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5-Star General Store v. American Express Company

2026-08-19

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 25-1023

5-STAR GENERAL STORE, a/k/a Bento LLC; MARC ALLEN, INC.; FAST

FORWARD MEDIA, INC.; KENNEDY'S IRISH PUB INC.; CARDEN, INC.;

FRENCH FLORIST, LLC; LUXE FURNITURE, INC.; LUNA'S HOSPITALITY

GROUP, LLC; THE GENT’S PLACE MEN'S FINE GROOMING LLC, on

behalf of themselves and others similarly situated; MEZE LLC,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY; AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL

RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary S. McElroy, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Montecalvo,

Circuit Judges.

Peter T. Barbur, with whom Kevin J. Orsini, Helam Gebremariam,

David H. Korn, Rebecca J. Schindel, and Cravath, Swaine & Moore

LLP were on brief, for appellants.

Thomas Scott-Railton, with whom Scott C. Harris, Peggy

Wedgworth, Milberg Coleman Bryson, Phillips Grossman PLLC, Deepak Gupta, Matthew W.H. Wessler, Gupta Wessler LLP, Tracey Kitzman,

Song PC, Antony R. Leone, II, John Joseph O'Brien, and Leone Law, LLC, were on brief, for appellees.

Brendan Benedict and Benedict Law Group PLLC on brief as amici

curiae supporting appellees.

August 19, 2026

MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Defendants-Appellants

American Express Company and American Express Travel Related

Services Company, Inc. ("Amex") appeal the district court's order

denying their motion to stay litigation and compel arbitration.

Plaintiffs-Appellees include the named plaintiff, a small store

located in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 5-Star General Store & Deli,

and thousands of other small merchants based throughout the United

States who we will refer to collectively as "5-Star." 5-Star filed

demands for arbitration against Amex in the American Arbitration

Association tribunal ("AAA," colloquially referred to as triple

A), the largest arbitration association in the United States and

one of the associations named in Amex's arbitration agreement with

5-Star. After the district court denied Amex's motion, Amex timely

appealed. This dispute centers on whether the district court

exceeded its authority when it held that Amex defaulted under the

Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 3, and waived its right

to compel arbitration. As we will explain, we find that the

district court neither exceeded its authority nor erred in finding

that 5-Star waived its right to compel arbitration.

- 3 -I. Background

In August 2023, 5-Star demanded arbitrations in AAA

against Amex under an existing arbitration agreement.1 That month,

5-Star filed demands for arbitration challenging Amex's

"swipe-fee" policies. A swipe fee is a charge levied on merchants

every time a customer uses a credit card to pay them. 5-Star

claims these swipe fees, which are around three percent or more of

each credit card sale, pose a substantial expense to small

merchants. 5-Star's arbitrations challenge certain

"non-discrimination provisions" within Amex's swipe-fee policies

that prohibit 5-Star from "incentiviz[ing] shoppers to use cheaper

payment cards." These provisions, 5-Star alleged, have forced

almost all credit-card-accepting merchants to accept Amex, despite

their burdensome fees.

Before AAA, the parties disagreed about the filing fees

that Amex owed to the tribunal in 5,155 of the demanded

arbitrations, which involve damages and injunctive relief claims.

No arbitrator was appointed in those cases because arbitrators are

appointed after filing fees are paid, and because the parties did

not follow AAA's suggestion to appoint an arbitrator to oversee

the fee dispute. For that reason, an administrator of AAA oversaw

The parties do not dispute the terms of the arbitration

1

agreement. Merchants must agree to Amex's arbitration agreement in order to accept payment by Amex credit card.

- 4 -this dispute. The AAA administrator informed the parties that

under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules' Administrative Fee

Schedule, damages claims that request injunctive relief and are

not contested have fees of $3,500 per case.2 After numerous written

exchanges between the parties and the AAA administrator regarding

the fee disagreement -- which took place over several

months -- the AAA administrator issued a determination stating the

fees owed by the parties. The administrator determined that a

filing fee of $3,500 applied to the at-issue arbitrations, with

5-Star responsible for $350 of that total and Amex responsible for

the remaining $3,150.

5-Star paid its share of the $3,500 filing fee, but Amex

refused to pay. Amex continued to dispute the $3,500 fee charged,

asserting that it contested those claims and, therefore, a lower

fee should apply to each case instead.3 During these exchanges,

the AAA administrator repeatedly warned that if the fees were not

paid by the due date -- February 26, 2024 -- "the cases [would] be

administratively closed." On February 29, 2024, pursuant to the

warnings, the AAA administrator informed the parties that the

2The administrator also informed the parties that the initial

filing fees would be smaller for damages claims where additional

injunctive relief was contested by Amex.

3 Amex asserted that a lower fee applied because they

contested those injunctive relief claims, and the administrator

had previously informed the parties that cases with contested

injunctive relief claims are subject to a lower filing fee.

- 5 -claims were "administratively closed for non-payment." The AAA

administrator then held a videoconference with counsel in March

2024, stating that the closure of the cases "was final" and that

the cases were "not subject to reopening."

In March 2024, 5-Star filed a class action complaint in

the District Court for the District of Rhode Island. On behalf of

a class of merchants involved in the arbitrations, 5-Star alleged

that Amex waived its right to compel arbitration in those suits.

5-Star claimed that Amex's refusal to pay filing fees in the

arbitrations before AAA caused those arbitration proceedings to

close and constituted a default under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3, and

a waiver under common law. Amex responded by filing a motion to

stay the district court proceedings under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3,

and to compel arbitration under § 4 in order to place the parties

back before AAA. 5-Star opposed Amex's motion. The district court

denied Amex's motion, explaining that the court first had to

determine whether Amex defaulted under § 3 and holding that Amex

did in fact default. The district court also held that, to the

extent a separate waiver analysis was required, Amex waived its

right to compel arbitration.4 Amex timely appealed.

4 Amex also moved to strike the class allegations in 5-Star's

complaint, but it does not appeal the district court's denial of

its motion to strike. Therefore, we do not discuss the class

allegations further.

- 6 -II. Discussion

A.

Amex requests that the district court stay litigation

here in order to return 5-Star's claims to the AAA tribunal and

restart proceedings there. To achieve that end, Amex must show

1) that the district court exceeded its authority in deciding

whether Amex waived its right to compel arbitration, and 2) that

Amex, in refusing to pay the administrative fees assigned to it,

did not waive its right to compel arbitration by its own behavior

before AAA. We address these questions in the order they arise.

1. Did the district court have the authority to decide whether

Amex waived its right to compel arbitration, thus defaulting in

proceeding with arbitration before AAA under 9 U.S.C. § 3?

We begin by assessing the district court's decision that

it had the authority to determine whether Amex defaulted under 9

U.S.C. § 3, rather than directing that question to an arbitrator,

when deciding Amex's motion to stay litigation and compel

arbitration. We review this preserved issue de novo. See Marie

v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2005).

A court is only permitted to stay litigation under § 3

of the FAA if "the applicant for the stay is not in default in

proceeding with such arbitration." Marie, 402 F.3d at 13 (quoting

9 U.S.C. § 3)(emphasis omitted).5 If a court stays litigation, it

5 Section 3 states in full:

- 7 -should also compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA. See id. And

even though § 4, which covers motions to compel arbitration, does

not include the word default, courts have long advised that § 3

and § 4 should be interpreted together. See id. (collecting

cases). As a result, questions about default are within the

court's ambit because a court must decide whether a party defaulted

to determine whether it should stay litigation and compel

arbitration under the FAA. See id. at 12-13, 14 n.10. And

"'default' has generally been viewed by courts as including a

'waiver.'" See id. at 13 (collecting cases).

Here, the parties disagree about whether the district

court exceeded its power under Marie, which instructs that courts

have the power to "decide waiver issue[s]" themselves, "at least"

when they involve "litigation-related activity." Id. In Marie,

we found that a party's participation in earlier proceedings before

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of

the courts of the United States upon any issue

referable to arbitration under an agreement in

writing for such arbitration, the court in

which such suit is pending, upon being

satisfied that the issue involved in such suit

or proceeding is referable to arbitration

under such an agreement, shall on application

of one of the parties stay the trial of the

action until such arbitration has been had in

accordance with the terms of the agreement,

providing the applicant for the stay is not in

default in proceeding with such arbitration.

9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).

- 8 -the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was

litigation-related activity, so the district court, not an

arbitrator, was empowered to decide whether a party's

participation in those proceedings constituted a waiver of its

right to compel arbitration. Id. at 13-14. This was because, in

Marie, the court was well-suited to answer the question and it

promoted efficiency. Id. at 14. Here, Amex contends that the

district court exceeded its authority because Amex's failure to

pay fees to AAA is not a "litigation-related activity" under Marie,

while 5-Star claims the failure to pay fees to AAA is a

litigation-related activity.

As we will explain, we view Amex's repeated failure to

pay arbitration fees to AAA for the claims here -- before an

arbitrator was assigned and resulting in AAA's administrative

closing of the cases -- to be the sort of litigation-related

activity discussed in Marie. The claims before us are the same

claims that 5-Star attempted to bring before AAA, and in each one

of those claims, Amex refused to pay the fees to open the

arbitration despite the AAA administrator's repeated warnings that

the cases would be closed without Amex's payment. Like the

activity in Marie, the activity here thus "arises out of conduct

within the very same litigation in which the party attempts to

- 9 -[now] compel arbitration."6 Id. at 13. And here, like in Marie,

the efficiencies weigh in favor of allowing the district court to

decide waiver. "[A] key purpose of the FAA" is "to permit speedy

resolution of disputes," and Amex is essentially asking for a

do-over of its arbitration before AAA.7 Id. at 14. Here, it would

be inefficient and likely unworkable to send this waiver issue

back to AAA when no arbitrator was ever appointed to adjudicate

5-Star's claims and AAA already administratively closed the cases

following Amex's nonpayment.8 For these reasons, we think that

6 While the activity constituting waiver occurred not before

the district court but before AAA, we explained in Marie that this distinction does not matter. 402 F.3d at 13-14 (explaining that

the fact that the at-issue activity occurred before the EEOC rather than the district court "ma[de] no difference"). Moreover, this

court has already held that activity before AAA can constitute

waiver. In re Tyco Intern. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 422 F.3d 41, 44-45

(1st Cir. 2005).

7 Amex not only argues that it should get a do-over, but also

that AAA's revised mass arbitration rules, which are more favorable to Amex and which became effective after AAA closed these cases,

should now be applied by AAA to these cases. We need not reach

these arguments. However, we note that AAA rules are not

retroactive but "apply in the form in effect at the time the

administrative filing requirements are met for a demand for

arbitration."

8 Amex makes two other arguments in connection with this

issue, but neither has merit. First, Amex contends that the

district court created a catch-22 when it applied Marie to this

case because the district court cannot revisit AAA's fee decision. This argument falls flat because the district court properly

understood that AAA had the power to make a fee determination and administratively close the arbitrations for nonpayment, while the district court had the power to determine whether that nonpayment constitutes a default under § 3 of the FAA. Amex also argues that the district court's extension of Marie to "encompass[] all issues concerning whether failure to pay arbitral fees constitutes

waiver" created a per se rule and was error. But, this is a

- 10 -the at-issue activity -- Amex's nonpayment of fees despite

repeated warnings from the AAA administrator that the cases would

be closed without payment -- is litigation-related activity under

Marie. Because the district court "at least" has authority to

determine whether a party waived its right to compel arbitration

when the at-issue activity is a litigation-related activity, on

the facts of this case, the district court had the authority to

determine whether Amex defaulted under § 3 of the FAA.9

misreading of Marie, and the district court's order only applied

to the specific facts here.

9 Amex also contends that nonpayment of fees is a procedural

issue and that under Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537

U.S. 79 (2002) procedural issues should be decided by the

arbitrator while substantive issues should be decided by the court. According to Amex, the dispute here implicates a circuit split on whether nonpayment of filing fees should be decided by the court

or the arbitrator. See, e.g., Pre-Paid Legal Servs. v. Cahill,

786 F.3d 1287, 1298 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that a nonpayment of fee issue should be decided by the court); Dealer Comput. Servs.

Inc. v. Old Colony Motors, Inc., 588 F.3d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a nonpayment of fee issue should be decided by the

arbitrator). We do not answer that question today. In Marie, we

explained the import of Howsam and noted that it "did not intend

to disturb the traditional rule that waiver by conduct, at least

where due to litigation-related activity, is presumptively an

issue for the court." 402 F.3d at 14. We follow, as we must, the

holding of Marie, and find only that the failure to pay the

administrative filing fee in this case -- where the claims before us are the same claims 5-Star tried to bring before AAA, where no arbitrator was assigned, where Amex chose not to pay the fees

despite repeated warnings, and where AAA administratively closed

the cases due to nonpayment -- falls into litigation-related

activity under Marie. See 402 F.3d at 9-10, 13.

- 11 -2. Did Amex waive its right to arbitrate, and thus default?

Having determined that the district court had authority

to decide whether Amex defaulted for nonpayment, we now review its

decision that Amex did in fact default. We review that legal

conclusion de novo, but we review the district court's underlying

factual findings for clear error. Joca-Roca Real Est., LLC v.

Brennan, 772 F.3d 945, 947-48 (1st Cir. 2014), abrogated on other

grounds by Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 417 (2022).

Amex contends that the district court erred in defining

"default" under 9 U.S.C. § 3 using the dictionary definition rather

than defining default as waiver.10 Amex argues that this was error

because the dictionary definition conflicts with the FAA's

statutory scheme "to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as

other contracts." 5-Star, by contrast, argues that the definition

is consistent with the FAA's statutory scheme, and that Amex is

instead interested in making arbitration agreements more

enforceable than other contracts.

In reviewing the district court's decision that Amex

defaulted, we need not consider the district court's adoption of

the dictionary definition of default because the district court

correctly evaluated default under Supreme Court precedent. As

10 When defining "default," the district court consulted

Black's Law Dictionary's definition, which states that default is "the omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty;

esp., the failure to pay a debt when due."

- 12 -discussed, default includes waiver. Marie, 402 F.3d at 13.

Moreover, waiver is "the intentional relinquishment or abandonment

of a known right."11 Morgan, 596 U.S. at 417 (quoting United States

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). The district court properly

considered this standard. It explained that Amex made the

"deliberate choice not to pay arbitration fees" even after being

warned by AAA repeatedly that the cases would be administratively

closed absent payment. The district court held that this

constitutes waiver, and we agree. Waiver by conduct may be present

where a party's conduct is inconsistent with a future desire to

arbitrate its claims.12 Marie, 402 F.3d at 11-12. We find waiver

by conduct here. The record makes clear that AAA warned Amex

multiple times, over the course of months, that its cases would be

administratively closed without payment. At the same time Amex

does not argue, nor could it, that it did not understand that the

cases would be administratively closed. Amex's refusal to pay the

filing fees set by the arbitrator resulted in the foreseeable (and

11 While Marie is instructive about the power of the district

court to decide whether Amex defaulted under 9 U.S.C. § 3, the

waiver test recited by this court in Marie was later impacted by

Morgan. See Marie, 402 F.3d at 15; Joca-Roca Real Est., LLC, 772

F.3d at 948, abrogated by Morgan, 596 U.S. at 417-19. For that

reason, we apply the test for waiver as discussed by the Supreme

Court in Morgan. 596 U.S. at 417-19.

12 "Like any other contract right, the right to arbitrate may

be waived either explicitly or through an implicit course of

conduct." Toddle Inn Franchising, LLC v. KPJ Assocs., LLC, 8 F.4th 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2021).

- 13 -forewarned) outcome of closure of those arbitrations. Under these

circumstances, we conclude that Amex's conduct was inconsistent

with an intent to arbitrate. Therefore, Amex waived their right

to compel arbitration and thereby defaulted in proceeding with the

arbitration.13

B.

We now turn to the unclean hands doctrine, reviewing for

abuse of discretion the district court's decision that 5-Star did

not have unclean hands. See Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc. v.

Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 480 (1st Cir. 2009). The district court's

decision on this issue was two-fold. First, it held that Amex

could not raise an unclean hands defense because under the FAA,

the district court first needed to ensure that Amex was not in

"default." Second, the district court found that regardless,

5-Star did not have unclean hands. Amex contests both parts of

this decision, while 5-Star agrees with the district court in full.

We need not decide whether the unclean hands doctrine

applies in this case because in any event, we affirm the district

court's finding that 5-Star did not have unclean hands. When

deciding whether a party has unclean hands, the court considers

whether the party seeking relief engaged in misconduct that is

13Because we hold that Amex defaulted under 9 U.S.C. § 3, the

district court did not err when it denied Amex's motion to stay

litigation and compel arbitration, and we need not reach Amex's

additional arguments regarding waiver.

- 14 -directly related to the merits of the controversy. See Vaquería

Tres Monijitas, Inc., 587 F.3d at 480; Precision Instrument Mfg.

Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1945). The

record does not suggest that 5-Star engaged in misconduct directly

related to the merits of the controversy. 5-Star participated in

dialogue with Amex and the AAA administrator about the fees owed,

and it paid the fees that the AAA administrator decided were owed.14

For this reason, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it found that 5-Star did not act with unclean

hands.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district

court's order denying Amex's motion to stay litigation and compel

arbitration.

14 While Amex insists that 5-Star failed to pay filing fees

on four separate occasions, it does not suggest that 5-Star refused to pay the invoiced fees at issue here by the deadline AAA set.

- 15 -