IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1344
Filed August 19, 2026
In re the Marriage of Amanda Lynn Feeler and Travis Michael Feeler
Upon the Petition of
Amanda Lynn Feeler,
Petitioner–Appellant,
And Concerning
Travis Michael Feeler,
Respondent–Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County,
The Honorable Elizabeth O’Donnell, Judge.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Amanda Feeler, Delmar, self-represented appellant.
Caren Carter of Caren Carter Law, Davenport, attorney for appellee.
Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.
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TABOR, Chief Judge.
Flipping houses was an extra source of income for Amanda and Travis Feeler during their marriage.1 When calculating Travis’s support payments in their dissolution proceedings, the district court referenced that houseflipping business and imputed an annual income of $62,400 to Amanda. She now challenges that calculation, as well as other economic aspects of the decree. Because the imputation of income was reasonable, we decline to upend the court’s calculation. Nor do we disturb the court’s division of the marital estate or its order that Amanda repay money she withdrew from their children’s bank accounts. But we do modify the decree to change the duration of the spousal support, given the parties’ traditional roles during their longterm marriage.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Amanda and Travis married in 2002. They have eight children. At the time of the dissolution, six of their children were under eighteen, including their youngest, five-year-old E.F., who requires therapy for developmental delays. 2 Amanda was the children’s primary caregiver. In fact, she homeschooled their children after they completed the sixth grade. 3 The
To “flip” a house means, rather than moving in, the buyer “intended to update
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and then resell the house for a profit.” Robeoltman v. Hartkopp, No. 23-1513, 2024 WL 2316658, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024).
The other five children still at home were ages fifteen, fourteen, thirteen, eleven,
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and seven at the time of the dissolution trial.
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Amanda said the children are “unschooled.” She testified: “[U]nschooled is where you teach your children life skills. So they go in and flip houses with us. They learn with gardening. They learn with animals. We build buildings on our property. So they’re learning different life skills.”
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family lived in a large house on an acreage,4 where Amanda and the children gardened and raised chickens, turkeys, quail, and hogs.
Meanwhile, Travis was the primary breadwinner, earning about
$133,666 per year in his job. His work for an elevator company required a good deal of travel, sometimes requiring weeks away from the family.
Amanda petitioned for divorce in 2024. The district court held a trial in May 2025. In the July 2025 decree, the court granted the parties joint legal custody and placed physical care of the children with Amanda.5 The court ordered Travis to pay $2,133.73 per month in child support.6
In the property distribution, the court awarded Travis his elevator constructors’ annuity and divided his pension between the parties in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The court valued the family home at $700,000 and awarded it to Amanda, but required her to refinance and pay Travis half of the equity in the house. If she was unable to refinance, the decree required the house be sold. The decree also divided the personal property—including vehicles, tools, and machinery—between the parties.7 Finally, the court ordered Amanda to repay the $46,000 she took from her children’s savings accounts.
4
The Feelers built their house in 2014. An appraisal prepared for Amanda set the house’s value at $655,000, while Travis’s appraiser reported a value of $840,000.
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Travis requested joint physical care at trial. But he does not appeal.
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The decree provided for stepped-down support amounts as each child reached the age of 18.
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The court awarded the parties’ 2023 GMC Denali to Amanda. She references that vehicle in her argument concerning money taken from the children’s savings accounts.
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As for spousal support, Amanda requested $1,500 per month. The
court found that an award of transitional alimony was warranted and ordered Travis to pay $1,000 per month to Amanda for three years.
Amanda appeals. 8 Without counsel, she contests the economic
provisions of the decree.
II. Scope and Standards of Review
Dissolution proceedings are tried in equity, so the standard of review is de novo. In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). We examine the entire record and decide anew the legal and factual issues properly presented and preserved for our review. In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). On spousal support, we intervene only where there is a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 416 (Iowa 2015).
III. Analysis
A. Child support
In her first issue, Amanda complains that the decree “listed the
parties’ incomes under the wrong names, attributed speculative houseflipping income solely to [her], counted only five minor children, and ignored [Travis’] recurring per diem.” In her view, these alleged errors “infected” both the child support and spousal support determinations.9
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While this matter was pending, Amanda filed a motion to expedite the appeal, alleging facts outside the record. The supreme court ordered that her motion be submitted for consideration with the appeal. We deny the motion.
As Travis notes in his brief, the district court issued an order nunc pro tunc
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correcting scrivener’s errors in the original decree.
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We start with the question of imputed income. In calculating child
support, the district court must determine the parents’ incomes from the most reliable evidence presented. In re Marriage of Powell, 474 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). “This often requires the court to carefully consider all of the circumstances relating to the parent’s income.” Id. The focus is on income that is “reasonably expected,” rather than “uncertain or speculative.” Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Iowa 2005).10
Admittedly, the district court struggled to find reliable evidence of Amanda’s income. The decree noted:
It was very difficult for the Court to determine Amanda’s income based on
the evidence presented. Amanda owns a business flipping homes. She is
experienced in construction and other aspects of that business. If she were
to work for someone else in the same type of business the Court finds it
reasonable that she would earn approximately $30.00 per hour working
full-time. The Court therefore imputes income to Amanda at $62,400.
On appeal, Amanda objects to the district court attributing the extra income solely to her. She asserts that the parties “engaged in house-flipping as a joint marital enterprise.” Indeed, the record supports her assertion. When asked whose idea it was to start flipping houses, Travis testified: “[A] combination of both of us.” But the joint nature of the enterprise does not undermine the district court’s analysis. The court disbelieved Amanda’s claim that she had no income and appropriately assigned her an annual
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Generally, the district court must use a parent’s actual income rather than imputing income, unless provided for by rule. Iowa Ct. R. 9.5(1)(d). Rule 9.11, as relevant here, permits a court to impute income when failing to do so “would be unjust or inappropriate” because (1) “substantial injustice would result to the payor, payee, or child(ren)”; (2) “[a]djustments are necessary to provide for the needs of the child(ren) or to do justice between the parties, payor, or payee under the special circumstances of the case”; or (3) “a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause.” Iowa Ct. R. 9.11(1)–(3).
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income of $62,400 based on past proceeds from flipping houses. The court properly gleaned from the record that Amanda had the skills to earn $30 per hour in construction or a related industry. Amanda acknowledges that “near the end of the marriage, [she] purchased her first flip property in her own name.” Deferring to its credibility determinations, we find no error in the court’s imputing of income to Amanda.
Amanda also complains that the district court overlooked Travis’s
“recurring per diem” payments from his company. She testified at trial that on top of his overall pay for the year, Travis received a “hefty per diem” which she estimated at $2,000 to $4,000 per month. As Travis explains on appeal, a per diem is “a monetary daily allowance” that allows a worker “to cover expenses” on a business trip. See Per Diem, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (noting per diem is Latin for “by the day”). Given that definition, we do not consider Travis’s per diem payments as income without evidence that the payments exceeded his expenses. See State ex rel. I.G. v. Rodriguez, No. 24-0638, 2025 WL 857251, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2025) (“Per diem is different from the typical non-salaried benefits we would include in an income calculation—the fact that it was not taxed indicates the employer’s intention that it be used for work expenses.”). Thus, we affirm the district court’s child support calculations.
One more point on child support. After countering Amanda’s
objection to imputing her income, Travis claims that the court should have based his income on a three-year average. He suggests: “Because the appellate court conducts a de novo review, it is appropriate for the appellate court to modify the decree to correct Travis’ gross income and re-calculate his child support and medical support obligations to conform with the most reliable evidence in the record.” Trouble is, Travis did not cross-appeal. That
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failure “precludes examination of this question upon appeal. Review is de novo as [Travis] states but it is such only on matters properly presented to this court.” See In re Marriage of Novak, 220 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Iowa 1974).
B. Spousal support
We next turn to Amanda’s challenge to the spousal support order. She contends that traditional, rather than transitional, alimony was warranted. We agree.
Based on the parties’ respective incomes, including the income
imputed to Amanda, the district court set a reasonable amount of $1,000 per month in spousal support. But we disagree with the duration of the award. After reviewing the four categories of spousal support (rehabilitative, reimbursement, traditional, and transitional), the district court settled on a transitional alimony award of three years to allow Amanda to bridge the gap to “single life.” See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 545 (Iowa 2022). The court reasoned:
Applying the factors of § 598.21A, this is a 23-year marriage. Amanda is
being awarded primary physical care for six minor children. While Amanda
is employed and does earn income, she does not earn a steady weekly or
bi-weekly wage like many “traditional” jobs. Amanda is used to relying on
Travis’s steady paycheck to support her and her children’s lives. Amanda
will need time to adjust to a life without a steady paycheck.
We see three flaws in that reasoning. First, while the aftermath of longterm marriages doesn’t always prompt permanent alimony, “[g]enerally speaking, marriages lasting twenty or more years commonly cross the durational threshold and merit serious consideration for traditional spousal support.” Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 410–11.
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Second, the case for traditional spousal support is compelling when— as with the Feelers’ marriage—life patterns have been set and one of the spouses has stayed home to care for the children. See id. at 410. Despite Amanda’s active participation in the house-flipping business, the fiscal health of this marriage rested on Travis’s regular paycheck. With six children still at home, including a young child who requires therapy for developmental delays, it is unlikely that Amanda—in just three years—will be able to support herself at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. See id. at 411 (citing Iowa Code section 598.21A(1)(f ) (2011)).
Third, that three-year period surpasses what is expected from
transitional spousal support. “Because transitional spousal support is focused on solving a short-term liquidity issue, a transitional spousal support award generally should not exceed one year in duration.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Iowa 2023).
Because the record establishes Amanda’s need for long-term support, we modify the decree to extend the duration of Travis’s obligation. We order Travis to pay traditional spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month until he retires or dies or Amanda remarries, cohabits with a new partner, or dies—whichever event occurs first.
C. Repayment of Withdrawals from Children’s Savings Accounts
Having addressed the issues of child and spousal support, we turn to the question of Amanda repaying $46,000 withdrawn from their children’s savings accounts. She argues the court’s directive “failed to account for [Travis’s] liquidation of joint funds and [her] use of those monies for the children’s immediate needs” and to make payments on the GMC Denali
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owned by the parties. As for the source of the children’s funds, Amanda testified that “over the years when we had flipped houses, the kids got paid because they helped with the business, and that money would always go into an account.” She claimed to be “the custodial account holder” for the children’s savings accounts. But she acknowledged that the children’s accounts were not marital property. See generally In re Marriage of Boomgarden, No. 08-2011, 2009 WL 2424348, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009) (upholding district court determination that one parent should have custodial supervision of the children’s savings bonds and bank accounts but not treating those assets as marital property).
Travis defends the district court’s order for Amanda to restore the money, arguing that “dissipation of and borrowing from the financial accounts of the minor children to maintain other marital property could conceivably be considered as part of the divisible marital ‘property’ subject to disposition by the trial court.” He also points out that Amanda admitted withdrawing the funds and “did not disclose the existence of the $46,000 in cash to the court in her filed affidavits of financial status.” What’s more, Amanda testified that whoever was awarded the paid-off Denali “needs to figure out how to put the money back in [the children’s accounts] or they need to sell the truck.”
We agree with Travis on this point. The court correctly ordered
Amanda to repay the $46,000 that she admitted taking from the children’s savings accounts.
D. Division of Marital Property
In her final assignment of error, Amanda alleges that the property
division was inequitable. In one sentence, she argues that the division favored
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Travis and left her with “fewer liquid and income-producing assets.” But as Travis notes in reply, “Amanda does not offer any argument as to what specific additional property she should have been awarded, just that what she was given was not nearly enough.”
“We conclude this issue has not been properly presented for our
review and consideration.” See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (declining to speculate on what arguments the party might have made and then “comb the record for facts to support such arguments”).
E. Appellate Attorney Fees
In his appellee’s brief, Travis contends that he is entitled to appellate attorney fees “as the prevailing party” and because Amanda failed to comply with the appellate rules.
We have discretion whether to award appellate attorney fees. In re
Marriage of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). In exercising that discretion, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal. Id. Weighing those factors here, we decline Travis’s request for appellate fees.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
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