In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-24-00270-CV
WALLY YAMMINE, Appellant
V.
PROPEL FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, AS AGENT AND ATTORNEY IN FACT
FOR PROPEL FUNDING NATIONAL 1, LLC, HOME TAX SOLUTIONS, LLC,
HK REO, LLC, CASEY LENDING, AND PROPEL NATIONAL FUNDING,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 348th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 348-333220-22
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Wally Yammine attempts to appeal from (1) findings of fact and
conclusions of law issued pursuant to Texas Government Code Section 51.903 and
(2) an order striking part of Yammine’s live pleading. We dismiss the appeal for want
of jurisdiction.
Yammine, “individually and as Trustee for 813 Opal Trust,” sued twelve
defendants for wrongful foreclosure. One of the defendants, HK REO, LLC, filed a
“Verified Motion for Summary Judicial Removal of Fraudulent Liens” pursuant to
Section 51.903(a) of the Texas Government Code seeking an order finding three liens
Yammine filed regarding the real property at issue in his wrongful-foreclosure claim
to be fraudulent. According to the procedure set forth in Government Code
Section 51.903, the trial court issued “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Regarding Instruments Purporting to Create a Lien” on March 6, 2024 (March Lien
Findings). Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.903(c), (e).
In addition, five of the defendants––appellees in this appeal––moved to strike
as frivolous any claims in the “Plaintiff’s Original Amended Petition for Wrongful
Foreclosure and Request for Temporary Orders” that were made by Yammine as
trustee of the 813 Opal Trust. On May 2, 2024, the trial court signed an order striking
“the claims asserted by 813 Opal Trust” (May Order). The trial court’s order noted
“that the claims asserted by Wally Yammine, Individually are unaffected by this
order.”
2
On June 14, 2024, Yammine filed a notice of appeal in the trial court. That
notice of appeal referenced the dates of both the March Lien Findings and the May
Order, but it did not specify in which capacity Yammine was filing the notice of
appeal. The trial court clerk forwarded the notice of appeal to this court. See Tex. R.
App. P. 25.1(f).
A little over a year after filing his initial notice of appeal,1 Yammine filed in the
trial court an “Updated Notice of Appeal”2 listing only the date of the March Lien
Findings as the date of the ruling to be appealed.
After reviewing Yammine’s later-filed appellant’s brief––which complained
about only the May Order––in light of the appellate record, we sent the parties a letter
informing them of our concern that this court does not have jurisdiction over the
appeal because, (1) to the extent the March Lien Findings ruling is interlocutory, the
notice of appeal was not timely filed; and (2) the May Order does not appear to be a
final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. We warned the parties that unless a
1
Almost two months after Yammine filed his first notice of appeal, we administratively stayed the appeal after receiving Yammine’s suggestion of bankruptcy indicating that he had filed a Chapter 13 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. While the appeal was suspended in this court, Yammine filed in the trial court a notice stating that the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay had been “terminated” on December 19, 2024. Yammine did not file such a notice in this court. On Yammine’s motion, we reinstated the appeal on October 1, 2025.
2
This notice of appeal likewise does not indicate that Yammine filed it in any particular capacity.
3
response was filed showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could dismiss it for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. Although Yammine filed a
response, it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.3
To the extent that Yammine has attempted to appeal the March Lien Findings,
the notice of appeal was not timely filed because it was not filed within the timeframe
for an accelerated appeal, regardless of whether the ruling is considered to be
interlocutory or final and appealable. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (requiring notice of
accelerated appeal to be filed no later than twenty days after judgment or appealable
order is signed), 28.1(a), (b) (providing that interlocutory appeals and “expedited”
appeals are subject to accelerated-appeal due dates and that the filing of a motion for
new trial does not extend those dates); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.903(c) (requiring
appellate court to expedite review of Section 51.903 findings); Morton v. Lakeview Loan
Servicing, LLC, No. 02-24-00525-CV, 2025 WL 211373, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Jan. 16, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that appeals from Section 51.903 findings
are subject to the accelerated-appeal deadlines and dismissing untimely appeal). “A
timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this court’s jurisdiction.” Armstrong v.
Royal Affairs Ballroom, LLC, No. 02-25-00500-CV, 2025 WL 3181156, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, we do not
3
Appellees filed a brief, in which they alternatively request that we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
4
have jurisdiction over Yammine’s attempted appeal from the March Lien Findings.
See id.
We also do not have jurisdiction over Yammine’s attempted appeal of the May
Order. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory
orders authorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex.
2001). The May Order’s language indicates that it is interlocutory because nowhere
does it state with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all
parties and because it expressly leaves pending Yammine’s claims in his individual
capacity. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding);
Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93. Likewise, the appellate record shows that Yammine’s
individual claims remain pending. See Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 826; Phillips v. Blue Nail
Enters., LLC, No. 02-24-00227-CV, 2024 WL 3822546, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Yammine has provided us no authority––nor
have we found any––allowing for an appeal of an interlocutory order partially striking
a pleading.4 See generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a); In re Guardianship of
Thrash, 610 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (holding that
order striking pleadings was interlocutory and that no statute authorized an appeal);
Because we are dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction, nothing in this
4
memorandum opinion should be construed as addressing the merits of Yammine’s underlying complaint.
5
Fudzie v. Williams, No. 05-12-00511-CV, 2012 WL 6685527, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
Because Yammine’s notice of appeal was not timely filed as to the March Lien
Findings and because the May Order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable
interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.
P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We deny Yammine’s request to file an amended brief as moot.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Delivered: August 13, 2026
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