FILED
Aug 18 2026, 9:13 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Coltin Drew Herzog,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
August 18, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-3169
Appeal from the DeKalb Superior Court
The Honorable Patrick L. Jessup, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
17D02-2109-F1-6
Opinion by Judge Foley
Judges Vaidik and Altice concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 1 of 15
Foley, Judge.
[1] Coltin Drew Herzog (“Herzog”) appeals from the trial court’s order revoking
his probation and ordering him to serve his previously suspended sentence in
the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Herzog presents two
issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court violated Herzog’s due process
rights because he claims that he was not provided written
notice of a violation of probation; and
II. Whether the trial court violated his due process rights
because he asserts that the trial court failed to provide him
with a written statement that sufficiently stated the reasons
and evidence relied on for revoking his probation.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 31, 2021, the State charged Herzog with Level 1 felony
attempted murder and Level 1 felony burglary. On June 20, 2022, Herzog
pleaded guilty to a lower charge of Level 4 felony burglary in exchange for the
State’s dismissal of the attempted murder charge. The trial court sentenced
Herzog to six years, with four years executed and two years suspended to
probation. Among the conditions of his probation, Herzog was required to
“remain on good behavior and remain free from any further criminal arrests or
convictions throughout [his] probation period.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
207.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 2 of 15 [4] In September 2023, Herzog began his probation term. On May 31, 2024, the
State filed a petition to revoke his probation, which alleged that he violated the
rules of his probation when he “obtained a new case in l7D02-2405-MR-[ ]2
with charges pertaining to Murder.” Id. at 239. On July 8, 2024, the trial court
held an initial hearing regarding the petition to revoke probation. At the
hearing, Herzog confirmed that he had received a copy of the petition, and the
trial court reviewed it with him, stating that the alleged violation was him
“being charged in the new case . . . 17D02-2405-MR-2 . . . that charge being
Murder.” (“murder case”). Tr. Vol. II p. 5. The trial court set the case for a
pretrial conference to be held concurrently with the next pretrial conference in
the murder case.
[5] A concurrent pretrial conference for both Herzog’s murder case and probation
violation was held on August 25, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, after
confirming the trial date for the murder case, the trial court asked Herzog how
he would like to proceed on the probation violation. Herzog’s attorney asked
that the probation violation “continue to track along” with the murder case,
and the trial court agreed to address it after the trial or reset it in the event of a
not guilty verdict. Id. at 12. Herzog’s murder trial was held on September 8–
12, 2025, and at the conclusion, the jury found Herzog guilty of the lesser
included charge of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 15.
[6] On November 17, 2025, the trial court held a final hearing on the probation
violation, which occurred after Herzog had been convicted of and on the same
day he was sentenced for voluntary manslaughter in the murder case. The
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 3 of 15
same judge presided over Herzog’s murder trial and proceedings and his
probation revocation proceedings. At the probation revocation hearing, Herzog
denied “committing any violation.” Id. The State requested that the trial court
take “judicial notice of the [voluntary manslaughter] conviction” in case l7D02-2405-MR-2. Id. The State explained that “[a]ll the testimony was given under
more stringent rules of evidence than would be applicable in a probation
violation hearing” and that his conviction was proven “beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . rather than a preponderance[.]” Id. The trial court took judicial
notice of the voluntary manslaughter conviction and judgment and found it
“sufficient to find violation of the conditions of . . . Herzog’s probation.” Id.
[7] The trial court then inquired if Herzog wanted to present anything, to which he
replied, “[n]o,” and only wanted to show an objection to “the incorporation of
all the evidence from trial towards the revocation of probation.” Id. at 16. The
trial court revoked Herzog’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of
his two-year suspended sentence in the DOC. The trial court’s written order
found Herzog “in violation of probation” and stated that probation was
“terminated in an unsatisfactory manner.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 8.
Herzog now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Herzog argues that he was denied due process in the procedure utilized by the
trial court in revoking his probation. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial
court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Smith v.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 4 of 15
State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d
184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). We review a trial court’s probation revocation decision
for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs ‘where the decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Prewitt, 878
N.E.2d at 188). “A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State need only
prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing
Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999)). A trial court may revoke a
person’s probation for a single violation. Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823,
832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied), trans. denied. When determining whether the
evidence was sufficient in probation revocation proceedings, “we consider only
the evidence most favorable to the judgment—without regard to weight or
credibility—and will affirm if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value to
support the trial court’s conclusion that a probationer has violated any
condition of probation.’” Rosenbourgh v. State, 268 N.E.3d 1255, 1265 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025) (quoting Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014)).
[9] “Although probationers are not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights
afforded defendants at trial, ‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does impose procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of
the conditional liberty created by probation.’” Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367,
374 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549). Certain due process rights
inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing, including “written notice of the
claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence against him, an opportunity to be
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 5 of 15
heard and present evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and a neutral and detached hearing body.” Price v. State, 255 N.E.3d
554, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind.
1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied). Whether a person was denied due
process is a question of law reviewed de novo. Van Hawk v. State, 275 N.E.3d
954, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied.
I. Notice
[10] Herzog first argues that he was denied due process because he contends that he
was not provided written notice of the claimed violation of probation. As
stated above, one of the minimum requirements of due process at a revocation
hearing is “written notice of the claimed violations of probation.” Hammann,
210 N.E.3d at 831 (citations omitted). “The written notice of the claimed
violations of probation must be ‘sufficiently detailed to allow the probationer to
prepare an adequate defense[,]’” and a trial court errs in revoking probation
based upon a violation for which the probationer did not receive notice. Id. at
831–32 (quoting Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). “It
is error for a probation revocation to be based upon a violation for which the
defendant did not receive notice.” Id. “[T]he mere filing of a criminal charge
against a defendant does not warrant the revocation of probation.” Jackson v.
State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Instead, when the State
alleges that the defendant violated probation by committing a new criminal
offense, the State is required to prove—by a preponderance of the evidence—
that the defendant committed the offense.” Id. However, where the violation is
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 6 of 15
based upon the commission of a crime, it is sufficient for the trial court to take
judicial notice of the new criminal conviction under Indiana Evidence Rule
201. See Moore v. State, 102 N.E.3d 304, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming a
probation revocation and finding no due process violation where the trial court
took judicial notice of a conviction and sentence the court had entered for the
same defendant).
[11] Herzog contends that, although he received notice of the allegation that he had
violated his rules of probation by “obtain[ing] a new case in 17D02-2405-MR-[
]2 with charges pertaining to Murder[,]” he did not receive “notice of an
allegation that he violated his rules of probation by having a criminal conviction
while on probation,” because “no such allegation was made.” Appellant’s Br.
pp. 8–9 (quoting Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 239). He asserts that there is a
significant difference between the allegation that he “obtained a new case,”
which was the allegation contained in the petition to revoke his probation, and
an allegation that he had a criminal conviction while on probation. Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 239.
[12] Initially, we note that Herzog did not raise a due process claim to the trial court
regarding lack of adequate notice. “Due process rights are subject to waiver,
and claims are generally waived if raised for the first time on appeal.” Terpstra
v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 285–86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Pigg v. State, 929
N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied), trans. denied. The record
reveals that Herzog never raised the issue of inadequate notice to the trial court
during his revocation proceedings, nor did he ever indicate that he was unaware
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 7 of 15
of what the alleged probation violation was, and he does not argue that the
alleged violation of his due process rights constituted fundamental error. Thus,
Herzog has waived his inadequate notice due process claim.
[13] Waiver notwithstanding, we proceed to decide the case on the merits. Herzog
relies on Gleason v. State, 634 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), for his contention
that it was error for the trial court to revoke his probation based on a criminal
conviction, when the petition to revoke probation alleged that he had “obtained
a new case.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. However, we find Gleason to be
distinguishable. There, our court reversed a probation revocation that was
based on a felony conviction from Michigan not identified in the petition,
where the petition only alleged that Gleason had been arrested for criminal
conduct in Michigan, which was a felony offense in Michigan but which
conduct was likely not a crime under Indiana law. 1 Gleason, 634 N.E.2d at 68.
[14] In Gleason, it is unclear based on the scant facts provided whether the felony
conviction that formed the basis of revocation was connected to the allegation
of criminal behavior in the petition. Here, however, the allegation in the instant
petition was that Herzog had been charged with new crimes pertaining to
murder in cause number 17D02-2405-MR-2, and the trial court clearly revoked
his probation based on the evidence of his conviction under the same cause
number. Therefore, we find the situation that Herzog faced to be different from
1
The evidence established that the boys whom Gleason took pictures of were between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen, which was not a crime in Indiana. See Gleason v. State, 634 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 8 of 15
that in Gleason. However, we note that, to the extent that Gleason holds that
such a minor variance between the language used in the petition giving notice
of the alleged violation and the language used by the trial court for its reason for
revocation, we disagree with the holding.
[15] At the revocation hearing here, Herzog denied committing any violation of his
probation, resulting in a contested hearing on the allegations. Prior to the
presentation of any evidence, the State recited that Herzog had been convicted
of voluntary manslaughter after a jury trial in the murder case. The trial court
judge had presided over the murder case and had observed the testimony and
evidence presented at the trial. The State also noted that the jury trial was
conducted under more stringent rules of evidence than required at the
revocation hearing and that his conviction had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, which was
applicable at the revocation hearing.
[16] The State requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the voluntary
manslaughter conviction, and the trial court did so. Herzog presented no
evidence rebutting the evidence that he had been convicted under cause number
17D02-2405-MR-2. Instead, he only objected to “the incorporation of all the
evidence from trial towards the revocation of probation” without any
explanation for the objection. 2 Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Although Herzog asserts that
2
We note that, although Herzog objected to the “incorporation of all the evidence from trial towards the
revocation of probation[,]” that is not what the trial court was doing when it took judicial notice. Tr. Vol. II
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 9 of 15
there was a significant difference in the allegation that he obtained a new case
while on probation and an allegation that he had been convicted of a crime
while on probation and the proof required to establish each allegation, he does
not elaborate as to what that differing evidence was or how he was at a
disadvantage due to the procedure utilized. He further does not argue that he
was not the subject of the charging information under cause number 17D02-2405-MR-2. Additionally, Herzog makes no argument that the trial court
taking judicial notice of his conviction in the murder case violated Indiana
Evidence Rule 201. 3 Due process required that Herzog be apprised of the
nature of the allegations against him such as to enable him to mount a
meaningful defense. In light of the circumstances here, we do not find that
Herzog’s due process rights were violated based upon his notice of the
allegations.
[17] Further, in support of his assertion, Herzog cites to Dalton v. State, 560 N.E.2d
558 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) and Eckes v. State, 562 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990), which reversed revocations of probation based upon due process
violations where the trial courts failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing as
required. See Dalton, 560 N.E.2d at 560; Eckes, 562 N.E.2d at 445. 4 To the
p. 16. The trial court was merely taking judicial notice of the judgment and conviction from the murder case
and not incorporating all of the evidence presented at trial into the revocation proceedings. See id. at 15.
3
Under Indiana Evidence Rule 201(a), a trial court may take judicial notice of records of a court of this state.
Ind. Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(C).
4
In Dalton v. State, the “‘hearing’ consisted of a conversation” between the five parties present with the State
not introducing any witnesses or evidence and the defendant not having the opportunity to cross-examine
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 10 of 15
extent that Herzog argues that his due process rights were violated because of
an alleged failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we disagree.
[18] Under Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3, the trial court is required to conduct a
hearing concerning the alleged violation with the evidence being presented in
open court, and the person is entitled to confrontation, cross-examination, and
representation by counsel. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(d), (f). Here, the evidentiary
hearing clearly met all due process requirements. The State rested after
establishing that Herzog had been convicted of the crime of voluntary
manslaughter in the murder case. Herzog was afforded the opportunity to
challenge the State’s evidence of his conviction but elected not to do so and
instead objected to “the incorporation of all the evidence from trial towards the
revocation of probation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. We have previously held that
taking such judicial notice of a new conviction and sentence in a probation
revocation hearing based on the commission of the same crime upon which the
conviction and sentence was entered does not constitute a due process
violation. See Moore, 102 N.E.3d at 309. Therefore, Herzog, who was
represented by counsel, received a hearing concerning the alleged violation with
the evidence presented in open court and had the opportunity for confrontation
and cross-examination of the evidence against him.
any witnesses or present evidence on his behalf. 560 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). In Eckes v. State,
the State introduced no evidence regarding the alleged violation, and the three witnesses called by the State
only testified about their recommendation that the defendant be required to serve the remainder of his
sentence. 562 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 11 of 15 [19] Having concluded there to be no due process violation based upon the
procedures utilized in this case, we make two final observations. First, in
almost all instances, a probation violation alleging the commission of a new
offense will be filed at some point after the defendant is arrested on the new
offense and prior to disposition of the new case. Therefore, most petitions will
allege some variation of a new arrest, new charges, or a new case, rather than
alleging a conviction that has not yet occurred. Requiring the State to amend a
petition to allege that the arrest, new charges, or new case, is now a conviction,
rather than merely proceeding on the petition that alleged a pending charge,
amounts to merely a matter of form over substance rather than preserving due
process.
[20] Next, the slight variation in the language used in the petition alleging the
probation violation from the language of the probation order and the language
the trial court used to describe the violation is not substantial enough to
generate due process concerns. Here, the probation order required that Herzog
“remain free from any further criminal arrests or convictions[,]” and the
petition alleged that he “obtained a new case in 17D02-2405-MR-[ ]2 with
charges pertaining to Murder.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 207, 239. During
Herzog’s initial hearing, the trial court advised Herzog of the nature of the
charges by stating, “Paragraph 2 says you violated your rules by being charged
in the new case, . . . 17D02-2405-MR-2, . . . that charge being Murder.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 5. Finally, at the probation violation hearing, the trial court stated,
“And the [c]ourt will take judicial notice of the judgment and conviction in
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 12 of 15
17D02-2405-MR-[ ]2.” Id. at 15. Despite the slight variations in the language
used to describe what had occurred, it is clear that Herzog’s order of probation
prohibited him from committing a new criminal offense while on probation, the
probation violation petition alleged he had done so, and finally, the trial court
concluded that he had done so.
II. Written Statement
[21] Herzog next argues that his due process rights were violated because there was
no written statement by the trial court as to the evidence relied on and the
reasons for revoking his probation. One of the due process rights that a
probationer must be afforded before revocation is the entitlement to a “written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for
revoking.” Scott v. State, 258 N.E.3d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing
Medicus v. State, 664 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Ind. 1996)). “The written statement
requirement is a procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding
and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions.” Puckett v. State, 956
N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d
618, 620–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). “A transcript of the evidentiary hearing,
although not the preferred way of fulfilling the writing requirement, is sufficient
if it contains a clear statement of the trial court’s reasons for revoking
probation.” Id.
[22] Looking to the record in this case, we conclude that the written statement
requirement was fulfilled in this case. Based on the written statement and the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 13 of 15
oral statement contained in the transcript, the trial court’s statements were
sufficient to inform Herzog that his probation was being revoked and the reason
for that decision and to ensure our accurate review of that decision. In its oral
statement, the trial court informed the parties that it “will take judicial notice of
the judgment and conviction in 17D02-2405-MR-[ ]2 [and] finds that that’s
sufficient to find violation of the conditions” of Herzog’s probation. Tr. Vol. II
p. 15. Such statement made it clear that the trial court was revoking Herzog’s
probation because he engaged in criminal behavior and had new criminal
charges and a new conviction based on those charges while he was on
probation. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not violate Herzog’s
due process rights in its fulfillment of the writing requirement.
Conclusion
[23] Based on the above reasoning, we conclude that Herzog’s due process rights
were not violated by the procedure utilized to revoke his probation.
[24] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John M. Haecker
Hamilton Law, LLC
Auburn, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 14 of 15 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Rebekah D. Bennett
Deputy Attorney General
Mia Roberts
Certified Legal Intern
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3169 August 18, 2026 Page 15 of 15