In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00497-CV
REIGNROCK CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC AND ROBERT D. RICHARDSON,
Appellants
V.
DANIEL GUSTAV TEWS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 48th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 048-362490-25
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2023, Appellee Daniel Tews was arrested and charged with committing theft
from his former employer. After the criminal case was dismissed and his arrest was
expunged, Tews sued the parties he blamed for his arrest: Appellant ReignRock
Capital Partners, LLC (ReignRock) and its managing member, Appellant Robert D.
Richardson. Alleging that the theft charge had been based on Richardson’s false
statements, Tews asserted claims for malicious prosecution, defamation, and
conspiracy. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizen Participation
Act (TCPA), which the trial court granted as to the defamation and conspiracy claims
but denied as to the malicious prosecution claim.
On appeal, Appellants argue in two issues that the trial court erred by
(1) holding that Tews established by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for
the malicious prosecution elements challenged in their motion and (2) considering a
Haltom City Police Department (HCPD) report included with Tews’s TCPA
response. Because Tews produced sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case for
malicious prosecution even without the police report, we will affirm.
Background
Tews’s malicious prosecution claim arose from his employment with Falcon
Steel America, LLC (Falcon Steel). Falcon Steel is connected to Appellants through
another entity, FSA Holdings, LLC (FSA Holdings): when Falcon Steel was formed,
2
its sole member was FSA Holdings, 1 an entity that is managed by ReignRock, which is
in turn managed by Richardson.2
In November 2018, Falcon Steel gave Tews an offer letter for the position of
its chief financial officer (CFO). The offer letter stated that the position paid
$230,000 annually and that Tews would be eligible for certain benefits. Two of those
benefits are at issue in this appeal. First, the offer letter provided that “[s]hould [Tews]
be terminated without cause” within the first four years of employment, 3 he would be
eligible for severance; for “Year 1,” the severance amount was “100% base salary.”
1
As we discuss in footnote 16 below, the parties disputed in the trial court and on appeal whether Tews became a part owner of Falcon Steel. We need not resolve this dispute.
2
Although ReignRock is a limited liability company, Tews refers to Richardson and two others—Steven Ganss and Douglas Kramp—as ReignRock partners, and documents in the record refer to Richardson as ReignRock’s managing partner. The record reflects that Falcon Steel was a partnership for tax purposes, but it does not reflect whether ReignRock is. See IRS, LLC filing as a corporation or partnership, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/llc-filing-as-acorporation-or-partnership (discussing when an LLC may be treated as a partnership for tax purposes). We assume that the parties use “partner” to mean “member” and “managing partner” to mean “manager,” but when discussing ReignRock, we use the term “partner” because the parties do. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.002(b)(4).
3
In his petition, Tews referred to the offer letter as an employment agreement, and Appellants did not dispute that assertion in their TCPA motion. Indeed, Appellants referred to it as an employment agreement in the trial court. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we treat the offer letter as a contract. We further note that while the offer letter did not define “cause,” Appellants’ TCPA motion did not raise any argument that the company sale constituted cause to eliminate his employment. They argued only that despite the sale, Tews’s employment had not yet been terminated by Falcon Steel when he left the company and that it was Tews’s decision to leave the company when he did.
3
Second, the offer letter stated that Tews was eligible for an “on target incentive”
(OTI) bonus of $57,500 based on goals “to be jointly discussed, defined[,] and agreed
upon with [the] CEO.”
The offer letter also stated that within the first sixty days of his employment, he
would be offered the opportunity to participate as an equity investor in Falcon Steel
and that he would be “granted 270 management pool units in this position that will be
vested over a four (4) year period.” The offer letter set an employment start date of
December 10, 2018. Tews accepted the position.
Due to financial difficulties, Falcon Steel began looking to sell its assets soon
after Tews started. Two buyers were located, and the assets were sold in mid-August
2019. Tews agreed to stay on temporarily; he alleged in his petition that he agreed to
stay on through the sale. In April 2019, Falcon Steel’s managers4 signed a written
consent authorizing the CEO “at his discretion” to pay Tews a retention bonus of an
amount between 25% and 75% of his base pay (that is, $57,500 to $172,500). In
mid-July, Tews and Richardson exchanged emails about Tews’s suggestion that he
4
See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.302(d)(2) (providing that an LLC’s manager need not be a member). Tews’s petition and other parts of the record use the term “managers.” For purposes of this appeal, we assume by “directors,” the parties mean “managers.” Id. § 101.002(b)(4) (providing that for purposes of that section, a reference to “directors” of a manager-managed LLC is a reference to the managers); Jongebloed v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, No. 03-08-00154-CV, 2009 WL 2837698, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Generally speaking, a limited liability corporation is governed by one or more ‘managers,’ similar to directors in a business corporation.”).
4
remain with Falcon after the sale. Richardson characterized the idea as “a win-win for
[Tews] and ‘old’ Falcon” because it would give Tews “a great runway” and would help
with Falcon Steel’s wind-down. The emails did not discuss how long after the sale
Tews would stay on.
On August 5, 2019, Tews met with Richardson, Ganss, and Kramp to discuss
severance and bonus payments that Tews believed he was owed under the offer letter.
At that time, in addition to being ReignRock members, Ganss was acting as Falcon
Steel’s president and was one of its managers, and Kramp was its CEO and one of its
managers. Tews alleged that at the meeting, he and the others reached an agreement
that he would receive a $230,000 severance payment and another $230,000 in bonus
payments—$57,500 as an OTI bonus (the amount provided for in his offer letter) and
$172,500 as a retention bonus (the upper end of the bonus authorized by the
company’s managers in April 2019).
Tews’s duties included approving payroll. On August 19, Richardson emailed
Tews, Ganss, and Kramp, telling Tews that for payroll that week, he should include
$50,000 for himself as a retention bonus.
On August 23, Tews authorized a bonus payment to himself. On August 30, he
authorized another bonus payment and a $230,000 severance payment. He “grossed
up” the bonus payments to account for taxes, resulting in the company paying
$375,960.15 and his receiving $230,000. When Falcon Steel later issued a W-2 to Tews
5
for 2019, it reflected “[w]ages, tips, [and] other compensation” to Tews of
$781,762.10.
On Saturday, September 14, 2019, Tews emailed Richardson, Kramp, Ganss,
and Falcon Steel’s other two managers to say that his CFO responsibilities no longer
existed and that beginning on September 20, he would be spending his time with a
family member undergoing cancer treatment. He noted that wind-down activities were
in progress, and he indicated who should handle his remaining duties. On September
30, Kramp replied with an email from Richardson’s email address, copying Ganss and
the two other Falcon Steel managers. The email stated that they had been unable to
reach Tews by phone or text, that he was sending the email to formally accept Tews’s
resignation, and that they hoped that he would spend “a few minutes in the next few
days to transition your responsibilities to the individual we have engaged to assume
your CFO position.” He concluded, “While your departure is a loss for Falcon, we
understand your need to take care of [the family member,] and we’ll be praying for
encouraging results over the next few months.”
The next month, the company authorized payroll to make a $7,500 payment to
Tews, which Appellants claim was intended to bring his retention bonus up to the
lower end that had been authorized by the managers. At that point, Ganss—who had
apparently taken on duties related to payroll—was notified by the company’s former
human resources director that the company’s practice had been to pay bonus
payments “Net to Gross” and that only Tews’s authorization as CFO had been
6
required for HR to process bonus payments and release payroll. During this process,
the company discovered that Tews had already authorized bonus payments and a
severance payment.
Later that month, Falcon Steel demanded that Tews repay the amounts he had
paid to himself. A law firm retained by Falcon Steel sent a letter to Tews5 asserting
that an audit had revealed the payments that he had authorized to himself; that the
$230,000 severance payment and $327,749 bonus payment had not been authorized;
that he was not entitled to any severance payment because he had resigned; that Tews
had refused to repay the money; and that Falcon Steel would “pursue all legal
remedies available to it to recoup these unauthorized payments.” 6 A year later, in
October 2020, the parties participated in mediation, but no agreement was reached.
In March 2021, Andrea Kim, an attorney acting on behalf of Falcon Steel,
prepared a memo (the attorney memo) to HCPD and the Tarrant County District
Attorney’s Office. The memo set out a “summary of theft committed by Dan Tews”
and was provided “to refer matters to the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office
5
In his affidavit attached to his response to the TCPA motion, Tews asserted that the attorneys who sent him the letter were “attorneys for ReignRock and Richardson,” but in the letter, the attorney stated that the firm had been retained by Falcon Steel.
6
This letter was attached to the TCPA motion filed by another attorney, Andrea Kim; Tews originally included her and her law firm as defendants in this proceeding. The trial court subsequently signed an order granting an agreed motion to dismiss the claims against her and the firm.
7
arising from the unlawful appropriation of monies . . . by [Tews].” [Capitalization
altered.] In the memo, the attorney asserted that the payments that Tews had paid
himself had not been authorized. Richardson submitted that memo to HCPD, and a
few days later, he spoke with a police officer there. He subsequently spoke with an
investigator with the District Attorney’s Office and, later, a prosecutor.
The District Attorney’s Office referred the matter to the grand jury, which
indicted Tews for felony theft. However, the charge was eventually dismissed by the
prosecutor, and the arrest was expunged. Tews then brought this suit against
Appellants.7
Appellants filed their TCPA motion. Regarding the defamation and conspiracy
claims, the motion asserted that they were barred by limitations. As for the malicious
prosecution claim, Appellants asserted that Tews could not meet his burden on any of
7
Tews’s petition alleged acts by Kramp and Ganss and alleged without elaboration that they held their manager roles at Falcon Steel “[b]y virtue of ReignRock’s investment” in FSA Holdings, but Tews did not specifically allege which acts of Kramp or Ganss, if any, were taken as ReignRock’s agent (as opposed to as managers or officers of Falcon Steel), and it is not entirely clear whether Tews bases his claims against ReignRock in part on acts of Kramp or Ganss or just on acts by Richardson. Moreover, Richardson is the only ReignRock member sued individually by Tews, and the petition does not specify whether the complained-of acts by Richardson were done as ReignRock’s agent or manager, in his individual capacity, or both. See Keyes v. Weller, 692 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tex. 2024) (noting that corporate agents can be sued for their own tortious acts). However, Appellants state in their brief that Falcon Steel was owned by FSA Holdings “and ultimately managed by ReignRock . . . [and] Richardson.” Because at this stage, neither party has raised issues of capacity or distinguished between the acts of Richardson and those of ReignRock, for purposes of this appeal, neither do we.
8
the claim’s elements, including that he was innocent, that they lacked probable cause
to initiate the criminal proceedings, that they caused the criminal proceedings, and
that they acted with malice. Tews filed a response addressing these arguments. The
trial court dismissed the defamation and conspiracy claims, but it denied the motion
as to the malicious prosecution claim. Appellants now appeal.
Discussion
I. The TCPA
If a defendant who moves for dismissal under the TCPA demonstrates that the
TCPA applies to the plaintiff’s claim, the claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
“establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential
element of the claim in question.” Ferchichi v. Whataburger Rests. LLC, 713 S.W.3d 330,
336 (Tex. 2025) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005). The plaintiff’s burden
“is not remotely equivalent to requiring early proof that the [party] will ultimately
prevail”; rather, “[t]he burden is to produce only ‘the minimum quantum of evidence
necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.’” Borgelt v.
Austin Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 975, 692 S.W.3d 288, 311 (Tex. 2024) (quoting In
re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)).
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the defendant will
nevertheless be entitled to dismissal if it “establishes an affirmative defense or other
grounds” on which it is entitled “to judgment as a matter of law.” Ferchichi,
9
713 S.W.3d at 336 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(d)). If the defendant
cannot meet that burden, the motion must be denied. Id.
In ruling on the motion, the trial court considers (1) the pleadings, (2) evidence
that a court could consider under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, and
(3) “supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or
defense is based.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.006; MFG Fin., Inc. v. Hamlin,
No. 03-19-00716-CV, 2021 WL 2231256, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 3, 2021, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). However, “conclusory statements” and “general allegations”
reciting a claim’s elements contained in a pleading do not constitute clear and specific
evidence. MFG Fin., 2021 WL 2231256, at *5.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a TCPA motion. Beving v. Beadles,
563 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied). “We view the
pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Darrigan v. Am.
Prospect, Inc., No. 02-24-00061-CV, 2025 WL 2423579, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 21, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
II. The TCPA Evidence
The parties do not dispute that the TCPA applies to Tews’s malicious
prosecution claim. See Whitelock v. Stewart, No. 10-23-00132-CV, 2025 WL 2473021, at
*2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 28, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); McShirley v. Lucas,
No. 02-23-00229-CV, 2024 WL 976512, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 7, 2024,
pet. denied) (mem. op.). The parties therefore focus on the other two TCPA steps.
10
Appellants argue under their first issue that the trial court erred by holding that
Tews had met his burden of establishing by clear and specific evidence a prima facie
case for each essential element of his malicious prosecution claim. They contend that
the information that they provided to law enforcement was true. They further
contend that “three layers of independent decisionmakers (the police, a prosecutor,
and a grand jury) all exercised independent discretion to advance the prosecution,”
and “there is no evidence that any governmental decisionmaker would not have
prosecuted Tews but for the information [that Appellants] provided to police.”
A. Evidence related to Tews’s hiring and the company’s financial
condition
We first discuss the evidence related to the terms of Tews’s employment, his
responsibilities, and the company’s management. We begin with Tews’s pleadings and
the allegations therein to the extent that they contain enough detail to show the
factual basis for his claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.006; MFG Fin.,
2021 WL 2231256, at *5; see also Hay v. eCORP Int’l, LLC, No. 14-20-00771-CV,
2022 WL 3592613, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 23, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (noting that in determining whether plaintiff met burden to establish
prima facie case in response to TCPA motion, we consider only the pleadings and
evidence in favor of the plaintiff’s case). Tews alleged that
• ReignRock’s partnership includes Richardson, Ganss, and Kramp, and
through FSA Holdings, “ReignRock and its partners invested in Falcon
Steel.”
11
• Ganss and Kramp served as two of Falcon Steel’s managers “[b]y virtue
of ReignRock’s investment” in FSA Holdings. 8
• Tews was hired to be Falcon Steel’s CFO in November 2018.
• Kramp became Falcon Steel’s interim CEO, and he delegated multiple
administrative tasks to Tews, including authorizing employee pay.
• Falcon Steel had financial difficulties, and its assets were ultimately sold.
Before the sale, in April 2019, Falcon Steel’s board of directors
authorized payment to Tews of up to $172,500 to induce him to stay
through the asset sale process.
The evidence attached to Tews’s TCPA response included his own affidavit. In
the affidavit, he stated that after he began working at the company, he “discovered
that the company was enduring a number of challenges, many of which stemmed
from” the former Falcon Steel leaders’ “mismanaging” the company’s “financials.” He
further stated that “[a]s the sale process moved forward, [he] became increasingly
concerned that ReignRock and Richardson might not honor their promises regarding
[his] compensation,” so he “contacted them several times in late July and early August
2019 to receive assurances.”
8
Per Falcon Steel’s company agreement, the entity was manager managed. The record reflects that Ganss and Kramp, both ReignRock members, were Falcon Steel managers, but it does not reflect that ReignRock ever was. Further, Richardson was mentioned as a Falcon Steel manager only in the July 31, 2019 “Unanimous Written Consent of Managers” sent by Tews to Richardson, Ganss, and Kramp, discussed below. But as noted above, Appellants state in their brief that Falcon Steel was owned by FSA Holdings “and ultimately managed by ReignRock . . . [and] Richardson.”
12
B. Evidence related to the end of Tews’s employment and the disputed
payments
Tews alleged in his petition that his employment with Falcon Steel ended in
September 2019.9 He alleged that his employment was terminated, and to support that
assertion, he asserted that
• Kramp had confirmed to him in June 2019 that his position would be
terminated upon finalization of the asset sale;
• Ganss referred to him as the “former CFO” in correspondence with the
company’s insurance agent 10;
• his health, life, and short- and long-term disability insurance were
terminated as of September 1, 2019; and
• on August 2, 2019, Falcon Steel’s board of directors sent a
company-wide email acknowledging Tews for his hard work and
recognizing that the asset sale was terminating Tews’s position as CFO.
Tews provided miscellaneous documents relating to the end of his
employment, some of which suggested that he would be staying on after the asset
sale. One such document was the July 2019 email discussed above in which
Richardson agreed with Tews that it was a good idea for him to stay on with “old
9
Tews alleged that he was “constructively discharged.” He did not include any factual allegations related to discrimination or intolerable conditions. See, e.g., Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016) (stating that constructive discharge claim requires plaintiff to prove discrimination by employer “to the point where a reasonable person in [that] position would have felt compelled to resign”); Cox v. Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 424, 433 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (stating similar).
However, as discussed below, those emails listed Tews as an employee who
10
would be staying on to manage the company’s wind-down.
13
Falcon” after the sale. Tews also produced emails relating to insurance coverage after
the sale and during the company’s wind-down. Those emails stated that Tews, the
“former CFO,” would be “staying on to manage the closure,” and he was included in
the company’s “windup coverage.” Another email stated that Tews would “stay on to
collect AR,” “manage the paydown of the company’s existing accruals and payables,”
and perform several other duties. But as noted above, Tews pled that Falcon Steel’s
board of directors had announced that his position would be terminated with the
asset sale, and in his affidavit he denied that he had resigned.
Appellants’ TCPA motion offered a different version of the end of Tews’s
employment. Richardson’s affidavit stated that on September 14, Tews had emailed
Richardson, Kramp, and Ganss “to announce his resignation,” which surprised them
because they “had understood that Tews would continue working into the first
quarter of 2020.” After they were unsuccessful at reaching Tews by telephone to
discuss the matter, Richardson emailed on Kramp’s behalf to accept the resignation.
Richardson attached the emails to his affidavit. Tews stated in his email
addressed to Kramp, Ganss, the other two Falcon Steel managers, and Richardson,
Gentlemen,
With the sale of assets and change of control at Falcon, my
responsibilities as CFO no longer exist.[11] The defined wind[-]down
Tews’s affidavit did not address this email directly but asserted that the
11
Appellants’ “repeated statements that [he] resigned from [his] position as CFO . . . were false. [His] role as CFO of Falcon Steel ceased to exist when the sale of the business closed in August 2019.” Tews’s offer letter provided for severance “[s]hould
14
activities are in-progress and with respect to the remaining debt
resolution, this should be handled through an independent 3rd party.
I believe that our paths crossed for a reason. It has been my pleasure to
get to know each one of you on a personal level. Beginning Friday
September 20th, I will spend my time helping [his family member]
through her chemo therapy [sic] and healing.
I will transition my pending items to [another employee] during the week
of September 16th. Thank you and God[ ]speed.
Richardson’s reply email on Kramp’s behalf noted that they were accepting his
resignation, that the company had hired someone to assume Tews’s ongoing
responsibilities, and that they would appreciate Tews’s cooperation in transitioning
those responsibilities. The email concluded by stating that Tews’s departure was “a
loss for Falcon.”
C. Evidence related to whether the parties had agreed to the payments
As for the disputed payments, Tews alleged in his petition that Richardson,
Kramp, and Ganss had all agreed to them. According to Tews,
• On August 5, 2019, Tews met with Richardson, Kramp, and Ganss for
lunch, “and in that meeting[,] it was agreed that Tews would be paid his
severance, OTI bonus, and retention bonus,” and that “[i]n all, [they]
agreed that Tews would receive $460,000.”
• Tews authorized payments to himself on August 23 and August 30,
2019. These payments were documented in Falcon Steel’s internal
[he] be terminated without cause.” It is not clear from their arguments whether the parties disagree about whether this provision applied only if the company entirely terminated his employment with the company or if it also applied if his employment continued but in a different role or in winding up the company. We need not resolve the question at this stage, as explained below.
15
employee earnings record as “bonus” and “severance,” and they were
included in Tews’s W-2, issued in early 2020, as earned income.
• After Tews’s employment ended, he nevertheless continued to help with
transition activities for the company through September 28, and during
that time, Richardson and Ganss had meetings about the company’s cash
flows, and at those meetings, the payments to Tews “were reflected and
addressed.”
In Tews’s affidavit, he referenced the Falcon Steel managers’ April
2019 consent authorizing the CEO to pay Tews a retention bonus of up to 75% of his
base pay, and he attached the document to his response.
Tews also reiterated in his affidavit that at the August 5 meeting, Richardson,
Kramp, and Ganss had agreed that he would receive $460,000: $230,000 as a
severance payment, $172,500 as a retention bonus, and $57,500 as an OTI bonus.
Tews further stated that he was entitled to the $230,000 severance payment under the
terms of his offer letter because his role was eliminated without cause within one year;
that the retention bonus was “in accordance with” the April 2019 managers’ consent;
and that the OTI bonus was “for [his] work managing the company’s liquidity
through the sale date and overseeing the successful sale of the company.” Tews stated
the agreement reached at the meeting “was memorialized by Richardson’s
handwritten note” on a copy of Tews’s offer letter. Tews attached the offer letter
copy, which had the following written in the upper right corner:
16
Dan
Severance 230,000
OTI 57,500
Retention Bonus 172,500
$460,000
0
Tews asserted that the “0” had been written by Richardson “to signify that these sums
would not be paid if Tews revealed the fact that a large percentage of the workers at [a
Falcon Steel facility] were undocumented.”
Tews also attached an email that he had sent to the other three men that day
telling them, “Thanks again for today’s discussion. Please see the attached proposed
structure.” The attached chart showed how Tews proposed structuring the severance
and bonus payments over several months. Richardson replied to the email stating that
they would discuss the matter and get back to him.
Tews attached an email sent from Richardson to Ganss on August 19, 2019—
two weeks after the August 5 meeting—with the subject line, “RE: MICA 12 Valuation
Analysis – updated 7.15ll.xlsx” and stating that he was attaching “the latest
spreadsheet with the final numbers from all 3 closings.” The attached spreadsheet had
an entry for “Other Expenses,” with the note “stay bonuses / other,” and the next
page listed “Stay bonuses” for three people, including “Dan.” The amount listed was
12
MICA Steelworks, Inc. was one of the buyers of Falcon Steel’s assets.
17
$165,000, which was less than the retention bonus that Tews ultimately paid himself
but more than the amount that Appellants claimed had been authorized.
Tews further attached to his response copies of what he claimed were
documents evidencing payments from three vendors, and he stated in his affidavit
that “[o]nce those payments were received, and because [he] had full authorization to
do so, [he] directed the payments for [his] agreed severance and bonus to be paid on
August 23 and 30, 2019, consistent with the August 5 agreement.”
Tews also included documents reflecting that in Falcon Steel’s own
documentation, it had not classified the payments to him as theft. First, Tews attached
some pages from the company’s employee earnings records, which described the
payments as severance and bonus payments.13 Second, Tews attached the W-2 issued
to him by Falcon Steel for tax year 2019, and it reflected that the company had paid
Tews $781,762.10 as “[w]ages, tips, [and] other compensation.”
In Appellants’ version, the extra payments had merely been discussed and had
never been agreed to. Appellants attached to their TCPA motion Richardson’s
affidavit and other exhibits, and Richardson’s affidavit discussed the April
2019 managers’ consent, asserting that it left payment of a retention bonus to the
CEO’s discretion. He then stated that on July 31, 2019, Tews had emailed him,
The documents do not reflect whether Tews or someone else had designated
13
them as such in the statements.
18
Kramp, and Ganss a proposal for Tews to receive bonuses and severance totaling
$460,000 over installments beginning on August 9.
Richardson attached the July 31 email; in it, Tews stated, “I know that this
process has been extremely painful for all of us and I regret that,” but “you are both
[sic] aware . . . what I have done for this company. . . . Therefore, I ask that this
Consent please be signed by Friday August 2nd.” The email attached a draft
document that would give Falcon Steel’s managers’ approval for the bonuses and
severance payment at issue in this case. According to Richardson, the consent was
never signed. Tews sent this email approximately two weeks after he and Richardson
had exchanged emails about Tews’s idea to stay on after the sale.
Richardson’s affidavit next addressed the August 5 meeting. Richardson agreed
with Tews that the men had reached an agreement that Tews would be eligible for the
amounts he requested, but he gave a different version of the terms; Richardson stated
that the agreement was for Tews to “remain with Falcon Steel through the first
quarter of 2020 and specifically oversee the filing of Falcon Steel’s 2019 tax return.”
Richardson asserted that his note on the copy of Tews’s offer letter memorialized his
understanding of Tews’s proposed terms, which was to receive those funds in return
for helping wind down the company through the first quarter of 2020. Further, he
said that the “0” reflected what he, Kramp, and Ganss would receive over the same
period. At the conclusion of the meeting, Tews was asked to send an updated
proposal to the other three.
19
As noted above, later that day, Tews sent an email with an attached chart
showing the proposed structure of the payments, which Richardson stated was “never
accepted or agreed to.” Richardson further stated that he had called Tews and told
him that the proposal “was not viable from a timing perspective, nor would we agree
to pay his income taxes by ‘grossing up’ the proposed payments.” He said, “Falcon
Steel still had many high-priority debts to pay, . . . and this request was inconsistent
with our August 5, 2019[ ] discussion. There was no agreement, but we planned to
continue discussions.”
Appellants did not address the W-2 or explain why the company’s internal
records classified the payments as severance and bonus rather than as theft or
unauthorized. Richardson did, however, assert that Tews was aware that the company
could not afford to pay him what he wanted. Richardson attached a September 17,
2019 email from Tews to a vendor reflecting that awareness. Tews had responded in
the email to a vendor’s inquiry about payment, and Tews responded to explain the
company’s financial difficulties and request a settlement of the amount owed:
Falcon was forced by our secured lender to sell all of Falcon Steel’s
assets and the sale proceeds were insufficient to cover the secured debt
holders. We also have $11.2M of unsecured creditors. Accordingly, we
are under-going an orderly liquidation process. I reviewed your account
with the [board] and they have authorized me to settle outstanding
A/P . . . at $0.35/$1.00 . . . . Again, I regret this circumstance[,] however,
please know that available cash will soon be exhausted and an
expeditious settlement is in your best interest.
The vendor agreed to the offer.
20
Appellants also attached an August 19 email from Richardson to Tews, Ganss,
and Kramp stating that for payroll that week, $50,000 should be included for Tews as
a retention bonus payment.
D. Evidence related to discovery of the payments and the criminal
proceedings
As for the parties’ disputing the payments and the instigation of criminal
proceedings, Tews alleged in his petition that the company demanded the money back
in 2019 and then waited until 2021 to instigate criminal proceedings:
• In October 2019, a law firm retained by Richardson, Kramp, and Ganss
demanded that Tews return the severance and bonus payments on the
basis that they had not been authorized;
• The parties participated in mediation the next year, but no resolution
was reached; and
• In 2021, Richardson submitted a criminal complaint to HCPD, and a
criminal referral was also submitted to the Tarrant County District
Attorney’s Office. The District Attorney’s Office opened an
investigation, and a grand jury indicted him for felony theft. This case
was dismissed, and the arrest was expunged.
To his TCPA response, Tews attached documents related to the criminal
investigation and Richardson’s role in it, including the attorney memo submitted to
HCPD,14 Richardson’s notes on some conversations he had with law enforcement,
and emails relating to the criminal case.
14
The attorney memo had exhibits that Tews did not include.
21
The attorney memo asserted that the payments to Tews had not been
authorized:
• “Tews became eligible to receive a discretionary Retention Bonus of
$57,500–$172,500” after the asset sale closed in August 2019.
• “[S]hortly after the closing . . . , Tews and members of [Falcon Steel’s]
Board attended a meeting where it was discussed that the company’s
ability to pay Tews the high-end range of his proposed bonus was
dependent upon its ability to collect outstanding receivables that Falcon
Steel retained as part of the Asset Sale which represented its only
remaining significant assets.” But Falcon Steel had “millions of dollars in
trade debts outstanding” and struggled to collect receivables.
• In August 2019, Richardson authorized Tews to include in payroll a
$50,000 payment to himself as a partial payment of the retention bonus.
• In mid-September 2019, Tews resigned, which disqualified him from
receiving a severance payment. He nevertheless caused Falcon Steel to
issue to him a $230,000 severance payment and a bonus payment
exceeding what had been authorized.
Richardson’s notes addressed his involvement in the start of the criminal
investigation into Tews:
• On March 15, he called “Sgt. Boykin,” who was apparently with the Fort
Worth Police Department. However, his notes further state that because
the “crime [was] committed in Haltom City, . . . [we] will need to work
with the HC Police Dept.”
• On March 22, he went to HCPD and discussed the case with an officer
there. The next day, Richardson sent further information at the officer’s
request.
• On April 20, he spoke to someone with the Tarrant County District
Attorney’s Office, who requested further information such as “payroll
information,” “job description,” “bonus histories,” and “direct deposit
records.” [Capitalization altered.] Richardson noted that “[e]verything
22
collected goes to financial analyst,” then to a prosecutor, and then
“[p]rosecutor takes to grand jury.”
The emails that Tews attached had been exchanged among Richardson, a
District Attorney’s Office investigator, and a prosecutor. These emails showed
Richardson communicating with the prosecutor and providing evidence to her as the
case developed:
• In one of the emails, the investigator asked if Tews owned a share “of
the company.” Richardson replied that Tews had purchased equity in
FSA Holdings, which owned Falcon Steel, but “[h]e did not have any
direct ownership in Falcon Steel. . . . This was a smoke screen and
simply a threat to try to get us to pay him.”
• He went on, “[Tews] did not prevail with the TWC.[15] He also alleged
the company had hired numerous illegal workers and that we threatened
him to stay quiet or he wouldn’t receive any severance. After his
departure, he started fabricating a lot of stories to justify his theft.”
• In December 2023, the prosecutor assigned to the case emailed
Richardson to request various documents related to Tews. Over several
emails, Richardson listed categories of documents that he would
assemble per the prosecutor’s request and stated that Tews’s defense
team could take “as much time as necessary in the storage unit to review
the contents.”
• In February 2024, Richardson submitted to the prosecutor and
investigator affidavits from Ganss and Kramp. Tews attached affidavits
from Ganss and Kramp to his response, and based on their dates, these
seem to be the affidavits that had been submitted to law enforcement.
Ganss’s affidavit stated that he had served as Falcon Steel’s president
from July 2019 until the company’s termination in December 2020, that
Tews had been authorized to receive a $50,000 retention bonus, and that
15
In an email with the prosecutor, Richardson mentioned Tews’s “Texas Workforce Commission wage case and ruling” as being resolved “in Falcon’s favor,” but the record contains no further information about the matter.
23
as president, Ganss had not authorized paying the additional amounts to
Tews.
• Kramps’s affidavit was essentially the same but reflected that he had
served as Falcon Steel’s CEO from March 2019 on.
• In March 2024, the investigator emailed Richardson to set up a meeting
with another investigator and the prosecutor. After the meeting,
Richardson emailed to say, “[I]n thinking about the spreadsheet you
showed us yesterday wherein the bonuses curiously added up to the total
[Tews] distributed, I can’t find anything [that] corresponds with that
document. I’m wondering if [Tews] purported to receive the document
via email as I’d like to see the transmission if possible.” He concluded, “I
think it’s forged as well.”
• About two weeks later, the investigator emailed Richardson to ask if
“Rei[g]nRock/Falcon Steel [had] report[ed] the Tews theft amount on a
W2 or 10-99 Misc [sic],” and, if so, could Richardson provide a copy of
it. Richardson provided a copy of Tews’s 2019 W-2 and Falcon Steel’s
employee earnings record for Tews, both discussed above.
• In April 2024, the prosecutor told Richardson that the matter was under
investigation by the grand jury.
• In September 2024, the prosecutor informed Richardson that she had
decided to dismiss the case “based upon information provided to me
this morning under Rule 511 and based upon information previously
provided to [Richardson] in [their] discussions.”
In addition to these emails, Tews also attached a copy of the report written by
the Haltom City police officer who had spoken to Richardson and then passed the
matter along to a detective for investigation. In the report, the officer noted that
Richardson had said that he wanted Tews to go to jail. Richardson had also told the
24
officer that Tews had a small ownership interest in FSA Holdings but was not an
owner of Falcon Steel.16
Finally, Tews attached a copy of the order expunging records of his arrest.
As for Appellants’ evidence, Richardson’s affidavit stated that the payments
had been discovered when the company decided to pay Tews another $7,500 bonus
payment on top of the previously authorized $50,000. Emails attached by Richardson
in support of these statements included one to him from Falcon Steel’s former human
resources director stating that “Dan advise[d] [that] Reign[R]ock has accepted his
resignation” and asking for the resignation’s effective date “to confirm when his
16
Tews alleged below and on appeal that he was part owner of Falcon Steel. The only evidence to show that he had a direct ownership interest in Falcon Steel was his affidavit statement that he had been granted management incentive units as part of his employment. He then stated that his “ownership level in Falcon Steel was noted in a memorandum sent to [him] by Richardson.” But that memo reflected that Tews had a 1.08% ownership interest in FSA Holdings, not Falcon Steel, and Tews presented no other evidence that he had exercised his right under the offer letter to become an equity investor in Falcon Steel or that his interest in any “management pool units” had ever vested. On appeal, Tews points to a flowchart related to a December 2018 amendment to Falcon Steel’s company agreement. The chart seemed to show that the company’s “management team” owned or in the future would own 13.4% of the company. But the chart does not show whether the “management team” included officers as well as managers. Further, the chart appeared to be part of an exhibit to the agreement, and the exhibit further stated that FSA Holdings owned all of Falcon Steel’s Class A shares and that ownership of any Class B shares would be “determined subsequently by the Management.” The exhibit did not reflect that any Class B shares were outstanding at that time, and these documents do not reflect that Tews or anyone else had ever been given any Class B shares. But we need not determine whether he held a direct ownership interest in the company to resolve the appeal.
25
payroll cuts off.” Richardson told her to treat Tews’s last day as September 27 and to
include in his final paycheck “an additional $7,500 Retention Bonus.”
Appellants attached the attorney memo, which included as an exhibit Ganss’s
affidavit. The affidavit attached emails that he had exchanged with Falcon Steel’s
former HR director in October 2019 in which Ganss had learned that the company
had been “grossing up” bonus payments to account for taxes; that the bonus
payments authorized by Tews had been “processed under [his] authority, discretion,
and direction . . . as CFO and officer of the company”; and thus that “no additional
authorizations would have been required before Human Resources processed th[o]se
transactions.”
Regarding the attorney memo, Richardson stated in his affidavit, “When I
delivered [it] to HCPD . . . , I believed that all the statements [within it] were true, and
I so believe today.” In Appellants’ reply to Tews’s TCPA response, they argued that
“everything [they] reported to law enforcement was true. The only fact Tews alleges
that [Appellants] falsely furnished was [his] ownership of the criminal victim, but on
that point, Tews is wrong on both the facts and law.”
III. Tews Met His Burden as to the Challenged Elements
We first address Appellants’ argument that we must consider their evidence,
including evidence unfavorable to Tews, in determining whether he met his prima
facie burden. The TCPA motion to dismiss stage is a “clearing of an initial hurdle,”
“not a battle of evidence,” USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead PC, 669 S.W.3d 195,
26
205 (Tex. 2023), and this court has held that we consider evidence favorable to the
nonmovant in determining whether the nonmovant has met their burden of
establishing a prima facie case, Vu v. Tran, No. 02-21-00059-CV, 2021 WL 3679245,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). As the Texas
Supreme Court has said, the nonmovant’s evidence “need not be conclusive,
uncontroverted, or found credible.” USA Lending Grp., 669 S.W.3d at 200. We apply
these standards here.
In Appellants’ reply brief, they argue that we may alternatively consider
whether their evidence established their right to judgment as a matter of law under the
TCPA’s third step. However, as we will discuss, their evidence raises “a battle of
evidence” rather than establishing their right to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Tews established causation and innocence
1. Causation in malicious prosecution
A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution claim must establish that the defendant
caused the criminal prosecution against the plaintiff. Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co.,
952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997). To prove causation, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant initiated or procured the action. Id.
A person “initiates” a criminal prosecution by making a formal charge to law
enforcement authorities. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex.
1994). A person “procures” criminal proceedings if the person’s actions “were enough
to cause the prosecution, and but for [those] actions the prosecution would not have
27
occurred.” Id.; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. 2002).
Generally, “procurement of criminal proceedings requires a direction or request for
the action taken,” and “merely reporting a crime and the suspected criminal to law
enforcement authorities does not constitute procurement . . . when the authorities
exercise discretion in deciding whether to prosecute.” Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d at
509 (footnotes omitted).
However, “an intelligent exercise of the officer’s discretion becomes
impossible” when the person reporting criminal activity provides information that the
person knows is false. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at 293–94 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 653, cmt. g). Consequently, a person “‘who provides false information cannot
complain if a prosecutor acts on it [and] cannot be heard to contend that the
prosecutor should have known better.’” Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d at 509 (quoting Lieck,
881 S.W.2d at 294).
Nevertheless, showing that the defendant supplied false information is not
sufficient on its own to prove procurement. Rather, “there must be proof that the
prosecutor acted based on the false information and that but for such false information
the decision would not have been made.” King v. Graham, 126 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex.
2003) (emphasis added); see In re Bexar Cnty. Crim. Dist. Atty’s Off., 224 S.W.3d 182,
185 (Tex. 2007). “Causation cannot be inferred solely from the falsity of statements
except possibly when the only information the decision maker relied on to prosecute
was false.” Vu, 2021 WL 3679245, at *5; see King, 126 S.W.3d at 79.
28
Here, the allegedly false information that Appellants provided included
statements about whether Tews was authorized to order the payments to be issued to
himself, information that is directly relevant to whether he committed theft. A person
commits theft when the person “unlawfully appropriates property with intent to
deprive the owner[17] of property,” and appropriation of property is unlawful if it is
without the owner’s consent. Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(a), (b)(1). Thus, to prove theft
as alleged in this case, the State would have had to prove that Tews did not have the
consent of Falcon Steel or a person authorized to act for it. However, Tews produced
clear and specific evidence that Falcon Steel had agreed to his bonus and severance
payments.
Tews’s offer letter stated that he would be entitled to a $230,000 severance
payment “[s]hould [he] be terminated without cause” within the first year. His petition
and affidavit offered clear and specific evidence that he left before the end of his first
year and that his CFO position was eliminated due to the sale of the company rather
than for cause. He specifically pled that Kramp had confirmed to him that his
position would be terminated upon finalization of the asset sale; that Falcon Steel’s
board of directors sent a company-wide email on August 2, 2019 stating that the asset
17
For purposes of the theft offense, “‘[e]ffective consent’ includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner.” Tex. Penal Code § 31.01.
29
sale was terminating Tews’s position as CFO; and that his health, life, and short- and
long-term disability insurance were terminated as of September 1, 2019. 18
Tews additionally alleged that Ganss referred to him as the “former CFO” in
correspondence with the company’s insurance agent. But Tews attached those emails
to his TCPA response, and while the phrase “former CFO” was used, the emails
discussed the fact that Tews was one of the employees who would be staying on after
the asset sale to manage the company’s closure, and the emails discussed the duties
that Tews would continue to perform during that time. Thus, in context, the “former
CFO” language in the emails is some indication that his position as CFO was being
eliminated but does not show that Tews’s employment was being terminated. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Tews, as we must, these emails also do not
say for how long Tews would stay on after the sale, nor do they negate Tews’s
allegation that Kramp and the board of managers said that his position was being
terminated after the sale and that his insurance was terminated as of September 1,
2019.
Similarly, the July 2019 email between Tews and Richardson about Tews
staying on after the sale did not negate Tews’s evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to Tews. This email exchange happened before the asset sale closed in
There is no indication in the record of whether the company provided such
18
insurance for any employee who remained with the company to manage the wind-down.
30
mid-August 2019. Further, Richardson stated in his email that he had talked to
“Steve” (presumably Ganss) about it, but he did not say that he had spoken to
Kramp, and it was Kramp who, according to Tews, said that Tews’s job would end
after the sale. Additionally, even if Richardson, Ganss, and Kramp had all agreed in
July that Tews would stay on, that would not prevent them from subsequently
deciding otherwise, and more importantly, it would not prevent them from deciding
that he was entitled to a severance payment regardless. That is, regardless of whether
the offer letter authorized severance only if the company terminated his employment
or also if it terminated his position as CFO and continued his employment in some
other capacity, Appellants could have agreed to pay him severance.
Regarding the bonus payments, the April 2019 consent of the managers was
evidence that the CEO had the discretion to pay Tews up to $172,500 as a retention
bonus. His offer letter stated that he would be eligible for an OTI bonus of
$57,500 upon meeting goals that were defined and agreed upon jointly with the CEO.
Thus, Kramp had the authority to approve those amounts for retention and OTI
bonuses. Nothing in the evidence presented by Tews—or Appellants, for that
matter—indicated that Kramp had no authority as CEO to authorize the payments
that had already been agreed to in the April 2019 managers’ consent (with respect to
the retention bonus) and in Tews’s offer letter (with respect to the OTI bonus and
severance). Cf. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.254 (discussing when an LLC’s agent’s act
31
for purposes of carrying out the company’s ordinary course of business will bind the
company).
Further, Tews stated in his affidavit that in August 2019, Kramp, Ganss, and
Richardson agreed to the payments. Not only were Kramp and Ganss officers of
Falcon Steel, but they were also managers. 19 Additionally, Tews alleged in his petition
that after his September 1 termination, he continued to support Falcon Steel’s
transition activities through September 28 and that during those weeks, Richardson
and Ganss had meetings in which the payments made to Tews “were reflected and
addressed,” meaning that they were aware of the payments at that time.
Appellants argue that, given the offer letter, the April 2019 managers’ consent,
and the draft consent proposed by Tews in July 2019, it would be “neither reasonable
nor legally appropriate” to conclude that Falcon Steel would pay Tews based on an
oral agreement made at the August 5, 2019 meeting. They further point to the fact
that Falcon Steel’s attorneys began demanding return of the money soon after the
company discovered the payments in October 2019.
But that evidence merely raises a fact issue for the jury. Cf. McShirley,
2024 WL 976512, at *7 (noting, in suit involving defamation claim, that at the TCPA
stage, where the plaintiff claims that an event did not occur and the defendant stated
that it did, the plaintiff’s denial can satisfy the burden to present prima facie evidence
Further, they and Richardson were members of ReignRock, which according
19
to Appellants, managed Falcon Steel.
32
that defendant’s statement was false). Appellants have not directed us to any company
policy or any part of the company agreement that required such payments to be
approved by the company’s managers in writing, especially when they had already
been put in writing in the April 2019 consent and Tews’s offer letter. To the contrary,
Richadson stated in his affidavit that at the August 5 meeting, the parties had agreed
that Tews would be eligible to receive the payments, although he disagreed about
when. He did not assert that the three men were not “legally authorized to act for”
Falcon Steel for purposes of the theft statute, see Tex. Penal Code § 31.01, and Tews
presented evidence that they had agreed to the payments.
Tews also presented evidence that the payments were designated in Falcon
Steel’s employee earnings records as bonuses and severance and did not indicate that
they were unauthorized. Further, the payments were included in Tews’s W-2 as
compensation. These records do not show who designated the payments that way or
when, but in this step of our analysis, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to Tews. See Darrigan, 2025 WL 2423579, at *5. These records are some evidence that
the payments had been approved, and Appellants produced no evidence explaining
how these documents were prepared, why the payments were so designated, or why
the company never amended them to reflect that the payments were unauthorized. 20
20
Tews argued in his petition that by the time Falcon Steel issued his W-2, Richardson had full control of the company’s “payroll account along with its financials,” and he then concluded that Richardson had therefore reviewed the payments and agreed that they were earned income. But the record does not support a
33
In summary, Tews presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
that his authorizing the payments to himself was with the company’s consent—that is,
that he was innocent of theft—and that Appellants’ statements to the contrary were
false.
Tews further established a prima facie case that the prosecution would not
have happened but for the false statements. Tews did not provide an opinion from
the prosecutor that her decision to present the case to the grand jury and move
forward with the case had been based on false information supplied by Appellants,
nor did he present any other direct evidence of the prosecutor’s reasoning. See King,
126 S.W.3d at 78 (noting lack of any evidence, such as an opinion from the district
attorney, that the prosecution had been based on provision of false information).
However, neither a prosecutor’s testimony nor any other direct evidence of causation
is required, Bexar Cnty. Crim. Dist. Atty’s Off., 224 S.W.3d at 186, and no such evidence
was necessary given the circumstances of this case.
Even if the prosecutor had access to all of Falcon Steel’s company records, she
could not have determined that Tews acted without consent unless she was told that
by Richardson, Kramp, and Ganss. They were the people at the meeting with Tews at
which it was allegedly agreed that he was entitled to the payments. Further, according
conclusion that Richardson had reviewed the payroll records and payment classifications before the W-2 was issued. On the other hand, as stated, Appellants presented no explanation for why the W-2 had never been amended or why it was issued in the first place with the payments classified as compensation.
34
to Tews’s petition and evidence, it was Kramp who told him that his employment was
ending with the sale. It was Kramp who would have worked with Tews to set goals
for the OTI bonus, and it was Kramp who had the discretion to authorize the higher
end of the retention bonus. Based on the record before this court and viewing the
record in the light most favorable to Tews, information about that meeting and about
whether he was entitled to the payments could have only come from those three men.
Thus, on this record, the statements were the but-for cause of the proceedings.
Appellants’ evidence that they had not agreed to the payments merely raised a fact
issue. See Hay, 2022 WL 3592613, at *9 (holding that because plaintiff brought
forward clear and specific evidence of challenged element, plaintiff met burden under
TCPA’s second step even if plaintiff’s evidence was disputed); Straehla v. AL Glob.
Servs., LLC, 619 S.W.3d 795, 813 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pets. denied)
(stating that movant failed to establish defense as a matter of law when material fact
issues existed).
Because Tews made a prima facie case of procurement, and Appellants did not
establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on this element, we overrule
this part of Appellants’ first issue.
B. Probable Cause
We next address the probable-cause element of malicious prosecution.
A plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim must prove that the
defendant lacked probable cause to initiate or procure the proceedings. Richey,
35
952 S.W.2d at 517. “The probable-cause determination asks whether a reasonable
person would believe that a crime had been committed given the facts as the
complainant honestly and reasonably believed them to be before the criminal
proceedings were instituted.” Id. A defendant’s failure to fully and fairly disclose all
relevant facts to law enforcement does not negate the reasonableness of the
complainant’s belief, and thus “failing to fully and fairly disclose all material
information and knowingly providing false information to the prosecutor” are not
relevant to probable cause. Id. at 519. Instead, such acts relate to causation and to the
defendant’s malice in filing the charge, an element discussed below. Id.
“[T]here is an initial presumption in malicious prosecution actions that the
defendant acted reasonably and in good faith and had probable cause to initiate the
proceedings.” Id. at 517. This is because “it is more important that a private citizen
report an apparent subversion of our laws than for the wrongly accused to attain
monetary redress from the accuser.” Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788,
794 (Tex. 2006). Thus, a defendant’s good faith is presumed, and the plaintiff is
required to rebut the presumption. Id. The plaintiff therefore has the initial burden to
produce evidence “that the motives, grounds, beliefs, and other evidence upon which
the defendant acted did not constitute probable cause.” Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 518.
Once the plaintiff meets this burden, “[t]he burden then shifts to the defendant to
offer proof of probable cause.” Id.
36
The existence of probable cause “is a question of law or a mixed question of
law and fact [and] depends on whether the parties dispute the underlying facts.” Id.
When the facts are not disputed, “and there is no conflict in the evidence directed to
that issue, the question of probable cause is a question of law” for the trial court. Id.
(quoting Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320, 323 (1885)). But when the parties dispute the
facts underlying the defendant’s decision to prosecute, the factfinder “must weigh
evidence and resolve conflicts to determine if probable cause exists, as a mixed
question of law and fact.” Id.
Here, much of the evidence that Tews relied on to establish causation is also
relevant to probable cause. Tews established a prima facie case that Richardson,
Ganss, and Kramp had agreed on the payments. If that was the case, then they knew
that Tews had consent and that his actions did not constitute theft. A reasonable
person with that knowledge would not believe that a crime had been committed, and
Tews therefore established a prima facie case that Appellants lacked probable cause to
procure criminal proceedings. See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 (setting out probable cause
standard).
Appellants produced evidence denying that an agreement had been reached or
that Tews was entitled to the payments and asserting that Richardson believed that no
agreement had been reached. But that evidence merely contradicted Tews’s version of
events, raising a fact issue. Because the TCPA stage is not a battle of the evidence, and
we can consider Tews’s evidence even if it is controverted, Appellants’ evidence did
37
not prevent Tews from establishing a prima facie case. See USA Lending Grp.,
669 S.W.3d at 200, 205; cf. West v. Quintanilla, 573 S.W.3d 237, 243 n.9 (Tex. 2019)
(noting that although the movant defendant “vigorously dispute[d] many of [the
nonmovant plaintiff]’s factual allegations,” at the TCPA stage, the court would decide
“only whether [the nonmovant] had established a prima facie case by clear and
specific evidence”). We overrule this part of Appellants’ first issue.
C. Malice
A malicious prosecution plaintiff must also prove that the defendant harbored
malice toward the plaintiff. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 792. In this context, “malice” means
“ill will, evil motive, gross indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of others.”
Hernandez v. Mendoza, 406 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). Failing
to disclose all material information and knowingly providing material and false
information to law enforcement is evidence of malice. King, 126 S.W.3d at 76; Richey,
952 S.W.2d at 519. The lack of probable cause can also provide circumstantial
evidence of malice. Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 519; Hernandez, 406 S.W.3d at 357.
We have held that Tews made a prima facie case that Appellants lacked
probable cause and provided false information to law enforcement. Thus, Tews also
made a prima facie case of malice. Appellants’ controverting evidence that Richardson
never believed that there was an agreement for the payments and did not knowingly
omit any information from his report did not establish Appellants’ right to judgment
as a matter of law.
38
In conclusion, Tews met his burden under the TCPA’s second step, and
Appellants did not establish a basis for judgment as a matter of law under the third
step. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied Appellants’ motion. See Ferchichi,
713 S.W.3d at 336 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(d)). We overrule the
remainder of Appellants’ first issue.
IV. Appellants’ Evidentiary Complaint
In their second issue, Appellants challenge the trial court’s consideration of the
police report attached to Tews’s TCPA response. Because we did not need to
consider the report to decide Appellants’ first issue, we do not address this issue. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellants’ two issues, we affirm the trial court’s order.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: August 13, 2026
39