FILED
Aug 18 2026, 9:19 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In the Matter of the Adoption of J.L.P.;
J.P.,
Appellant-Respondent
v.
J.M.,
Appellee-Petitioner
August 18, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-AD-790
Appeal from the Jackson Superior Court
The Honorable Amy Marie Travis, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
36D02-2407-AD-18
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 1 of 17
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judge Bradford concurs.
Judge Felix concurs in result.
Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] J.P. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of the petition for adoption
regarding J.L.P. (“Child”) filed by J.M. (“Adoptive Mother”). We affirm.
Issues
[2] Father raises several issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether Father’s due process rights were violated by the
failure to include in the petition for adoption an allegation
that Father’s consent was unnecessary and the basis for
dispensing with Father’s consent.
II. Whether the trial court’s determination that Father’s
consent to the adoption was unnecessary is clearly
erroneous.
III. Whether the trial court’s determination that the adoption
is in Child’s best interest is clearly erroneous.
Facts
[3] Child was born in September 2020 to Father and K.P. (“Mother”). Child has
lived with Adoptive Mother since he was “about one.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. The
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 2 of 17
trial court entered a decree of dissolution regarding the marriage of Father and
Mother on June 2, 2022. At that time, Adoptive Mother was awarded legal and
physical custody of Child due to the incarceration of both Father and Mother.
At some point, Father was released from his incarceration and had visits with
Child for approximately five months. In June 2023, Father was again arrested
and incarcerated. 1 Father was released from incarceration in December 2024.
[4] On July 25, 2024, Adoptive Mother filed a petition to adopt Child. At the time,
Father and Mother were both incarcerated. Father filed a letter that the trial
court interpreted as contesting the adoption. The trial court then appointed
counsel for both Father and Mother.
[5] A hearing on the petition for adoption was held on January 29, 2026. Mother
did not appear for the hearing, but she was represented by counsel. Father
appeared and was also represented by counsel. Adoptive Mother testified:
Father was aware of where she lived; Father has failed to have any parenting
time or meaningful contact with Child “over the past two, three years”; Father
has not contacted Adoptive Mother to arrange parenting time or contacted
Child; and Father has failed to provide any financial support for Child. Tr. Vol.
II p. 7.
1
Father was charged with operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of his license for life, a Level 5 felony,
and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor. The State also alleged that Father was an
habitual offender. The State later dismissed the operating a vehicle while intoxicated charge. A mistrial was
granted during Father’s trial, and the State later filed a motion to dismiss the remaining charges, which the
trial court granted.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 3 of 17 [6] Father’s testimony was often rambling and difficult to follow. 2 Father,
however, admitted that he had not provided financial support for Child in the
past two years and that he had not “had any parenting time” with Child in the
past two years. Id. at 27.
[7] The trial court granted Adoptive Mother’s petition for adoption of Child and
entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Regarding Father, the trial
court found:
6. That, pursuant to I.C. 31-19-9-8, the natural father’s consent is
not necessary as Petitioner has proven that natural father has not
had meaningful contact with the minor child for more than a
year, when able to do so, and has failed to provide any financial
support for the child when able to do so.
7. Additionally, natural father provided testimony at the hearing
that placement with him would not be possible, or safe for the
minor child, at the time due to his alleged employment with the
2
When asked how long he had lived at his address, Father responded:
Oh, well, I just moved, I had a, I had a large art collection out there in the front yard that’s kind
of federally protected and everything, you know, and it’s like, like, there’s like billions of dollars
of stuff laying out there, you know, I got some of the vastest art collection that you could see,
you know, dinosaur heads, everything, you know, I’m getting ready to bring this stuff to sell
because the State of Indiana is going slow in giving them more money, so I’ll sell some of my
assets, you know.
Tr. Vol. II p. 21. Father testified that he was in constant contact with Donald Trump, that he was working
for the FBI and CIA, and that he was “out there building AI stuff,” “out there getting stars hung,” and “out
there building a safe haven.” Id. at 15. Father described “safe haven” as “an alternate realm” that was a
“different star system.” Id. at 29. Father claimed that “[t]he White House sees the lies,” that he was digging
up “300 pounds of gold” out of his “own personal rock garden,” that he had “above top secret clearance,”
that he was “owed all this money from the state,” and that he could “buy” Brownstown and Seymour. Id. at
18, 23, 26, 30. Finally, Father claimed that his family owned mineral rights to oil under a “huge national
forest.” Id. at 29.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 4 of 17
United States Federal government among other outlandish
claims.
8. Specifically, natural father believed he was working directly
with President Donald Trump and the CIA, was building an
alternate reality, had recently exhumed three hundred pounds of
gold, and had billions of dollars’ worth of artifacts in his
possession.
9. Natural Father’s testimony has given the Court grave concern
for his mental state, finds that he is unfit to be a parent, that it is
in the child’s best interest that the adoption be approved and that
his consent disposed of.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 96-97. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Father challenges the trial court’s grant of Adoptive Mother’s petition to adopt
Child. Our Supreme Court has explained that appellate courts should
“generally show ‘considerable deference’ to the trial court’s decision in family
law matters ‘because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to
judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics,
and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.’” In re
Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 274 (Ind. 2021) (quoting E.B.F. v. D.F., 93
N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018)). “So, ‘when reviewing an adoption case, we
presume that the trial court’s decision is correct, and the appellant bears the
burden of rebutting this presumption.’” Id. (quoting E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762).
“[W]e will not disturb that decision ‘unless the evidence leads to but one
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 5 of 17
conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.’” Id. (quoting In
re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014)).
[9] In an adoption case, a trial court’s findings and judgment will be set aside only
if they are clearly erroneous. E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762. “A judgment is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail
to support the judgment.” Id. On appeal, we will neither reweigh evidence nor
assess the credibility of witnesses; instead, we consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s decision. I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274 (citing T.L.,
4 N.E.3d at 662).
[10] We note, however, that Adoptive Mother did not file an appellee’s brief.
“[W]here, as here, the appellees do not submit a brief on appeal, the appellate
court need not develop an argument for the appellees but instead will ‘reverse
the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie
error.’” Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384,
386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind.
2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first
appearance, or on the face of it.’” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at
758). This less stringent standard of review relieves us of the burden of
controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden
properly rests with the appellee. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014). We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts
in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 6 of 17
I. Father’s due process rights were not violated.
[11] Father first contends that the petition for adoption failed to allege that his
consent was not required or to provide the basis for dispensing with his consent.
The petition for adoption alleged that Father was incarcerated at the time of
filing and that Adoptive Mother had been Child’s third-party custodian since
June 2022, but the petition did not specifically allege that Father’s consent was
unnecessary or set out the basis for dispensing with his consent. Father argues
that the lack of specificity regarding the basis for dispensing with his consent left
him “unable to discern” the allegations and violated his due process rights.
Appellant’s Br. p. 11.
[12] Father, however, never raised this argument regarding the petition for adoption
below. Moreover, Father did not raise a due process argument before the trial
court and makes no fundamental error argument on appeal. The issue, thus, is
waived. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal
may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process
rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”).
[13] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that, although not explicitly required by
the adoption statutes, a petition for adoption should allege, if applicable, that
consent is not required and explain the reasons for that allegation. Adoptive
Mother’s failure to do so here, however, did not result in a violation of Father’s
due process rights.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 7 of 17 [14] We begin by reviewing the relevant adoption statutes. Upon receiving a
petition for adoption, a trial court is required to “promptly [ ] examine the
petition for adoption” and “determine whether the petition for adoption is in
proper form.” Ind. Code § 31-19-2-10. Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-6 lists the
required contents of an adoption petition and does not specifically require
allegations regarding the parent’s consent. The statute, however, does require
the petitioner to include “[a]dditional information consistent with the purpose
and provisions of this article that is considered relevant to the proceedings.”
Ind. Code § 31-19-2-6(a)(10).
[15] Further, Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-2(b) provides that a petition for adoption
must include either “[a] written consent to the adoption from each individual
whose consent to the adoption is required” or “[a] certified copy of a court
order terminating the parental rights of each parent whose consent to the child’s
adoption is required under IC 31-19-9.” If a trial court, upon examining a
petition for adoption, finds that written consents or court orders terminating
parental rights are not attached to the petition and the petition does not specify
that consents are not required, the trial court would have difficulty determining
whether the petition for adoption is in the proper form.
[16] Moreover, notice of the adoption petition must be given to “a person whose
consent to adoption is required under IC 31-19-9-1.” Ind. Code § 31-19-2.5-3(a)(1). Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-1 requires written consent to adoption
from “[e]ach parent of a child born in wedlock.” Indiana Code Section 31-19-2.5-2(b) then provides:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 8 of 17
If a petition for adoption alleges the consent of a putative father
or a parent to the adoption has not been obtained and is
unnecessary under:
(1) IC 31-19-9-8(a)(1) [abandonment for six months];
(2) IC 31-19-9-8(a)(2) [failure to communicate or support for at
least one year]; [or]
*****
(6) IC 31-19-9-8(a)(11) [parent unfit];
notice must be given under IC 31-19-4.5.
(emphasis added). Additionally, Indiana Code Section 31-19-4.5-2 provides:
“Except as provided in IC 31-19-2.5-4[ 3], if a petition for adoption alleges that
consent to adoption is not required under IC 31-19-9-8, notice of the adoption
must be given to the person from whom consent is allegedly not required under
IC 31-19-9-8.” (emphasis added). These notice provisions also suggest that the
petition for adoption should specifically allege that consent is not required and
cite the statutory basis for dispensing with consent.
[17] The burden of proof also depends upon the allegations regarding consent.
Indiana Code Section 31-19-10-1.2(a) provides: “If a petition for adoption
3
The exceptions listed in Indiana Code Section 31-19-2.5-4 are not applicable here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 9 of 17
alleges that a parent’s consent to adoption is unnecessary under: (1) IC 31-19-9-8(a)(1); or (2) IC 31-19-9-8(a)(2); and the parent files a motion to contest the
adoption under section 1 of this chapter, a petitioner for adoption has the
burden of proving that the parent’s consent to the adoption is unnecessary
under IC 31-19-9-8.” (emphasis added). On the other hand, if the petition
alleges that consent is unnecessary because the child was conceived through
child molesting or sexual misconduct with a minor, the burden is on the parent
to prove that the child was not conceived in that manner. Ind. Code § 31-19-10-1.2(b). The allegations in the petition, thus, determine which party bears the
burden of proof.
[18] Finally, in ruling on a petition for adoption, the trial court must comply with
Indiana Code Section 31-19-11-1(a), which provides:
Whenever the court has heard the evidence and finds that:
(1) the adoption requested is in the best interest of the child;
*****
(5) proper notice arising under subdivision (4), if notice is
necessary, of the adoption has been given;
*****
(7) proper consent, if consent is necessary, to the adoption has
been given;
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 10 of 17
*****
the court shall grant the petition for adoption and enter an
adoption decree.
We have also required trial courts to make specific findings to explain why a
parent’s consent to the adoption is unnecessary. See W.M. v. H.T., 157 N.E.3d
1231, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
[19] Given this statutory framework, even though Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-6
does not specifically require allegations regarding the parent’s consent in the
petition for adoption, we infer from the adoption statutes that the petitioner
should include in the petition an allegation that consent is not required and
explain the basis for that allegation. 4 Without this specific allegation, it would
be unclear whether the petition for adoption is in the proper form, whether
proper notice was given, and which party has the burden of proof. This specific
allegation also allows the parent to readily determine the alleged basis for
dispensing with the parent’s consent and prepare a defense.
[20] We now consider whether Father’s due process rights were violated given this
statutory background. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “‘the
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
4
“Statutory provisions cannot be read standing alone; instead, they must be construed in light of the entire
act of which they are a part.” Int'l Union of Police Assocs., Loc. No. 133 v. Ralston, 872 N.E.2d 682, 686-87 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 11 of 17
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910,
917 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). Here,
Father was afforded the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Father was aware of the adoption petition, contested the
petition, and was represented by counsel. Father did not request a more
definite statement under Indiana Trial Rule 12(E) or file a motion to dismiss
under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B). Rather, Father fully participated in the hearing
on the matter and presented evidence on the relevant basis for dispensing with
his consent. Accordingly, we conclude that Father’s due process argument
fails.
II. Father’s consent to the adoption was not required.
[21] Father argues that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that his consent to
the adoption was not required. In general, “a petition to adopt a child who is
less than eighteen (18) years of age may be granted only if written consent to
adoption has been executed by . . . [e]ach parent of a child born in wedlock . . .
.” Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a)(1). “‘[U]nder carefully enumerated circumstances,’
however, the adoption statutes allow ‘the trial court to dispense with parental
consent and allow adoption of the child.’” In re Adoption of C.W., 202 N.E.3d
492, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274).
[22] Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-8(a) provides in relevant part:
Consent to adoption, which may be required under section 1 of
this chapter, is not required from any of the following:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 12 of 17
*****
(2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a
period of at least one (1) year the parent:
(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate
significantly with the child when able to do so; or
(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of
the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial
decree.
*****
(11) A parent if:
(A) a petitioner for adoption proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent;
and
(B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted
would be served if the court dispensed with the parent’s
consent.
[23] Our courts have long held that a natural parent enjoys special protection in
adoption proceedings. C.W., 202 N.E.3d at 495 (citing I.B., 163 N.E.3d at 274).
Accordingly, we strictly construe our adoption statutes to preserve the
fundamentally important parent-child relationship. Id.
[24] Here, the trial court found that Father’s consent was not required because: (1)
Father failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 13 of 17
for at least one year when able to do so; (2) Father knowingly failed to provide
for the care and support of Child for at least one year when able to do so as
required by law or judicial decree; and (3) Father was unfit and Child’s best
interests were served by dispensing with his consent. We need not address
Father’s arguments regarding his ability to provide support for Child and his
unfitness because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding
that Father failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with
Child for at least one year when able to do so.
[25] Father argues that he was justified in postponing communication due to his
incarceration, Child’s young age, and his mental health struggles.5 There is no
indication that Father was unable to communicate with Child during his
incarceration. Our Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in In re
Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965 (Ind. 2014), where the father was serving a
5
Although not mentioned by Father, we note that Indiana Code Section 31-19-10-1.4(b) provides:
If a petition for adoption alleges that a parent’s consent to the adoption is unnecessary under IC
31-19-9-8(a)(1) or IC 31-19-9-8(a)(2) and the parent files a motion to contest the adoption under
section 1 of this chapter, the court may consider:
(1) the parent’s substance abuse;
(2) the parent’s voluntary unemployment; or
(3) instability of the parent’s household caused by a family or household member of the
parent;
as justifiable cause for the parent’s abandonment or desertion of the child as described in IC 31-19-9-8(a)(1), failure to communicate significantly with the child as described in IC 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A), or failure to provide for the care and support of the child as described in IC 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B), if the parent has made substantial and continuing progress in remedying the factors
in subdivisions (1), (2), and (3), and it appears reasonably likely that progress will continue.
Indiana Code Section 31-19-10-1.4(b) does not list incarceration, a child’s young age, or mental health issues
as a factor the trial court may consider for a finding of justifiable cause. We do not, however, view Indiana
Code Section 31-19-10-1.4(b) as an exclusive list of circumstances that would justify a finding of justifiable
cause.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 14 of 17
seven-year sentence of incarceration, sent no mail to the child, and called only
once. The Court found that the father’s incarceration was not justifiable cause
for his failure to communicate significantly with the child for more than one
year and that his consent to the child’s adoption was unnecessary.
[26] Similarly, here, after Child’s placement with Adoptive Mother, Father visited
with Child for approximately five months. Father, however, was then
incarcerated again in June 2023 and failed to communicate with Child for more
than one year. Adoptive Mother filed her petition to adopt Child in July 2024.
At the January 2026 hearing, Adoptive Mother testified that Father has failed to
have any parenting time or meaningful contact with Child “over the past two,
three years,” and that Father has not contacted Adoptive Mother to get
parenting time or contact with Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Adoptive Mother
testified that she had lived in the same location for twenty years, and Father
was aware of her location. Father admitted at the hearing on this matter that he
failed to communicate with Child for more than one year.
[27] Given this evidence, Adoptive Mother presented evidence that Father failed
without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with Child for more than
one year when he was able to do so. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that
Father’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary is not clearly erroneous.
III. The adoption was in Child’s best interest.
[28] Next, Father challenges the trial court’s finding that the adoption was in Child’s
best interest. Indiana Code Section 31-19-11-1(a)(1) provides that the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 15 of 17
shall not grant an adoption petition unless “the adoption requested is in the best
interest of the child.” The trial court here found that “it is in the child’s best
interest that the adoption be approved.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 97.
[29] Father contends that it “would be unjust” to grant the adoption because he
previously visited with Child; he has not had the opportunity to “rehabilitate
himself”; he “was kept from the child before he had ample opportunity to
position himself as an adequate parent”; and “it was impractical for Father to
play a role in [Child’s] life due to his incarceration, his financial situation, and
his mental health struggles.” Appellant’s Br. p. 17.
[30] The evidence, however, showed that Child was born in September 2020, Child
has lived with Adoptive Mother since he was “about one,” and Adoptive
Mother has been Child’s legal third-party custodian since June 2022. Tr. Vol. II
p. 7. Both parents were incarcerated at that time. Although Father visited with
Child for approximately five months after his release from incarceration, he was
soon incarcerated again, and Father has had no contact with Child since that
time. Father’s severe mental health issues were evident at the hearing on this
matter. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s finding that the adoption
was in Child’s best interest is not clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
[31] We conclude that Father’s due process rights were not violated by Adoptive
Mother’s failure to include allegations regarding Father’s consent in the
adoption petition. Further, the trial court’s finding that Father’s consent to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 16 of 17
adoption was not required is not clearly erroneous, and the trial court’s finding
that the adoption was in Child’s best interest is not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[32] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., concurs.
Felix, J., concurs in result.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
R. Patrick Magrath
West Sixth Law, LLP
Madison, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-AD-790 August 18, 2026 Page 17 of 17