Opinion issued August 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00983-CR
YOLANDA INEZ JINEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 7
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2513246
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Yolanda Inez Jinez was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of
terroristic threat and sentenced to 180 days in county jail, probated to 15 months of
community supervision. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a). On appeal, she argues
that the evidence was legally insufficient because there was a material variance between the evidence presented at trial and the evidentiary statements in the
complaint supporting the charging instrument. Because there is no variance
between the information that charged Jinez with the offense of terroristic threat and
the evidence presented at trial, and because the evidence is legally sufficient to
support the conviction, we affirm.
Background
Jinez was charged by information with the Class B misdemeanor offense of
terroristic threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a). The complaint that supported
the information stated:
IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS
Before me, the undersigned Assistant District Attorney of Harris
County, Texas, this day appeared the undersigned affiant, who under
oath says that he has good reason to believe and does believe that in
Harris County, Texas, YOLANDA INEZ JINEZ, hereafter styled the
Defendant heretofore on or about May 20, 2024, did then and there
unlawfully, threaten to commit an offense involving violence, namely
a Murder upon [J.P.] hereinafter called the Complainant, with the
intent to place the Complainant in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury.
The complaint included a probable cause affidavit from Harris County
Sheriff’s Deputy K. Garza. He and another deputy responded to a call for service
on Tuesday evening, May 21, 2024, and met with J.P., who told them “he was
threatened by his employee’s girlfriend in the CVS parking lot” the day before.
The probable cause affidavit, included in the complaint, continued:
2
[J.P.] stated his employee . . . “Beto” . . . had a girlfriend named Yolanda Jinez, who he also employed for a short term. [J.P.] stated Beto had been his employee for approximately eight months . . . . [J.P.] stated he had been harassed by [Jinez] for most of the time that Beto had been employed with [Jinez] stating [J.P.] was taking
advantage of Beto due to his undocumented status. [J.P.] stated he did not care about the harassment and ‘brushed it off’ and continued to employ Beto because he was a good worker.
[J.P.] stated he was at the CVS . . . [in] Channelview . . . on Monday, May 20, 2024, to pick up prescription medicine for his wife. [J.P.] stated he parked his truck on the south side parking lot and when he was returning to the truck, an unknown vehicle had blocked him in. [J.P.] then stated he observed [Jinez] exit the vehicle and began to tell him[,] “You thought I wasn’t going to find you,” which [J.P.] then stated he told her[,] “I didn’t know you were looking for me.” [J.P.] stated [Jinez] reached under the floor board which appeared to him as if she was reaching for a firearm. [J.P.] stated he grabbed his firearm from the middle console and placed it on the passenger seat, still in a holster. [J.P.] stated to [Jinez] to let him leave, which she failed to do so [J.P.] then stated she told him [,] “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December, so he can fucking kill you.” This threat caused [J.P.] to be in fear[,] and he stated he wanted to pursue
charges.
The information, which was signed on the same day as the complaint, stated:
IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
Comes now the undersigned District Attorney of Harris County,
Texas, on behalf of the State of Texas, and presents in and to the Harris County Criminal Court at Law No ____ of Harris County,
Texas, that in Harris County, Texas, YOLANDA INEZ JINEZ,
hereinafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about May 20,
2024, did then and there unlawfully, threaten to commit an offense involving violence, namely a Murder upon [J.P.], hereinafter called the Complainant, with the intent to place the Complainant in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
3
J.P. was the sole witness at trial. He testified that he owned an RV repair
business, had employed Jinez’s boyfriend Beto “for quite sometime,” and had
employed Jinez “at one time as well.” Beginning around July or September 2023,
Jinez sent him harassing messages through text, cell phone, and videos on social
media, all asserting that J.P. was mistreating Beto. J.P. asked her to stop multiple
times.
In May 2024, J.P. drove his full-sized truck and trailer to a CVS to pick up
time sensitive medication for his seriously ill wife. J.P. parked parallel to the side
of the building, across six parking spots. When J.P. left the store, Jinez drove up,
pulled her car in front of J.P.’s truck blocking him in, and confronted him. J.P.
testified that her demeanor was “very angry”, she had a “very mean face,” and her
“tone of voice was very angry.” He said they were “screaming at each other right
off the bat.” He said he was confused because he did not know she was aggravated
or looking for him. He asked her to move her car, but she refused.
J.P. testified that during the confrontation, Jinez told him that he was not the
only one who had a gun. As she reached for something in the car, she said that she
had a gun. J.P. believed she was reaching for a gun. J.P. was standing on the
running board of his truck between the open driver’s side door and the driver’s
4
seat. He grabbed his holstered gun from beneath the seat and put it on the driver’s
seat, within reach.1 Neither Jinez nor J.P. pointed a gun at each other.
J.P. testified that as he attempted to deescalate the situation, Jinez “told me
she was going to kill me, and if not, that she was going to get her brother—once he
got out of jail, I believe in Chicago—to come down here and kill me.” The State
followed up:
Q. Do you remember the exact words she said?
A. I don’t remember.
Q. But you remember those were the details she said?
A. Yes. She said, “I am going to kill you, Motherfucker, and if I
don’t, I am going to get my brother to kill you.”
J.P. testified that he was afraid, and he believed Jinez’s threat “100 percent.”
Q. So because of what she said and what she did, you were afraid
of her brother killing you?
A. Either her or her brother.
Q. Yeah, because what she said and what she did, you were also
afraid of her killing you?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And if nothing else, because of what she did and what she said,
you were afraid of her in some way hurting you?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time?
1
J.P. testified that he “never keep[s] [his] pistol in the console.”
5
A. Yes.
Q. In that moment?
A. Yes.
On cross examination, J.P. testified that Jinez said, “I will kill you.” He was
“very much” surprised that Jinez’s threat was not included in the police report, and
that the only quoted threat included in the report was Jinez’s statement, “I can’t
wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you.”
Q. Would it surprise you that the only quote that they put in the
police report was, “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of
prison in December so he can fucking kill you”?
A. That would be—that would surprise me that I would not have
said that she said the exact same thing.
On redirect examination, the State asked about the specific threat and its
impact on J.P.:
Q. You stated that the Defendant said, “I will kill you,” and then,
kind of in the same breath, said, “My brother will kill you in
December.”
A. Yes.
Q. So is it fair to think that whenever you were telling the police
officers who were taking notes by hand on their notepad, they
may have combined those?
A. I would think so.
Q. Great. And to just be abundantly clear, were you afraid that
your life was in danger, specifically, in immediate danger, on
May 20, 2024, based on the words and actions of the
Defendant?
6
A. Yes.
J.P. left the encounter, cared for his wife overnight, and then contacted law
enforcement the next day. J.P. explained he did not call the police until the
following day because his wife needed “time-sensitive” medications given her
medical condition and he knew calling the police would be a “lengthy process.”
At the charge conference, the defense requested a limiting instruction
focusing on the quoted statement in the complaint, “I can’t wait until my brother
gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you.” The defense sought “a
limiting instruction or clarification to the jury that the threat was that statement, not
the gun or any other statement.” Defense counsel argued: “That’s what we were
prepared for and on notice for, not the gun piece.” The State argued that the
information stated only that the threat was murder. The trial court agreed with the
State, denying the request for a limiting instruction and noting that the information
did not allege any “manner and means specifically,” and that the information was
“the formal notice of the charges” against Jinez.
The jury found Jinez guilty of the Class B misdemeanor of terroristic threat
with the intent to place another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, and the
trial court sentenced her to 180 days in jail, which was probated to 15 months’
community supervision. Jinez appealed.
7
Analysis
On appeal, Jinez argues that the evidence is legally insufficient due to a
material variance between the evidentiary statements in the complaint and the
evidence presented at trial. She contends that she had notice only that the State
alleged she threatened to have her brother harm J.P. seven months in the future,
which is not a threat of imminent serious bodily injury. She argues that she was
surprised and harmed when J.P. testified that she also said, “I will kill you,” which
she asserts is a much more immediate threat and a separate offense. She asserts that
the statements “I will kill you,” and “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of
prison in December so he can fucking kill you,” are two separate offenses, and she
had no notice of the threat, “I will kill you.”
The State responds that any challenge to the information was waived, the
information is a sufficient charging document, and the evidence supports the
conviction.
I. Terroristic threat
As relevant here, a person commits the offense of “terroristic threat” if she
“threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with
intent to . . . place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury . . . .” TEX.
PENAL CODE § 22.07(a)(2). A threat is a “communicated intent to inflict harm or
loss on another or on another’s property, esp. one that might diminish a person’s
8
freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful consent; a declaration, express or
implied, of an intent to inflict loss or pain on another.” THREAT, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
It is immaterial whether the victim or anyone else was actually placed in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury or whether the accused had the capability or
intention to carry out his threat. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1982). Rather, it is the threat of violence, made with the intent to
place the victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, that constitutes the
offense. See id. at 306; George v. State, 841 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), aff’d, 890 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“All that
is necessary to complete the offense is that the accused, by his threat, sought as a
desired reaction to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”).
“Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.”
George, 841 S.W.2d at 547 (citing Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); see TEX. PEN. CODE § 6.03 (“A person acts
intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result
of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.”). “A victim’s reaction, while unnecessary to prove under the
statute, may provide evidence of the actor’s intent.” Calder v. State, No. 12-25-9
00085-CR, 2026 WL 181337, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 22, 2026, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
II. The Charging Instrument
To begin a Class B misdemeanor prosecution in a county court, the State
presents either an indictment or an information as a charging instrument.2 See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 12.02; see also State v. Drummond, 501 S.W.3d 78, 81
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016); State v. McField, 649 S.W.3d 721, 725 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). “An ‘information’ is a written statement filed
and presented [o]n behalf of the State by the district or county attorney, charging
the defendant with an offense which may by law be so prosecuted.” TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 21.20. 3
2
A complaint alone is the charging instrument that invokes the court’s jurisdiction
for a prosecution in a justice or municipal court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
45A.001 (“The purpose of this chapter is to establish procedures for processing
cases under the criminal jurisdiction of the justice and municipal courts.”); id. art.
45A.002(1) (“In this chapter . . . ‘Complaint’ means a sworn allegation charging
an accused person with the commission of an offense.”). In her brief, Jinez cites
several cases for the proposition that the purpose of the complaint is to inform the
defendant of the facts surrounding the charged offense to permit him to prepare a
defense. Two of the cases she relies on, Rose v. State, 799 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.), and Vallejo v. State, 408 S.W.2d 113, 113 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1966), involve speeding prosecutions that originated in municipal
court, where the complaint itself is the charging instrument. By contrast, the
charging instrument here is the information presented by the State. 3
An information is sufficient if it meets the following requisites:
(1) It shall commence, “In the name and by the authority of the
State of Texas”;
10
“An information that tracks the statutory language is ordinarily sufficient” to
provide an accused with notice of the offense charged. George, 841 S.W.2d at 548
(citing Beck v. State, 682 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). “Unless a fact
is essential for notice to the accused, the information need not plead the evidence
relied upon by the State.” Id. For the offense of terroristic threat, details like the
nature of the threat, whether it was written or verbal, and how the threat was
communicated are evidentiary in nature and need not be included in the
information. Id. Under article 1.14(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
defendant generally waives any objection to “a defect, error, or irregularity of form
or substance in an indictment or information” by failing to object before trial. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14(b).
(2) That it appear to have been presented in a court having
jurisdiction of the offense set forth;
(3) That it appear to have been presented by the proper officer;
(4) That it contain the name of the accused, or state that his
name is unknown and give a reasonably accurate description
of him;
(5) It must appear that the place where the offense is charged to
have been committed is within the jurisdiction of the court
where the information is filed;
(6) That the time mentioned be some date anterior to the filing
of the information, and that the offense does not appear to be
barred by limitation;
(7) That the offense be set forth in plain and intelligible words;
(8) That it conclude, “Against the peace and dignity of the
State”; and
(9) It must be signed by the district or county attorney,
officially.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.21.
11
When the State presents an information, an underlying complaint is required.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.22; Drummond, 501 S.W.3d at 81. “A
complaint to support an information is a sworn affidavit, duly attested to by the
district or county attorney, that is made by some credible person charging the
defendant with an offense.” Drummond, 501 S.W.3d at 81 (internal quotations
omitted); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.22. “The purpose of the complaint is
to inform the defendant of the facts surrounding the charged offense to permit him
to prepare a defense to the charge.” State v. McField, 649 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). The complaint’s affiant must be a
“credible person,” but the affiant need not be “the person who originally
complained about the alleged offense to the district attorney.” Id. (citations
omitted). “[C]ourts have long held that this affiant can be a police officer, or
someone else, including someone without personal knowledge of the facts
supporting the offense.” State v. Yakushkin, 625 S.W.3d 552, 561 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d). 4
4
Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 15.05, a complaint is sufficient if
it: (1) states the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, gives some
reasonably definite description of her; (2) shows that the accused has committed
some offense, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and
does believe, that the accused has committed the offense; (3) states the time and
place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as can be done; and (4) is
signed by the affiant by writing his name or affixing his mark. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 15.05; State v. McField, 649 S.W.3d 721, 726–27 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). The affiant may base his belief that an offense has
been committed on information he read from a police report, without directly
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III. Evidentiary Sufficiency
“Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every
element of the crime charged.” Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766, 772–73 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011). We follow the usual standards of review for legal sufficiency. 5 “We
measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined
in a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 773 (citing Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Such a charge would be one that
accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment [or information], does
not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the
speaking to the law enforcement officer who had knowledge of the offense.
McField, 649 S.W.3d at 727.
5
We evaluate legal sufficiency by considering all the evidence, in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, to determine whether any rational factfinder could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the factfinder to fairly resolve
conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the
facts. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Zuniga
v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (factfinder is sole judge of
weight and credibility of evidence). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as
direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor” and “the standard of review on
appeal is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.” Guevara v.
State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (cleaned up) (stating “circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt”). The testimony of a sole
witness to an offense may constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
See Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (upholding
conviction for assault with intent to murder where only one witness saw defendant
with gun); Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2005, no pet.) (“It is well established that a conviction may be based on the
testimony of a single eyewitness.”).
13
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240; see Ramjattansingh v.
State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 546–47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (applying hypothetically
correct jury charge analysis to sufficiency review of conviction for misdemeanor
charged by information and without any reference to complaint). “‘As authorized
by the indictment’ [or information] means the statutory elements of the offense as
modified by the charging instrument.” Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546. “A
‘variance’ occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the
charging instrument and the proof at trial.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “Under Gollihar v. State, whether an unproved allegation
is to be included in the hypothetically correct jury instruction is determined by
whether or not the variance between the allegation and proof is ‘material.’”
Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546–47 (citing Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257). A
material variance prejudices a defendant’s substantial rights and renders the
evidence insufficient. Id. at 547. A material variance arises “when the
[information], as written, 1) fails to adequately inform the defendant of the charge
against him, or 2) subjects the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for
the same crime.”6 Id.
6
The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of variances:
14
IV. The State did not offer proof of a distinct, unpled statutory violation at
trial.
Jinez argues that there is a material variance between the complaint and the
evidence at trial because the State adduced evidence of “a distinct, unpled statutory
violation at trial.” Appellant’s Br. 20. The complaint, however, is not the charging
instrument in this case. Rather, the complaint, with its probable cause affidavit,
was made in support of the information—the charging instrument here. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.22; Tollett v. State, 219 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) (noting that unlike in justice or municipal courts,
complaint is not charging instrument in court at law). Jinez has not cited, and we
have not found, any authority supporting her argument that in determining whether
1. a statutory allegation that defines the offense; not subject to
materiality analysis, or, if it is, is always material; the hypothetically
correct jury charge will always include the statutory allegations in
the indictment;
2. a non-statutory allegation that is descriptive of an element of
the offense that defines or helps define the allowable unit of
prosecution; sometimes material; the hypothetically correct jury
charge will sometimes include the non-statutory allegations in the
indictment and sometimes not;
3. a non-statutory allegation that has nothing to do with the
allowable unit of prosecution; never material; the hypothetically
correct jury charge will never include the non-statutory allegations in
the indictment.
Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “The
bottom line is that, in a sufficiency review, we tolerate variances as long as they
are not so great that the proof at trial ‘shows an entirely different offense’ than
what was alleged in the charging instrument.” Id.
15
there is a variance, we may consider the averments made in the supporting
complaint and probable cause affidavit. To the extent Jinez argues we should
extend the law to so hold, we decline the invitation. See Chavis v. State, 177
S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Gollihar, 46
S.W.3d at 246) (holding that “variance occurs when there is a discrepancy between
the allegations in the charging instrument and the proof at trial”).
Reviewing the charging instrument and the proof at trial here, we conclude
there is no variance. The gravamen of the terroristic threat statute is the making of
a threat of violence coupled with one of the six statutory intended effects. Gillette
v. State, 444 S.W.3d 713, 729 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, no
pet.). Terroristic threat is a nature of conduct offense. See id. at 730; see also
Johnson v. State, 710 S.W.3d 447, 455 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (same).
Section 22.07(a)(2), pursuant to which Jinez was charged, does not require the
victim or anyone else to actually be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury. The offense is completed once a person makes a threat to commit a violent
offense seeking the desired reaction. Grimaldo v. State, No. 13-20-00404-CR,
2021 WL 4202163, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 16, 2021,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also In re A.C., 48
S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2001, pet. denied) (“The offense is completed
16
if the accused, by his threat, sought as a desired reaction, to place a person in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury.”).
Here, the State presented evidence that, after harassing J.P. for eight months
online and through text messages, Jinez tracked or followed J.P. to a CVS, blocked
his exit from the parking lot with her car, angrily screamed at him and threatened
to kill him. The evidence at trial showed that there was one threat of violence: a
threat to murder J.P. The testimony was that on May 20, 2024, during an
altercation outside CVS, Jinez threatened to kill J.P. or that her brother would kill
J.P. when he was released from prison. In other words, the evidence established
that Jinez threatened to murder J.P. as alleged in the information.
V. There is no variance between the information and the evidence at trial,
which is legally sufficient under Jackson and a hypothetically correct
jury charge.
The information alleged that on or about May 20, 2024, Jinez threatened J.P.
with murder with the intent to place him in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Given this information, a hypothetically correct jury charge would require the jury
to find that Jinez threatened J.P. with murder and that she did so with the intent to
place him in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See Ramjattansingh, 548
S.W.3d at 546–47. But it would not require the jury to find that Jinez said, “I can’t
wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you,”
because the specific words used to threaten murder are evidentiary and not part of
17
the offense as defined by the statute or the information. See George, 841 S.W.2d at
548 (holding that information need not plead evidence relied upon by State).
The evidence at trial consisted of J.P.’s testimony. He testified that on
May 20, 2024, in the same breath, Jinez threatened to kill him or that her brother
would kill him, saying, “I am going to kill you, Motherfucker, and if I don’t, I am
going to get my brother to kill you.” He testified that she made this threat of
murder after eight months of harassing him online and by text messages. He said
that when she made the statement, Jinez had an angry demeanor and was
screaming at him, after blocking his vehicle from leaving the parking lot of a
pharmacy. He testified that Jinez mentioned having a gun and made a movement in
her car that he believed was her reaching for a gun. He testified that he believed
her threats and “in that moment” feared that he would be murdered or hurt. In light
of this evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that Jinez made the threat
with the intent to place J.P. in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See id. at 547
(“Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.”).
Because the discrepancies Jinez points to are only differences in the
evidence presented to support the charge, we conclude that there was no variance
between the information and the evidence presented at trial. See id. Moreover,
considering all the evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict because
18
a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895;
see George, 841 S.W.2d at 547 (“Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and
conduct of the accused.”).
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Susanna Dokupil
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2.
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