[Cite as Booth v. Buchanan, 2026-Ohio-3148.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
BRANDI BOOTH, AS :
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE CASE NO. CA2026-03-034 OF DUSTIN BOOTH, :
OPINION AND
Appellant, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
8/17/2026
vs. :
ROBERT BUCHANAN, et al., :
Appellees. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CV 2024 10 2048
Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., and Christopher T. Herman and Dawn M. Frick, for appellees.
Kircher Law, LLC, and Konrad Kircher, for appellant.
OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Dustin Booth suffered from a severe, sudden mental health crisis. Dustin's
family, his friends, medical professionals, and officers in the Monroe Police Department
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made efforts to get Dustin the help he desperately needed. Those efforts ended when
officers conducted a traffic stop against Dustin, with the goal of taking him to the hospital
for treatment. Tragically, Dustin pulled a firearm out during the traffic stop, the officers
shot him, and Dustin died. Dustin's widow, Brandi, subsequently brought lawsuits in
federal and state court, alleging those responsible for making decisions surrounding his
medical care as well as the planning and execution of the traffic stop should bear legal
consequences for his death.
{¶ 2} In this appeal, we must decide whether Brandi's state law claims for
wrongful death and survivorship are precluded from moving forward because a federal
court found Chief Robert Buchanan and Lt. Mike Rosenbalm had qualified immunity under
federal law. We hold those state law claims are precluded as a result of the federal
litigation. Brandi had a full opportunity to argue the facts and issues surrounding the
propriety of Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm's actions in federal court. That court
determined those actions were reasonable under the law, entitling the officers involved to
qualified immunity. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to the facts and issues
supporting the federal court's finding of reasonableness and is dispositive here. Because
Brandi is precluded from relitigating the same facts and issues here as she did in federal
court, there can be no genuine issue of fact in dispute that shows either Chief Buchanan
or Lt. Rosenbalm acted recklessly under Ohio law. Therefore, we affirm.
Background
Events Leading to Dustin's Death
{¶ 3} Dustin had no history of mental health issues. However, in the months
leading up to February 2022, he began exhibiting unusual behavior, including believing
the earth is flat, sleeping less, losing weight, and consuming large amounts of cannabis
via a vape pen. Brandi and Dustin's mother eventually grew so concerned about Dustin's
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behavior that they called the Monroe Police. Law enforcement and crisis intervention
specialists responded to evaluate Dustin and later transported him to the hospital. There,
Dustin was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with mania.
{¶ 4} After several days, hospital staff believed Dustin's mania appeared
controlled and discharged him with instructions to keep taking his newly prescribed
medications. However, Dustin did not take his medications, and his behavior quickly
became erratic and concerning once again. Monroe Police and highway patrol officers
responded to another call to Dustin's home but declined to take him to the hospital
because Dustin did not appear to pose a danger to others or himself.
{¶ 5} Several days later, Brandi called the police again, telling them she now
believed Dustin was a danger to himself and others and may possess a firearm in his
truck. When law enforcement later came into contact with Dustin in the Booths'
neighborhood, he refused to cooperate, drove back to his residence, and went inside.
Law enforcement, crisis intervention specialists, and tactical negotiators all came to the
home to de-escalate the situation. Brandi told every officer she encountered that Dustin
had firearms in the house.
{¶ 6} Chief Buchanan was present during this response at Dustin's house
(defendants Lt. Rosenbalm and Officer Fred Doughman were not). Chief Buchanan
eventually ordered all officers to withdraw except for unmarked units. After returning to
the police station, Chief Buchanan conducted a debriefing with the officers. However,
Chief Buchanan testified he left the room repeatedly to talk to other members of the
department and had no knowledge of the plan that the other on-duty officers began to
develop to conduct a traffic stop to get custody of Dustin and return him to the hospital.
{¶ 7} Sgt. Robert Meyers was present during officers' initial response to Dustin's
house that day, during the debrief/planning session, and at Dustin's fatal traffic stop. Sgt.
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Meyers testified via deposition that the stop "wasn't planned to happen any certain way"
because of the "numerous variables that [officers] couldn't account for." He stated there
was no plan other than that if Dustin left the house, officers would conduct the traffic stop
and get Dustin medical attention.
{¶ 8} At some point during the day, Dustin's friend, Justin Duh, went over to the
Booths' home to calm down Dustin and was allowed inside. Later that day, after officers
had left the scene, Dustin and Duh left the house together. Dustin brought a firearm with
him. Duh continuously communicated with officers and informed them of their plan to
leave the home and Dustin's possession of the firearm.
{¶ 9} Lt. Rosenbalm, the third shift supervisor, arrived at work that evening and
was informed by Sgt. Meyers of the ongoing situation with Dustin. Concerned that Dustin
left the house armed, Sgt. Meyers recommended officers not conduct the stop. However,
Lt. Rosenbalm determined a show of force as well as Duh's presence would get Dustin
to comply with officers. Lt. Rosenbalm ordered Officer Doughman to go to the scene with
his canine officer as part of that show of force. Lt. Rosenbalm testified there was no
additional time to consider bringing in the crisis intervention specialists because the traffic
stop began approximately 15 minutes after his shift started.
{¶ 10} When officers initiated the stop, they observed a struggle inside the vehicle
between Duh and Dustin to gain possession of the firearm. Duh subsequently exited the
vehicle and stated Dustin had the gun. Dustin then exited the vehicle with the firearm and
began walking away toward a busy intersection, ignoring Officer Doughman's commands.
Officer Doughman deployed the canine (which did not make contact with or bite Dustin)
and attempted a hands-on takedown of Dustin. During the struggle, Officer Doughman
observed Dustin reaching into his waistband and saw part of the firearm. As Dustin began
raising the firearm, officers shot Dustin. Dustin later died from his injuries.
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Federal Litigation
{¶ 11} Brandi filed suit in federal court as administratrix of Dustin's estate. The suit
included both federal and state claims. Relevant federal claims included (1) unlawful
seizure/detention and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution against the officers who conducted the traffic stop and (2) failure to train,
inadequate supervision, and ratification against Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm.
Booth v. Lazzara, 2024 WL 4363213, *7 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 30, 2024) ("Booth D.C."). Brandi
argued that the "'ratification (indeed, initiation of the plan) was a moving force in causing
the constitutional violation.'" Id. at *11. Brandi's state claims included wrongful death
claims against all defendants.
{¶ 12} Law enforcement defendants—including Chief Buchanan and Lt.
Rosenbalm—filed for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity barred Brandi's
claims. As to the unlawful detention/seizure claim, the trial court concluded that there was
"probable cause to support the decision to stop Dustin's truck if and when he left the
Brandi home" given the events of that day. Booth D.C. at *11. As to the excessive force
claim, the trial court determined "a reasonable officer in Doughman's position could see
Dustin as a growing and imminent threat to the officers and other people in the area as
he walked [away from law enforcement and] toward a busy intersection and nearby
businesses." Id. at *14. In light of these circumstances, the trial court concluded the use
of physical force to tackle Dustin to the ground was reasonable. Id. It should be noted that
Brandi did not assert the act of shooting Dustin violated any of his constitutional rights.
{¶ 13} The trial court also determined that "without an underlying violation of
Dustin's constitutional rights . . . approval or initiation of the plan to perform a traffic stop
on Dustin's truck [could not constitute] a constitutional violation. Id. at *11. Having
dismissed all of Brandi's federal claims, the trial court elected to not exercise
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supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and dismissed them without
prejudice. Id. at *15.
{¶ 14} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. See
generally Booth v. Lazzara, 164 F.4th 581 (6th Cir. 2026) ("Booth C.A."). In relevant part,
the court found that law enforcement "had an objective basis to believe that a mentally
unstable Booth posed a danger to the officers, to bystanders, and to himself" during the
traffic stop. Id. at 592. As a result, the court concluded it was reasonable for officers "in
this tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situation" to conduct the traffic stop and later
to use "some degree of force to detain him." (Internal quotations and emphasis omitted.)
Id. at 592-593. While recognizing Brandi's "legitimate questions about how her sincere
efforts to get her husband mental-health treatment could turn into a fatal shooting" the
court concluded the "officers' conduct did not violate the law because of the obvious
danger that Booth posed." Id. at 594.
{¶ 15} The court did not comment on the state law claims other than
acknowledging they were dismissed by the trial court. Id. at 588.
State Litigation
{¶ 16} Brandi's state law claims were subsequently refiled in the Butler County
Court of Common Pleas. Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm again filed for summary
judgment, arguing they were immune under R.C. 2744.03 and that the federal litigation
collaterally estopped Brandi from further litigating the legal propriety of their actions.
{¶ 17} The trial court granted their motion for summary judgment. In relevant part,
the trial court found Chief Buchanan "was not present and had no knowledge when the
on duty officers began to develop a plan . . . to get Booth into custody." As to Lt.
Rosenbalm, the trial court found that when he—the third shift supervisor—arrived, "the
plan was rapidly evolving and demanded prompt decision-making" due to Dustin being
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armed. As a result, the court concluded "the facts presented do not support a finding of
reckless, malicious, wanton, or willful conduct, nor conduct undertaken in bad faith" which
would exempt them from immunity.
{¶ 18} The trial court also concluded collateral estoppel applied to Brandi's state
law claims. The trial court reasoned that the federal court's Fourth Amendment rulings
"foreclose[d] [Brandi's] wrongful death claim as a matter of law, because there is no
evidence of any wrongful act, neglect, or default . . . that proximately caused [Dustin's]
death . . ." As to Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm, the court stated, "[a]bsent personal
involvement in the planning or the execution of the traffic stop, [they] are not liable for
Booth's death."
{¶ 19} Brandi now appeals to this court.
Summation of Brandi's Two Assignments of Error
{¶ 20} On appeal, Brandi asserts two assignments of error. First, she argues
material issues of fact made summary judgment in favor of Chief Buchanan and Lt.
Rosenbalm improper. She claims that "[b]oth the planning (initiated and designed by
Buchanan) and the execution (ordered and supervised by Rosenbalm) of the traffic stop
consciously disregarded the obvious risk of confronting a mentally ill, otherwise
upstanding citizen, who possessed a gun and did not want to return to the hospital." In
other words, Brandi asserts Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm were reckless in
planning, ordering, and supervising a high-risk stop of Dustin. She argues measures
including establishing a 360-degree perimeter around the stop area, having crisis
intervention specialists on site, using de-escalation tactics during the stop, and the
development of contingency plans in the event Dustin left his home with a gun, should
have been considered and utilized but were not. Brandi also claims "the planning and
execution of the traffic stop flagrantly violated Monroe policies for dealing with mentally ill
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subjects."
{¶ 21} In her second assignment of error, Brandi argues the trial court improperly
applied collateral estoppel to the facts of this case. Her argument rests solely on the fact
that the federal courts dismissed her state law claims without prejudice, meaning "[t]here
was no final judgement on recklessness" under Ohio law as opposed to the constitutional
reasonableness of law enforcement's planning, detention, and use of force.
{¶ 22} We will address the issue of collateral estoppel first because, when
applicable, the doctrine procedurally bars further litigation of the same facts and issues,
necessarily leading to the conclusion that there can be no genuine issue of material fact
in dispute sufficient to prevent summary judgment.
Applicable Law
Collateral Estoppel
{¶ 23} "'Application of the doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel to a particular
issue is a question of law'" that we review de novo. Lycan v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676,
¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 2007-Ohio-6594, ¶ 41
(10th Dist.). Collateral estoppel "prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and
issues in a subsequent suit that were fully litigated in a prior suit." Thompson v. Wing, 70
Ohio St.3d 176, 183 (1994). The doctrine "applies when the fact or issue (1) was actually
and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action." Id.
{¶ 24} Importantly, a party's causes of action in separate proceedings do not need
to be the same for collateral estoppel to apply. Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v.
State Emp. Relations Bd., 1998-Ohio-435, ¶ 14. Moreover, "[i]f the same evidence would
sustain both issues, then the two issues are the same for purposes of applying collateral
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estoppel." Id. at ¶ 18. Stated differently, even where state and federal standards are
different but "revolve around the same factual issue," collateral estoppel will apply. Id. at
¶ 19. See also Mt. Pleasant Blacktopping Co. v. Inverness Group, Inc., 2025-Ohio-284, ¶
33 (1st Dist.) (Noting that "despite the different causation standards" at issue in Frye, both
retaliation theories at issue would be supported with the same evidence).
{¶ 25} In this appeal, the issue before us is whether the first element of collateral
estoppel—whether the same facts or issues were actually and directly litigated in prior
federal court proceedings—is satisfied. Specifically, the parties contest what, if any,
impact federal court determinations regarding qualified immunity have on Brandi's state
law claims against Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm. To assess this, we first review
and compare federal and state immunity standards.
Federal Immunity
{¶ 26} Law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity under federal
law unless a plaintiff can "show that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment and that
then-existing precedent put this violation beyond debate." (Internal quotations omitted.)
Booth C.A., 164 F.4th 581 at 590. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
prohibits unreasonable seizures and excessive use of force by law enforcement.
However, law enforcement can "seize individuals for mental-health evaluations—what
[courts] have called 'mental-health seizures'—if they have 'probable cause' that the
individuals 'pose a danger to themselves or others.'" Id. at 591, quoting Helms ex rel.
Helms v. Boyd Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 2025 WL 1693827, at *4 (6th Cir. June 17, 2025).
"[C]ourts must objectively evaluate whether a seizure meets this test from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene—not through the filter of hindsight." (Internal
quotations omitted.) Id.
{¶ 27} "To decide whether force was warranted or unjustified, [courts] consider the
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totality of the circumstances from a reasonable officer's objective perspective." (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 592. To analyze police seizures and use of force involving individuals with
mental health issues, courts "ask whether individuals suffered from a medical condition
that might lead them to pose a danger and whether the force used was reasonably
necessary to eliminate this danger." (Internal quotations omitted.) Id.
State Immunity
{¶ 28} Generally speaking, law enforcement is also immune from civil liability
under Ohio law unless one of several statutorily identified exceptions apply. See R.C.
2744.03. One exception is when an otherwise immune "employee's acts or omissions
were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner." R.C.
2744.03 (A)(6)(c). Recklessness is the relevant term on appeal. "Reckless conduct is
characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of
harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater
than negligent conduct." (Emphasis added.) Anderson v. Massillon, 2012-Ohio-5711, ¶
34; Estate of Smith v. W. Brown Local School Dist., 2015-Ohio-154, ¶ 57 (12th Dist.).
Thus, recklessness "is subject to a high standard." Estate of Smith at ¶ 58.
Analysis
{¶ 29} Upon review, we conclude Brandi's state law claims are barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. In doing so, we observe that federal and state courts have
repeatedly acknowledged the interplay between their separate immunity inquiries. As
stated by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, "When federal qualified immunity and Ohio
state-law immunity . . . rest on the same questions of material fact, we may review the
state-law immunity defense 'through the lens of the federal qualified immunity analysis.'"
Hopper v. Phil Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 759 (6th Cir. 2018), quoting Chappell v. City of
Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 fn.1 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th
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900, 922 (6th Cir. 2024) (stating Ohio immunity standard "overlaps with [the] qualified
immunity analysis because officers act in a 'wanton or reckless' manner when they violate
an individual's clearly established constitutional rights."); Estate of Lewis v. Anderson,
2026-Ohio-2096, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) ("the Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness
standard may serve as a helpful analytical tool because it helps distinguish objectively
reasonable conduct from conduct reflecting a higher degree of culpability.").
{¶ 30} Because of this overlap in immunity standards, federal decisions have
repeatedly (though not uniformly) exercised jurisdiction over state law claims and found
members of law enforcement to be immune under state law after finding federal immunity
applied to their actions. See e.g. Chappell, 585 F.3d at 907 fn.1 ("Inasmuch as plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable, it
follows that she has also failed to demonstrate that defendants acted with 'malicious
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner,' such as is required to avoid
statutory immunity under Ohio law . . ."); Cooper v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 2023 WL
1434055, *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2023) ("[B]ecause both officers reasonably perceived a
serious threat of injury, they are entitled to statutory immunity under Ohio law."); Pollard
v. City of Columbus, 780 F.3d 395, 404 (6th Cir. 2015) ("If the officers were objectively
reasonable in shooting [the decedent], it logically follows that they could not have been
reckless in shooting [him]."); Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 769 (6th Cir. 2015);
Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 517 (6th Cir. 2002).
{¶ 31} In instances where the federal courts dismissed a plaintiff's state law claims
against law enforcement officials, Ohio state courts have addressed the preclusive effect
of federal litigation on subsequent state proceedings where both dealt with the issue of
immunity. See generally Jordan v. Howard, 2021-Ohio-4025 (2nd Dist.); Ferrante v.
Peters, 2008-Ohio-3799, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).
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{¶ 32} The facts in Jordan, as summarized by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
during federal litigation, were as follows:
During the early morning hours of October 20, 2017, Jamarco
McShann was asleep in the driver's seat of a locked, running
car with his right hand resting on a pistol in his lap and music
blaring from the car stereo. Just seconds after police officers
roused him from his slumber, McShann stopped complying
with their orders that he keep his hands up and away from the
gun. He instead reached down, grabbed the gun, and swung
it towards the driver-side door, where two officers were
positioned. Fearing for their safety and that of their fellow
officers, Officers Jerry Knight and John Howard opened fire,
shooting and killing McShann.
Id. at ¶ 73, quoting Jordan v. Howard, 987 F.3d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 2021). The federal
courts determined the officers were immune from suit, finding they "acted reasonably to
stop a serious threat of deadly force" when McShann reached for his gun. Id. at ¶ 3.
{¶ 33} The district court did not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's
state claims, and when those claims were subsequently refiled in state court, the trial
court dismissed the wrongful death claim, finding collateral estoppel applied. Id. at ¶ 3,
15. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed, observing that "[t]he underlying facts
are the same if the issue were phrased as whether the officers acted recklessly or if it
were phrased as whether the officers acted reasonably for purposes of qualified
immunity." Id. at ¶ 71. The court further noted that the parties "had a full opportunity to
litigate" the issue of the propriety of the officer's actions. Id. at ¶ 72. The court concluded:
In view of the findings in the federal district and appellate
courts that the officers' use of deadly force (resulting in
McShann's death) was reasonable, and that they did not
violate established law, it would be factually and logically
inconsistent to conclude in this action that the officers were
reckless in causing McShann's death and, therefore, were not
entitled to immunity under [state law].
Id. at ¶ 75. See also Estate of Lewis, 2026-Ohio-2096 at ¶ 28 (10th Dist.) ("[I]f an officer's
use of force is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then it cannot satisfy the
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heightened culpability necessary to establish recklessness or wantonness, much less bad
faith or malicious conduct.").
{¶ 34} In Ferrante, police officers located and surrounded a vehicle driven by the
Ferrantes (husband and wife) after law enforcement received a 911 call stating that an
individual in a vehicle similar to the Ferrantes' flashed a gun. Ferrante, 2008-Ohio-3799
at ¶ 2 (8th Dist.). During the ensuing confrontation, police fired shots at the Ferrantes'
vehicle. Id. at ¶ 5-6. No one was hurt, and the Ferrantes were later taken into custody. Id.
at ¶ 7. In subsequent federal proceedings brought by the wife (the husband's claims were
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice) the district court held that the officer's actions did not
violate any of the wife's rights, "were made in a good faith effort to maintain and restore
order," and were not "malicious or sadistic." Id. at ¶ 8, 27. The federal court refused to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction of the wife's state claims, and after remand to state
court, the officers were granted summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 9, 11. The Eighth District
Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:
Although we do not equate the terms "reckless" and "wanton"
with bad faith and malice, we do not see, nor does [plaintiff]
argue, how we could make a finding that the officers' actions
were wanton and reckless after a court of competent
jurisdiction has previously held that the officers' actions were
in good faith and without malice. Thus, we agree with the
officers that the federal court's findings preclude a different
result in the instant case.
Id. at ¶ 33.
{¶ 35} Consistent with the legal reasoning in Jordan and Ferrante, application of
collateral estoppel in this case is appropriate, meaning Chief Buchanan and Lt.
Rosenbalm are immune from Brandi's state law claims. The facts did not change from
those asserted in the federal case. Brandi supported her state law claims with the same
evidence she used to support her federal claims. Brandi argued in federal court that the
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initiation and approval of a high-risk traffic stop "was a moving force" in Dustin's death
and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. But the district court determined the
conduct of the officers who conducted the traffic stop was reasonable and that "without
an underlying violation of Dustin's constitutional rights . . . [the] approval or initiation of
the plan to perform a traffic stop on Dustin's truck [could not constitute] a constitutional
violation." Brandi D.C., 2024 WL 4363213, at *11. The Sixth Circuit did not disturb that
determination.
{¶ 36} Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm's immunity status for their role in the
events leading to Dustin's death is the exact same legal issue before this court. Despite
the fact that federal and state immunity standards are different, "[t]he underlying facts are
the same if the issue were phrased as whether the officers acted recklessly or if it were
phrased as whether the officers acted reasonably for purposes of qualified immunity."
Jordan, 2021-Ohio-4025 at ¶ 71 (2nd Dist.). Brandi had the opportunity to litigate these
facts in federal court. There, the district court determined there was no genuine issue of
fact that the actions of all involved were reasonable and protected by federal immunity.
Given this result, it would be "factually and logically inconsistent" for this court to find that
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm
were reckless for ordering a traffic stop already found reasonable by federal courts. Id. at
¶ 75.
{¶ 37} We overrule Brandi's first and second assignments of error.
Conclusion
{¶ 38} We doubt it brings Brandi any solace for us to acknowledge, like the federal
courts before us, the unmitigated tragedy the facts this case present. It is all too easy to
wonder if and how things could have turned out differently. Despite this, the parties have
already litigated the propriety of law enforcement's actions that night, including those of
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Chief Buchanan and Lt. Rosenbalm, in federal court. There, it was determined that law
enforcement's actions—though undisputably tragic in result—were reasonable under the
law. The doctrine of collateral estoppel therefore precludes later proceedings from coming
to the inconsistent conclusion that Chief Buchanan's and Lt. Rosenbalm's actions could
nonetheless meet the heightened culpability of recklessness under Ohio law.
{¶ 39} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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