TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-26-00537-CV
In re Environment Plus, Inc., R. Alexander Conant, and Joshua Eames-Cepero
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relators Environment Plus, Inc.; R. Alexander Conant; and Joshua Eames-Cepero
have filed a mandamus petition challenging the trial court’s order imposing sanctions against
them, jointly and severally, and requiring the sanctions to be paid within eleven days of the
order. We conclude that the portions of the order imposing sanctions for relators’ actions in a
prior, different proceeding are void, and we therefore direct the trial court to vacate those
portions. We otherwise deny relief.
BACKGROUND
In July 2024, in Cause Number D-1-GN-24-004203 (the Contract Suit), real party
in interest JRMG Solutions, LLC sued Environment Plus for its alleged failure to pay for
contractual staffing services. The parties mediated their dispute, and the trial court rendered an
agreed judgment of $60,000 in favor of JRMG. Thereafter, Environment Plus filed a motion for
new trial and to set aside judgment, which the trial court denied; a motion to modify or
reconsider the order denying its motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court also denied; and then a formal bill of
exception and offer of proof, to which JRMG responded in opposition. In February 2026, JRMG
filed a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees, challenging each of Environment Plus’s
post-judgment motions and filings as being in violation of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and
Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 10.001, .004. On April 15, 2026, the court signed (1) an order dismissing
JRMG’s motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees for want of jurisdiction, finding that its plenary
power had already expired; and (2) its Judge-Prepared Bill of Exception stating that its bill
“accurately reflects the proceedings in the trial court, as follows:
The record in this cause begins with Plaintiff’s Original Petition
filed on July 8, 2024, and consists of everything that is filed into
this cause up to and including the Order Denying Defendant
Environment Plus, Inc.’s Motion to Modify or Reconsider Order
on New Trial or in the Alternative Request for Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, signed on February 4, 2026, which was
the last exercise of the trial court’s plenary power in this cause and
none further.”
Environment Plus perfected an appeal in this Court of the agreed judgment, which is pending
under Cause Number 03-26-000114-CV.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 2026, JRMG filed in the trial court an application for a
writ of garnishment to collect on the $60,000 agreed judgment in a separate proceeding, Cause
Number D-1-GN-000145 (the Garnishment Proceeding). JRMG listed the debtor as
Environment Plus and the garnishee as Bank of America, alleging that JRMG is entitled to a writ
of garnishment to collect on the agreed judgment and attaching the affidavit of its owner, Jose
Mata Guerra. A writ was issued, and thereafter Environment Plus filed an original answer,
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cross-claims, and emergency application to dissolve the writ of garnishment and later a renewed
application to dissolve the writ of garnishment and to strike the affidavit of Guerra. JRMG filed
a motion for sanctions and attorneys’ fees, moving the court to impose sanctions and award it the
attorneys’ fees it incurred in responding to and defending against (1) Environment Plus’s
post-judgment filings in the Contract Suit and (2) Environment Plus’s filings opposing the writ
of garnishment in the Garnishment Proceeding.
After a hearing, the trial court signed an order (Sanctions Order) in the
Garnishment Proceeding requiring relators to pay, jointly and severally, $47,516.56 to JRMG
“for its reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees incurred to defend and respond to the
post-judgment pleadings and related conduct as identified and described hereinabove including
the efforts necessary in obtaining this Order, by 5:00 p.m. on June 19, 2026.” In the Sanctions
Order’s Conclusions of Law (appearing in paragraphs 39–42 and 47–48), the trial court
concluded that the following post-judgment filings of Environment Plus in the Contract Suit are
“groundless and evince[] bad faith” and that JRMG incurred the following respective reasonable
and necessary attorneys’ fees in responding to or defending against each filing:
• Motion for New Trial and to Set Aside Agreed Judgment—$8,608.75;
• Motion to Modify or Reconsider Order on New Trial or in the Alternative Request for
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law—$2,044; and
• Formal Bill of Exception and Offer of Proof—$5,749.50.
The trial court additionally concluded that JRMG incurred the following reasonable and
necessary attorneys’ fees in responding to or against the following groundless and bad-faith
filings of Environment Plus in the Garnishment Proceeding:
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• Original Answer, Cross-Claims, and Emergency Application to Dissolve Writ of
Garnishment—$4,199; and
• Renewed Sworn Application to Dissolve Writ of Garnishment and Strike Affidavit of
Guerra—$6,390.
The trial court’s Sanctions Order also awarded JRMG $18,417.29 for the attorneys’ fees it
incurred in seeking the recovery of sanctions and $2,108.02 it incurred for the hearing on its
motion for sanctions, but the order did not segregate those amounts between JRMG’s efforts to
obtain sanctions for Environment Plus’s post-judgment filings in the Contract Case and its filings
opposing JRMG’s writ of garnishment in the Garnishment Proceeding.
Relators filed a “Motion to Defer Payment of Sanctions Until Final Judgment and
to Stay the June 19, 2026 Payment Deadline.” In their motion, relators cited the supreme court’s
Braden v. Downey opinion, see 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding), arguing
that Braden required the trial court to defer the sanctions until final judgment so that relators
would have the opportunity to supersede and have “meaningful [appellate] review of the order,”
and because immediate payment would “threaten” their “ability to keep litigating this cause.”
They did not support the motion with evidence or factual allegations beyond these general
statements, and they did not request a hearing or set the motion for hearing, instead asking the
court to consider the motion on submission, which the court did. The trial court signed a
four-page order denying the motion to defer, concluding that relators’ reliance on Braden was
“inapt and misplaced” and that “the sanctions imposed in this case do not have the preclusive
effects of discovery sanctions under Rule 215 as discussed in Braden.”
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DISCUSSION
Relators initially contend that the portions of the trial court’s Sanctions Order
identifying filings they made in the Contract Suit and awarding specified sanction amounts for
each of those filings are void due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They additionally argue
that the trial court abused its discretion (1) by sanctioning Environment Plus’s attorneys, Conant
and Eames-Cepero, because they were not identified in the motion by name and did not have
adequate notice and (2) by ordering joint-and-several liability against all three relators for the
total sanctions amount because Rule 13 and Chapter 10 require the sanctions to be tied to the
party or person who signs and files each sanctionable pleading or motion.
We agree with relators that the provisions of the Sanctions Order sanctioning
conduct that occurred in the Contract Suit are void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
In re Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 415 S.W.3d 522, 530–31 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding) (holding that trial court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction to sanction Department for its conduct in earlier, separate proceeding and that
sanctions order was void, conditionally granting mandamus relief and directing trial court to
vacate order); Greene v. Young, 174 S.W.3d 291, 301–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
pet. denied) (holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose Rule 13 sanctions
concerning filings made in separate proceeding in bankruptcy court); see also In re Velte,
140 S.W.3d 709, 711–12 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig. proceeding) (concluding that trial
court’s rendition of sanctions order after its plenary power had expired made such order void);
Kenseth v. Dallas County, 126 S.W.3d 584, 600 (Tex App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (“A
sanctions order must be tied to the portion of the proceedings in which the sanctionable conduct
occurred,” and “[o]nce the court’s plenary power over that portion of the postjudgment
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proceedings had expired, the court had no more power to sanction for conduct within
those proceedings.”).
When an order is void, mandamus relief is appropriate, without the necessity of
showing the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We therefore direct the trial
court to vacate the portions of the Sanctions Order imposing sanctions on relators for the conduct
that occurred post-judgment in the Contract Suit.
As to the rest of the Sanctions Order, we deny the requested relief without
considering whether the trial court abused its discretion because we conclude that on this record,
relators have an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Preventative Pest Control Houston, LLC,
580 S.W.3d 455, 461–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding) (“Ordinarily,
relators have an adequate remedy by appeal from an order awarding sanctions.”); see also
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (observing that
mandamus relief is appropriate only if trial court clearly abuses its discretion and there is no
other adequate remedy at law). Although the supreme court’s Braden opinion established an
exception to the general rule that an adequate remedy by appeal exists for a sanctions order, see
811 S.W.2d at 928–30, we hold that relators did not make the necessary allegations and
showings to trigger the exception, see In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., No. 05-24-00447-CV,
2024 WL 4986164, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)
(holding that under Braden process, relator challenging sanctions order must contend and allege
facts showing that prepayment of sanctions before final judgment would preclude or
substantially impact its access to court or significantly impair its willingness or ability to
continue litigation); In re Preventative Pest Control, 580 S.W.3d at 461–62 (holding that relator
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had not made necessary allegation and showing to trigger Braden exception to general rule that
adequate remedy by appeal exists).
In their motion to defer, relators contended that requiring payment of the
sanctions by the deadline “would extinguish any meaningful review of the order and would
threaten [their] ability to keep litigating this cause,” but they did not allege facts that would
establish the immediate-payment requirement would have a preclusive effect or significant
impairment of their court access or continued litigation. It was not enough for relators to merely
cite Braden and contend in a conclusory statement that their ability to continue litigating was
threatened. Cf. In re Casey, 589 S.W.3d 850, 855 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (determining
that relator’s sworn declaration averring that deferring sanctions was necessary to ensure that he
and his client could continue litigation and that they lacked financial means to make immediate
payment was sufficient to invoke Braden’s deferral requirement and require court to hold prompt
hearing or make written Braden findings). We conclude that relators are not entitled to their
requested relief as to the portions of the Sanctions Order sanctioning conduct occurring in the
Garnishment Proceeding.
CONCLUSION
We conditionally grant relators’ petition for writ of mandamus in part and direct
the trial court to vacate the portions of its Sanctions Order sanctioning conduct that occurred in
the Contract Case and the award of attorneys’ fees associated therewith. The writ will issue only
if the trial court fails to comply. We deny the remaining relief requested by relators. In addition,
we lift this Court’s June 18, 2026 stay order.
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Karin Crump, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis
Filed: August 12, 2026
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