In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00228-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF L.Q.-W., L.W., AND L.W., CHILDREN
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CIV-25-0257
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
While home alone with her three young children—L.Q.-W. (Larry), L.W. (Laura),
and L.W. (Lydia)1—Appellant Mother attempted suicide by drinking antifreeze and
alcohol. While she recovered in the hospital, the Department of Family and Protective
Services filed its original petition for protection, conservatorship, and termination of
parental rights and then removed the children from her father (Appellant Grandfather),
with whom she and the children had been living. Mother attended one visit with the
children during the case, did none of the services provided by the Department to
attempt to reunify her with them, and did not appear at trial.
Grandfather intervened, seeking managing conservatorship. Although his home
was assessed for placement, and Grandfather eventually attempted to make repairs
identified in the assessment and by the Department’s caseworkers,2 his home ultimately
did not pass muster as a safe environment for the children. The children remained with
their adoption-motivated foster family for the case’s duration.
1
We identify the children by pseudonyms and their family and others by their relationship to them. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b). At the time of their removal, Larry was four years old, Laura was one year old, and Lydia was two months old.
2
The original caseworker left during the case, and a new caseworker was assigned. Both testified during trial.
2
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights based on endangerment,
constructive abandonment, and controlled-substance use, as well as the children’s best
interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2).3 The trial court
entered a take-nothing judgment as to Grandfather and dismissed him from the suit
instead of placing the children with him.
In five issues, Mother complains about the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s findings and its decision not to place the children with Grandfather.
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment,
best-interest, and placement findings and overrule these dispositive issues without
reaching her remaining issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
In three issues, Grandfather—proceeding pro se—complains that the trial court
erred by striking his intervention and by denying him due process based on limiting his
cross-examination at trial and the Department’s alleged procedural failures.4 However,
the record reflects that Grandfather either failed to raise his complaints in the trial court
or failed to secure a ruling on them and that the evidence is otherwise sufficient to
3
The trial court terminated the children’s fathers’ parental rights based on best interest and each father’s having filed an affidavit of relinquishment. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (2).
These three issues appear in his amended brief. In his original appellate brief,
4
Grandfather raised five issues that only somewhat overlap with the three issues presented in his amended brief despite our brief-correction letter’s instruction that no additional or different points should be raised without first filing a motion and obtaining an order from this court allowing him to do so.
3
support the trial court’s rulings. Thus, we overrule his issues.5 We will affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
II. Discussion
To terminate a parent–child relationship, the Department must prove two
elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent’s actions satisfy one
ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the
child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545
(Tex. 2020). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established.” Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545.
Further, if—as here—the trial court has terminated a parent’s rights based on
endangerment under Subsection (D) or (E) of Section 161.001(b)(1), and the parent
challenges the finding, due process and due course of law demand that we address the
finding and detail our analysis because once a person’s parental rights are terminated
5
Like his original brief, Grandfather’s amended brief contains no record references and only sporadic citations to legal authority. Cf. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring a brief to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). In our brief-correction letter, we gave Grandfather the opportunity to file an amended brief that complied with our rules of appellate procedure and cautioned him that failure to file a compliant brief could result in striking the brief, dismissing the appeal, or waiving noncomplying points. The amended brief is noncompliant. Thus, to the extent we do not otherwise dispose of Grandfather’s issues below, we overrule them on inadequate briefing. See id.
4
based on a Subsection (D) or (E) finding, Subsection (M) allows a trial court to
terminate the person’s parental rights in a future case. Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235, 237 (Tex. 2019); see In re C.W., 586
S.W.3d 405, 406 (Tex. 2019) (relying on N.G. and holding same).
A. Standards of review
To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental-rightstermination case, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged
finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or
conviction that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder may draw
inferences, but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the factfinder
settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could
have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding.
Id.; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). That is, we consider evidence favorable
to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless
a reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). The
factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the
factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child
5
relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due
deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own.
In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to decide
whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
Department proved the challenged ground or grounds under Section 161.001. See Tex.
Fam. Code § 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder
reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually
sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.
B. Mother’s endangerment and best-interest issues
Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
trial court’s endangerment findings6 and the factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support its best-interest finding.
1. Endangerment under Subsections (D) and (E)
“Endanger” means “to expose to loss or injury” or “to jeopardize.” In re J.F.-G.,
627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d
531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). Although “endanger” means more than a threat of metaphysical
injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it does not
Because we resolve this appeal on the endangerment and best-interest grounds,
6
we do not reach Mother’s second and third issues on the constructive-abandonment and controlled-substance findings. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
6
require that there be conduct directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury.
In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022).
To terminate a parent’s rights under Subsection (E), the court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent has engaged in conduct or knowingly placed
the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the child’s physical or
emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under Subsection (E), the
court may consider acts occurring both before and after a child’s birth––and after
removal––in determining a course of conduct. In re C.Y., No. 02-21-00261-CV, 2022
WL 500028, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 18, 2022, pet. denied). Such acts may
create an inference that similar conduct could recur and further jeopardize a child’s
well-being. Id. Evidence of how a parent has treated another child is also relevant to
establish a course of conduct under Subsection (E). In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 636–37
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). Endangerment evidence
may include a voluntary failure to engage in services, see In re M.G., No. 02-23-00074-CV, 2023 WL 4008687, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2023, pet. denied), a
parent’s lack of significant contact with a child, see In re A.J.D., No. 02-13-00183-CV,
2013 WL 5781478, at *4 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.), or a parent’s
untreated mental health issues, see In re L.M.F., No. 02-13-00459-CV, 2014 WL
2465137, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 29, 2014, no pet.).
To terminate a parent’s rights under Subsection (D), the court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that the parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
7
the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or
emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(1)(b)(D). Subsection (D) permits
termination based upon a single act or omission, and a parent need not know for certain
that a child is in an endangering environment: awareness of such potential is sufficient.
In re L.L., No. 02-23-00132-CV, 2023 WL 5767483, at *18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sept. 7, 2023, pet. denied). However, the relevant time frame for evaluating this ground
is before the child’s removal, as conditions and surroundings cannot endanger a child
unless that child is exposed to them. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. The suitability of a child’s
living conditions and the conduct of parents or others in the home are relevant to a
Subsection (D) inquiry. Id.
a. Mother’s arguments
Mother argues that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to prove that
she had taken “any act or omission that in any way endangered the children” because
the Department reported that the children did not exhibit signs of abuse at the time of
removal and the incident that triggered the investigation—her suicide attempt while she
was sole caregiver—“did not endanger or cause harm to the children.”
Mother contends that while it was undisputed at trial that she suffered from
mental-health issues, had been hospitalized for a possible suicide attempt, and regularly
left the children in Grandfather’s care, “there was no evidence that any of these things
actually endangered the children.” She acknowledges that she did not complete her
service plan but asks that we “examine the crux of the concern of [the Department] for
8
the children,” i.e., her mental health and alcohol use. She asserts that “there was
absolutely no evidence offered at trial that the children were harmed as a result of or
were even aware of the incident that cause[d] [her] to seek medical treatment” or that
she had harmed or endangered the children “as a result of her drinking alcohol.” She
also argues that there was “no direct evidence that the children had been harmed or
were endangered by [Grandfather] while they were in his care.”
b. Application
The trial court could have reasonably found a firm belief or conviction that
Mother had endangered the children under either endangerment ground based on the
following evidence at trial:
• Mother was an alcoholic suffering from post-partum depression who attempted
suicide while left alone with her three young children in Grandfather’s unsafe home.
• Mother had previously attempted to drive while intoxicated with Laura in the back
seat of her car. During that incident, she was arrested for public intoxication and
taken to jail.
• Mother did not begin any of her services and attended only one visit with the
children after the case began.7
• Grandfather’s home study reflected that even though he knew the home where he
and Mother had lived with the children was being inspected for placement, he still
left caked-on food on Lydia’s high chair and child-accessible power tools and
construction materials inside and outside the house. When caseworkers visited, they
The caseworker informed the trial court in a status hearing that during the visit,
7
Mother left “[Lydia], the baby, behind in the lobby and had to be reminded to go get the baby. And she also left the baby in the carrier for almost the whole visit, didn’t take her out until the last 30 minutes, and that’s when the baby started crying.”
9
noted safety concerns about the clutter and power tools and told him that these
posed a danger to the children.
• The children were so filthy when Brett Addison, the Department’s investigator,
removed them from Grandfather8 that the foster parents had to throw away the
clothing they were wearing.
• Lydia was severely underweight at the time of removal,9 and her sister Laura—who
was one-and-a-half years old at the time of removal—had not been started on solid
food.
• At the time of removal, the children had not been current on their immunizations
and had never been to the dentist, and two of them were developmentally delayed.10
8
Grandfather told the home assessor that he bathed the children nightly after dinner but that when Mother was there, she did not bathe them as often. He attributed their having been dirty at the time of their removal on April 16 to Mother’s having not bathed them every night. However, this statement is contrary to his April 22 email to the Department, which was admitted into evidence at trial, in which he stated that Mother had not “been home in a week or so” at the time of the April 16 removal.
9
Foster Father testified that when the children arrived at his house on April 16, 2025, two-month-old Lydia had been severely underweight—8 pounds, 7 ounces—and wearing newborn-sized clothes. The foster family had to take her for weight check-ins every two weeks for the first two or three months and then monthly as she started gaining steady weight. At her one-year check-in, Lydia had finally gained enough weight, at 17 pounds, 6 ounces.
10
At the October 2, 2025 initial permanency hearing, the caseworker reported that Larry and Laura would undergo an autism evaluation later that month, and that Lydia had been participating in early childhood intervention services for a few months “to catch up” to her correct level. At the January 22, 2026 permanency hearing, the caseworker testified that Larry and Laura both had appointments to complete autism testing. At that hearing, Grandfather informed the trial court that the children had been “happy and thriving” in his home. In his March 2026 discovery responses, Grandfather stated that the children had thrived with him but were “in decline” after their removal, “being te[s]ted for tantrums, autism[,] and trauma” and that they “did not start with those problems.” At trial, Grandfather testified that he had not been aware of any developmental delays when the children were removed.
10
• Larry required so much dental work caused by neglect that he had to be put under
anesthesia to complete it all. At the October 2, 2025 initial permanency hearing, the
caseworker testified that Larry’s dental work had included five cavities that had to
be capped and crowned.
• Grandfather opined at trial that Mother was the one who had neglected the children,
but Foster Father testified that five-year-old Larry, who had been diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), had told him that Grandfather drank
“alcohol all the time” and “spanked him all the time.”
The trial court could have reasonably determined based on the above evidence
that Mother’s conduct had endangered the children and that she had left them in an
endangering environment when she attempted suicide while they were home alone with
her in a house that presented numerous hazards to small children and that Grandfather,
a primary caregiver, had not recognized or attempted to fix until instructed to do so by
the Department. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D)–(E).
Further, until her suicide attempt, Mother’s alcoholism and mental-health issues
had been untreated—endangering conduct that also created an endangering
environment. See L.L., 2023 WL 5767483, at *18; L.M.F., 2014 WL 2465137, at *14.
Mother did not work any of her services, thus further endangering the children by
leaving her endangering conduct unaddressed, see M.G., 2023 WL 4008687, at *7, and
she did not visit the children more than once during the case, further endangering the
children, see A.J.D., 2013 WL 5781478, at *4. We conclude that the evidence is both
11
legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings11 and
overrule Mother’s first issue. See Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.
2. Best interest
In her fourth issue, Mother complains that the evidence is factually insufficient
to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. Specifically, she argues that the
evidence is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that a child’s best interest
is served by keeping the child with a natural parent and that the relevant Holley factors
do not support termination.
Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s
best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is
child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C.,
560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether evidence is sufficient to
support a best-interest finding, we review the entire record. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be the same
evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. Id. at 249; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at
28; see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the evidence in light of
nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply in determining the child’s best
interest:
11
As stated by the Department in its appellee’s brief, “The Family Code does not require the Department to wait until a parent’s untreated mental illness or alcoholism results in irreversible tragedy.”
12
(A) the [child’s] desires . . . ;
(B) the [child’s] emotional and physical needs[,] . . . now and in
the future;
(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in
the future;
(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the [child’s] best interest . . . ;
(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or[, if applicable,]
by the agency seeking custody;
(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(H) the [parent’s] acts or omissions . . . indicat[ing] that the
existing parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and
(I) any excuse for the [parent’s] acts or omissions.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402
S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among
other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796,
807 (Tex. 2012). These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may not
apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just
one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor
will not support such a finding. Id.
13
Mother argues that there was no evidence offered at trial of the following Holley
factors: the children’s desires; the emotional and physical danger to the children now
and in the future; her acts or omissions that might indicate that the existing parent–
child relationship is not proper; and any excuse for her acts or omissions, specifically,
her mental-health struggles and epilepsy.
We disagree. The trial court heard the endangerment evidence set out above,
which is also probative of best interest, see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249, and which speaks
to the present and future emotional and physical danger to the children, Mother’s acts
and omissions, and her parental abilities. The trial court also heard evidence about the
children’s successful foster-to-adopt placement to contrast with Mother’s desire (via
Grandfather’s testimony) for the children to be placed with him despite his own
endangering acts and omissions.12 And the record reflects that Mother made no effort
during the case: she attended one visit with the children and did not engage in any
services to help her become a better parent.
Further, although Grandfather completed a parenting class and attended nine of
eleven visits with the children,13 he did not complete the homemaking class that was
12
At the January 2026 hearing, Mother did not appear, but her counsel stated that Mother wanted the children placed with Grandfather because Mother “believe[d] that to be a safe and loving placement.”
13
At the January 2026 hearing, the caseworker testified that Grandfather was often late to the visits and that, as to a January 2026 visit, he was so late that it had to be cancelled.
14
supposed to help him understand how to create a safe environment for small children
and to provide for their proper nutrition. Foster Father testified about the children’s
filthy condition, Lydia’s severely malnourished state, Laura’s failure to be on solid food
at one-and-a-half years old, and Larry’s poor dental condition at the time of their
removal from Grandfather, as well as Larry’s concerning statements about
Grandfather’s alcohol use and spanking and his PTSD diagnosis.
One of the caseworkers testified that during his visits, Grandfather was focused
on being the “fun grandpa.” The court-appointed special advocate (CASA) testified
that during visits, Grandfather ignored Laura and Lydia to focus mainly on Larry and
that he cancelled a visit when he learned that Larry would not be there.14
The trial court, as the factfinder, determined the witnesses’ credibility, including
Grandfather’s and that of his witnesses,15 who all testified that they had no concerns
about Grandfather’s abilities to care for the children and that he treated the children
equally, although at least one testified that Mother was not fit to care for the children
14
During the June 5, 2025 status hearing, the caseworker testified that Grandfather had told her that he did not want to attend the May 28 visit “because [Larry] wasn’t going to be there.”
15
Mother’s sister (Aunt), Aunt’s boyfriend, Grandfather’s girlfriend, and Great Aunt testified during Grandfather’s case.
15
at that time.16 The trial court also noted at the trial’s conclusion that Grandfather’s
testimony had been “contradictory inherently,” and it was entitled to weigh that
assessment with the remaining evidence to conclude that terminating Mother’s parental
rights would be in the children’s best interest. We overrule Mother’s fourth issue.
C. Placement
In her fifth issue, Mother complains that the trial court erred by failing to place
the children with Grandfather. Because Grandfather appears to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support this decision in his third issue, we will address
these issues together to avoid repetition.
1. Applicable law
In making a placement decision for a child, the Department “shall [first] give
preference to . . . a person related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption [and then
to] a person with whom the child has a long-standing and significant relationship,”
16
As argued by the Department in its appellee’s brief, Grandfather was unable to appreciate the risks Mother posed to the children and so would be unlikely to protect them from such future exposure:
Despite overwhelming medical evidence, including Mother’s
hospitalization . . . and treatment with an [antifreeze-poisoning] antidote,
[he] refused to believe Mother had actually attempted suicide. His refusal
to acknowledge Mother’s serious mental health crisis demonstrated an
inability to protect the children from the very danger that prompted their
removal. . . . The trial court could reasonably infer that Grandfather would
continue to allow Mother unsupervised access to the children because he
did not believe she presented any risk.
16
followed by a foster home, and then a general residential operation. Tex. Fam. Code
§ 262.114(d). However, before placing a child with a relative, the Department must
investigate to determine whether the proposed placement is in the child’s best interest.
In re S.W., No. 02-11-00200-CV, 2012 WL 3115749, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 2, 2012, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Fam. Code § 264.754).17 The Department must
“expedite the completion of the background and criminal history check, the home
study, and any other administrative procedure to ensure that the child is placed with a
qualified relative or caregiver as soon as possible after the date the caregiver is
identified.” Tex. Fam. Code § 264.753. Even if a home study has been completed and
approved, however, it is not binding on the trial court. In re R.N.W., No. 01-13-00036-CV, 2013 WL 3467206, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 5, 2013, no pet.).
Rather, in considering a potential placement, the trial court may weigh evidence other
17
The Legislature has tasked the Department with developing a program to “promote continuity and stability for children for whom the [D]epartment is appointed managing conservator by placing those children with relative or other designated caregivers” and to “facilitate relative or other designated caregiver placements by providing assistance and services to those caregivers.” Tex. Fam. Code § 264.752(a). Most of the guidelines pertain to funding and reporting requirements, see id. §§ 264.755– .758, .760, .762, although there is also a section defining “low-risk criminal offense,” to prevent such offenses from disqualifying a potential placement without a sufficient notice-and-review process, see id. § 264.754(a), (c)–(e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (requiring states, as a condition of federal-funding eligibility, to consider giving preference to an adult relative over an unrelated caregiver when determining a placement for a child, “provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protection standards”).
17
than the home-study results, including the child’s expressed wishes and the nature of
the relationship between the child and the proposed placement. Id.
“Reasonable efforts should be made with respect to a child to be placed in foster
care to preserve and reunify families and to give preference to an adult relative over a
non-related caregiver in determining the placement of a child.” In re M.G., No. 02-24-00026-CV, 2024 WL 3195855, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2024, no pet.).
And the establishment of a stable, permanent home is a paramount best-interest
concern. Id. But we may not discount or minimize the level of permanence a child has
achieved with his or her foster family. Id. In M.G., we held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to remove the child from his foster family—the only
family he knew—to place the child with a relative with whom he had no relationship,
particularly when the trial court could have chosen to give weight to the caseworker’s
testimony that the relative might not prevent the parent from having unsupervised
access to the child. Id.
2. Mother’s and Grandfather’s arguments
In her fifth issue, Mother argues that “[w]hile [the Department] presented
evidence as to why [it] felt that placement of the children in the home of [Grandfather]
was inappropriate, it is apparent when examining the record in its entirety th[at] the
evidence presented was insufficient to provide that the best interests of the children
were served by placing the children outside of the family.” Mother directs us to
caseworker testimony admitting that the “hazards” in Grandfather’s home had caused
18
no injury to the children and asserts, without further elaboration, “[I]t is clear that the
[c]ourt did not give the family placement the appropriate consideration as called for
under the law.”
In his amended brief’s third issue, Grandfather asks “[w]hether the Department
and OCOK failed to follow required kinship placement procedures, resulting in
unnecessary delays and harm to the children.”18
18
Although rephrased, Grandfather’s third issue in his amended brief appears to cover some of the same topics as his third, fourth, and fifth issues in his original brief regarding the Department’s actions in this case, to-wit: whether the Department had portrayed him as uncooperative; whether the Department had failed to follow mandatory placement procedures; and whether the Department improperly initiated and maintained the case. In his amended brief, he complains that the Department twice informed him that placement with him was “imminent” but that it was abandoned “without explanation” and that Aunt “was told she was being considered, but her process also stalled without timely action.”
At the June 5, 2025 status hearing, however, a caseworker testified that although a home study on Aunt’s home had been approved, Aunt had indicated her main goal was for the children to remain with Grandfather. The caseworker also testified that Grandfather had failed to turn in his release of information to begin his home study, and the Department’s attorney asked the caseworker to re-send the request for information to Grandfather. Mother’s counsel told the trial court that Mother did not want the children placed in Houston (where Aunt lived) and that she had expressed to him at different times her comfort or discomfort with the children’s staying with Grandfather. The children’s ad litem and CASA advised the trial court that remaining in the foster placement would be in the children’s best interest. Grandfather’s initial home study inspection occurred four days later.
At the October 2, 2025 initial permanency hearing, Mother testified that she wanted Grandfather to be the children’s managing conservator. Grandfather told the trial court that his home assessment had been completed July 24 and that he had been recommended for placement. The trial court replied that it thought there had been issues regarding the house and asked him about the children’s dental care. Regarding Larry’s cavities, Grandfather stated, “That’s a failure on my part for sure,” and he
19
3. Application
To the extent Mother and Grandfather challenge the evidentiary sufficiency to
support the trial court’s placement decision and whether the Department failed to
follow placement procedures, the evidence at trial reveals otherwise:
• The trial court admitted into evidence the April 16, 2025 police report that stated,
“CPS has an emergency removal order[;] grandparents are not cooperating.” It also
admitted into evidence an email that Grandfather sent to the supervisor of Addison,
the Department’s investigator, copying Addison, to complain about the removal in
which Grandfather stated, “I was presented with a court order that gave [Addison] the
authority to do so and then told I did not have the right to examine or have a copy[,] I
was not the parent, and my Voluntary Guardianship was worthless.”19 [Emphasis
added.] The April 16, 2025 order notifies the children’s parents of the time, date,
and location of the April 29, 2025 adversary hearing.
• At trial, Addison testified about the children’s filthy condition at removal, his having
to contact law enforcement for help when Grandfather became argumentative, and
Grandfather’s refusal to supply any of the children’s clothes, medication, or other
necessities. Addison described the refusal as follows: “It boiled down to him telling
me that at this point if [the Department] is going to be taking the children, then
they’re [the Department’s] responsibility.”
• The trial court’s April 29, 2025 temporary orders following the adversary hearing
contained these findings: placement with a relative was not in the children’s best
assured the trial court that he would pay “much more close attention to [the children’s] dental needs.”
19
Grandfather did not have a voluntary guardianship. To his amended petition, which was admitted into evidence at trial, he attached authorization-agreement-forvoluntary-adult-caregiver forms that Mother had signed for Larry in December 2022 and for Laura in February 2024 that granted him certain permissions but not guardianship. Among other specific but limited permissions, the forms allowed Grandfather to authorize Larry and Laura’s medical and dental treatment and immunizations and cautioned that they did “not confer on the voluntary adult caregiver the rights of a managing or possessory conservator or legal guardian.” [Emphases added.]
20
interest; “If the children have not been placed with a relative or other designated
caregiver, the Court finds that the Department has provided the reasons for not
placing the children and the actions, if any, to be taken to place the children”; and,
as to each child, “The Court finds that the Department does not have the option
of placing the child with a relative or other designated caregiver.”20
• The trial court admitted into evidence Grandfather’s June 2025 home assessment.
The form offered three options: “placement recommended,” “placement not
recommended due to risk associated with listed concerns,” and “placement
recommended with the following guidance.” The assessor selected the last option
and listed eight hazards for Grandfather to remedy. The form had a separate section
for “Field Supervisory Staff Action” with two options: “placement approved” and
“placement not approved.” Neither option was marked. A caseworker testified that
her supervisor—not the home assessor—would have been the one to approve the
placement.
• Grandfather contended that he had been told the children would be placed with him
despite the home-study form’s separate sections for recommendation and for actual
approval.21 He admitted that Department representatives came out to his home
several times to help him remedy his property’s dangers.
20
Mother, Grandfather, Grandmother, Aunt, and Aunt’s boyfriend attended the adversary hearing, but only Mother and Addison testified, and the children’s ad litem and CASA gave updates. The trial court accepted Addison’s affidavit as a summary of his testimony and then heard his testimony that the children were doing well in foster care and that the Department had begun the process for a home study on Aunt’s home. The children’s ad litem and CASA both agreed that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in the foster home at that time.
In his complaint form to the Department, Grandfather asserted that it was “unacceptable that [Grandmother’s] word was prioritized over [his] documented caregiving history,” but the adversary-hearing record shows that Grandmother did not testify, Addison’s removal affidavit indicated that he had attempted to speak with Grandmother but had been unsuccessful, and Grandfather’s caregiving history was not offered into evidence.
21
The form also contained the following warning:
IMPORTANT: The content of this home assessment was
developed based on limited contact with the family and collateral
contacts. Efforts have been made to verify the content of this study
21
• Addison testified that if Grandfather had allowed him to complete a preliminary
home study and that if he had seen the home in the condition found by the home
assessor, he would not have been able to leave the children there because it would
have been dangerous for them. See Tex. Fam. Code § 262.114(a) (requiring
Department to complete a home study of the most appropriate substitute caregiver,
if any, identified as a potential caregiver on the proposed child placement resources
form before the full adversary hearing), (b) (requiring Department to conduct a
preliminary evaluation of the relative’s home before child is placed there or within
48 hours after placement).
• In his home assessment, Grandfather told the assessor that the children were happy,
healthy, and had no behavioral issues, developmental delays, or special-care needs;
that there had never been any concerns at the children’s well-child doctor visits; and
that he had always been their primary caregiver. He denied drinking alcohol to the
point of intoxication and told the assessor that he rarely drank when the children
were present.22 He also told the assessor that he used time-outs for grounding and
had never used physical discipline.
• As set out in our review of the endangerment and best-interest evidence, Foster
Father testified about the children’s condition at removal and their improvements
since then.
• Both caseworkers testified about the safety concerns identified at Grandfather’s
house. The second caseworker testified that she had spoken with Grandfather on
when possible; however, due to the nature of the assessment, a
considerable amount of the information contained in this report was
gathered through self-report by the prospective caregivers. The
signature below reflects the submission of the Home Assessor
assessment ONLY and NOT the approval of the respective home.
This signature verifies the Home Assessor has prepared the home
assessment in compliance with applicable State Standards.
22
At trial, Grandfather denied that he had ever seen an open container of alcohol in his home or that he had ever seen Mother drink alcohol. However, he acknowledged that in 2016, officers from the Parker County Sheriff’s Office had come to his house and found him inebriated. Addison testified that on the night of April 14, 2025—after Mother’s suicide attempt—Grandfather told him that Mother had an alcohol problem.
22
three occasions about issues with his storm cellar.23 She also testified that when she
received the case, the Department’s intention had been to work with Grandfather
despite his insistence that placement had already been approved in the home study.
And she testified about the state of Larry’s dental care at removal and the children’s
needs having been met since their foster-care placement.
• The CASA confirmed the conditions of, and safety concerns about, Grandfather’s
home and testified that he had required specific, detailed instructions on how to fix
the safety issues and that the children would be in danger if placed with him. She
testified that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in the foster home and
be adopted by their foster parents.
• In his September 15, 2025 letter to the trial court, Grandfather stated that he had
“attended every doctor’s appointment” of the children and had provided “love,
housing, meals, baths, [and] daycare transportation.” He also raised a variety of
complaints about the children’s removal from him, but there is no indication that
he sought a ruling from the trial court on those complaints.
• In his March 2026 discovery responses, Grandfather denied that he had any of the
children’s medical or dental records. During his trial testimony, however, he
clarified that he had some medical records, like “shot records for [Larry],” which he
did not produce, and admitted that he had not attended every doctor’s appointment
despite his September letter’s representation to the trial court. He attended Larry’s
February 26, 2024 three-year-old-well-child visit at which the doctor marked
“Dental care,” and he testified that he had never taken any of the children to a
dentist and that he had not been aware of any dental issues when the children were
removed.
• Grandfather filed with the trial court a copy of his “DFPS Case Complaint Form,”
a pre-printed form promulgated by the Department’s Office of Consumer Affairs
(OCA) for concerns “about how DFPS staff members followed (or may not have
followed) policy and procedures in a specific DFPS case.” The form was admitted
at trial. In the form, Grandfather listed his complaints as “Unlawful Removal of
Grandchildren,” “DFPS Misconduct,” and “Civil Rights Violations,” complained
23
During the June 9 home study, the assessor noted that Grandfather’s
underground cellar was easily accessible and unlocked, and Grandfather had told the assessor that the children liked playing in it. The first caseworker testified that when she had the case, the storm cellar did not lock and had standing water in it.
23
that the children’s “unjust removal” from him “violated [his] constitutional rights,
misrepresented facts to the court, and disregarded [his] legal standing as a
continuous, authorized caregiver,” and expressed his intention to pursue federal
action.24 There is no indication in the record that he requested a ruling on any of
these complaints in the trial court or that he filed a separate federal lawsuit.
• Grandfather testified that he had corrected the identified home hazards. He also
claimed that he had various documentation, but he offered none, nor any photos of
the home, during his case. He also put forth no evidence that the children had
suffered harm by being placed with the foster family or to contradict the evidence
about the children’s condition at removal.
• Grandfather testified that Larry and Laura had lived with him “pretty much [their]
entire [lives]” and that although he had known about Mother’s post-partum
depression after delivering each child, he became aware of Mother’s alcohol and
other mental-health issues during the case and denied having told a police officer
almost three years before trial that Larry had lived with him most of his life because
of Mother’s narcotics issues.
• Grandfather’s witnesses testified that his home and behavior were not dangerous to
the children.
The trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to disbelieve Grandfather and his
witnesses and to believe the investigator, caseworkers, and CASA and the documentary
evidence regarding whether the placement procedures were followed and whether
denying placement with Grandfather had harmed the children. We overrule Mother’s
fifth issue and Grandfather’s third issue.
Addison testified that no finding of wrongdoing had been made regarding
24
Grandfather’s complaint against him.
24
D. Grandfather’s remaining issues
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the
desired ruling, if not apparent from the request’s, objection’s, or motion’s context. Tex.
R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The objecting party must also secure a ruling—either express
or implied—from the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A), (b); see Lenz v. Lenz, 79
S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. 2002); see also In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. 2005)
(requiring preservation of constitution-based complaints in termination cases); In re J.P.-L., 592 S.W.3d 559, 575 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied) (“[C]omplaints
about due process violations must be raised and ruled on in the trial court in order to
be preserved for appeal.”).
In parental-rights-termination cases, “adhering to our preservation rules isn’t a
mere technical nicety; the interests at stake are too important to relax rules that serve a
critical purpose.” In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 708 (Tex. 2003). Indeed, allowing
appellate review of unpreserved error would undermine the Legislature’s intent that
cases terminating parental rights be expeditiously resolved, thus promoting the child’s
interest in a final decision and placement in a safe and stable home. Id. at 711.
Accordingly, a trial court must have the opportunity to correct errors as a matter of
judicial economy; this is not just a policy but a statutory mandate to ensure “that
children’s lives are not kept in limbo while judicial processes crawl forward.” In re
B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tex. 2003).
25
In his amended brief’s first issue, Grandfather asks, “[W]hether the trial court
erred by allowing the Department to remove the children from [his] home without a
warrant, without a court order, and without exigent circumstances” and relies on the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Family Code Section 262.104 (“Taking
Possession of a Child in Emergency Without a Court Order”) to support his complaint
about the children’s removal.25 Assuming, without deciding, that the Fourth
Amendment’s protections would apply to the removal of children from a home,
because the record reflects that there was a court order for their removal, neither
Section 262.104 nor the constitutional amendments are implicated, and we overrule his
first issue.
In his amended brief’s second issue, Grandfather asks, “[W]hether the trial court
erred by striking [his] intervention and denying him a meaningful opportunity to be
heard,” complaining that when Addison and the caseworkers testified, “[H]e was
skipped and not allowed to question them.”26 However, Grandfather did not raise these
objections during trial or in a post-trial motion.
25
Grandfather’s first issue in his original brief was similar but not identical: “Whether the removal was invalid where the Department’s affidavit did not identify the actual caregiver, omitted the removal events, omitted police findings, and did not allege any danger posed by the person from whom the children were removed.”
26
In his original brief, Grandfather instead asked “[w]hether the Department violated due process by withholding exculpatory evidence, including police reports, supervisor communications, and internal OCA findings acknowledging policy violations and unlawful entry.”
26
Further, although Grandfather complains that the trial court “struck his
intervention during the bench trial, . . . prevented him from questioning” the
investigator and caseworkers,27 and “ignored his attempts to introduce exculpatory
evidence,” the record reflects that Grandfather never objected when these witnesses
were passed without his opportunity to question them, that he did not offer any
evidence or make an offer of proof for the trial court to determine any evidentiary
admissibility, cf. Tex. R. Evid. 103, and that he did not thereafter attempt to make a
formal bill of exception to admit for appellate review evidence that would not otherwise
be found in the record, cf. Tex. R. App. P. 33.2. His intervention was not struck until
the very end of trial, after he had presented his own case to the trial court. And though
Grandfather complains that the Department withheld OCA’s findings, he did not file a
motion to compel production or otherwise bring the matter before the trial court to
obtain a ruling.
Although the record reflects that Grandfather complained to the Department
about its treatment of him and even filed a formal complaint with the agency, he did
not (1) raise any of these issues in the trial court in a motion before trial, during trial, or
in a post-trial motion or (2) secure a ruling, both of which are required for us to review
Grandfather was given the opportunity to cross-examine one of the
27
caseworkers. However, after he began his cross-examination with, “I just disagree . . . ,” the trial court interrupted him, stating, “No, you don’t testify. You ask her questions. You’ll have a chance to testify again.” Grandfather then replied, “No questions.”
27
his complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Because pro se litigants are held to the same
standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable rules, see Barcroft v.
Walton, No. 02-16-00110-CV, 2017 WL 3910911, at *5 & n.11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.), we overrule Grandfather’s remaining two issues without further
reaching their merits.
III. Conclusion
Having overruled this appeal’s dispositive issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice
Delivered: August 13, 2026
28