IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00324-COA
THOMAS PATRICK RAMSEY APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TOMIKA HARRIS IRVING
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COPIAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MERRIDA COXWELL
LAMAR PICKARD
COURTNEY DENISE SANDERS
MADELINE AYLETT BEARD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DANIELLA MARIE SHORTER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/18/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.
EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Copiah County, Mississippi, Thomas Patrick
Ramsey was found guilty of kidnapping and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
Aggrieved, Ramsey appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On October 31, 2020, Ramsey, a high school senior at Copiah Academy, hosted a
Halloween party at his family’s home where he resided with his parents, Tommy and Missie.
The Ramseys’ home was built on a conventional foundation with a large space underneath that is accessible from an exterior entrance. The home is located on several acres of land,
where the family raises livestock. While Ramsey’s parents were aware that their son was
hosting the party, they were not outside supervising the partygoers.1
¶3. Fourteen months after Ramsey’s party, on December 28, 2021, Paul W.’s father filed
a complaint with the Copiah County Sheriff’s Department alleging that his minor son was
then chained to a pole during a party while he was unconscious. It was later determined that
the incident occurred at Ramsey’s Halloween party. Paul’s father showed Deputy Jacy Maher
videos of his son unconscious and chained to a pole. Additional videos depicted individuals
drawing penises on Paul’s face. Deputy Maher completed the report and turned the case over
to the investigations department.
¶4. Deputy Clement began his investigation by talking to a witness, B.L., who stated that
he had been at Ramsey’s Halloween party and witnessed people drinking, but he left for a
while to go to another friend’s father’s house. When B.L. returned to Ramsey’s house, he
saw Paul passed out and chained to a pole. B.L. claimed that Paul woke up and was
screaming to be released. At this point, Ramsey had left to take some other people home.
Disturbed by the screaming, Missie called Ramsey’s cell phone and told him to stop the
yelling because she was trying to sleep. Ramsey called B.L. and told him to put a sock in
Paul’s mouth to prevent him from screaming, but B.L. refused. Once Ramsey returned, B.L.
and another person J.N. again asked Ramsey to release Paul. Ramsey pulled a gun on them
and threatened to shoot them. B.L. then left the party. Deputy Clement showed B.L. the
1
We use pseudonyms or initials at times to protect the privacy of the minors involved.
2
videos that had been provided, and B.L. identified the other individuals in the video.
¶5. Several days later, Deputy Clement took a statement from J.N., who stated that
Ramsey had provided alcohol to the partygoers and that Ramsey chained Paul to the pole “to
keep him from doing anything stupid.” J.N. identified B.G. as the person narrating in the
videos. J.N. said that Ramsey left the party around 10 p.m. to drive a few people home.
Ramsey took the keys to the restraints and the bolt cutters with him. Ramsey did not return
until around 3:30 a.m. (the next morning). All this time, Paul was left chained to a pole and
lying on the basement floor in his own urine.
¶6. Deputy Clement submitted his report to the district attorney, who presented the case
to the grand jury. Ramsey was indicted on November 21, 2023, for kidnapping, aggravated
assault, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He was arrested on December 4,
2023, and bonded out of jail the same day.
¶7. During a three-day trial, the State called seven witnesses, and the defense called eight.
B.G. testified that he had recorded the videos that were admitted into evidence. At the time
of the incident, B.G. was fourteen years old. B.G. also admitted that it was his voice on the
video stating, “[T]his is some illegal ass shit,” as Paul could be seen unconscious and chained
to the pole while Ramsey drew penises on Paul’s face with a red Sharpie. B.G. also told the
court that B.L. and Ramsey got into an argument when Ramsey refused to give B.L. a key
to release Paul. B.G. testified that when Paul woke up, he was asking to be let go, and
Ramsey refused. Under cross-examination, B.G. said that he witnessed Paul drinking but did
not observe him doing anything dangerous.
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¶8. J.N. testified that Ramsey picked up him, Paul, and a friend on the day of the party and
took them to Ramsey’s house. According to J.N., they spent the day building the bonfire for
the night. As people arrived at the party, they all began drinking and listening to music. J.N.
testified that he saw Ramsey provide alcohol to everyone who did not bring their own,
including Paul. Around 9 p.m., J.N. and another friend left to ride horses. When J.N. returned
to the party, he heard Paul screaming. When he asked Ramsey what was going on, Ramsey
told him that Paul “was very intoxicated and staggering around and he did not feel like
babysitting him [Paul] that night.” J.N., who was fifteen years old at the time of the incident,
stated that he and B.L. then tried to have Ramsey release Paul, but Ramsey pulled a gun on
them and threatened to shoot them. Ramsey then closed the access door to the area where
Paul was chained up and locked it. When Ramsey then left to take people home, he took the
bolt cutters and key to both the door and the shackles. J.N. stated that the only way he could
communicate with Paul was through air vents during the approximately three hours that
Ramsey was gone. Once Ramsey returned, J.N. convinced Ramsey to release Paul. J.N. stated
that Paul had urinated and defecated on himself. He and another friend helped carry Paul
inside the Ramseys’ house. About 4:30 a.m., Ramsey took J.N. home.
¶9. B.L. testified that Ramsey provided alcohol to him and others, including Paul. B.L.
witnessed Paul “acting drunk” by “slurring his words and tripping,” but B.L. did not observe
Paul doing anything dangerous. B.L. left the party with a friend for a couple of hours, and
when he returned, he went to check on Paul. He further testified that Ramsey had tried to get
him to put a sock in Paul’s mouth, and when B.L. tried to get Ramsey to unchain Paul,
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Ramsey pulled a gun on him. B.L. left the party after that because he was scared of being
shot.
¶10. Paul then testified for the State. He said that he was thirteen years old at the time of
the incident and that Ramsey picked him up from a friend’s house and drove him to
Ramsey’s house. Paul admitted to drinking alcohol at the party and testified that Ramsey had
provided him with the alcohol. He testified that he did not ask to be shackled to the pole and
that he was screaming to be let go. Paul also stated that B.L. had tried to help, but Ramsey
pulled a gun on him. He admitted to being in and out of consciousness during the ordeal. Paul
said he remembers being cold and scared. He testified that he used the bathroom on himself
because Ramsey would not let him go. He recalled driving a golf cart that night, but only
driving it to Ramsey’s house. Paul also believed that he put gasoline on the bonfire. He did
not recall who carried him to the space under the Ramseys’ home. Following the incident,
Paul needed counseling and changed schools because he “was not mentally stable to sit in
a classroom all day.”
¶11. After the State rested its case-in-chief, the defense moved for a directed verdict as to
Count II of the indictment, which was granted.2 The first witness for the defense, W.C.,
testified that he saw Paul at the party and that he was drunk. He told the jury that Paul got
alcohol out of his cooler, without W.C.’s permission. W.C. testified that he saw Paul with
weapons (a gun and a chainsaw), waving them around. He testified that Paul was “[j]ust
2
Count II of the indictment charged Ramsey with aggravated assault against J.N. The defense did not move for a directed verdict as to Count I, kidnapping, or Count III, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, of which Paul was the victim.
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acting crazy, a fool, running around doing things he shouldn’t have been doing and putting
people in danger.” According to W.C., these actions included attempting to throw gasoline
on the bonfire, inappropriately touching a female, waving a firearm around, and revving a
chainsaw.
¶12. A.S., a fourteen-year-old female, testified that Ramsey brought her and another girl
to the party and took them home. A.S. said she remained with Ramsey the whole time she
was there and never saw Ramsey provide alcohol to anyone. When A.S. first arrived, she saw
Paul “kind of stumbling around, kind of giggly, drunk.” A.S. said she saw Paul get into a golf
cart, and he almost ran over her. A.S. then observed Paul go to the back of Ramsey’s truck
and get a rifle. A.S. testified that after Paul “shot in the air near the wooded area,” Ramsey
took the gun from Paul. A.S. said Paul also tried to put gasoline on the fire but was not
successful. A.S. testified that Paul was “grabbing onto” her friend and would not stop
harassing her. According to A.S., Paul let some horses loose from the barn. Later, she saw
Paul passed out on the ground. A.S. said that while Paul was unconscious, she witnessed J.N.
and Ramsey drag Paul under the house, but she did not witness them restrain him.
¶13. The next witness, S.S., testified that he was dropped off at Ramsey’s Halloween Party
around 6 p.m. by his mother and a friend. He did not see Ramsey provide Paul with alcohol,
but S.S. saw Paul become intoxicated as the night progressed. He observed Paul try to get
onto the golf cart but did not see him operate the cart. S.S. did see Paul trying to put gas onto
the fire but “scattered away” because he saw the nozzle of the plastic can catch fire. He did
not see Paul try to hurt anybody. S.S. did not see him fire a weapon, release any animals, or
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hold a chainsaw. He testified he left the party around 11 p.m., before Paul was chained up.
¶14. Ramsey then testified in his own defense. He testified that Paul was drunk, and others
told him that Paul had been waving a gun and a chainsaw around. Ramsey said he took the
gun away from Paul. Ramsey saw Paul driving the golf cart and almost hit people and
animals with the golf cart. Paul ran the golf cart into a hole, and Ramsey had to get it out.
While Ramsey was pulling the cart out of the hole, Ramsey testified that Paul got the rifle
out of his truck and started shooting into the woods. Ramsey told the jury that livestock and
two residences were in the direction Paul was shooting. Ramsey described Paul as continuing
to be belligerent to everybody. He said that Paul was acting in manner that made him a
danger to himself and others. Ramsey said that Paul would pass out and then wake up and
start acting crazy again. Under the circumstances, Ramsey admitted that he restrained Paul
by “cuffing” him to the pole in the basement of the house. Ramsey also told the jury that
while taking the girls to their mother’s house, his mother and others called him reporting that
Paul was screaming and asking to be released. Ramsey told them he would take care of it
when he got back because he did not know what Paul might do when they released him.
Ramsey also admitted to drawing on Paul’s face while he was “passed out,” but he denied
pulling a gun on B.L. and J.N.
¶15. After hearing all the testimony, being given instructions as to the law they were to use
in reaching a verdict, and hearing the closing arguments of the attorneys, the jury retired to
begin their deliberation. In due course, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of kidnapping and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Ramsey was sentenced to serve seven years in
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the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for kidnapping and six
months for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, with the sentences set to run
concurrently. Ramsey was also ordered to register as a sex offender.3 Ramsey argues four
issues on appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Did the trial court err in failing to sua sponte give the jury an
instruction on the defense of necessity?
¶16. Represented by new counsel on appeal, Ramsey argues that at trial,
[Ramsey] had a defense. That defense was necessity. It was a well-developed
necessity defense, but [Ramsey’s] trial attorney did not understand or know
there was a defense called necessity. Instead, he argued, sometimes with little
coherence, that the defense was duress. Duress did not apply in this case. He
offered a duress instruction that did not apply, and he had the old, overruled
circumstantial evidence two-theory instruction added into the duress.
Ramsey contends on appeal that this was just one example of his counsel’s confusion, slip
of the mind, and mistakes made throughout the trial that is part and parcel of his claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, which we will address below. Ramsey argues that counsel’s
failure to request a jury instruction regarding necessity was so obvious and egregious that the
trial court erred in failing to intervene in the interest of fundamental fairness and instruct the
jury on Ramsey’s one and only defense.
¶17. When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction on appeal, the supreme court
explained in Victory v. State, 83 So. 3d 370, 373 (¶12) (Miss. 2012):
3
Mississippi Code Annotated sections 45-33-23(h) and 45-33-25 (Rev. 2023) require persons convicted of kidnapping to register as a sex offender in cases where the victim was below the age of eighteen.
8
[T]o grant or deny proposed jury instructions is within the sole discretion of
the circuit court. Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010). Thus,
this Court reviews the grant or denial of jury instructions for an abuse of
discretion. Id. No one instruction should be singled out. Id. Accordingly, the
Court reviews the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether an error
has occurred. Id. “A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which
present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the
court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered
fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.”
Id. at 74 (¶20) (quoting Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶45) (Miss. 2008)).
“[I]f the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no
injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Id. at 73 (¶20) (quoting
Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 785 (¶224) (Miss. 2006)).
¶18. During the jury instruction conference, Ramsey’s counsel proposed jury instruction
D-17 on duress. The proposed instruction read as follows:
Evidence has been presented that the defendant acted under duress in
committing the crime.
“Duress” is the exercise of unlawful force upon a person whereby that person
is compelled to do some act that he/she otherwise would not have done. In
order for duress to be a defense to a criminal charge, the impelling danger must
be present, imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce in that
person a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act
is not done. A person having a reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the
crime without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm cannot invoke
duress as a defense.
If the State has failed to prove from the evidence in this case beyond a
reasonable doubt (and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis)
that the defendant acted voluntarily in committing the crime and not under
duress, then you shall find the defendant not guilty.
(Emphasis added). During the discussion regarding proposed instruction D-17, the following
conversation took place between the trial judge and counsel:
STATE: Your Honor, we believe that this jury instruction is
unnecessary. There has been no evidence of the word
duress, Your Honor, not even the mention of any
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evidence presented in this case surrounding duress.
Therefore, the instruction only explaining or the
definition of duress would be unnecessary in this case.
DEFENSE: Duress is an element of the crime. It is up to them to
determine whether there was duress or not but I believe
we showed duress. And it was unlawful force that they
claim.
THE COURT: So, first, duress is not an element of kidnapping and it is
not an element to contributing to the delinquency of a
minor. So Mr. Shannon, he testified about duress?
DEFENSE: I believe it is relevant.
THE COURT: I understand you think it is relevant. I have to make sure
the law that you give the jury is accurate and there has
been some testimony for them to decide to support it. So
my question to you is who talked about duress? Who
gave testimony about duress?
DEFENSE: We presented proof that we didn’t do something that was
going to cause death or seriously bodily harm.
THE COURT: You are wanting to give the jury a definition of duress?
DEFENSE: Yes, Ma’am.
THE COURT: Duress is not a term in either one of these elements of
either charge. So my question to you is, who testified
about duress in the trial?
DEFENSE: The State and the fact was the –
THE COURT: That is fine. Who out of all the witnesses that were
called? Who testified about duress? I am asking you
because the State said that nobody did. So I am asking
you to tell me.
DEFENSE: I believe the victim with the cuffs on his hands and he
was crying out.
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THE COURT: So you are saying Mr. [Paul W.] testified as to duress?
DEFENSE: He talked about the straps on his arms and legs.
THE COURT: The court is going to reject D-17, specifically it goes
against what you are just telling me about. So D17 is not
going to be given. Two things, number one, the last
paragraph gives instruction as if this is a circumstantial
instruction case. We only have one standard which is
beyond a reasonable doubt. The second paragraph says
beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion as to
every other hypothesis which is no longer the case law in
the State of Mississippi since 2021. So the Court is
going to reject D17.
(Emphasis added).
¶19. It is clear from the exchange between the trial court judge and Ramsey’s attorney that
the judge went to great lengths to understand Ramsey’s counsel’s reasoning for the request
for an instruction on duress. The judge asked counsel multiple times, “Who gave testimony
about duress?” The first paragraph of the requested duress instruction stated that “[e]vidence
has been presented that the defendant acted under duress in committing the crime.”
(Emphasis added). However, when counsel was asked who specifically gave testimony
concerning duress, his only response was, “I believe the victim with cuffs on his hand and
he was crying out.” (Emphasis added). Ramsey’s counsel could not articulate a clear
rationale for wanting the duress instruction, and his responses to the trial judge’s questions
did not support an instruction on the defendant’s defense of duress. In fact, Ramsey’s
counsel did not argue during the jury instruction conference any duress on his client’s part
as a defense to the crimes charged; rather, he discussed testimony put on by the State
concerning the victim’s apparent duress during the incident. To compound the issue with the
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proposed duress instruction, the last paragraph of the requested instruction stated an incorrect
legal standard and contained inapplicable caselaw. For those reasons, the trial court refused
the proposed duress instruction.
¶20. Ramsey filed a post-trial motion for a new trial and argued with specificity why the
court was in error for not giving an instruction on duress. In his motion, Ramsey claimed
that all four elements required to satisfy a duress defense were proved at trial.4 While Ramsey
argued in his post-trial motion that he had put on sufficient proof at trial to support a jury
instruction on duress, Ramsey has abandoned this argument on appeal.
¶21. Ramsey’s appellate counsel now argues that the trial court erred in failing to rectify
trial counsel’s misplaced attempt to have a duress instruction submitted to the jury by sua
sponte giving them an instruction on the defense of necessity. In Stodghill v. State, 892 So.
2d 236, 238-39 (¶¶8-9) (Miss. 2005), the supreme court stated:
In Knight v. State, 601 So. 2d 403, 405 (Miss. 1992), the Court adopted the
defense of necessity and held that when a “person reasonably believes that he
is in danger of physical harm[,] he may be excused for some conduct which
ordinarily would be criminal.” The defense is also available where the
defendant reasonably acts out of fear of “imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm” to others. See McMillan v. City of Jackson, 701 So. 2d 1105,
1106-07 (Miss. 1997). To prove that he had an objective need to commit a
crime excusable by the defense of necessity, a defendant must prove three
essential elements: (1) the act charged was done to prevent a significant evil;
(2) there must was no adequate alternative; and (3) the harm caused was not
disproportionate to the harm avoided. Id. at 1107. Factors such as intoxication
or abnormality are irrelevant to the inquiry into objective reasonableness
4
Ramsey’s motion for a new trial referenced a Texas necessity statute, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.22, which states that “conduct is justified if . . . the actor reasonably believes the conduct necessary to avoid imminent harm,” and the urgency of avoiding the harm outweighs the harm of the act done. However, Ramsey referenced this necessity statute to show its similarity to the definition of duress in support of his request for the instruction.
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“since the ‘reasonable man’ standard postulates a sane and sober man.” Taylor
v. State, 452 So. 2d 441, 446-47 (Miss. 1984).
. . .When a defendant attempts to prove an affirmative defense, such as
necessity, it is his burden to prove that such circumstances exist so as to
substantiate such a defense. See Bush v. State, 585 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Miss.
1991).
(Emphasis added). Ramsey did not argue the essential elements of a necessity defense during
the jury instruction conference.
¶22. In any event, in Davis v. State, 347 So. 3d 1205, 1211 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022),
this Court stated:
First, the issue of whether the trial court should have sua sponte corrected the
proposed domestic violence jury instruction was never raised by Davis at trial
or on appeal. A party is required to submit instructions or object to instructions
to preserve those issues for appeal. See MRCrP 22(d). Further, this Court
repeatedly has held that issues not brought before the trial court are deemed
waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Smith v. State, 986
So. 2d 290, 296 (¶19) (Miss. 2008); see also Donaldson v. State, 262 So. 3d
1135, 1153-54 (¶67) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); Wilcher v. State, 479 So. 2d 710,
712 (Miss. 1985). This Court “cannot find that a trial judge committed
reversible error on a matter not brought before him to consider.” Montgomery
v. State, 891 So. 2d 179, 187 (¶33) (Miss. 2004); see also Stringer v. State, 279
So. 2d 156, 158 (Miss. 1973). Davis’s trial counsel never tendered or proposed
a simple assault jury instruction at trial. Further, Davis’s trial counsel never
requested an opportunity to correct his refused instruction to include a new
theory of defense. “Traditionally, trial counsel’s decision regarding whether
to request certain jury instructions is considered trial strategy.” Taylor v. State,
109 So. 3d 589, 596 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Here, Davis not only failed
to raise this issue to the trial court at trial, his motion for JNOV simply stated,
“[T]he denial of Defense Jury Instruction D-5, the lesser included offense, was
in error.” Davis never argued the trial court should have corrected instruction
D-5 to be a simple assault theory of defense.
As far back as 1882, the Supreme Court has affirmed the power of trial courts
to correct erroneous statements of the law in tendered jury instructions:
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We are not disposed to hamper and abridge the court in the
exercise of this valuable power, nor to prescribe too strictly the
shape which the modification must take; but it is manifest from
the language of the statute that the Legislature intended to deny
the judge the power of originating independent instructions of
its own motion, not called for or rendered necessary by those
requested by counsel.
Watkins v. State, 60 Miss. 323, 325 (1882) (emphasis added). In reading the
emphasized portion, the Court was equally clear in instructing a judge not to
create new instructions and instead consider “those requested by counsel.” Id.
Had the evidence supported the giving of a duress instruction, the trial court would have been
required to correct the instruction. The law is clear, however, the trial court cannot be held
to be in error for failing to give an instruction that was never requested. Given the evidence
at trial, we find no error by the trial court in denying Ramsey’s request for the proposed jury
instruction on duress or by the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on the
necessity defense.
II. Did Ramsey receive ineffective assistance of counsel at trial?
¶23. Ramsey’s counsel on appeal claims that Ramsey received ineffective assistance of
counsel throughout the entirety of his trial. Ramsey claims that his counsel was ineffective,
in part, due to his lack of understanding of key elements of Ramsey’s criminal charges, as
well as confused regarding trial witnesses and facts on fundamental law and procedures.
¶24. In Gregg v. State, 372 So. 3d 132, 137 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), this Court stated:
A defendant “is permitted to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct appeal. However, when this issue is raised, this Court’s review is
strictly limited to the appellate record.” Amos v. State, 911 So. 2d 644, 656
(¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “Generally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings.”
Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶29) (Miss. 2020) (brackets omitted)
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(quoting Bell v. State, 202 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶12) (Miss. 2016)). “This Court
will address such claims on direct appeal when [1] the record affirmatively
shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate
that the record is adequate and the Court determines that the findings of fact
by a trial judge able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not
needed.” Id. (quotation marks and other brackets omitted). We may also
address such “claims on direct appeal when the record affirmatively shows that
the claims are without merit.” Id. If the record on direct appeal is insufficient
to address a defendant’s ineffective assistance claims, we will “dismiss the
claims without prejudice, preserving the defendant’s right to raise the claims
later in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief.” Sandlin v. State, 156
So. 3d 813, 819 (¶20) (Miss. 2013).
In the case at hand, the State argues that Ramsey’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
should be reserved for post-conviction collateral proceedings. Further, the record on direct
appeal is insufficient to fully address and evaluate Ramsey’s claims. Specifically, Ramsey
argues on appeal that counsel was deficient in calling the victim’s mother as a defense
witness and offering a duress instruction instead of a necessity defense instruction. It is
possible that the choices Ramsey’s counsel made in those situations were intentional and part
of an overall trial strategy. Therefore, we dismiss Ramsey’s ineffective assistance claim
“without prejudice” to his “right to raise the claim[] later in a properly filed motion for postconviction relief.” Sandlin, 156 So. 3d at 819 (¶20).
III. Did the cumulative effect of the alleged errors at trial deprive
Ramsey of the right to a fair trial?
¶25. This Court has found no error by the trial court, harmless or otherwise. Therefore,
Ramsey’s argument regarding cumulative error has no merit. See Thomas v. State, 416 So.
3d 102, 117 (¶53) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025).
IV. Was Ramsey’s substantive and fundamental due process right to
a fair trial violated as a result of plain error?
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¶26. In his final issue on appeal, Ramsey argues that the trial court committed plain error
by failing to give a necessity instruction despite the fact that Ramsey had not requested such
an instruction. Having already found that the trial court did not err by failing to give the jury
an instruction on necessity sua sponte, there can be no plain error in this regard. Concerning
a plain error analysis, the supreme court stated in Spiers v. State, 361 So. 3d 643, 657 (¶41)
(Miss. 2023):
“Plain-error review is properly utilized for correcting obvious instances of
injustice or misapplied law.” Ambrose v. State, 254 So. 3d 77, 111 (Miss.
2018) (quoting Armstead v. State, 196 So. 3d 913, 916 (Miss. 2016)). The
plain error doctrine applies when there has been an error that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Ambrose, 254 So. 3d at 136 (quoting
Conners v. State, 92 So. 3d 676, 682 (Miss. 2012)). “To determine if plain
error has occurred, this Court must determine ‘if the trial court has deviated
from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear[,] or obvious, and whether
that error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.’” Conner v. State, 138 So.
3d 143, 151 (Miss. 2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Grayer v. State, 120 So. 3d 964, 969 (Miss. 2013)).
We find the trial court did not deviate from a legal rule by failing to give an instruction on
the defense of necessity in this case. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶27. Ramsey’s convictions and sentences for kidnapping and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor are affirmed.
¶28. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE,
McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J.,
CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION.
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