UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ABDULRAHMAN AL-SHEIKH,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-3704 (TSC)
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Abdulrahman Al-Sheikh, a United States citizen residing in Bahrain, brings tort,
constitutional, and statutory claims against the United States, based on his military detention in
Iraq and difficulties he alleges he has faced since his release in 2018. Before the court is
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 40, along with Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, ECF No. 33, motion for leave to amend, ECF No. 51, and various other motions. For
the following reasons, the court will GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss and DENY Plaintiff’s
motions.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s claims arise from his detention from 2017 to 2018 in Iraq by the United States
military after the Department of Defense determined he was an enemy combatant for ISIL. See
Doe v. Mattis, 928 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2019). He alleges that he endured “a year and a half of
harsh detention under inhumane conditions,” including confinement in a “completely enclosed
metallic solitary cell” with lights that “remained on 24 hours a day” and an air-conditioning system
“used in a torturous manner,” and that the resulting harm “remains ongoing—physically, mentally,
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and materially.” Compl. at 2–3, ECF No. 1. In 2017, Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging his detention. See Mattis, 928 F.3d at 6. After the parties stipulated that the
Department of Defense released Plaintiff in Bahrain in October 2018, the court dismissed the
action with prejudice. See Doe v. Mattis, No. 17-cv-2069, ECF Nos. 125, 126.
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff filed this action in October 2025 against the United States and
its agencies, invoking the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3); 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 4001(a); the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a;
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706; and various treaties, among other
authorities. He seeks damages and broad equitable and declaratory relief.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) tests the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The United
States may be sued only where it has waived sovereign immunity, and any waiver “must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text.” Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). Plaintiffs
bear the burden of establishing the existence of a waiver, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite.
See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The
court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true but disregards “legal conclusion[s] couched
as . . . factual allegation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” set
forth in “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1).
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The court construes pro se filings liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
and considers all filings submitted by a pro se litigant in assessing a complaint, see Brown v. Whole
Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But liberal construction cannot supply
a waiver Congress has not enacted or state a claim where the pleadings do not.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s FTCA claims suffer from fatal jurisdictional defects. To begin, he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The
FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their
administrative remedies.”); see Simpkins v. District of Columbia Government, 108 F.3d 366, 371
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) sets out the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement: a plaintiff
cannot sue “unless the claimant [has] first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency
and his claim [has] been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered
mail.” Plaintiff mailed his administrative claims to the appropriate agencies in May 2026, seven
months after filing this action. See ECF Nos. 1, 48. His tort claims are therefore premature, and
that defect cannot be remedied by amendment. See Edwards v. D.C., 616 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117
(D.D.C. 2009). And even assuming administrative exhaustion, Plaintiff’s FTCA claims arise from
injuries suffered abroad, and the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims
“arising in a foreign country.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 712 (2004) (“[T]he FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims based on
any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission
occurred.”).
As to Plaintiff’s constitutional claims for damages, the United States has not waived its
sovereign immunity. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477. Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke Bivens—which
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creates a cause of action, in limited contexts, to sue federal officials in their personal capacities for
damages arising from constitutional violations—fails on its face, as the only named Defendants
are the United States and its agencies. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. But even had Plaintiff named
individual officers, the court would not imply a Bivens remedy here. Recognizing a new Bivens
context is “‘a disfavored judicial activity,’” unavailable whenever “there is any reason to think that
Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482,
491–92 (2022) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017)). While courts take a “caseby-case approach in determining whether to recognize a Bivens cause of action,” “cases involving
national security and the military counsel[] hesitation in recognizing a Bivens cause of action where
Congress has not done so.” Meshal v. Higginbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The
D.C. Circuit has already refused to extend Bivens to claims of unlawful detention and mistreatment
during an overseas terrorism investigation. See id. at 426–27. The same special factors—national
security, military detention, and extraterritorial injury—counsel hesitation before authorizing a
new kind of federal litigation here. See id. at 421–26; Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 395–96
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff’s other statutory theories likewise provide no basis for relief. Section 1983 applies
only to persons acting “‘under color’ of” state, territorial, or D.C. law; it “does not apply to federal
officials acting under color of federal law.” Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104
(D.C. Cir. 2005). Section 1985(3) likewise does not apply to actions against the United States.
See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 245 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). And neither 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) nor § 242
confer a private right of action. See Bailey v. Bureau of Prisons, 133 F. Supp. 3d 50, 55 (D.D.C.
2015); Ballard v. Kendall, 640 F. Supp. 3d 41, 55 (D.D.C. 2022). Finally, Plaintiff fails to state a
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claim under the Privacy Act: he neglects to identify an agency record or allege denial of access or
amendment, unauthorized disclosure, adverse determination based on an inaccurate record, or
other actionable violation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4), (b), (d)(1)–(3), (e)(5), (g)(1)(A)–(D).
Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for actions “seeking
relief other than money damages” is also unavailing. 5 U.S.C. § 702; see ECF No. 23. The State
Department issued him a passport in 2023, mooting any claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) based on
the alleged delay in processing his passport application. See Compl. at 3. His requests for
additional consular assistance identify neither a “discrete agency action that [the Department] is
required to take,” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004), nor final agency
action, see 5 U.S.C. § 704; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). His request to correct
unspecified watchlist “listings” alleges no facts suggesting that he appears on any such list much
less that an agency has taken or unlawfully withheld reviewable action concerning a listing. ECF
No. 23 at 91. And his requests that the court order a federal investigation or declare void an
“executive decision granting diplomatic immunity to Ahmad Al-Shar’a” are not justiciable. Id. at
76. “[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process,
is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985), and “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another,” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Nor do the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), or the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, supply Plaintiff an independent basis
for relief or jurisdiction. Absent “a cognizable cause of action,” Plaintiff has “no basis upon which
to seek declaratory relief.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And the All Writs
Act authorizes writs only “in aid of” jurisdiction otherwise established, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); it
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“does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity,” Holt v. Davidson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96
(D.D.C. 2006). Mandamus is a “drastic” and “extraordinary” remedy, Allied Chemical Corp. v.
Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980), available only where “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to
relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available
to plaintiff,” Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Northern States
Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff, as discussed above,
has identified no such duty.
Plaintiff also seeks a preliminary injunction to address safety concerns related to Iranian
drone and missile attacks on Bahrain. ECF No. 33. He seeks an injunction “to stop . . . restrictions”
and “[s]uspend any administrative measures that impede his freedom or safety”; an order to
“[e]nable him to leave the danger zone to a safe place immediately”; and an order for “the
government to take immediate measures to protect him.” Id. at 10. But a preliminary injunction
may grant only “intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally”;
that condition is not satisfied when the motion “deals with a matter lying . . . outside the issues in
the suit.” De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). The Complaint
predates the 2026 military conflict with Iran, meaning any relief premised on that conflict falls
outside the allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff’s other requests for interim injunctive relief to
lift administrative restrictions he alleges prevent him and his daughter from fleeing hostilities in
Bahrain similarly fall outside the scope of this action. ECF Nos. 26, 30.
In the alternative, Plaintiff requests leave to amend his Complaint. ECF No. 51. But he
fails to attach a proposed amended complaint as this District’s local rules require. See Local Civ.
R. 7(i), 15.1; Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2012). And in any
case, amendment would be futile: it cannot cure the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity,
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the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement, or the unavailability of a Bivens remedy. See, e.g.,
Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[L]eave to amend
should be freely given unless there is a good reason, such as futility, to the contrary.”).
Plaintiff’s remaining miscellaneous motions are meritless. He seeks to compel the
American Civil Liberties Union, a non-party, to produce records, ECF No. 22, but “it
is well settled that discovery is generally considered inappropriate while a motion that would be
thoroughly dispositive of the claims in the Complaint is pending,” Institut Pasteur v. Chiron
Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2004) (cleaned up). His motions for entry of default, ECF
Nos. 31, 32, fail because the Government responded within the extended time the court allowed;
his motions to expedite, ECF Nos. 15, 34, 35, 38, 59, and the Government’s objection to the
related-case designation, ECF No. 39, are moot in light of this disposition. His request for
appointment of counsel, Compl. at 10, will be denied given the absence of any viable claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT the Government’s motion to dismiss.
ECF No. 40. The court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion to compel production, ECF No. 22; motion
for declaratory and equitable relief, ECF No. 23; motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 33;
further motions or requests for interim relief, ECF Nos. 26, 30; motions for entry of default, ECF
Nos. 31, 32; and motion for leave to amend, ECF No. 51. The Government’s objection to the
related-case designation, ECF No. 39, and Plaintiff’s remaining miscellaneous motions and
requests, ECF Nos. 13, 15, 18, 34, 35, 38, 43, 48, and 59, will be DENIED or terminated as moot.
To the extent the Complaint requests appointment of counsel, that request will be DENIED.
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Date: August 18, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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