PETITIONER APPEARING PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: ANDY YOUNG THEODORE E. ROKITA
Wadsworth, IL ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
SHELBY M. STOUDER FILED
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR: BENJAMIN M.L. JONES Aug 19 2026, 2:54 pm ROBERT B. GOLDING JR. DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL CLERK AMBER, GOLDING & HOFSTETTER Indianapolis, IN Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
Dyer, IN and Tax Court
IN THE
INDIANA TAX COURT
ANDY YOUNG, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
and )
)
DEBORAH FOSTER, )
)
Intervenor, ) Case No. 25T-TA-00006
)
v. )
)
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL )
GOVERNMENT FINANCE, )
)
Respondent. )
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
FOR PUBLICATION
August 19, 2026
MCADAM, J.
Indiana law allows taxpayers to challenge property tax valuations from multiple
angles. A property owner is free, of course, to appeal a tax assessment on their specific
parcel for a specific tax year. But there is another option, broader in its scope and prospective in its application. By statute, a taxpayer may petition the Department of
Local Government Finance (“DLGF”) to review the schedule of land values (known as a
“land order”) adopted by the county assessor that are used as part of the property
assessment process. This latter approach was used by Young to challenge the land
order adopted by the Lake County Assessor in 2023. However, Young, along with
several members of the community, was unable to convince the DLGF that these base
rates should be modified or rejected. Now, on appeal with this Court, Young and the
Intervenor Foster raise a litany of issues to suggest that the DLGF’s review was
insufficient. The Court does not agree, finding insufficient evidence in the record to
overturn the DLGF’s final determination.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As noted in the introduction, this case is about a county land order. By statute,
every county assessor is required to “determine the values of all classes of commercial,
industrial, and residential land . . . in the county using guidelines determined by the
department of local government finance.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(a) (2025). A land
order is the colloquial term for a document that contains those land values. See Young
v. Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., 237 N.E.3d 1175, 1176 n.1 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024), transfer
denied, 255 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. 2025) (Young I). To determine the land values, the
Assessor categorizes all property in a county into different neighborhoods (each of
which is assigned a class based on majority use) and then selects representative sales
disclosures or valuations that fairly represent the value of property in each
neighborhood. See REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR 2021, Ch. 2 at 6–8
[hereinafter “GUIDELINES”] (incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.4-1-2(c)
2
(2025)). By listing land values in the land order on a per-unit basis (e.g., per square foot,
per front foot, etc.), the assessor effectively sets a “base rate” for a “base lot” in each
neighborhood. Id. at 8 (noting that the base rate is the value of the “base lot” and
“represent[s] the typical and average characteristics of lots in the neighborhood for the
purpose of making pricing adjustments”). To determine the value of a specific parcel of
land as part of an assessment, an assessor adjusts the base rate for that neighborhood
with an influence factor, which “represents the composite effect that influences the value
of certain lots within the boundaries of an entire neighborhood.” Id. at 43. This land
value is then combined with the values of a property’s improvements and other rights
that add or remove value to reach an assessment of the real property in question.
GUIDELINES, Ch. 1 at 2 (explaining what is included in the reassessment of real
property).
By statute, a person may file a petition to have the DLGF review the land values
determined in a land order. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(d). The petition must be filed not
later than forty-five days after the land values are determined and must be signed by
100 property owners or 5% of the property owners in the county, whichever is fewer. Id.
Once a valid petition is filed, the DLGF is required to “review the land values determined
by the county assessor” and hold a public hearing. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(e). The
DLGF must then approve, modify, or disapprove the land values. Id.
In this case, the Lake County Assessor developed a new land order in 2023 and
presented it to the Lake County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals
(“PTABOA”) at a public meeting in June of 2023. The 2023 land order was created
using sales data from 2021 and 2022 and replaced the land order developed in 2022.
3
Young challenged the Lake County Assessor’s 2023 land order using the petition
process outlined in statute. He submitted a petition for review to the DLGF that included
signatures from 170 affected property owners. After the petition was received, the DLGF
notified the township and county assessors in Lake County and requested a copy of the
land order, sales data used to create the land order, and information about the
delineation of neighborhoods. In response to these requests, the assessors provided
more than 2,800 pages of information on the 2023 Lake County land order, including
the entire order itself, neighborhood counts, sales data, parcel lists, emails, and
PTABOA meeting minutes.
The DLGF scheduled a public hearing for October 10, 2023, and sent notice of
that hearing, by mail, to each petition signatory approximately forty days before the
hearing. In its notice, the DLGF included a hearing agenda, guidance for providing
information, and instructions for registering to speak. The DLGF posted the hearing
notice and exhibits on its website approximately one month before the hearing. Notice
of the hearing was also posted outside of the Lake County Assessor’s office and outside
the DLGF hearing room in Indianapolis.
At the hearing, the DLGF received public comments from several property
owners expressing concern about the 2023 land order, particularly from residents of the
Miller Beach area in Calumet Township. These comments were not given under oath,
and each speaker was limited to five minutes. The DLGF also received written
comments from over 200 taxpayers both before and after the hearing.
The DLGF also conducted two separate reviews of the data the Lake County
Assessor used to create the 2023 land order. The reviews were completed by DLGF
4
field representatives at the request of the DLGF’s Director of Assessment. They
analyzed underlying sales data from 2021 and 2022, reviewed ratio studies for each
township, and performed focused analysis of Calumet Township and the Miller Beach
area. 1
The DLGF issued its final determination on February 28, 2025 and ordered no
change to the 2023 land order. In its determination, the DLGF noted that it reviewed the
public comments, statistical tools used to create the land order, and the reports created
by DLGF employees analyzing the land order sales data. The DLGF also explained that
special attention was paid to the Miller Beach neighborhood, and Calumet Township
more generally, because the taxpayers who expressed concerns about the land order
were from those areas. When the ratio studies for these areas were reviewed, the
DLGF found all data to be in the proper range and in compliance with assessment and
appraisal standards. Ultimately, the DLGF concluded that (1) the 2023 land order was
properly prepared, (2) the base rates were determined using correct methodologies and
sufficient data, and (3) taxpayers submitted no probative evidence warranting
modification or disapproval. (Cert. Admin. R. at 4051, 4054.)
Young then appealed the DLGF’s determination to this Court. Foster later moved
to intervene in the appeal, which the Court granted after neither party opposed her
request.
1
A ratio study compares the assessed values of properties within a jurisdiction by using objective, verifiable data, such as sales prices or appraisals. Thorsness v. Porter Cnty. Assessor, 3 N.E.3d 49, 51 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014).
5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The party challenging the DLGF’s final determination bears the burden of
demonstrating its invalidity. City of Greenfield v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., 22
N.E.3d 887, 891 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014). This Court reviews “the propriety of 1) the DLGF’s
factual findings and 2) the DLGF’s legal conclusions in light of those factual findings.”
Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., 988 N.E.2d 1274,
1277 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013) (citing State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Gatling Gun Club, Inc., 420
N.E.2d 1324, 1326–29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)). Accordingly, a petitioner must demonstrate
that the final determination is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, contrary
to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. City of Carmel v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc.
Gov’t Fin., 246 N.E.3d 832, 834 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024), review denied sub nom. City of
Carmel v. Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., 259 N.E.3d 998 (Ind. 2025). The Court neither
reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of witnesses in its review. Brown v.
Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., 989 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013).
DISCUSSION
The Petitioner and Intervenor each raise multiple challenges to the DLGF’s
determination affirming the Lake County land order for 2023. While both believe that the
DLGF failed to adequately review the land order, their arguments differ substantially and
merit separate discussion. Therefore, to ensure the Court is both thorough and efficient
in its examination of every argument presented, the claims of Young and Foster will be
discussed separately.
6
I. Young’s Claims
Young raises numerous claims in this appeal, many of which overlap or are not
clearly delineated. Although Young bears the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error
by the DLGF in this case, the Court has categorized his claims to ensure thorough
analysis.
A. Timing of the 2023 Land Order
Young asserts two claims of error related to the timing of the 2023 land order.
First, Young claims that the land order was submitted too late to apply to the 2023
assessment year. He contends that, because the Assessor did not present the 2023
land order to the PTABOA until June 21, 2023—after the January 1, 2023 assessment
date under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-2-1.5(a)(2)—the land values contained therein could
not lawfully be applied to 2023 payable 2024 tax bills. 2 (Pet’r Br. at 5, 8–9, 13–14.)
Second, Young argues that the 2023 land order impermissibly overlaps with the 2022
land order, which this Court addressed in a previous case, Young I, involving the same
petitioner. (Pet’r Br. at 5, 15.) Young believes that Young I established a requirement
that the 2022 land order be applied to the 2023 tax year. See id. The Court disagrees
with Young on both claims.
Regarding Young’s claim that the 2023 land order was submitted too late, Young
conflates the annual assessment date for valuing tangible property under Indiana Code
§ 6-1.1-2-1.5 with the process for the preparation and submission of land orders. The
deadline for preparing and submitting land orders is established by a county’s
2
For clarity, property taxes are often referenced by both assessment and payment years because, absent an exception, property taxes “assessed for [one] year . . . are due . . . the following year.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-22-9(a).
7
reassessment plan. Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-13.6(a) expressly requires an assessor to
submit a land order to the PTABOA and DLGF “by the dates specified in the county’s
reassessment plan.” By contrast, the annual assessment date is the point in time at
which the value of property is determined for purposes of property taxation. See IND.
CODE § 6-1.1-1-2 (defining the “assessment date” as “the date on which tangible
property is assessed and valued for purposes of collecting ad valorem property taxes
imposed for that date”); IND. CODE § 6-1.1-2-1.5.
The annual assessment date is not a deadline by which assessors must
complete land orders. This Court previously rejected this argument that a land order
submitted to the PTABOA after the January 1 assessment date was untimely in
Camelot Co., LLC v. Bartholomew Cnty. Assessor, 224 N.E.3d 1007, 1014 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2023). There, the Court explained that Indiana law does not prohibit an assessor from
using valuation data submitted to the PTABOA after the assessment date:
[W]hile Indiana’s annual assessment date is January 1 . . . that does not
mean that assessments are actually completed and finalized on that date.
For example, when formulating land values to be used in a given
assessment year, assessing officials are to analyze and rely on data from
sales transactions that have occurred through and including December 31
of the previous . . . calendar year . . . . [I]t is not possible for assessing
officials to analyze all applicable sales data, determine land values, submit
them to the [PTABOA], reassess overall assessment valuations using
those land values, update corresponding record cards, and provide notice
to taxpayers of changes to assessments between December 31 and
January 2. Accordingly, . . . the process by which land values and land
orders are determined and applied must be very fluid and flexible.
Indiana’s Assessment Manual provides that flexibility by specifying that
property assessments are to reflect a valuation “as of” the January 1st
date.
Id. at 1015 n.5 (internal quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted); see also
Marion Cnty. Assessor v. Simon DeBartolo Grp., LP, 52 N.E.3d 65, 69–70 (Ind. Tax Ct.
8
2016) (recognizing that evidence of value from dates after an assessment date may be
used to value a property if there is “[an] attempt to relate that evidence to the
appropriate valuation and assessment dates”).
In this case, there is no evidence that the 2023 land order was not adopted by
the deadline established in Lake County’s reassessment plan. The 2023 land order was
completed within the first year of the reassessment cycle, and its base rates appear to
apply prospectively from the time of its submission. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3311–3312,
3932 (showing the 2023 land order was submitted to PTABOA on July 12, 2023).) As in
Camelot, no Indiana law prohibited the Lake County Assessor from submitting the 2023
land order when she did. 3
As to the purported overlap with the 2022 land order that Young raises in his
second claim, Young misreads this Court’s decision in Young I. Young points to this
Court’s observation that:
[B]ase rates in [the 2022 land order] will be applied to taxes due in 2023
and subsequent years until the year after the next determination of land
values is adopted. The next land values determination must be adopted
no later than 2026, though it may be prepared at any time within the
reassessment cycle.
Young I, 237 N.E.3d at 1178. According to Young, the Court’s statement that the 2022
land order “will be applied to taxes due in 2023” is binding and precludes the Assessor
3
Although not addressed by any party, it appears that the Assessor’s application of the land order to assessments is consistent with statute. Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-4.2 provides that “[a] reassessment is the basis for taxes payable in the year following the year in which the reassessment is to be completed.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-4.2(a)(7) (2023) (emphasis added). Here, the Assessor submitted the land order in 2023 and applied the new values to 2023 assessments which would have been the basis for taxes payable in 2024. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3302, 3311–12 (documenting the Assessor’s submission of the land order to the PTABOA in June 2023); Cert. Admin. R. at 3932 (noting that “new land base rates were implemented for the January 1, 2023 assessment date”).)
9
from adopting a new land order for that year. But Young reads too much into the Court’s
attempt to contextualize its holding. The Court went on to explain that a new land values
determination “may be prepared at any time within the reassessment cycle.” Id. Young I
simply clarified the relationship between the four-year reassessment cycle and the
timing of land orders, explaining that “[t]he four-year period is not the time during which
a particular determination of land values applies. Rather, it is the period during which at
least one land values determination must be adopted.” Id. at 1177.
As Young I explains, Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-4.2 only requires that “each group
of parcels shall be reassessed under the county’s reassessment plan once during each
four (4) year cycle.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-4.2. This occurred here. Although the DLGF
does not make such a finding in its final determination, the record establishes that the
2022 and 2023 land orders were issued during different assessment cycles. As part of
its review of Young’s petition, the DLGF noted that:
The county’s 2023 land order was part of the current four (4) year cyclical
plan. This land order was done and was implemented in the first year of
the 4 year cycle. The new land base rates were implemented for the
January 1, 2023 assessment date.
(Cert. Admin. R. at 3932.) Consistent with this fact, the 2022 land order was issued in
the last year of its assessment cycle. See Young I, 237 N.E.3d at 1178 (“The Lake
County Assessor submitted a new determination of land values at the Lake County
PTABOA meeting on April 6, 2022, again in the last year of that four-year cycle.”
(emphasis added)). The 2023 land order, then, was issued in the first year of its own
four-year cycle. (Cert. Admin. R. at 3932.) This evidence shows compliance with
Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-4.2, and Young does not otherwise support his claim that the
2023 land order, which could be “prepared at any time within the reassessment cycle”
10
prior to 2026, improperly overlapped with the previous land order. Young I, 237 N.E.3d
at 1178.
Accordingly, the DLGF did not err in concluding that the 2023 land order was
timely. 4
B. Sufficiency of Sales Data
Young contends that the 2023 land order was based on insufficient sales data,
pointing to notes in the portion of the land order regarding Calumet Township which he
claims indicate that many neighborhoods had no vacant land sales or that the only
available sales were tax sales. (Pet’r Br. at 6, 10, 16–17; Cert. Admin. R. at 847–862.)
Young argues that the near total absence of normal market sales of vacant land
indicates a “moribund market” and that large base rate increases over the prior year
were unjustified. (Pet’r Br. at 17.) The Court finds that Young has failed to demonstrate
that the available market data was insufficient to support the values in the land order.
The DLGF’s regulations expressly contemplate alternative methods for valuing land
when sales are limited.
The DLGF’s administrative rule, 50 Indiana Administrative Code 27-5-7, provides
that “[t]he sales comparison approach is the primary approach to land valuation and is
always preferred when sufficient sales are available.” 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE
27-5-7(b) (2025). However, when fewer than five sales exist in a given stratum, the rule
4
It is not obvious whether the DLGF may review the components of the land order plan creation process; Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-13.6 only explicitly authorizes the DLGF to (1) review the land values and (2) approve, modify, or disapprove those values. Questions regarding the frequency of land reassessments in a land order plan, the effective date of a land order, or the propriety of adopting of multiple land orders within a 4-year cycle may require review through a different mechanism or may even be properly reviewed by a different entity, such as the Indiana Board of Tax Review. However, such questions will be left for another day, as they are neither raised by the parties nor necessary to resolve this appeal.
11
authorizes several alternative methods, including using land values from a similar
neighborhood, extracting land value from valid sales of improved properties, or
expanding the time period from which sales are drawn. Id. at (b)(1)–(3).
The record reflects that the DLGF’s field representatives carefully analyzed the
sales data underlying the 2023 land order and found sufficient sales of improved
properties to extract a land value as permitted by the DLGF’s regulations. (Cert. Admin.
R. at 4058–4061.) For Calumet Township, the DLGF found 1,337 valid sales for
residentially improved property. The ratio study statistics showed that the median
assessment ratio, coefficient of dispersion, and price-related differential were within the
standard of the International Association of Assessing Officers (“IAAO”). 5 The DLGF
further analyzed individual Miller Beach neighborhoods and confirmed that each met the
applicable statistical parameters.
Young does not identify legal, mathematical, or other authoritative support to
establish a minimum threshold of sales data beyond that expressed in 50 Indiana
Administrative Code 27-5-7. Likewise, while Young believes that the sales data was
misinterpreted and led to base rate changes that are “mathematically impossible,” he
provides no support for these claims. He does not provide a competing analysis of the
data or point to any authority to support his claims that the methodology employed by
the DLGF and Assessor was improper. Without legal support, Young’s assertions are
conclusory and cannot be used by this Court to overturn the DLGF’s determination.
5
The IAAO is an educational and research association of individuals working with property taxation and assessments. See Meridian Towers E. & W. v. Washington Twp. Assessor, 805 N.E.2d 475, 480 n.8 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003). IAAO standards are expressly permitted by law for use by county assessors and the DLGF in adjustments and equalizations. 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 27-1-4.
12
See, e.g., Marinov v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 119 N.E.3d 1152, 1156 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2019) (noting generalized statements without supporting evidence are merely
conclusory and are not sufficient to overturn an assessment). Because Young failed to
show that the DLGF’s examination of the sales data was inadequate, the Court will not
disturb the DLGF’s final determination on this ground.
C. Valuation Methodology
Young challenges the Assessor’s use of the abstraction and allocation methods
to determine land values, arguing that the Assessor over-relied on these methods and
that they yielded arbitrary results. 6 (Pet’r Br. at 6, 17–18.) Young also argues that the
Assessor should have relied more heavily on tax sales when analyzing sales data.
(Pet’r Br. at 18.) This criticism of the Assessor’s methodology, however, is not
accompanied by legal or factual support to show the Court that an error has occurred.
Without such support, Young’s claims cannot demonstrate the errors he alleges. As
such, the Court declines the invitation to overturn the DLGF’s determination on this
basis.
The abstraction and allocation methods for valuing residential land are
authorized by Indiana law. The DLGF’s Real Property Assessment Guidelines explain
that “[w]hen establishing land values throughout the jurisdiction, each assessing official
shall evaluate sales information by using the sales comparison method, the abstraction
method, or the allocation method.” GUIDELINES, Ch. 2 at 12 (emphasis added). The
abstraction method estimates land value by subtracting the depreciated value of
6
Young occasionally refers to the “extraction method” and the use of a “15–20% land to value” ratio. (See, e.g., Pet’r Br. at 17.) The Court understands him to mean the abstraction method and a land-to-improvement ratio.
13
improvements from the sales price. Id. The allocation method estimates land value by
analyzing the percentage contribution of land to the total sale. Id. at 13. Both methods
value land by obtaining sales data for improved properties and deriving a land value by
removing the value of improvements—a practice which is explicitly authorized by
Indiana law when unimproved sales are insufficient. See 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE
27-5-7(b)(2) (permitting assessors to “[e]xtract the land value from valid sales of
improved properties” when there are insufficient sales available in a stratum).
The Assessor’s application of the abstraction and allocation methods was
reviewed by the DLGF when it had two different experts review the content of the
submitted ratio studies used to determine the land values; both found that the methods
complied with all IAAO requirements. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3934–35, 3938–40.)
Without any analysis showing how or why the Assessor’s calculations or methodology
were flawed, the Court is left with a bare supposition, which cannot meet Young’s
burden on appeal.
Young’s other contention that tax sales should have played a larger role in the
creation of the land order is wholly unsupported. Tax sales occur when property is sold
to satisfy tax debt and are not necessarily reflective of a property’s market value-in-use.
See Robey v. Fairfield Twp. Assessor, No. 49T10-0708-TA-42, 2009 WL 4668740, at *5
(Ind. Tax Ct. Dec. 9, 2009); cf. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS,
STANDARD ON RATIO STUDIES at 49 (Apr. 2013) (noting that forced sales are generally
invalid for ratio studies without evidence that the sale was an open market transaction),
https://www.iaao.org/wp-content/uploads/Standard_on_Ratio_Studies.pdf. Nonetheless,
Young asserts that the high frequency of tax sales demonstrates a downward trend in
14
the area’s real estate market. While this may very well be true, Young fails to support
his claim with data, calculations, legal citations, or expert testimony. Beyond his
unsupported claim, there is no authority provided for the proposition that assessors
should incorporate tax sale data into their land order analysis. As this Court held in
Robey, use of a tax sale to value a property requires a demonstration “that the bid price
is probative [of] the property’s market value-in-use.” Robey, No. 49T10-0708-TA-42, at
*5. Young has therefore failed to demonstrate a reason to overturn the DLGF’s
determination on this basis.
D. Pricing Methods
Young takes issue with the Assessor’s decision to use the per-square-foot
(“PSF”) method rather than the per-front-foot (“PFF”) method to value residential land in
the Miller area. (Pet’r Br. at 19–20.) He asserts that the Lake County and Calumet
Township assessors have been using the PSF method to assess residential land in
Lake County. (Pet’r Br. at 20.) He argues that, because the 2023 land order did not
include PSF pricing for residential vacant land in Miller, the entire land order should be
“set aside” and that any assessments of residential land utilizing the PSF method
should be deemed invalid because they are not in compliance with the 2023 land order.
(Pet’r Br. at 20.) The Court finds that the lack of such a pricing method does not
undermine the land order or require a remand.
First, to the extent that Young is challenging the application of the land values in
the 2023 land order to the assessments of specific properties, such a claim is outside
the scope of the review contemplated by Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-13.6(e). The DLGF’s
review of the 2023 land order concerned the base rates applicable to classes of land
15
across the county, not the application of those rates to individual parcels. See IND. CODE
§ 6-1.1-4-13.6(a) (when creating a land order, “[t]he county assessor shall determine
the values of all classes of . . . residential land . . . [and] submit the values and any
supporting document to the county”). The sole power granted to the DLGF by the
statute is to “review the land values determined by the county assessor” and “approve”,
“modify”, or “disapprove” those values. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(e) Whether a
particular land value determined in a land order is properly applied to a particular parcel
is beyond the scope of the DLGF’s power under section 6-1.1-4-13.6. Such claims are a
different matter with a different process, appropriately channeled through the property
tax appeal process. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-1.1, -1.2 (identifying the available claims,
applicable deadlines, and initial review processes for appealing assessments of tangible
property owned by individual taxpayers.)
Second, to the extent Young is correct that the 2023 land order did not include
PSF pricing for residential land, the DLGF’s assessment rules give assessors wide
latitude to decide which particular pricing method to use and note that many different
pricing methods are valid. The Real Property Assessment Guidelines describe five
types of unit values for land valuation: front foot value, square foot value, acreage value,
site value, and unit density. GUIDELINES, Ch. 2 at 13–15. The Guidelines specifically
note that “[i]t should be stressed that the pricing method for valuing the neighborhood is
of less importance than arriving at the correct value of the land as of the valuation date.”
Id. at 14. The Guidelines also provide that the assessing official determines which unit
value is appropriate and advise that the determination of which pricing method is
appropriate turns on several factors. Id. at 13–14 (listing the following factors: “size,
16
dimensional data available on tax maps or plat maps, methods of comparison used by
the typical buyer and seller, and the ease of application”). Here, the DLGF, in its review,
determined that the methods used by the Assessor were correctly applied and Young
has not provided any authority to support his claim that they were not.
E. Statutory Notice Requirements for the DLGF’s Hearing
Young argues that the DLGF’s notice of the public hearing was inadequate and
did not comply with Indiana Code § 5-3-1-2. (Pet’r Br. at 7, 27.) Young contends that
public notice of the DLGF’s hearing and the Assessor’s land order should have been
included in the local newspapers. The Court concludes that no such requirement exists
and that the notice provided by the DLGF was sufficient.
Young fails to demonstrate that the DLGF’s hearing was subject to Indiana Code
§ 5-3-1-2. Subsection a of Indiana Code § 5-3-1-2 limits the application of the statute’s
notice requirement to situations “when notice of an event is required to be given by
publication in accordance with this chapter.” IND. CODE § 5-3-1-2(a). Young has not
provided any analysis or pointed to any authority linking section 5-3-1-2 to the DLGF’s
review under section 6-1.1-4-13.6; the Court will not endeavor to do so on its own. It is
the litigant’s responsibility to walk the Court through its argument and explain its
contention. Ciceu v. Knox Cnty. Assessor, 272 N.E.3d 583, 589 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2025).
The applicable law in this instance, as was the case in Young I, does not impose
a statutory notice requirement on the DLGF beyond the obligation to hold a public
hearing. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6. 7 “The Indiana General Assembly has provided
7
The legislature recently amended Section 13.6 to add a requirement that “notice of the hearing shall be given by the [DLGF] to the assessor and to the first ten (10) petitioners at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing.” IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6 (2026); see Pub. L. No. 230-2025, § 20, 2025 Ind. Acts 3719. This provision did not exist when the DLGF held its
17
specific public hearing notice requirements in multiple places throughout Indiana Code’s
Article 6-1.1, and here it has not done so.” Young I, 237 N.E.3d at 1181. As this Court
said in Young I, “the Court will not create its own specific notice requirement. That is a
matter for the legislature.” Id.
Even so, like the facts in Young I, the record here demonstrates that the DLGF
made reasonable efforts to provide public notice. The DLGF scheduled the hearing for
the evening after traditional working hours and allotted each taxpayer who requested to
speak up to five minutes of time to testify. The DLGF mailed individual letters to all 171
petition signatories that included “a hearing agenda, guidance for providing evidence,
and instructions for registering to speak at the hearing” along with a “virtual computer
link address for members of the public to electronically attend the hearing” and a phone
number for taxpayers to participate by telephone. (Cert. Admin. R. at 4051.) The DLGF
posted the hearing notice and exhibits on its website approximately one month before
the hearing, and the Assessor posted notice outside her office. (Cert. Admin. R. at
3929–3930, 4051–4052.) The DLGF also accepted written submissions for two weeks
after the hearing and responded to communications with over 250 individual taxpayers.
Nothing further was required of the DLGF.
F. DLGF Review of Individual Taxpayer Properties
Young objects to the DLGF’s thorough review of properties he owns, asserting
that DLGF staff spent “an inordinate amount of time” investigating his holdings and that
this was irrelevant to the land order review. (Pet’r Br. at 23–25.) The record reflects that
the DLGF reviewed properties belonging to Young and other petition signatories to
hearing and so does not apply in this case, though the Board’s actions far exceed the new statutory requirement for notice.
18
cross-check its analysis of the 2023 land order. (Cert. Admin. R. at 4059.) Young does
not explain how the DLGF’s consideration of this information rendered the 2023 land
order flawed or the final determination erroneous. If anything, the DLGF here exercised
reasonable judgment, focusing its review efforts on the property owners who were likely
affected the most, as such an effect would motivate action in those owners. The mere
fact that the DLGF examined the petitioner’s properties as part of its review does not
establish that the review was biased or improper.
G. Assessment Errors
Young also points out a specific instance where he believes the DLGF failed to
make proper adjustments to an erroneous property valuation. He specifically references
a property in Gary that sold for over $7 million in 2022 but was assessed at $7,400.
(Pet’r Br. at 25 n.19.) Young says that although this issue was brought to the DLGF’s
attention, the property value was not changed.
But, again, Young overstates the scope of the DLGF’s review. A review of a land
order looks for correct values of land categories, not the accuracy of individual property
assessments. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(e) (directing DLGF to “review the land
values determined by the county assessor” and “approve”, “modify”, or “disapprove”
them). Such individualized review is a different matter with a different process,
appropriately channeled through the property tax appeal process. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-1.1, -1.2 (identifying the available claims, applicable deadlines, and initial review
processes for appealing assessments of tangible property owned by individual
taxpayers.) As such, Young’s claim is beyond the scope of the statutory review process
underlying this appeal.
19
H. Other Assertions
Beyond the arguments outlined in detail above, Young also makes a multitude of
assertions without support from legal or evidentiary citations. These assertions include
that such high magnitude base rate increases are impossible, that the base rate for U.S.
Steel’s land demonstrates unequal treatment, that the Assessor misinterpreted sales
data, and that specific errors exist in land order entries or their applications to specific
properties. (Pet’r Br. at 4–5, 9, 21–23, 25–26; Pet’r Suppl. Br. at 2–3, 6–7; Pet’r Suppl.
Reply Br. at 2–4.) In some instances, the assertions are particularly severe, such as
where Young alleges that the Lake County Assessor and the DLGF “perpetrated a
fraud” and relied on “fraudulent data” for its studies. (Pet’r Br. at 4–5.) It is not always
clear what remedy Young is requesting or believes to be appropriate. 8
Pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys; they
cannot avoid this Court’s standard of review or plead ignorance of its requirements.
Ciceu, 272 N.E.3d at 588. Among those standards is the requirement to explain the
legal and factual basis of each claim and walk the court through the analysis. Id. at 589
n.4. Because Young has not done that here with any of these claims, the Court
considers them waived and will not address them further. Id. 9
8
Young’s Supplemental Brief suggests that the Court should order the DLGF to review all value increases over 100%. (Pet’r Suppl. Br. at 1 (“It would be a gross injustice to let the base rates that increased by 3 and 4-digit percentage[s] . . . stand”).) Such a claim was untimely presented in the post-hearing supplemental briefing and could have been addressed in Young’s initial brief. It was also unauthorized by the Court’s limited order for supplemental briefing. The argument is therefore waived. Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023); see Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A).
9 Young also failed to walk the Court through any analysis of what he characterizes as an incorrect entry in the 2023 land order that “list[s] . . . values of over 1-million per acre more in the case of the residential excess acreage classification, and over 100k more for the homesite per acre category than” the 2022 land order. (Pet’r Br. at 25–26 n.20.) Although this issue is subject to waiver, the Court notes that the 2023 land order, on its face, marks those rows for
20
II. Foster’s Claims
Foster intervened in this appeal, without objection from either party, raising four
principal claims: (1) that the DLGF’s determination of the base rate for her property in
Neighborhood 2515 was not uniform and equal because her land was assessed on an
acreage basis (amounting to $11.48 per square foot after conversion) while other
platted lots in the same neighborhood were assessed at $2.98 per square foot; (2) that
she had a constitutional right to actual notice of the DLGF’s review proceedings; (3) that
she was not given notice of reassessment for the 2023 tax year as required by Indiana
Code § 6-1.1-4-22; and (4) that her land was improperly assessed more than once
during the four-year reassessment cycle. 10 (Interv’r Br. at 1–8.) The Court will address
each in turn.
A. Discrepancy, Uniformity, and Fundamental Error
Foster’s primary complaint is the discrepancy in treatment between her property
and others in her neighborhood. She claims that her property’s base rate was
determined on an acreage basis, which converts to an effective rate of $11.48 per
square foot, while the other platted lots in Neighborhood 2515 were determined on a
front foot basis, resulting in an effective rate of $2.98 per square foot. (Interv’r Br. at 2–
4.) Foster believes that her property should be assessed on a square foot basis like
removal and replaces them with a row that does not contain the alleged mathematical error Young highlights. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 850 (allegedly erroneous rows are highlighted with a note stating “delete, no acreage parcels” in red and followed by a row identifying a different land type code and pricing method for all 278 relevant properties).)
10
While the DLGF believes Foster should be prohibited from bringing claims at this stage in the appeals process, the DLGF had the opportunity to object when Foster sought to intervene but chose not to do so. Nonetheless, the failure of her substantive claims renders this issue moot.
21
other properties in the neighborhood and that this discrepancy demonstrates a
fundamental error in the land order in violation of her right to a uniform and equal tax
rate under the Indiana Constitution. (Interv’r Suppl. Br. at 5–6.) While Foster is
consistent in her belief that the effective rate of $11.48 per square foot is incorrect, she
is inconsistent in attempting to identify what error results in this incorrect rate. She
initially claims that the use of the acreage basis is the fundamental error, claiming that
property located in a neighborhood and zoned for single family residence must be
valued on a square footage basis. After the hearing, however, Foster pivots to three
different arguments. First, she argues that, as a “logical proposition,” the rate of
increase in the price per acre category must match the rate of increase in the price per
front foot category for her neighborhood. (Interv’r Suppl. Br. at 4 and n.2.) Second, she
asserts “that land directly on Lake Michigan in neighborhood 2512 should increase [in
value] at the same or at a greater rate than land not directly on Lake Michigan” in
neighborhood 2515 (Foster’s neighborhood). (Interv’r Suppl. Br. at 5.) Third, Foster
contends that a fundamental error occurred because her land-to-improvement ratio was
significantly higher than the typical value. (Interv’r Suppl. Br. at 5–6.)
Foster’s primary argument, that her property should be assessed on a square
footage basis like other properties in her neighborhood, requires an examination of her
individual property, which is properly done through an appeal of her individual
assessment instead of through an appeal of the DLGF’s land order review. As has been
said, whether a particular land value determined in a land order is properly applied to a
particular parcel is beyond the scope of the DLGF’s power under section
6-1.1-4-13.6(e). Whether the Assessor correctly classified Foster’s property as a platted
22
lot or acreage is a question about the parcel-level application of a land order that likely
falls within the jurisdiction of the PTABOA and, on further appeal, the Indiana Board of
Tax Review under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-1.1. See, e.g., Muir Woods Section One
Ass’n, Inc. v. O’Connor, 172 N.E.3d 1205, 1207 (Ind. 2021) (reviewing the application of
land order base rates to common areas owned by a homeowners association);
McDonald’s Corp. v. Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ind. Tax
Ct. 2001) (concluding that a taxpayer’s land was not valued correctly pursuant to the
effective land order). 11
Turning to Foster’s supplemental arguments, Foster does not point to any
authority aside from pure logic to support her assertions about land valuation. She does
not support, with law or evidence, her contention that the rate of increase in the price
per acre of land must match the rate of increase in the price per front foot of land for her
neighborhood. She also does not support her contention that land directly on Lake
Michigan in one neighborhood should increase at the same rate or greater than land not
directly on Lake Michigan in her neighborhood. And she does not explain why her landto-improvement ratio should match the average or typical value. 12
11
Indeed, Foster stated at oral argument that she appealed her individual property tax assessment for the years at issue and resolved those matters favorably. (Tr. 70:24-70:21.) 12
Foster points to a note in the land order that she contends indicates that the acreage base rate should match the front foot rate. (Cert. Admin. R. at 475 (note stating: “homesite rate to match lot values of FF lots”).) However, the note is ambiguous and offers little insight into its intended purpose. Foster does not point to any evidence in the record illuminating its meaning or explaining its import. Moreover, as the DLGF correctly points out in its brief, the accuracy of the note is not within the DLGF’s review authority. (Interv’r Suppl. Br. at 3.) As has been noted, the statute only directs the DLGF to “review the land values determined by the assessor.” IND CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(e). An inconsistency between the note and the land values does not mean the land values are inaccurate, though it may indicate scrutiny is warranted.
23
Foster’s arguments also make assumptions about comparative property values
without examining whether variations in those base rate values are justified according to
generally accepted appraisal practice or the DLGF assessment regulations.
Generalizations about improper variation in land value on and near Lake Michigan or
atypical land-to-improvement ratios are only relevant if the land being compared has the
same classification and substantially similar characteristics. Such a comparison,
however, would require analysis of many features such as the size and shape of tracts,
zoning, development conditions, infrastructure components, geographic features,
proximity to primary traffic routes, government services, and neighborhood desirability.
See GUIDELINES, Ch. 2 at 8–9. Such differences in character may explain the differences
highlighted by Foster as differing property characteristics may yield different unit values
to accurately reflect the value of a property. Id. at 13–14 (noting that different valuation
methods are appropriate for different types of property).
The Court remains unconvinced that differences in land order base rates are
inherently demonstrative of a fundamental error in the land order. The base rates are
best understood as starting points, from which the value of specific properties may be
derived and thereafter reviewed through the assessment appeals process. Foster fails
to support her claims about errors in the land order with legal authority, evidence about
property classifications or characteristics, or evidence of generally accepted appraisal
practice. The Court cannot presume that the difference between two different
classifications in a land order should not result in different values due to substantive
differences between the properties or their locations. Without an argument supported by
24
evidence in the record to show the alleged error and its effect on the entire land order,
the Court will not disturb the DLGF’s determination.
B. Notice of the Public Hearing
Foster, through counsel, argues that she was entitled to notice of the land order
review process, and that the lack of notice violated her due process rights. In her
briefing, Foster argues that the DLGF violated her right to procedural due process when
it failed to provide her with actual notice of the hearing. (See Interv’r Br. at 4.) She
claims that the owners of every property in the Miller Beach neighborhood are entitled to
actual notice of the DLGF’s hearing due to the “disproportionate impact” of the land
order on these properties. (Interv’r Br. at 4.) The Court disagrees.
“The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’ Only after finding the deprivation
of a protected interest do [courts] look to see if the State’s procedures comport with due
process.” Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999)). A protected property interest requires
“more than an abstract need or desire for it” or a “unilateral expectation of it.” Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Instead, a person must
have “a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Id. These entitlements do not stem from the
Constitution, but instead “stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.” Id.
Although Foster focuses her argument on what sort of notice due process
requires, she provides scant details of the protected interest she believes entitles her
25
and other Miller Beach property owners to that notice. In her filings, Foster claims
simply that “[the] lack of any procedure for giving notice to [Foster] cannot, as a matter
of law, be reasonable,” and cites Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950) and Front Row Motors v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753 (Ind. 2014). (Interv’r Br.
at 5; see also Interv’r Reply at 7.) While both cases discuss the notice required to meet
due process standards, neither provides any analysis of the rights or interests which
give rise to a due process violation claim in the first place.
Foster fails to meaningfully engage in any of this analysis of the due process
rights at stake in the land order or the DLGF’s review of such an order. She provides no
discussion about the protected property interest she has in the land order, in the
DLGF’s review of that order, or in the DLGF’s public hearing. 13 She offers no
explanation or identification of her “legitimate claim of entitlement” to this unidentified
property interest. And certainly, she does not engage in a meaningful conversation
about the source of this claim that secures benefits and supports a finding of her
entitlement. Without any discussion of these critical components of a due process claim,
the Court is left with little more than an unsupported accusation that is assumed to
speak for itself. It does not.
Beyond the question of interests, Foster has not analyzed the adequacy of the
process available to her. Foster has not explained how the failure to receive actual
13
While Foster does eventually identify a purported interest in her supplemental reply brief (Interv’r Suppl. Reply at 3) (noting a “right to have the land order contain correct calculations so that the rate of taxation is uniform”), she provides only scant analysis of that interest and does not attempt to identify the source of that right. Moreover, such analysis was both untimely and unauthorized by the Court’s limited order for supplemental briefing and could have been addressed in Foster’s initial brief. The argument is therefore waived. Davidson, 211 N.E.3d at 925; see Ind. App. R. 46(A).
26
notice of the land order or the DLGF’s review of that order deprives her of an
opportunity to contest the land order when it is actually applied to her property. The
property tax assessment and appeal process entitles her to notice of any assessment or
reassessment and a right to challenge the application of the land order. IND. CODE
§ 6-1.1-4-22; see also IND. CODE § 6-1.1-15-1.1. Unless and until it is applied to her
property, the land order has no direct bearing on her property assessment or her taxes;
individual lots often have characteristics that require adjustments to the property’s
value. See GUIDELINES, Ch. 2 at 43 (“Often, there are conditions peculiar to specific lots
within a neighborhood that must be analyzed on an individual basis . . . [which] require
the assessor to make an adjustment to the value of the lot . . . [called] an influence
factor”). It is only through the application of the land order to her land through the
assessment that the land order can have any impact on her at all. Yet, Foster does not
make any attempt to grapple with the effect of this appeal process, how it affects the
analysis of her due process claim, or why it is inadequate to supply the due process she
seeks. The answers to these questions are not self-evident.
This Court has firmly established that it will not make a party’s argument for it;
the party bearing the burden of proof must walk the Court through every element of its
analysis. Ciceu, 272 N.E.3d at 589 n.4. If a party fails to cite controlling law or provide
cogent argument based on that law, the argument may be waived. Abraytis v. Porter
Cnty. Assessor, 220 N.E.3d 77, 81 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2023). By failing to provide the legal
analysis necessary to articulate her due process claim, Foster effectively asks this Court
to accept as true her incantation that the lack of notice procedure “cannot . . . be
reasonable” and therefore is a violation of due process. (Interv’r Br. at 5.) The Court
27
declines Foster’s invitation to develop her argument out of whole cloth. Foster’s due
process argument is waived. 14
Regardless of the statutory or constitutional notice requirements for its public
hearing on the review of the land order, as detailed above, the DLGF mailed notice to all
petition signatories, posted notice on its website, and provided multiple avenues for
participation. While Foster was not a petition signatory and did not participate in the
proceedings before the DLGF, this did not (and does not) hinder her ability to resolve
existing issues with her individual land value and any related assessment concerns
through administrative appeals. The Court is sympathetic to Foster’s position that
broader notice would be desirable, but fulfilling such a desire is for the General
Assembly, not this Court—and, indeed, the legislature addressed this issue in 2025 by
enacting specific notice requirements for future land order hearings. See Pub. L. No.
230-2025, § 20, 2025 Ind. Acts 3719 (modifying IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6).
C. Notice of Reassessment
Foster claims that the Assessor violated Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-22 by failing to
provide her with notices of reassessment. (Interv’r Br. at 6.) She states that she had no
opportunity to argue her case before the DLGF because she was never given notice of
14
Even if Foster’s argument were not waived, it is unclear whether the land order’s creation or its review by the DLGF is subject to the due process standards of adjudicative proceedings. Courts have consistently drawn a distinction between legislative or policymaking actions and adjudicative actions and the due process protections afforded each. See Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Elbert Cnty., 838 F.3d 1039, 1044–45 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that legislative and policymaking actions are not entitled to traditional procedural due process protections). The prospective nature and general applicability of land orders suggest that they may be best understood as a policy-type rule or standard and therefore not subject to traditional due process requirements, though resolution of that question must be left for another day. See id. at 1046–47 (describing factors used to distinguish policymaking and adjudicative actions).
28
reassessment. This argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of a land order
and fails for two reasons.
First, the DLGF’s review under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-13.6 does not extend to
evaluating whether a county assessor properly issued individual assessment notices
under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-22. As has been stated, the sole power granted to the
DLGF by the statute is to “review the land values determined by the county assessor”
and “approve”, “modify”, or “disapprove” those values. See IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-13.6(e).
Foster’s remedy for any failure to receive an assessment notice lies in the appeal
process available under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-1.1, not in this proceeding.
Second, section 6-1.1-4-22 does not apply to the adoption of a land order
because a land order is not an assessment or a reassessment. Section 6-1.1-4-22 only
requires notice of an assessment, reassessment, or an assessor’s appraisal of a
property. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-4-22(b). A reassessment, insofar as it relates to a land
order, requires adjustments to the base rate to account for a particular parcel of real
property. See GUIDELINES, Ch. 2 at 43. A land order, standing alone, is nothing more
than an official policy, establishing the values of different classifications of land to be
used to assess property within a given geographical area. Because section 6-1.1-4-22
is only triggered by an assessment or reassessment and a land order is neither, Foster
was not entitled to a notice of reassessment when the 2023 land order was adopted.
D. Reassessment Frequency
Finally, like Young, Foster argues that her land was improperly assessed “more
than once in the four-year cycle” in violation of Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-4.2(b). (Interv’r
Br. at 7–8.) She contends that because the 2022 land order already applied to
29
assessment years 2022 through 2025, a second land order in 2023 was prohibited.
However, she does not expand on Young’s argument, and therefore her claim fails for
the same reasons articulated in Section IA. 15
CONCLUSION
In summary, neither Young nor Foster has demonstrated that the DLGF’s final
determination approving the 2023 land order was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. While both parties
raise concerns about the land order process, their individual assessments, and the
adequacy of the DLGF’s review, nothing from either party substantiated these concerns
with evidence, law, calculations, or other support that would indicate an error requiring
remand.
***
The DLGF’s final determination approving the 2023 Lake County land order
values is AFFIRMED.
15
Foster also raises a new argument in her supplemental brief regarding the sufficiency of the DLGF’s review of the land order and potential errors in data sampling. (Interv’r Suppl. Br. at 6– 7.) However, these arguments go beyond the scope of the discussion authorized by the Court in its supplemental briefing order and are thus inappropriate to raise at that time. Foster could have raised those arguments in her original briefing.
30