IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1080
Filed August 19, 2026
City of What Cheer, Iowa,
Petitioner–Appellee,
v.
Jamie Sue Molyneux,
Respondent–Appellant,
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Keokuk County,
The Honorable Myron Gookin, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Patrick C. Streit of Moore, McKibben, Goodman & Lorenz, LLP,
Marshalltown, attorney for appellant.
Nicole C. Bryant of Heslinga Law Firm, Oskaloosa, attorney for appellee.
Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.
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BADDING, Judge.
Jamie Molyneux appeals a district court ruling that found a property owned by her estranged husband, Zachary Molyneux, was abandoned under Iowa Code section 657A.10B (2024) and awarded title to the City of What Cheer. She claims the property was not abandoned because Zachary lived there in the six months before the City’s petition was filed. We agree on our de novo review of the record and reverse the district court’s ruling.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This case concerns a dilapidated house and partially constructed pole building at 501 West Section Street in the small town of What Cheer. The property is owned by Zachary Molyneux. He lived there with his wife, Jamie, and their children for about ten years.
In the fall of 2022, a neighbor complained to the county sanitarian, Eric Dursky, that the property’s septic system was discharging raw sewage into a nearby ditch. The neighbor also reported that the property was “in ill repair,” with “a lot of trash” and “overgrown” vegetation. Dursky looked at the property and saw that it was only serviced by an old tank installed “probably back in the ʻ30s or ʻ40s” that was “illegal even back then” because there was no secondary treatment system. See generally Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-69.3.
Because the property was within the city limits of What Cheer, Dursky initially referred the issue to the City and suggested connecting the property to its sewer system. That option, however, would have cost the City around $100,000. So Dursky agreed to work with Zachary on designing a new septic system that would accommodate the house on the property as well as a new pole building the Molyneuxes started to construct in November 2022.
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At Dursky’s recommendation, Zachary obtained a survey of the property in September 2023 to help determine where the septic system should be located. Zachary also contacted a friend to help him install the system. Dursky went to the property and mapped out where the system needed to go. But because “the weeds were 4 or 5 feet tall,” he told Zachary that he needed to mow “so that we can figure out elevations first.” Dursky testified that Zachary cleared some weeds and had a tank and material delivered to the property. But when Dursky went to inspect the progress, he discovered the tank had been set in the wrong spot. He also noticed the old septic system lid “was letting boiled raw sewage out on the surface of the ground.”
While Dursky was working with Zachary on the septic system, the city clerk continued to receive complaints from neighbors that the yard was “full of junk” and weeds. She said that garbage was left in the yard, “and animals would get into it, and it would blow everywhere.” The City had asked the Molyneux family to clean up the property over the years, but the city clerk said that it would only “partially get done.” Jamie blamed much of the mess on the construction of the new building, which was never finished. Zachary and Jamie also failed to pay their water bills, so the City permanently shut off their water service. And because of the ongoing sewage issues, which were never fixed, the City petitioned for a permanent injunction to prohibit Zachary and Jamie from using the property as a residence until a properly working septic system was installed. The City obtained a default judgment against the couple in January 2024, and its request for a permanent injunction was granted the next month.
Around the time the default judgment was entered, Jamie moved out of the home with some of her children. Jamie testified that Zachary stayed
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behind with three of their older children, although she said that he was also staying with a girlfriend in Minnesota “for a while” and “[w]as back and forth” until May or June of 2024.
The City petitioned for title of the property on July 31, 2024, alleging that it was abandoned under Iowa Code section 657A.10B(2)(a). Although Zachary and other potential interest holders were named as respondents, only Jamie answered the petition. Default judgment was entered against the other respondents, and the case proceeded to trial against Jamie in May 2025. The district court granted the City’s petition the next month.
Jamie appeals this ruling, claiming that the property “was not abandoned for at least six months before the filing of the City’s petition” and that “the city failed to present sufficient evidence that the property was abandoned under the factors” in section 657A.10B(4).
II. Standard of Review
Because actions to obtain title to abandoned property are heard in equity, our review is de novo. Iowa Code § 657A.10B(2)(b); City of Waterloo v. Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d 245, 257 (Iowa 2008).
III. Analysis
Under Iowa Code section 657A.10B(2)(a), a city “in which a building that has been abandoned for at least six consecutive months is located may petition the court to enter judgment awarding title to the abandoned property to the city.” A building is “abandoned” if it “is vacant, or is occupied only by trespassers, and in violation of the housing code or building code of the city in which the property is located.” Iowa Code § 657A.1(1). In determining
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whether a building has been abandoned, the court must also consider thirteen factors listed in Iowa Code section 657A.10B(4).
Jamie first focuses on the definition of “abandoned” in
section 657A.1(1) and argues that the evidence failed to show that the property was vacant or occupied only by trespassers for six consecutive months before the City’s petition was filed. Although the district court found that there was “no credible evidence of the exact, or even approximate, date” that Zachary and Jamie last resided at the property, it concluded “that considering all the evidence together, it is more accurate to conclude that both [Zachary and Jamie] . . . vacated the premises more than six months before this action was filed.” We cannot reach the same conclusion on our de novo review of the record.
Jamie testified that Zachary was living at the property—at least parttime—until May or June 2024. The mayor of What Cheer agreed, testifying that Zachary was residing at the property until May. The district court focused on testimony from the city clerk that the Molyneux family had not lived at the property for “[t]wo years probably.” But the clerk’s testimony was unclear. On cross-examination, she testified that she was “not really for sure” if Zachary was living at the property in the six months before the petition was filed. And she agreed that in a deposition, she testified the Molyneux family was residing there in that time period. The city clerk also testified that she was “not an inspector” and did not drive by the property herself. This equivocal testimony did not establish that the property was vacant six months before the petition was filed.
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Still, the district court found that even if Zachary was residing at the property until May or June, as Jamie testified, he was a trespasser. The court reasoned:
[A] default order was filed on January 17, 2024, finding Zach and Jamie
(and others) in default on the City’s request for a permanent injunction.
Despite this default order, hearing was set on entering an injunctive order
for February 9, 2024. Effectively, Zach and Jamie were found in default on
the issue of a permanent injunction on January 17, 2024, and all rights they
had to resist such an injunction were extinguished at that point. No one
appeared for the hearing on February 9, 2024, except the City, and a
permanent injunction was issued on that date against both Zach and Jamie
(and others) from occupying the subject property as a residence. Under
such circumstances, the court concludes Jamie and Zach were effectively
determined to be trespassers on January 17, 2024, and the subject property
was abandoned for six months prior to the initiation of the action.
Jamie argues that because injunctions only function prospectively, the relevant date is when the injunction was entered. See Bear v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 540 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Iowa 1995) (“A permanent injunction is issued primarily to prevent future acts of harm . . . .”). She is correct. “[F]or an injunction to be in effect, it must be granted.” Christ Vision, Inc. v. City of Keokuk, No. 21-0908, 2023 WL 387070, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1501 (“An injunction may be granted as part of the judgment; or may be granted by order at any prior stage of the proceedings, and is then known as a temporary injunction.”). The order on January 17, 2024, encompassed only the entry of default and set a hearing for February 9 “for the purposes of entering an order for an injunction as requested in the petition.” See 12 Barry A. Lindahl, Iowa Practice Series: Civil & Appellate Procedure § 41:42 (2026 ed.) (“Entry of the default does not itself constitute a judgment.”). Because the injunction was not entered until February 9, which was less than six months before the abandonment petition was filed,
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the court erred in finding that Zachary and Jamie “were effectively determined to be trespassers on January 17, 2024.”
Given our conclusion that the City failed to prove the property was vacant for six consecutive months before the petition was filed, we need not reach Jamie’s alternative argument that the court erred in finding the property was abandoned under the factors in section 657A.10B(4). For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand for entry of an order dismissing the petition and returning title to Zachary Molyneux.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
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