J-A14036-26 2026 PA Super 185
ZORYANA KASPRYAK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MYKHAYLO STADARSKYY : No. 2781 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 250700810
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2026
Appellant Zoryana Kaspryak, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal
of her partition action against Appellee Mykhaylo Stadarskyy, her former
spouse. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition
with prejudice because she lacked standing. We affirm.
The trial court provided the following relevant facts:
[The parties] were previously married and shared legal ownership
of the property located at 736 Greymont St., Philadelphia (the
Property). The parties filed for divorce in Potter County,
Pennsylvania, and entered into a contemporaneous property
settlement agreement [(PSA) on April 23, 2023. A]fter the
divorce was finalized [on September 15, 2023, Appellant] filed this
action seeking to partition the Property [on July 8, 2025].
Trial Ct. Op., 12/17/25, at 1-2, 4 (some formatting altered).
In seeking partition, Appellant alleged that the parties had “acquired
ownership interest in the . . . Property during their prior relationship,” that “no
legal action has removed [Appellant]’s name from the deed,” and that J-A14036-26
Appellee “has failed to refinance, buy out, or sell the Property despite repeated
requests.” Appellant’s Pet., 7/8/25, at 1 (some formatting altered).
Appellee filed preliminary objections, wherein he brought the parties’
PSA to the trial court’s attention. See Appellee’s Prelim. Obj., 9/1/25; see
also id. at Ex. B. The PSA is a two-page document bearing the notarized
signatures of both parties. See Appellee’s Prelim. Obj., 9/1/25, Ex. B. The
PSA sets forth a division of then-jointly-owned property between the parties,
namely three automobiles and the Property, and states, inter alia, that
Appellee “shall have the sole and exclusive right, title and interest in and to
the [Property], free and clear of any claim of [Appellant].” See id. at 1. The
PSA provides that each party would be “solely responsible for any debts or
liabilities associated with the property they have received pursuant to this
agreement.” Id. (some formatting altered). Lastly, the PSA states that it
“shall be binding upon . . . the parties.” Id. at 2. Appellee alleged in his
preliminary objections that Appellant had “relinquished all ownership rights
and interests in the [P]roperty” in the PSA and, therefore, “lacks standing to
maintain an action in partition.” Appellee’s Prelim. Obj., 9/1/25, at 2-3
(unpaginated).
Appellant responded by stating, in relevant part, that the PSA “is not
binding on title to the Property because the agreement was not incorporated
into the divorce decree or other court order.” Trial Ct. Op., 12/17/25, at 1-2,
4 (some formatting altered); see also Appellant’s Ans., 9/7/25. On
September 26, 2026, the trial court sustained the preliminary objections and
-2-J-A14036-26
dismissed the partition action with prejudice. Trial Ct. Op., 12/17/25, at 2.
Appellant did not seek to amend her pleadings; rather, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following claims, which we have
reordered:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining
preliminary objections and dismissing the complaint with
prejudice where genuine issues of material fact exist[]
regarding the PSA’s enforceability and Appellee’s performance?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing
Appellant’s complaint with prejudice and denying leave to
amend under Pennsylvania’s liberal amendment policy?
3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by concluding
that Appellant lacked standing to bring a partition action under
Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1553, where Appellant remained a record title
holder at the time the action was filed?
4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by treating the
[PSA] as a self-executing conveyance that divested Appellant
of her ownership interest, in violation of the Statute of Frauds,
33 P.S. § 1?
Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (some formatting altered).
Prior to reviewing Appellant’s claims, we first address whether they are
preserved for appeal as “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). An appellant
also waives her issues on appeal where she fails “to develop cognizable
arguments with discussion and citation to relevant authority.” Saber v. Navy
Fed. Credit Union, 350 A.3d 965, 970 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citations omitted);
-3-J-A14036-26
see also Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (Pa. 2014) (holding
that appellate courts may sua sponte find waiver for failure to adhere to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) regarding the argument section of their brief on appeal);
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring the argument section of an appellate brief to
contain discussion and citation to pertinent authority).
Here, addressing Appellant’s first two claims, the record reflects that
Appellant did not aver that any factual disputes remained outstanding, in
either her petition or her answer to preliminary objections, nor at any time
prior to filing her notice of appeal. See generally, Appellant’s Pet., 7/8/25;
Appellant’s Ans., 9/7/25. Appellant also did not seek to amend her pleadings
prior to seeking appeal. Accordingly, because Appellant did not raise these
issues before the trial court, she has failed to preserve them for appeal and
they are, therefore, waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).1
In her remaining claims, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
concluding the PSA was an enforceable contract which had conveyed her
interest in the Property to Appellee. See Appellant’s Brief at 11-12, 14, 16,
18. Noting that she was still a record owner of the Property when she filed
for partition, Appellant claims that she “remained a legal co-owner of the
Property” because the parties’ divorce decree did not incorporate or merge ____________________________________________
1 We note that Appellant has raised other issues on appeal (such as “duress,
undue influence,” and “lack of informed consent”), contending that “the trial court did not address these allegations substantively.” See Appellant’s Brief at 21. The record reflects that Appellant failed to present these issues to the trial court and, accordingly, failed to preserve them and they are, therefore, waived on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
-4-J-A14036-26
the PSA and, further, the parties had not executed a deed removing her as an
owner of the Property. Id. at 12, 14 (citing Brown v. Hall, 435 A.2d 859
(Pa. 1985)). Appellant argues that the Statute of Frauds, 22 P.S. § 1, requires
“a written instrument, such as a deed, to transfer an interest in land” and that
the instrument must “be recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds to
effectuate a transfer of legal title.” Id. at 12. Appellant also contends that
21 P.S. § 351 requires instruments conveying interests in land to be recorded.
See Appellant’s Reply Brief, 3/11/26, at 6.
Appellant additionally argues that the PSA was not enforceable because
it was an “unadjudicated” or “executory contract – a promise to perform in
the future [and, therefore,] not a conveyance” of the Property. Appellant’s
Brief at 12. Appellant contends that the PSA lacked “definite terms and mutual
performance” and “cannot be enforced to defeat statutory rights” or “as a
shield against legal claims.” Id. at 18. Appellant claims that Appellee had
“materially breached” the terms of the PSA by failing to “refinance the
mortgage.” Id. at 14. Ultimately, Appellant argues that dismissal with
prejudice was an “inequitable” outcome that left her “financially responsible
for a mortgage she could not control and a property she could not possess.”
Id. at 16.2
2 The PSA states that each party “shall be solely responsible for any debts or
liabilities associated with the property they have received pursuant to this agreement.” Appellee’s Prelim. Obj., 9/1/25, Ex. B (some formatting altered).
-5-J-A14036-26
Here, Appellant did contend below that, because the PSA “was never
incorporated into a court order, nor approved by the court,” it had “no binding
effect on title to the [P]roperty” and, consequently, she had standing to bring
the partition action. Appellant’s Ans., 9/7/25. The record does not reflect,
however, that the trial court had an opportunity to consider the arguments or
purported authority that Appellant now presents to this Court on appeal. For
example, Appellant never cited Brown, 22 P.S. § 1, or 21 P.S. § 351 to the
trial court, nor did she challenge the validity of the PSA itself below; rather,
her argument below was solely that the PSA could not affect title to the
Property, without reference to any authority. Accordingly, Appellant has not
preserved these issues for appellate review and they are, therefore, also
waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Even if not disposed of pursuant to Rule 302(a) waiver, Appellant has
failed to reference authority that supports her claims. The Brown opinion
does not support Appellant’s claim that the PSA could not convey a land
interest because it was not merged into the divorce decree. See Appellant’s
Brief at 14; see also Brown, 435 A.2d at 861-62 (holding that, where a
property settlement agreement has not been merged into a divorce decree,
the parties continue to be liable to each other under the terms of the
agreement and a court other than the one that issued the divorce decree may
hear disputes about those terms).
In the same vein, while it is true that the Statute of Frauds generally
requires ownership interests in land to be conveyed in a written instrument,
-6-J-A14036-26
i.e., a writing signed by the party with an ownership interest, Appellant’s next
contention, that such an instrument must also “be recorded in the office of
the Recorder of Deeds to effectuate a transfer of legal title,” is not contained
in the statute. Appellant’s Brief at 12;3 see also 33 P.S. § 1. Likewise,
Section 351 of Title 21 does not operate to invalidate a land conveyance if the
conveyance is not recorded, as Appellant asserts. See MERSCORP, Inc. v.
Delaware Cty., 207 A.3d 855, 868-70 (Pa. 2019) (holding that 21 P.S. § 351
“does not impose a mandatory duty to record” conveyances of interests in
land; rather, “the process of recording a conveyance . . . is essentially a
service purchasers and mortgage holders have a right to accept or decline”
(citation omitted)).
Moreover, in addition to Appellant’s misstatements and/or
misrepresentations of authority, Appellant’s reply brief contains citations that
have no connection to their captions. See Appellant’s Reply Brief, 3/11/26,
3 Even if Appellant’s claims were not waived, her reliance on the Statute of Frauds, considering only the contention supported by the language of the statute, is misplaced. As noted earlier, the PSA is a written instrument, executed with the notarized signatures of Appellant and Appellee. See Appellee’s Prelim. Obj., 9/1/25, Ex. B. The PSA accordingly meets the conditions set forth in the Statute of Frauds for an effective conveyance of an interest in land. See 33 P.S. § 1. This statute therefore reinforces Appellee’s contention, as well as the trial court’s conclusion, that the PSA effectuated a transfer of Appellant’s interest in the Property to Appellee. See id. Likewise, Section 351 of Title 21 does not support Appellant’s contention that a written instrument conveying an interest in land must be recorded to be effective. See MERSCORP, Inc., 207 A.3d at 868-70. Appellant’s claims would therefore also fail on the merits.
-7-J-A14036-26
at 5, 7. Specifically, Appellant cites to “General Fin. Co. v. Archetto, 167
A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. 1961)” and “Lowrey v. Eastaff, 860 A.2d 533 (Pa.
Super. 2004).” See id. (some formatting altered). These citations are so
nonsensical and disconnected from Appellant’s claims that we conclude that
they are hallucinated citations.4
To the extent that Appellant has employed generative artificial
intelligence (“generative AI” or “GAI”) tools to draft her brief, as indicated by
her repeated misrepresentations of the meaning of valid statutes and
precedential opinions as well as her reliance on hallucinated authority, we note
that
the use of GAI to draft legal filings (including by pro se litigants),
without verification of the accuracy of the content so produced,
may lead to misstatements and/or misrepresentations of legal
authority. . . [and,] if further disseminated, would undermine the
sense of accuracy and reliability of the law they purport to
reference.
See Saber, 350 A.3d at 969 n.4.
4 We note that the Atlantic Reporter citation “167 A.2d 306” leads to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion, Slott v. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 167 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1961), not to a Pennsylvania Superior Court opinion captioned “General Fin. Co. v. Archetto” as Appellant states. The closest approximation to “General Fin. Co. v. Archetto” is an opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, not any opinion of this Commonwealth. See General Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 176 A.2d 73 (R.I. 1961). The Atlantic Reporter citation “860 A.2d 533” leads to Commonwealth v. duPont, 860 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super. 2004), and not, as Appellant states, to “Lowrey v. Eastaff.” In fact, “Lowrey v. Eastaff” appears to be an entirely fabricated caption, coupled with a hallucinated citation.
-8-J-A14036-26
After our review of Appellant’s filings on appeal, we find that Appellant
has not referenced any relevant authority to support her arguments. Further,
Appellant has misrepresented and/or misstated authority and fabricated
authority. Accordingly, Appellant has also waived her claims by failing to cite
to pertinent authority in her appellate brief. See Saber, 350 A.3d at 970;
Wirth, 95 A.3d at 837; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 8/19/2026
-9-