Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00774-CV
EKRE OF TX, LLC,
Appellant
v.
Elizabeth Anne ROBINSON and/or All Other Occupants of 218 Harding Pl.,
San Antonio, TX, 78203,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2025CV06135
Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 12, 2026
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellant EKRE of TX, LLC challenges the county court at law’s order dismissing its
forcible detainer petition for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the county court’s order and remand
this cause to the justice court for resolution of EKRE’s forcible detainer petition.
04-25-00774-CV
BACKGROUND
This dispute revolves around a residential property in San Antonio. In 2016, appellee
Elizabeth Anne Robinson’s brother conveyed the property to her by general warranty deed.
Robinson and EKRE agree that they entered into a contractual relationship regarding the property
in 2022. Robinson contends, and EKRE does not dispute, that before the contractual relationship
at issue, Robinson owned the property free and clear, with no mortgage.
In connection with their agreement, EKRE and Robinson executed several documents,
including a Residential Real Estate Sales Agreement (“the sales agreement”), a Residential Real
Estate Option Agreement (“the option agreement”), a Residential Lease Agreement (“the lease
agreement”), a Sell and Stay Contract Summary (“the summary”), a document entitled
“Transaction Risk Factors,” and a general warranty deed with vendor’s lien. EKRE contends that
by executing these documents, Robinson sold the property to EKRE and subsequently lived there
as EKRE’s tenant. Robinson, in contrast, argued below that she did not intend to sell her property
to EKRE; that she believed her agreement with EKRE was a loan that permitted her to retain
ownership; and that she did not understand that she was creating a landlord-tenant relationship
with EKRE. She also contended that EKRE only provided her with the signature page of the
general warranty deed, not the entire document.
Robinson has not explicitly alleged that she was denied an opportunity to read the other
documents she signed. The summary, lease agreement, and Transaction Risk Factors all identified
Robinson as “Tenant” and EKRE as “Landlord.” The summary noted that EKRE “becomes the
owner of the Property,” informed Robinson that “[u]pon entering into a Lease Agreement with
[EKRE], you will become the tenant of [EKRE],” and specified, “You [Robinson] acknowledge
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that [EKRE] is not extending credit or making a loan of any kind to you or on your behalf.” The
Transaction Risk Factors contained the following representations:
• “You are selling the Property to [EKRE].”
• “By selling the Property to [EKRE], [EKRE] becomes the owner of the Property.”
• “By selling the Property to [EKRE] and entering into a lease agreement with [EKRE], you
become the tenant of [EKRE] and [EKRE] becomes your landlord.”
• You acknowledge that [EKRE] is not extending credit or making a loan of any kind to you
or on your behalf. YOU HAVE NOT REQUESTED, AND [EKRE] HAS NOT OFFERED,
TO MAKE YOU A LOAN.” (emphasis in original)
• By selling the Property, you will no longer own the Property or have any right, title or
interest in the Property as an owner.”
Robinson initialed these and several other representations listed in the Transaction Risk Factors,
and she signed the document as “Seller.”
The option agreement identified EKRE as “the fee owner of” the property. It also provided
that during the term of the lease agreement, Robinson had “an option to effect the sale of the
Property” to either herself or a third party for a specified price. The option agreement further stated
that EKRE was “under no obligation to provide [Robinson] with a loan to pay the” specified price
and that it would terminate “on the date . . . that the Lease Agreement terminates.”
In December of 2024, Robinson filed for bankruptcy protection. Robinson’s bankruptcy
petition stated that she rented her residence, and it did not list EKRE as a creditor or assert that she
owned the property at issue here. The bankruptcy court signed an order of discharge on March 27,
2025 and closed the bankruptcy proceeding the next day.
On May 7, 2025, EKRE filed a forcible detainer suit in the justice court. EKRE alleged
that Robinson had failed to pay the rent required by the lease agreement, that it had provided her
with written notice of default, and that she had failed to vacate or otherwise comply with EKRE’s
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demand for possession. As support for its petition, EKRE attached the lease agreement and a ledger
that purportedly showed Robinson’s failure to pay rent.
On June 25, 2025, Robinson filed a trespass to try title action in Bexar County District
Court. In that district court action, Robinson argued that the parties’ agreements were
unenforceable and the general warranty deed was void because the contractual arrangement was
“a Sham Sale-Leaseback Transaction that consists of several agreements and procedures carefully
crafted to induce desperate and unknowing individuals.” 1
On June 27, 2025, Robinson filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the justice court. In her plea,
she argued that both parties claimed ownership of the property and the justice court therefore
lacked jurisdiction over EKRE’s forcible detainer suit because “[d]etermination of the right to
immediate possession requires adjudication of a title dispute[.]” The justice court granted
Robinson’s plea and dismissed EKRE’s forcible detainer suit. EKRE appealed to the county court
for a trial de novo, and on August 11, 2025, it filed a motion for summary judgment.
Shortly after EKRE filed its motion for summary judgment, Robinson sought to reopen her
bankruptcy proceeding. The motion to reopen alleged that “[a]t the time this [bankruptcy] case
was filed, [Robinson] did not have an ownership interest in any real estate, having conveyed the
property [at issue here] by warranty deed dated May 4, 2022”; that Robinson “was leasing said
property from the buyer under a lease agreement filed in the real property records of Bexar County,
Texas”; and that due to an alleged “pattern of conduct and scheme in this transfer of [Robinson’s]
property and many other properties,” Robinson “may have the ability to recover” the property or
may have the right to other remedies that would be “property of the bankruptcy estate.” Robinson
1
EKRE eventually removed Robinson’s trespass to try title action to federal court on diversity grounds. The appellate record does not contain any information about the federal court’s disposition, if any, of the trespass to try title action.
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asked to reopen the bankruptcy so she could “amend [her] schedules to include the above-described
asset(s)[.]” The bankruptcy court granted Robinson’s motion to reopen on September 9, 2025.
In her September 12, 2025 response to EKRE’s motion for summary judgment in county
court, Robinson argued, as she had in the justice court, that “whether EKRE has the right to
possession is so intertwined with the issue of title that title is required to be determined before
possession may be.” As support for her summary judgment response, Robinson attached a copy of
her district court trespass to try title petition. She also attached, inter alia, an affidavit in which she
averred that she “relied on the representations of EKRE of what the documents [she signed] meant”
and that she believed those documents “reflect[ed] a loan transaction with EKRE” wherein she
“would remain the owner of the property[.]” She further averred that “EKRE did not provide [her]
with a complete copy of the General Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien . . . so [she] had no reason
to believe that any document transferred full ownership of [her] house to EKRE.”
On October 23, 2025, the county court signed an “Order Granting Defendant’s Plea to
Jurisdiction,” which dismissed EKRE’s forcible detainer petition without prejudice. 2 EKRE then
timely filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A forcible detainer action “is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to
obtain immediate possession of property.” Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417
S.W.3d 909, 919 (Tex. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Jurisdiction to hear forcible
detainer actions is vested in justice courts, and on appeal, to county courts for trial de novo.”
2
While Robinson filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the justice court, the appellate record does not contain any plea to the jurisdiction that she filed in county court. However, Robinson’s response to EKRE’s motion for summary judgment directly challenged the county court’s jurisdiction, and EKRE has not complained on appeal that the county court’s order granted Robinson relief she did not properly request.
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Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001,
pet. dism’d w.o.j.).
The sole issue in a forcible detainer suit is which party has the right to immediate
possession of the property; “the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated.” Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P.
510.3(e). 3 “[T]o prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff is not required to prove title, but
is only required to present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to
immediate possession.” Vela v. Shafaii Invs., Ltd., No. 01-23-00065-CV, 2024 WL 3056641, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 20, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted).
In some cases, a question regarding the property’s title is “so intertwined with the issue of
possession” that possession cannot be adjudicated “without first determining title.” Yates v.
WIOSA, LLC, No. 04-22-00083-CV, 2022 WL 17480469, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 7,
2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). “[T]he county court is deprived of jurisdiction if
resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to the determination of the right to immediate
possession.” Id. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a title dispute will not automatically deprive
the justice court or the county court of jurisdiction. See Guillaume v. EKRE of TX, LLC, No. 05-24-00316-CV, 2025 WL 2694461, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 17, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Those courts lose jurisdiction only if “the right to immediate possession necessarily requires the
resolution of a title dispute.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
If the issues of title and possession are not inextricably intertwined, “a forcible-detainer
suit in justice court may run concurrently with another action in another court—even if the other
action adjudicates matters that could result in a different determination of possession from that
3
The Texas Supreme Court amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.3 effective January 1, 2026. This opinion cites the prior version of the rule, which was still in effect when the county court signed the order challenged in this appeal.
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rendered in the forcible-detainer suit.” Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 437
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “A forcible detainer action is cumulative, not
exclusive, of other remedies that a party may have, thus the parties may pursue both a forcible
detainer action in justice court and a suit to quiet title in district court.” Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at
558. This is because “a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a determination only
of the right to immediate possession and does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties to
any other issue in controversy relating to the realty in question.” Guillaume, 2025 WL 2694461,
at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). “[W]here the relationship between
the purchaser and seller of real property encompasses the landlord and tenant relationship, even
where such a relationship occurs in the context of a sale of property, the issue of immediate
possession can typically be determined without first necessarily determining the issue of title.” In
re Gallegos, No. 13-13-00504-CV, 2013 WL 6056666, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Nov. 13, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
We review the county court’s determination of its jurisdiction in a forcible detainer suit de
novo. See, e.g., Yates, 2022 WL 17480469, at *1. When examining a jurisdictional question in a
forcible detainer matter, “we focus first on the plaintiff’s petition to determine whether the facts
pleaded affirmatively demonstrate that jurisdiction exists.” Guillaume, 2025 WL 2694461, at *4.
“We examine the pleadings, construing them in the pleader’s favor and taking as true the facts
pleaded, and determine whether those facts support jurisdiction in the trial court.” Id. If the pleaded
facts establish jurisdiction, the forcible detainer defendant must then “provide specific evidence of
a genuine title dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession” to defeat
jurisdiction. Id.
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Application
In its forcible detainer petition, EKRE alleged that it had entered into a residential lease
agreement with Robinson, that Robinson had “failed to pay the full rent owed as required by the
Lease,” and that it had given Robinson a written notice of default and demand to vacate. See id.
(examining a similar petition). It also presented a copy of a written lease agreement signed by
Robinson and a ledger that it contended showed her failure to pay rent. “Taking these allegations
as true and construing them in EKRE’s 4 favor, as we must, we conclude that these facts support
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id.
To defeat the justice court’s jurisdiction, Robinson bore the burden to “provide specific
evidence of a genuine title dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession.”
Henderson v. Altura Realty LLC, No. 05-21-00860-CV, 2023 WL 3860428, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). “‘[S]pecific evidence’ of a title dispute exists when” a
forcible detainer defendant “has asserted a basis for title ownership that is not patently ineffective
under the law and is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession.” Yarto v. Gilliland, 287
S.W.3d 83, 93 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, no pet.).
Under some circumstances, “an unresolved title dispute, involving the same parties and
same property, pending in the District Court at the time of [the] forcible detainer action” can be
sufficient to defeat jurisdiction over a forcible detainer. See Mitchell v. Armstrong Cap. Corp., 911
S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). But in most cases, a parallel
trespass to try title case does not necessarily strip the justice and county courts of jurisdiction over
a forcible detainer. See Henderson, 2023 WL 3860428, at *2. Issues of title and immediate right
to possession “may be litigated in separate proceedings in different courts with appropriate
4
EKRE was also the forcible detainer plaintiff in Guillaume.
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jurisdiction. . . . [J]ustice and county courts may adjudicate possession when issues related to the
title of real property are tangentially or collaterally related to possession.” Id.
The record in this case shows that Robinson filed a trespass to try title claim in the district
court on June 25, 2025, two days before the justice court granted Robinson’s plea to the
jurisdiction. It thus appears that the justice court and/or the county court may have concluded that
the pending trespass to try title claim was dispositive of those courts’ jurisdiction over EKRE’s
forcible detainer action. For the following reasons, we disagree.
Robinson argues that her possession of the property is inextricably tied to the title because
her right to re-acquire title under the option agreement “is conditioned entirely upon her ‘prior’
ownership and her continued payments of ‘rent.’” She contends that if she “were to lose possession
(via eviction), she would also lose the option to reacquire title to the Property or vice-versa.” While
Robinson has accurately described the terms of the option agreement, there is no evidence that she
ever attempted to exercise her rights under that agreement. As a result, her argument on this point
relies solely on a hypothetical future right to obtain title. She has not explained how this
hypothetical future right establishes that her right to immediate possession is superior to EKRE’s.
Stated differently, she has not explained how her argument on this point is relevant to the only
question at issue in a forcible detainer. See, e.g., Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557. Nor has she
explained how this hypothetical future right establishes a currently operative “basis for title
ownership that is not patently ineffective under the law and is intertwined with the issue of
immediate possession.” See Yarto, 287 S.W.3d at 93. We conclude that this issue is merely
collateral to the title, as opposed to so inextricable from the title that the two questions must be
resolved in the same proceeding. See Guillaume, 2025 WL 2694461, at *3; contra Gallegos, 2013
WL 6056666, at *5–6 (concluding a conveyance and lease that involved a buyback option “clearly
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implicate[d] the transfer of title” because the lease stated that the landlord/lender would hold the
deed as part of a loan transaction and “‘upon final payment on bank note the house will be
return[ed] to the lessee’”). 5 Consequently, that issue was not sufficient to divest the justice court
and county court of jurisdiction over the forcible detainer.
Robinson also argues that EKRE’s right to possession is inextricably related to the title
because EKRE obtained title to the property through fraud. Based on this assertion of fraud,
Robinson argued in her district court trespass to try title action that the general warranty deed was
void. On appeal, she relies on Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no
pet.), to argue that “when the question of possession is so integrally linked to a title dispute or
fraud claim that the two cannot be separated, the justice court must decline jurisdiction.”
But Dass does not hold that the mere assertion of fraud will divest a justice court of
jurisdiction. See generally id. In Dass, the parties agreed that a business owned by Smith had once
leased real property from Dass, a corporation owned by McFalls. Smith contended that Dass had
sold the property to him, and he presented evidence “that he made payments in consideration of
that agreement.” See id. at 200–01. McFalls, in contrast, testified that no sale agreement existed,
and he “claimed [his] signature on the sale agreement was forged.” Id. at 201. Because Smith
presented evidence that the relationship “was one of seller-buyer, not landlord-tenant” and
Dass/McFalls presented evidence of the exact opposite, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that “the
determination of the right to immediate possession of the property necessarily require[d] a
resolution of the title dispute” and the justice court lacked jurisdiction over the forcible detainer.
5
While Robinson argues on appeal that EKRE “deceived [her] into surrendering title to her home under the guise of a loan,” the summary and Transaction Risk Factors directly refute this assertion. As explained above, both documents expressly stated that EKRE was “not extending credit or making a loan of any kind to [Robinson] or on [Robinson’s] behalf.” These documents are therefore distinguishable from the evidence reviewed by the Gallegos court. See Gallegos, 2013 WL 6056666, at *5–6.
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Id.; see also Gallegos, 2013 WL 6056666, at *4 (“In general, cases have held that where the
relationship between the parties in a forcible detainer suit is that of buyer and seller only, the
determination of the right to immediate possession of the property necessarily requires resolution
of the title dispute.”).
Like Smith, Robinson argued below that she is the true record title holder of the property.
But unlike Smith, Robinson did not present evidence that the parties had an existing agreement to
convey the property to her. She claimed only that EKRE had misled or defrauded her into
conveying her property and that she was not given an opportunity to review the general warranty
deed before she signed it. However, she has not disputed that her signature appears on the
documents associated with the parties’ agreement, nor has she contended that her signature on any
document was forged. See Dass, 206 S.W.3d at 201. She also has not argued that she was denied
an opportunity to review the summary, lease agreement, or Transaction Risk Factors, all of which
explicitly describe Robinson as “Tenant” and EKRE as “Landlord.”
We express no opinion on Robinson’s claims that EKRE misled or defrauded her. But as
Robinson herself recognizes in her appellee’s brief, “[d]eeds obtained by fraud are voidable rather
than void[.]” Ford v. Exxon Mobile Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
Such deeds “remain effective until set aside,” see id., and Robinson has remedies available to her
in the district court to seek that result. See McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex.
1984). We conclude that under these circumstances, Robinson’s claim that the deed is voidable
due to fraud may be resolved independently of EKRE’s claim that it has the superior right to
immediate possession. See Guillaume, 2025 WL 2694461, at *4; see also Casalicchio v. Fed.
Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-19-00392-CV, 2021 WL 921779, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding forcible detainer defendant was “not
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required to prove that its title is valid”); Vela, 2024 WL 3056641, at *3 (holding that validity of a
foreclosure could be decided separately from right to immediate possession). Robinson’s
contention that EKRE’s title was voidable was thus insufficient to divest the justice court of
jurisdiction over the forcible detainer.
Finally, it is well-established that in most circumstances, “[a] landlord-tenant relationship
provides an independent basis on which the trial court could determine the issue of immediate
possession without resolving the issue of title to the property.” Vela, 2024 WL 3056641, at *3
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the lease agreement shows the existence of a landlordtenant relationship on its face, and the existence of that relationship is reinforced by the summary,
the Transaction Risk Factors, and the option agreement. While Robinson challenges the validity
of the lease agreement, that challenge is tied directly to her fraud claim, which we have already
held was insufficient to divest the justice court and county court of jurisdiction. Furthermore,
Robinson’s own evidence—specifically, her bankruptcy court filings, which she attached to her
response to EKRE’s motion for summary judgment—showed that she knew she was leasing the
property from EKRE. Based on the lease agreement, the justice court and county court could have
determined that EKRE had the superior right to possession of the property without deciding any
title issues. See id.; contra Yarto, 287 S.W.3d at 89–90 (holding justice court and county court
lacked jurisdiction over forcible detainer where parties presented conflicting evidence about
“whether a landlord-tenant or buyer-seller relationship exists” and “neither party’s assertion [had]
the support of a contractual document”); Aguilar v. Weber, 72 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. App.—Waco
2002, no pet.) (concluding justice court and county court lacked jurisdiction where the parties’
agreement “did not provide for a landlord-tenant relationship”). Because the lease agreement
provided an independent means to determine the issue of immediate possession, the justice court
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and the county court at law erred by concluding they lacked jurisdiction over EKRE’s forcible
detainer petition. See Vela, 2024 WL 3056641, at *3; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
For these reasons, we hold that Robinson did not “provide specific evidence of a genuine
title dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession.” Guillaume, 2025 WL
2694461, at *4. We therefore sustain EKRE’s first issue and conclude that the county court erred
by dismissing EKRE’s forcible detainer for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at *4–6. In light of our
disposition of this issue, we need not reach EKRE’s second issue, which addresses the reopening
of Robinson’s bankruptcy proceeding. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the county court’s order and remand this cause to the justice court for resolution
of EKRE’s forcible detainer petition.
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
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