FOURTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
WATKINS and EPPS, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
August 19, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1027. JACKSON v. CANTRELL et al.
WATKINS, Judge.
This personal injury action is before us a second time. Plaintiff Bryson Jackson
was injured when 15-year-old Parker Cantrell accidentally shot him in the leg while the
two were in a truck owned by Parker’s father, Frederick Brad (“Brad”) Cantrell.
Jackson sued Parker, Brad, and Brad’s company, Cantrell Tractor and Loader Service,
LLC, to recover for his injuries. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the LLC (“Jackson I”).1 The trial court later granted
summary judgment to Parker and Brad based on a limited release signed by Jackson.
Jackson appeals from that order, arguing that the Cantrells are not entitled to
1
Jackson v. Cantrell Tractor & Loader Serv., A25A0017 (Ga. App. Mar. 18, 2025) (unpublished).
summary judgment because they failed to show that a condition of the release — that
no other insurance policy covers Jackson’s injuries — has been met. For reasons that
follow, we reverse.
We set forth the relevant facts in Jackson I, as follows:
On Sunday, June 28, 2020, Jeilen Jones, who sometimes did odd jobs for
Brad Cantrell, asked Brad if he could borrow Brad’s lawnmower to cut
the grass at Jones’s trailer. Brad agreed. Neither Brad nor the LLC had
any ownership interest in Jones’s house, and the blue truck used to
transport the lawnmower was owned by Brad, not the LLC. No money
was offered or taken by anyone concerning this errand.
Before getting into the truck driven by Jones and occupied by Jackson,
Parker Cantrell took a 9-millimeter pistol from his father’s dresser
drawer, hid it in his waistband, and pulled his shirt over it. Brad had
previously told his son not to use the gun except for “home defense” or
if Brad gave him permission to practice shooting. Jackson provided no
evidence that the LLC owned the pistol or that Brad commingled his
personal funds with those of the LLC. While the young men were
returning to Jones’s trailer in the blue truck, Parker accidentally shot
Jackson in the leg, eventually resulting in its amputation.2
2
Jackson I, slip op. at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
2
Jackson sued Parker, Brad, and the LLC, alleging that Brad was negligent for
furnishing the gun to Parker and that the LLC was liable as “a mere instrumentality
and alter ego for the transaction of Brad’s affairs.” Five months later, Jackson
executed a limited release agreeing to relinquish all claims against Parker and Brad
arising from the incident in exchange for an insurance payout, “except to the extent
other insurance coverage is available which covers the claim or claims of [Jackson.]”
Later, while discovery was still pending, Parker and Brad filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that Jackson had released his claims against them. Jackson opposed the
motion, arguing that he had not yet received complete information about all insurance
policies available to the defendants. The trial court denied the motion, but ruled that
Parker and Brad could “re-file [it] as one for summary judgment following completion
of discovery.”
More dispositive motions followed. The LLC moved for summary judgment on
the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to its responsibility for
the incident, and Jackson sought partial summary judgment “on the unqualified
3
existence of an agency relationship between [Brad] and [the LLC].” The trial court
granted the LLC’s motion and denied Jackson’s.3
Jackson appealed, arguing that the LLC was not entitled to summary judgment
because Brad and the LLC were “one in the same.” We affirmed the trial court’s
rulings, pointing to a lack of evidence that “Brad commingled his personal funds with
those of the LLC,” that the LLC owned “any of the instrumentalities or properties
at issue,” that the young men in the truck were employees of the LLC or acted in
furtherance of its interests, or that any negligence by Brad or the occupants of the
truck was imputable to the LLC.4
Following remittitur, Parker and Brad filed a renewed motion to dismiss and/or
for summary judgment, again citing Jackson’s release and contending that no other
insurance coverage was available to cover his claims against them. The Cantrells
acknowledged that the LLC had several other insurance policies, including a
commercial auto policy from Home-Owners Insurance Company, but they maintained
that those policies were inapplicable because the LLC, having been awarded summary
3
Brad also filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court likewise denied.
4
Jackson I, slip op. at 3-5.
4
judgment, was no longer a party to the case. Jackson opposed the motion, arguing that
the LLC’s commercial auto policy provided coverage and that the LLC should be
“restored as a party.” The trial court granted the Cantrells’ motion without
explaining its reasoning and awarded attorney fees to defense counsel under OCGA
§ 9-11-68. Jackson appeals.
1. As an initial matter, the Cantrells argue that Jackson’s “failure to include the
entire record on appeal is a fatal defect” requiring us to affirm the trial court. We
disagree. In his notice of appeal, Jackson asked the trial court clerk to transmit “only
those parts of the record not already included in the record of [Jackson I] — namely,
all additional filings, orders, evidence, and transcripts filed or entered since the
preparation of the record for that earlier appeal.” Because this Court may take into
account the record from a prior appeal,5 Jackson did not need to designate for
inclusion in this appeal the parts of the record we already had.6 Further, it does not
appear that anything necessary for our review is missing from the record.
5
See Trend Star Continental v. Branham, 220 Ga. App. 781, 783(2) (469 SE2d 750) (1996).
6
While the appellate record does contain multiple copies of the same 2024 hearing transcript, this defect is immaterial to our review.
5
2. As to the merits, Jackson argues that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment to the Cantrells under the limited release because the LLC’s
commercial auto policy may provide additional insurance coverage for his injuries.
Jackson contends that our recent decision in Harvey v. Hall7 controls this case and
requires reversal of the trial court’s order. We agree.
In Harvey, a passenger in a truck was injured when the driver fell asleep and
crashed into a culvert. The passenger signed a limited release like the one in this case,
insulating the driver, his employer, and his employer’s insurance company from
liability “except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers the
claim.”8 The passenger then sent demand letters to two of the employer’s other
insurance companies, which both denied coverage. Later, the passenger sued the
driver and the employer, who both sought summary judgment on the basis that “the
limited release [the passenger] signed released them from liability while allowing him
to pursue other available insurance coverage — and no such coverage existed.”9 The
7
378 Ga. App. 98 (924 SE2d 25) (2025).
8
Id. at 98 (punctuation omitted).
9
Id. at 99.
6
trial court denied the defendants’ motion, but we reversed because the passenger had
failed to present evidence of additional insurance coverage.
We held that a defendant seeking summary judgment based on an affirmative
defense, such as a release, must present evidence “which establishes the prima facie
affirmative defense,” after which the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence
creating a jury issue on an element of the defense.10 If the plaintiff fails to meet this
burden, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.11 The
Harvey defendants carried their burden of proof in support of their affirmative defense
by presenting the release and the written denials of coverage from the employer’s
other insurers. The burden thus shifted to the passenger to present evidence that the
incident was, in fact, covered by the other policies; however, the passenger failed to
carry this burden.12 Consequently, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
Applying Harvey to the facts of this case, the Cantrells presented evidence of
Jackson’s limited release insulating them and their insurance company from liability
10
Harvey, 378 Ga. App. at 99-100 (citations and punctuation omitted).
11
Id. at 100.
12
Id. at 101.
7
“except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers the claim or
claims of [Jackson.]”13 They also presented evidence of several other insurance
policies held by the LLC, including the commercial auto policy issued by HomeOwners, which they say does not apply because the LLC is no longer a party to this
lawsuit. Jackson contends that the Cantrells have not met their initial burden of proof
as to the commercial auto policy because they have not presented evidence, such as
coverage denial letters, “affidavits from the insurer,” or “sworn testimony that
coverage had been denied[.]”
To resolve this issue, we look to the terms of the commercial auto policy.14 As
the Cantrells point out, the policy names the LLC as the insured. It is undisputed that
the policy lists two covered vehicles, neither of which was the truck in which Jackson
13
This document “release[d] the settling insurance carrier from any liability to the claimant, and release[d] the tortfeasor[s] from personal liability while preserving the claimant’s right to pursue claims to judgment against the tortfeasor[s] for the purpose of collecting against other available insurance coverage[.]” Carter v. Progressive Mountain Ins., 295 Ga. 487, 489 (761 SE2d 261) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 33-24-41.1.
14
We do not read Harvey to require a defendant to present affirmative evidence of coverage denial for a policy that is plainly inapplicable on its face. Indeed, Jackson agrees on appeal that such evidence is not necessary if the terms of the policy clearly “establish[ ] non-coverage as a matter of law.”
8
was shot, and three covered drivers, none of whom was the driver or the shooter.
Accordingly, the Cantrells maintain that the policy plainly does not apply here.
But Jackson points to other policy provisions suggesting that coverage may be
broader than the Cantrells claim. The policy states that Home-Owners will pay “all
sums an insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury ... to which this
insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the ownership,
maintenance or use of a covered auto as an auto.”15 In addition to the two listed
vehicles, the policy also covers “non-owned autos,” which are defined as “autos [the
named insured] do[es] not own ... that are used in connection with [the named
insured’s] business. This includes autos owned by ... members (if [the named insured
is] a limited liability company), but only while used in [the named insured’s] business
or ... personal affairs.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is undisputed that Brad owned the
truck at issue and that Brad is a member of the LLC. He loaned the truck to Jones to
15
Although the Cantrells do not argue otherwise, we note that injuries resulting from the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a vehicle may, depending on the facts, fall within automobile liability coverage. See Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burnett, 167 Ga. App. 480, 481(1) (306 SE2d 734) (1983) (“[W]here a connection appears between the use of the vehicle and the discharge of the firearm and resulting injury such as to render it more likely that the one grew out of the other, it comes within the coverage defined[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
9
transport a lawnmower for Jones’s use. Whether this mission occurred in a “nonowned auto” used for the LLC’s “personal affairs” under the commercial auto policy
may be a question of fact. And although Jones was not listed as a scheduled driver, the
policy also generally defines “insured” as “[a]nyone else while using, with [the named
insured’s] permission, a covered auto[.]” Based on these broad coverage provisions,
Jackson argues that there are questions of fact as to whether the commercial auto
policy provides coverage for the incident in question. The Cantrells do not address
these policy provisions or explain why they fail to provide coverage here, much less
offer any affirmative evidence of coverage denial under the policy. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Cantrells have not met their initial burden of showing that no other
insurance coverage is available to cover Jackson’s injuries.16
It is not our task, at this juncture, to determine whether coverage actually is
available under the LLC’s commercial auto policy; we hold only that the Cantrells
have failed to carry their burden of showing that it is not. Therefore, the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in their favor on the basis of the limited release.
16
See Harvey, 378 Ga. App. at 99-100.
10
3. Jackson maintains that the trial court erred by ignoring an amended complaint
that he filed shortly before the trial court granted summary judgment to the Cantrells.
In the amended complaint, Jackson asserted a claim for declaratory judgment,
purportedly against the LLC, seeking a ruling that the LLC’s commercial auto policy
“provides coverage applicable to [Jackson’s] claim[.]” The trial court did not address
the amended complaint in its summary judgment order. Because “this Court is for the
correction of errors of law made by the trial courts,”17 we will not consider the
propriety of the amended complaint in the first instance. We note, however, that our
ruling in Jackson I granting summary judgment to the LLC stands as the law of the
case and is “binding in all subsequent proceedings.”18 Accordingly, the LLC is no
longer a party in the case.19
17
Burke Moore Law Group v. Drew Eckl & Farnham, 374 Ga. App. 810, 820(2)(b) (914 SE2d 333) (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted).
18
Lundy v. Kemp, 379 Ga. App. 374, 379(1)(a) (928 SE2d 206) (2026).
19
In his opening appellate brief, Jackson argued that despite our affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the LLC in Jackson I, the LLC should “remain in the case[.]” In his reply brief, however, he stated that although he disagrees with Jackson I, he does not ask us to disturb it.
11
4. Finally, Jackson argues that the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the
Cantrells under OCGA § 9-11-68 must be reversed, as that award was dependent upon
the grant of summary judgment in their favor. We agree. In light of our ruling in
Division 2, we also reverse the attorney fee award.
Judgment reversed. McFadden, P. J., and Epps, J., concur.
12