Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-26-00380-CV
Ra Hermes VELTHRA,
Appellant
v.
INVESTORADE COMMUNITY TEXAS HOLDINGS LLC, d/b/a Texas Hill County Resort,
Appellee
From the 198th Judicial District Court, Bandera County, Texas
Trial Court No. 26-010-DCCV-00047
Honorable M. Patrick Maguire, Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM
Sitting: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 12, 2026
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART
Before this Court is Appellant Ra Hermes Velthra’s “emergency” motion that challenges
the trial court’s setting of supersedeas bond and the trial court’s order denying appellant’s claim
of indigency. We affirm the trial court’s February 26, 2026 order denying Velthra’s claim of
indigency. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s May 4, 2026 order that required Velthra to
post an appeal bond in the amount of $7,500.00 and render that Velthra is not required to post an
appeal bond to supersede the trial court’s judgment.
04-26-00380-CV
On February 26, 2026, Velthra filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed as Appeal No.
04-26-00206-CV. Velthra sought review of the trial court’s February 26, 2026 order denying his
claim of indigency under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g) regarding his inability to pay court
costs. On April 9, 2026, this Court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there was
no final judgment. See Velthra v. Investorade Cmty. Holdings, LLC, No. 04-26-00206-CV, 2026
WL 1020540, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 8, 2026, no pet.). On May 4, 2026, the trial
court signed a final judgment granting appellee’s motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 91a, awarding appellee $4,800 in attorney’s fees, and setting a supersedeas bond in the
amount of $7,500. On May 12, 2026, Velthra timely filed a notice of appeal, challenging the trial
court’s dismissal of his claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, the award of attorney’s
fees, and the amount of the supersedeas bond. On that same date, Velthra filed an “emergency”
motion requesting that this Court review the supersedeas bond and review the trial court’s February
26, 2026 order denying his Rule 145(g) claim of indigency and requiring payment of court costs.
On May 22, 2026, appellee filed a motion to enforce the trial court’s order requiring a supersedeas
bond, requesting that we “confirm” that the trial court’s judgment is not superseded. On May 28,
2026, we ordered the clerk’s and reporter’s records to be filed relating to Velthra’s claim of
indigency and the trial court’s setting of supersedeas bond. Those records have now been filed.
INDIGENCY
On February 26, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on Velthra’s claim of indigency. That
same day, the trial court issued an order requiring appellant to pay costs and found that he was not
indigent. “A party who cannot afford payment of court costs must file the Statement of Inability
to Afford Payment of Court Costs approved by the Supreme Court or another sworn document
containing the same information.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(b). The district clerk, a court reporter, or an
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opposing party may file a motion in the trial court to challenge the declarant’s claim of indigency.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(e). If a motion challenging the declarant’s claim of indigency is filed, “the
declarant must not be ordered to pay costs” unless: (1) the trial court holds “an oral evidentiary
hearing”; (2) the declarant receives at least “10 days’ notice of the hearing”; and (3) the trial court
makes “detailed findings that the declarant can afford to pay costs.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(f)(1), (2).
“At the hearing, the burden is on the declarant to prove the inability to afford costs.” TEX.
R. CIV. P. 145(f)(1). “In the trial court, the test for determining indigence is whether the record as
a whole shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant would be unable to pay the
costs, or a part thereof, or give security therefor, if he really wanted to and made a good-faith effort
to do so.” Basaldua v. Hadden, 298 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, order). We
review a trial court’s ruling on a claim of inability to pay costs for abuse of discretion. See
Rodriguez v. H-E-B, No. 04-19-00795-CV, 2020 WL 354766, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan.
22, 2020, order); In re J.P.N., No. 04-17-00633-CV, 2018 WL 626526, at *1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Jan. 31, 2018, order).
The trial court’s February 26, 2026 order found that Velthra owns stock valued at
approximately $29,000.00. The reporter’s record further reflects that Velthra receives voluntary
financial assistance and, when those funds are insufficient, he may “dip into” his stock holdings,
although doing so would be financially detrimental to him. The trial court concluded that Velthra’s
preference not to liquidate his assets was insufficient to establish indigency. The trial court
reasoned that the mere existence of those assets disqualified Velthra from proceeding without
payment of costs.
In reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, we conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s findings. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
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concluding that Velthra failed to meet his burden of proof under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
145(f). We therefore affirm that the trial court’s February 26, 2026 order finding that Velthra failed
to meet his burden to prove his inability to afford costs.
SUPERSEDEAS BOND
Velthra’s “emergency” motion also challenges the amount of the supersedeas bond ordered
by the trial court. On the motion of a party, an appellate court may review the sufficiency or
excessiveness of the amount of security. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.006(d); TEX. R.
APP. P. P. 24.4(a). We review the trial court’s determination of the amount of security under an
abuse of discretion standard. Haedge v. Cent. Tex. Cattlemen’s Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex.
2020). “Under an abuse of discretion standard, we defer ‘to the trial court’s factual determinations
if they are supported by evidence,’ but review legal determinations de novo.” Id. (quoting Stockton
v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. 2011)).
“[W]hen a judgment is for money, the amount of the security must equal the sum of: (1)
the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the judgment; (2) interest for the estimated
duration of the appeal; and (3) costs awarded in the judgment.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
52.006(a); see TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(1). The Texas Supreme Court has held that compensatory
damages or costs under section 52.006 do not include attorney’s fees unless the underlying suit
concerns a claim for attorney’s fees as an element of damages. See In re Nalle Plastics Fam. Ltd.
P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 174-76 (Tex. 2013) (holding that attorney’s fees incurred in the
prosecution or defense of a claim are neither compensatory damages nor costs and that only when
“the underlying suit concerns a claim for attorney’s fees as an element of damages” can those fees
be included as part of a compensatory damages award); see also In re Corral–Lerma, 451 S.W.3d
385, 387 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (holding that attorney’s fees under the Texas Theft
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Liability Act are not compensatory damages). “Because attorney’s fees are neither compensatory
damages nor costs for purposes of suspending enforcement of a money judgment,” a trial court
may not factor the attorney’s fees award into the required bond amount, meaning that an appellant
need not post security for the attorney’s fees award in order to suspend execution of the judgment
on appeal. In re Nalle Plastics, 406 S.W.3d at 176.
In this case, the trial court granted appellee’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and, in its final
judgment issued on May 4, 2026, awarded appellee $4,800 in attorney’s fees, which was the only
monetary relief granted. The trial court did not award any compensatory damages. Therefore, the
trial court abused its discretion in setting a supersedeas bond in the amount of $7,500. See id. No
supersedeas bond is required to suspend enforcement of the trial court’s judgment. For that reason,
we deny appellee’s motion to enforce.
CONCLUSION
Appellant’s emergency motion to review the trial court’s indigency determination and
setting of supersedeas bond is granted in part and denied in part. Because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in issuing the February 26, 2026 order denying Velthra’s claim of indigency,
we affirm that portion of the ruling. However, because the final judgment awarded only attorney’s
fees, which are non-compensatory in nature, we hold that no supersedeas bond is required to
suspend enforcement of the judgment. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s May
4, 2026 order setting a $7,500 supersedeas bond and render that no supersedeas bond is required
to suspend enforcement of the judgment.
PER CURIAM
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