which appellant

expressly waived his right to appeal in exchange for separate consideration from the

State at the revocation hearing. Courts have enforced such waivers under ordinary

waiver principles. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, No. 01-14-00358-CR, 2015 WL

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1778605, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); Nickerson v. State, No. 01-14-00683-CR, 2015 WL

1407855, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); Mendez v. State, 558 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Radford v. State, No. 05-18-00764-CR, 2018

WL 6616896, at *1 (Tex. App.––Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

When a defendant waives his right to appeal in exchange for consideration

from the State, and the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant

may not appeal. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697-99 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009); Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

The record here reflects that appellant signed and swore to a stipulation of

evidence and judicial confession in which he pleaded true to the allegations in the

State’s motion to adjudicate guilt. The document recites the parties’ agreement that

the State would recommend revocation of appellant's community supervision, four

years’ confinement, and no fine. It also contains a separate waiver provision stating:

As part of my agreement with the prosecutor to plead true, I AGREE TO

WAIVE any right to appeal I may have concerning any issue or claim in this

case, including my plea of true or admission of guilt.

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Appellant separately initialed the waiver provision. The trial court then found the

allegations true, adjudicated appellant’s guilt, and assessed punishment in

accordance with the agreed recommendation.

We acknowledge one arguable ambiguity in the record. During the

adjudication hearing, after confirming appellant's waiver of appeal, the trial court

stated:

THE COURT: As part of this plea, did you waive your right to appeal?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you understand you still have a limited right to

appeal to the Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas? If you cannot afford

an attorney, one will be appointed for you. If you cannot afford a copy

of this record, one will be provided.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

The trial court was likely referencing that “no appeal waiver serves as an absolute

bar to all appellate claims.” Ex parte Castillo, 664 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2022) (quoting Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232, 237, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744, 203 L.

Ed. 2d 77 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). In any event, the trial court’s general

admonition concerning appellate rights did not negate appellant’s express oral and

written waivers. The record contains a clear, specific, and bargained-for waiver of

appeal that appellant acknowledged both in writing and orally. See Broadway, 301

S.W.3d at 697-99; Blanco, 18 S.W.3d at 219-20.

Because appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right

to appeal in exchange for the State’s punishment recommendation, appellant has no

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right of appeal in this case. See Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 12 n.12 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending

motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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