[Cite as State v. Bost, 2026-Ohio-3213.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 25CA3
:
v. :
: DECISION AND
RICHARD A. BOST, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES:
Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and R. Jessica Manugo, Assistant
Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
Anna Villarreal, Chillicothe City Law Director, and Andrew Anastasi, Assistant
Law Director, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Richard Bost, appeals the judgment of the Chillicothe
Municipal Court convicting him of one count of cruelty against a companion
animal after a bench trial. On appeal, he contends that his conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Because the State presented substantial credible
evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the offense had been established,
we find no merit to the arguments raised under appellant’s sole assignment of
Ross App. No. 25CA3 2
error. Accordingly, his assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
FACTS
{¶2} On October 1, 2024, a criminal complaint was filed against appellant
charging him with one count of cruelty against a companion animal, a first-degree
misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 959.131(B). The complaint stemmed from an
incident that occurred on September 24, 2024, involving a Siberian Husky puppy
owned by appellant and his wife, Kelly Edwards. Appellant pled not guilty to the
charge and the matter proceeded to a bench trial on January 13, 2025.
{¶3} At trial, the State presented the testimony of Kelly Edwards as well as
Ryan Waites, a deputy dog warden. Edwards testified that in the early morning
hours on the date of the incident, she was lying in bed with her daughter when she
heard loud thumps, her dog yelp, and appellant scream “You stupid dog.” She then
heard the door shut and the garage door go up and down, at which point she and
her daughter ran to the kitchen. Her 25-year-old son came up the basement stairs
at the same time. She testified that, out of fear, she waited until appellant left the
house before going to check on the dog. She found her dog lying by its water bowl
with blood on its fur. She also saw blood splattered on the wall. She testified that
the dog was bleeding from its nose and that it took about two and half hours to get
the bleeding to slow down.
Ross App. No. 25CA3 3
{¶4} Edwards testified that she put the dog on the table and took photos.
Three black and white copies of photos were admitted into evidence. Two
photographs show the dog with some speckles on its white fur and what appears to
be either a towel or paper towel lying beside it with spots that appear to be blood
on it. A third photo depicts what appears to be blood splatters on the floor and
wall.
{¶5} Edwards explained that once she got the bleeding to slow down, she
went to the Sheriff’s Office, where she was told they could not help her. She then
went to the dog warden. After that, she took the dog to the veterinarian, where he
was treated and released with antibiotics. She testified that it took about six hours
for the bleeding to completely stop. She also testified that after the incident, she
had to rehome the dog due to the fact that the dog thereafter would hide or hunker
down and appeared to be afraid of appellant.
{¶6} Waites testified that he arrived at the house about two and a half hours
after Edwards came into the office and made the complaint. He testified that he
did not see any blood on the dog when he got there. He further testified that he had
not received any prior related complaints and that appellant was charged based
upon Edwards’ statement.
{¶7} Appellant testified on his own behalf at trial. He stated that things
were tense between himself and Edwards at that time and that Edwards had been
Ross App. No. 25CA3 4
asking for a divorce. He testified that on the morning in question, he got up
between 5:15 and 5:30 a.m. as usual to get ready for work. When he entered the
kitchen to make his lunch, he found that the dog had peed on the floor. He
conceded that he said “stupid dog.” He testified that as he bent down to wipe up
the mess, the dog grabbed the towel out of his hand and took off with it. He stated
that the dog ran behind a recliner in the sunroom with the towel. Appellant
testified that he had to bend down around the recliner to get the towel, at which
point he “tap[ped]” the dog on the top of the snout and said “bad.” He then
finished cleaning up the mess, got his lunch, and left the house. He testified that
the dog was still behind the recliner when he left. Appellant conceded that no one
else was up that morning and that the couple’s other two dogs were in a different
room when the incident occurred. Appellant denied doing anything to hurt the
dog.
{¶8} The trial court ultimately found appellant guilty. In issuing its decision
from the bench, the trial court stated that it was convinced that appellant hit the
dog. The court stated that in its view, appellant had gotten up early to find a mess
during what was essentially a tense time period when his wife wanted a divorce,
and he lost his temper. The court found that appellant hit the dog and caused the
dog pain. The court also found that the fact that Edwards waited until appellant
Ross App. No. 25CA3 5
left the house to go to the dog demonstrated her fear of him and that she knew he
had a temper.
{¶9} The trial court recited the testimony regarding what Edwards heard and
found, how she went to law enforcement, the dog warden, and then the vet. The
trial court expressly stated that it found Edwards’ testimony reliable and believed
that she was telling the truth. The trial court also cited the dog’s subsequent
behavior as well as the fact that it had to be rehomed in support of its reasoning.
When appellant verbally disputed the findings during the hearing, the trial court
informed appellant that it had heard his testimony, but that it didn’t accept his
testimony.
{¶10} Appellant was ordered to pay a fine of $500, plus costs, and was put
on probation for one year. Appellant was also ordered to pay the vet bill, which
the State estimated to be $200.1 The trial court filed an entry of sentence on
January 13, 2025. It is from this judgment that appellant now brings his timely
appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
I. RICHARD BOST’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
1
The State did not offer any bills or vet records into evidence but estimated the vet bill to be $200 when the trial court inquired as to whether there was a bill.
Ross App. No. 25CA3 6
{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that his conviction
is against the manifest weight of the evidence. More specifically, he argues that
the State’s evidence was inconsistent and lacked credibility and that it was also
fragmented and inadequately corroborated. Appellant further argues that the
State’s evidence fell short of the statutory and case law standard for “cruelty.” The
State responds by arguing that the trial court properly exercised its function as the
trier of fact and did not lose its way. For the following reasons, we agree with the
State.
Standard of Review
{¶12} When an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction is against
the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dutifully examine the entire
record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and consider the witness
credibility. See State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, ¶ 151, citing State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). A reviewing court must bear in mind, however,
that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve. See State v.
Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001); State v. Murphy, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31 (4th
Dist.). “ ‘ “ Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is
particularly competent to decide ‘whether, and to what extent, to credit the
testimony of particular witnesses,’ we must afford substantial deference to its
determinations of credibility.” ’ ” State v. Kuntz, 2024-Ohio-1680, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.),
Ross App. No. 25CA3 7
quoting Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Konya, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), in turn quoting State v. Lawson, 1997 WL 476684 (2d
Dist. Aug. 22, 1997).
{¶13} As the Court explained in Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179:
“ ‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment
must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.
* * *
If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is
consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to
sustaining the verdict and judgment.’ ”
Eastley, supra at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d
77, 80, FN. 3 (1984), in turn quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review,
Section 60, 191-192 (1978).
Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the
evidence to the factfinder as long as a rational basis exists in the record for its
decision. See State v. Picklesimer, 2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); see also State
v. Howard, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“We will not intercede as long as the
trier of fact has some factual and rational basis for its determination of credibility
and weight.”).
{¶14} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may
reverse the judgment of conviction only if it appears that the fact-finder, when
Ross App. No. 25CA3 8
resolving the conflicts in evidence, “clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). See also
Thompkins, supra, at 387. If the prosecution presented substantial credible
evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the offense had been established,
the judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See
State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169 (1978), syllabus, superseded by state
constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89
(1997); see also Eastley at ¶ 12 and Thompkins at 387 (explaining that a judgment
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence when “the greater amount of
credible evidence” supports it). Thus, “ ‘[w]hen conflicting evidence is presented
at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply
because the jury believed the prosecution testimony.’ ” State v. Cooper, 2007-Ohio-1186, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Mason, 2003-Ohio-5785, ¶ 17 (9th
Dist.). Instead, a reviewing court should find a conviction against the manifest
weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘ “exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.” ’ ” State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479,
483 (2000), quoting Thompkins at 387, in turn quoting Martin at 175.
Ross App. No. 25CA3 9
Legal Analysis
{¶15} Appellant was convicted of cruelty against a companion animal in
violation of R.C. 959.131(B), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly
torture, torment, needlessly mutilate or maim, cruelly beat, poison, needlessly kill,
or commit an act of cruelty against a companion animal.” The statute further
provides that “ ‘[c]ruelty,’ ‘torment,’ and ‘torture’ have the same meanings as in
section 1717.01 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 959.131(A)(2). R.C. 1717.01(B)
states that “ ‘[c]ruelty,’ ‘torment,’ and ‘torture’ include every act, omission, or
neglect by which unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused,
permitted, or allowed to continue, when there is a reasonable remedy or relief.”
{¶16} Furthermore, R.C. 2901.22(B) provides:
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person
is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain
result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has
knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such
circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence
of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge
is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high
probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with
a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
State v. Crumpton, 2024-Ohio-5064, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.).
{¶17} As set forth above, appellant contends that the State’s evidence was
inconsistent and lacked credibility. Appellant concedes that he “tapped” the dog
but posits that the central issue is whether he caused the alleged injuries that
Ross App. No. 25CA3 10
resulted in bleeding, as claimed by his Ms. Edwards. He argues that contradictions
in her testimony undermined her credibility. In support of his contention, appellant
argues that Edwards testified that she and her daughter found the dog covered in
blood after appellant left for work, yet the photographs “belie that description” and
instead appear “to be the natural freckles and normal markings of the dog’s face
and paws.” He also points to Edwards’ testimony at one time stating that the
bleeding lasted for two and half hours and at another time stating that the bleeding
continued for six hours. Appellant further argues that the fact Ms. Edwards later
left the dog in his care while she went out of town casts doubt on the veracity of
her claims.2
{¶18} Appellant also contends that the State’s evidence was “fragmented
and inadequately corroborated.” In support of his contention, he argues that Ms.
Edwards’ testimony was unsupported by physical evidence or neutral witnesses.
Appellant points to Edwards’ testimony indicating that she used a towel to stop the
bleeding, then called law enforcement as well as the dog warden, and then took the
dog to the vet.3 He then contrasts this testimony with testimony from Deputy
Waites indicating that when he arrived at the residence two and a half hours after
2
We summarily reject this argument as overall reading of the transcript demonstrates the dog at issue had been rehomed at the time Edwards left the couple’s other two dogs alone in appellant’s care. Further, Edwards testified that appellant had never hurt those dogs.
3
We note that contrary to appellant’s arguments, the trial transcript makes clear that Edwards actually drove to the Sheriff’s Office, then drove to see the dog warden, and then took the dog to the vet. She did not simply make calls to those offices.
Ross App. No. 25CA3 11
the report was called in, the dog was neither bleeding nor visibly injured. He
argues that Waites’ testimony conflicts with Edwards’ claim that it took six hours
for the bleeding to stop. Appellant also criticizes the fact that there was no
testimony from the veterinarian, and no records submitted documenting the alleged
injury.
{¶19} Finally, appellant contends that the weight of the State’s evidence
falls short of the statutory and case law standard for “cruelty.” In support of his
contention, he relies on the holding of State v. George, 2023-Ohio-2016 (12th
Dist.). In George, the court found cruelty was proven where video evidence
clearly depicted the defendant swinging a bat at his dog and screaming profanities
at it. Id. at ¶ 21. Appellant also relies on State v Mills, 2011-Ohio-2323 (9th
Dist.). Mills admitted to hitting the dog at issue four or five times with a metal
fence post. Id. at ¶ 9. The dog was found dead in its pen thereafter. Id.
{¶20} Appellant contrasts the strength of the evidence in both George and
Mills with the evidence in the present case. He argues that he only admitted to
giving the dog a light tap that caused no immediate injury. He also argues that
there were two other dogs in the house, as well as Ms. Edwards’ 25-year-old son,
suggesting there were “other plausible explanations” for the dog’s alleged injury.
He further criticizes the lack of video evidence or other eyewitness testimony.
Ross App. No. 25CA3 12
{¶21} The State responds by arguing that the trial court found Edwards’
testimony and exhibits, which included photos, to be credible and ultimately
determined that appellant had a very bad temper, was already unhappy, and injured
the dog. The State contends that the trial court properly assessed the testimony and
exhibits and the reliability thereof. The State also points out that the trial court, as
the trier of fact, observed the demeanor of the witnesses, assessed their credibility,
and weighed the evidence.
{¶22} After reviewing the evidence, we cannot conclude that appellant’s
conviction for cruelty against a companion animal is against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Nor can we conclude that the trier of fact lost its way in finding him
guilty of this charge. Appellant admitted he was the only person awake in the
house where the dog was located on the morning in question. He conceded that the
dog caused a mess that he had to clean up and that he said “stupid dog” as reported
by Edwards. Although he claims he only tapped the dog, the evidence introduced
by the State showed otherwise.
{¶23} While appellant, by his own admission, was the only person or animal
present where the dog at issue was located on the morning in question, he was
overheard screaming at the dog. At the same time, Edwards heard the dog yelp
and heard loud thuds. Photos submitted into evidence depicting the area of the
house where appellant stated he left the dog showed what appeared to be blood
Ross App. No. 25CA3 13
splattered on the floor and wall. Additionally, there is testimony in the record
indicating the dog was found by Edwards immediately after appellant left the
house. Edwards testified the dog was bleeding from its nose and continued to
bleed for several hours. Appellant’s arguments regarding inconsistencies in
Edwards’ testimony related to timeframes and the duration of the bleeding have no
merit as the timeframes were sufficiently explained and clarified by direct
questioning by the trial court.
{¶24} While appellant compares the facts of the present case to much more
egregious facts in both State v. George and State v. Mills, supra, we do not find
those cases to demand reversal of the present case. In fact, in George, although the
dog at issue was struck several times with a bat, it sustained no apparent injury but
instead only appeared to be afraid afterwards, as evidenced by its “flinching.”
George, supra, at ¶ 7. The George court further found that evidence of actual
injury was not necessary because George was not charged with the subsection of
the statute requiring serious physical injury. Id. at ¶ 22. The same is true here.
{¶25} As set forth above, the State was required to demonstrate that
appellant knowingly committed an act of cruelty against a companion animal. As
further set forth above, the term “cruelty” encompasses “every act * * * by which
unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused * * *.” R.C. 1717.01(B).
There is evidence in the record demonstrating that the dog sustained an injury to its
Ross App. No. 25CA3 14
nose that caused bleeding for several hours. There is also evidence that the dog
was subsequently afraid of appellant to the extent that it had to be rehomed. Thus,
our review of the record reveals that the State presented substantial, credible
evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that appellant was guilty. Although the Mills case relied upon by appellant was
much more egregious and resulted in a dog’s death, such extreme behavior and
results are not required to satisfy the language of the statute.
{¶26} Further, although there were competing versions of events, the trial
court, as the trier of fact, clearly accepted the State’s version of events. That fact
does not render the verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial
court was in the best position to view the witnesses’ demeanor and assess their
credibility. The trial court expressly stated that it found Edwards’ testimony to be
reliable and truthful, and that although it heard appellant’s testimony, it did not
accept it.
{¶27} Moreover, despite appellant’s criticism regarding the lack of any
eyewitness testimony, evidence may be direct or circumstantial. “[D]irect
evidence is ‘ “[e]vidence, which if believed, proves [the] existence of [the] fact in
issue without inference or presumption[.]” ’ ” State v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-4507, ¶
43 (4th Dist.), quoting Reeves v. Vitt, 2009-Ohio-2436, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.), in turn
quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990). “ ‘Circumstantial evidence is
Ross App. No. 25CA3 15
defined as “[t]estimony not based on actual personal knowledge or observation of
the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which deductions are drawn,
showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved.” ’ ” State v. Meddock, 2017-Ohio-4414, ¶ 54 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150
(1988), in turn quoting Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979). As this Court
observed in State v. Jarrells:
“Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess
the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the
same standard of proof. When the State relies on circumstantial
evidence to prove an essential element of the offense charged,
there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable with any
reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.”
State v. Jarrells, 2024-Ohio-2816, ¶ 32 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Collins, 2024-Ohio-794, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.).
{¶28} In light of the foregoing, we find no merit to appellant’s sole
assignment of error. Therefore, it is overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 25CA3 16
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall
pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Chillicothe Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON
BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal set forth in the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration
of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.