[J-18-2026] [MO: Mundy, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 6 WAP 2025
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Superior Court entered November
: 20, 2024, at No. 931 WDA 2023,
v. : Affirming the Order of the Court of
: Common Pleas of Allegheny
: County entered June 1, 2023, at
CLIFFORD E. WILSON, : No. CP-02-CR-009579-2021.
:
Appellant : ARGUED: April 14, 2026
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: AUGUST 18, 2026
On July 21, 2021, an off-duty paramedic was driving home when he encountered
a vehicle that had crashed into a fence. Upon finding an unconscious Clifford Wilson
(“Wilson”) in the driver’s seat of the vehicle, the off-duty paramedic called 911 and
reported a suspected overdose. Officer Brett Carb responded to the call. N.T., 4/27/2023,
at 7-8, 19. Wilson remained unresponsive until being administrated Narcan. Id. at 9-10,
20. Medics examined Wilson at the scene and an ambulance transported him to the
hospital. Id. at 10-11. The off-duty paramedic who reported the suspected overdose
identified himself to the responding officer and remained with Wilson until his arrival.
Officer Carb determined that Wison’s illegally parked vehicle had to be towed. Id.
at 12. After Wilson agreed to go to the hospital, Officer Carb conducted an inventory
search, a standard procedure prior to towing a vehicle. Id. The officer found “an empty
stamp bag” used to package heroin “in the gear shifter” of Wilson’s vehicle. Id. at 13.
Officer Carb removed the bag and placed it into evidence. Id. The officer subsequently met Wilson at the hospital, where he informed Wilson that he was being arrested for
suspected driving under the influence (“DUI”). A blood draw, which Wilson consented to,
revealed that Wilson had Fentanyl in his system. Id. at 15-16; Trial Court Opinion,
10/23/2023, at 2.
Wilson was convicted of two counts of DUI ─ controlled substance, and one count
of possession of drug paraphernalia.1 The trial court sentenced Wilson to four days in
the DUI alternative to jail program, six months of probation, and imposed fines. The
Superior Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 327 A.3d 659 (Pa. Super. 2024).
This Court granted allowance of appeal to consider “[w]hether the Superior Court erred
in its interpretation of the scope of the exception to immunity under the Drug Overdose
Response Immunity Act [(“DORIA”)], 35 P.S. § 780-113.7(d)(1)?” Commonwealth v.
Wilson, 337 A.3d 961 (Pa. 2025) (per curiam). Specifically, we must decide whether the
evidence in question, an empty stamp bag, was discovered by a police officer “prior to or
independent of the action of seeking or obtaining emergency assistance …” such that
Wilson is not immune from prosecution. 35 P.S. § 780-113.7(d)(1). Today’s Majority
concludes that a police officer discovered the evidence “independent of the action of
seeking or obtaining emergency assistance” such that DORIA’s limiting provision
precludes immunity for Wilson for the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia.
Because I disagree with the Majority’s interpretative analysis, I respectfully dissent.
The question presented for our review involves statutory interpretation which
presents a question of law. As a result, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Peck, 242 A.3d 1274 (Pa. 2020) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013)).
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)-(2); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32).
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The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of our General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The best expression of legislative intent
appears in the plain language of a statute. Peck, 242 A.3d at 1279. Only when the words
of the statute are ambiguous may a court ascertain legislative intent by considering
outside factors. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). The words of a statute “shall be construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approve usage.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). “[W]hen the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is
no need to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 981 A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v.
Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438, 446 (Pa. 2021).
The statute at issue provides:
(a) A person may not be charged and shall be immune from prosecution for
any offense listed in subsection (b) and for a violation of probation or parole
if the person can establish the following:
(1) law enforcement officers only became aware of the
person’s commission of an offense listed in subsection (b)
because the person transported a person experiencing a drug
overdose event to a law enforcement agency, a campus
security office or a health care facility; or
(2) all of the following apply:
(i) the person reported, in good faith, a drug
overdose event to a law enforcement officer, the
911 system, a campus security officer or
emergency services personnel and the report
was made on the reasonable belief that another
person was in need of immediate medical
attention and was necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury due to a drug overdose;
(ii) the person provided his own name and
location and cooperated with the law
enforcement officer, 911 system, campus
[J-18-2026] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 3
security officer or emergency services
personnel; and
(iii) the person remained with the person
needing immediate medical attention until a law
enforcement officer, a campus security officer or
emergency services personnel arrived.
(b) The prohibition on charging or prosecuting a person as described in
subsection (a) bars charging or prosecuting a person for probation and
parole violations and for violations of [35 P.S. § 780-113] section 13(a)(5),
(16), (19), (31), (32), (33) and (37).[ ]
(c) Persons experiencing drug overdose events may not be charged and
shall be immune from prosecution as provided in subsection (b) if a person
who transported or reported and remained with them may not be charged
and is entitled to immunity under this section.
35 P.S. § 780-113.7(a)-(c). The statute defines a “drug overdose event” as
An acute medical condition, including, but not limited to,
severe physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria or death, which
is the result of consumption or use of one or more controlled
substances causing an adverse reaction. A patient’s
condition shall be deemed to be a drug overdose if a prudent
layperson, possessing an average knowledge of medicine
and health, would reasonably believe that the condition is in
fact a drug overdose and requires immediate medical
attention.
35 P.S. § 780-113.7(f).
In sum, the statute confers immunity upon the overdose reporter to the extent the
aforementioned statutory conditions are met. 35 P.S. § 780-113.7(a)(2). Here, the offduty paramedic was the overdose reporter who satisfied the conditions of subsection
(a)(2). The statute provides the overdose victim with immunity from prosecution for minor
crimes, including the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia, if the overdose reporter
“remained with them and may not be charged and is entitled to immunity under this
section.” 35 P.S. § 780-113.7(b), (c). Thus, subsection (c) extends immunity to the
[J-18-2026] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 4
overdose victim, in this case Wilson. Id. Of importance to this appeal, the statute limits
immunity in relevant part as follows:
(1) This section may not bar charging or prosecuting a person
for offenses enumerated in subsection (b) if a law
enforcement officer obtains information prior to or
independent of the action of seeking or obtaining
emergency assistance as described in subsection (a).
35 P.S. § 780-113.7(d)(1) (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that the statutory preconditions for immunity apply. 35 P.S. §
780-113.7(a)-(c). The sole issue before us is whether subsection (d)(1) precludes
immunity under the circumstances. This question requires the Court to resolve whether
Officer Carb obtained the drug paraphernalia “independent of the action of seeking or
obtaining emergency assistance as described in subsection (a).” 35 P.S. § 780-113(d)(1) (emphasis added). My analysis of this statutory text leads me to the conclusion
that Wilson is immune from prosecution because DORIA’s limitation upon immunity in
subsection (d)(1) does not apply.
In my view, the previously bolded language is clear and unambiguous. As relevant
to Section 780-113(d)(1), Black’s Law Dictionary defines “independent” as “3. Not
dependent or contingent on something else <an independent person>.” Independent,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines
“independent” in relevant part as: “not requiring or relying on something else: not
contingent[.]” Independent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/independent.
Consistent with the plain statutory text, the empty stamp bag was not obtained
“prior to or independent of the action of seeking or obtaining emergency assistance as
described in subsection (a).” 35 P.S. § 780-113.7(d)(1). Officer Carb’s discovery of the
empty stamp bag was “dependent or contingent on something else[,]” namely, “the action
[J-18-2026] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 5
of seeking or obtaining emergency assistance.” Independent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(12th ed. 2024); see also 35 P.S. § 780-113.7(d)(1). The off-duty paramedic called 911
and reported the suspected drug overdose, and Officer Carb responded to the call. N.T.,
4/27/2023, at 7-8, 19. Officer Carb would not have been at the scene and in contact with
Wilson or his parked vehicle without the reported suspected drug overdose. The officer’s
discovery of the stamp bag was procured during an inventory search necessitated by the
consequences of the reported drug overdose and the emergency assistance rendered to
Wilson. In other words, the emergency event directly led to the discovery of the stamp
bag. The stamp bag was not found pursuant to an independent investigation or report
because the inventory search was not independent of the report.
The Majority acknowledges that “[t]he word independent, by its very structure,
means not dependent, which is consistent with dictionary definitions suggesting a
meaning of not contingent, managed, or limited by something else.” Majority Op. at 8
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (6th ed. 1990)). Without analyzing the plain text of
DORIA or deeming the statute ambiguous, the Majority points to other jurisdictions which
have relied upon a so-called causation analysis to define independent. Id. at 8-15. The
Majority finds “search and seizure law analogous and thus useful in understanding the
intended scope” of the statutory language at issue. Id. at 15-16. But, no help is needed
to understand the clear language of the provision defining the scope of the exception to
immunity. The Majority bases its interpretive analysis upon outside factors reserved for
ambiguity. The Majority’s holding cannot be reconciled with the plain language.
Because I find the language of subsection (d)(1) clear and free of ambiguity, I
would hold that the Superior Court misconstrued the statutory language at issue and erred
in concluding that subsection (d)(1) of DORIA precludes immunity in this situation. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
[J-18-2026] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 6