IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1269
Filed August 19, 2026
In re the Marriage of Rose A. Ames and James D. Hartman
Upon the Petition of
Rose A. Ames,
Petitioner–Appellant,
And Concerning
James D. Hartman,
Respondent–Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Van Buren County,
The Honorable Shane M. Wiley, Judge.
AFFIRMED
Carly M. Schomaker of Gaumer, Emanuel & Goldsmith, P.C., Ottumwa,
attorney for appellant.
Heather M. Simplot of Harrison, Moreland, Webber, Simplot & Sieren,
P.C., Ottumwa, attorney for appellee.
Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.
1
AHLERS, Judge.
Rose Ames petitioned the court to modify the physical-care provisions relating to the two children she shares with her ex-husband, James Hartman. She claims his new job represents a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of their joint-physical-care arrangement to give her physical care. The mother also requested trial attorney fees. The district court denied the petition. The mother appeals. Both parties request appellate attorney fees.
I. Procedural Background
The parties married in 2013 and divorced in 2016. Several
modification actions followed, which ultimately resulted in the parties having joint legal custody and joint physical care of their children. The mother initiated the current proceeding seeking to modify the physical-care arrangement to grant her physical care of the children. The father resisted, and the case went to trial. At the time of trial, the older child was thirteen and the younger was seven.
The court found a change in circumstances but declined to modify the physical-care provisions of the operative order because doing so was not in the children’s best interests. It also denied the mother’s request for trial attorney fees. The mother appeals, raising the aforementioned issues.
II. Standard of Review
Petitions to modify physical care are in equity, so our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 2016). We are not bound by the district court’s fact finding but we give them weight, particularly those concerning the credibility of witnesses. Id. We review claims for trial
2
attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326, 337 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).
III. Physical Care
The party seeking modification “faces a heavy burden, because once custody of a child has been fixed, ʻit should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.’” Harris, 877 N.W.2d at 440 (quoting In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983)). To meet that burden, the party must (1) prove by preponderance of the evidence that a substantial change in circumstances occurred after entry of the order the party seeks to modify; and (2) prove the party’s superior ability to minister to the needs of the children. Id. The change must affect the welfare of the children, must not have been contemplated by the court when it entered the prior order, and must be more or less permanent. Id. The controlling consideration is the best interests of the children. In re Marriage of Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 235– 36 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
As to the mother’s burden to prove a substantial change in
circumstances, the mother points to the father’s new job schedule that requires him to be gone for long periods at a moment’s notice and his inability to access a phone to communicate while working. For the same reasons, she also argues she has a superior ability to minister to the needs of the children.
Following our de novo review, we agree with the district court that the father’s change in work schedule was not contemplated by the court that issued the initial decree and conclude the change is permanent. So, the mother has met her burden of establishing a substantial change of circumstances.
3
But the mother must also show the change affected the children’s
welfare and that she has superior ability to minister to their needs. She argues the instability of the father’s new work schedule is not in their best interests because it hinders their relationship with him and requires his significant other to provide much of their care. She also claims her consistent work schedule and attendance at medical appointments show her superior ability to minister to the children’s needs.
We conclude the mother failed to carry her heavy burden. The father had been at his new job for almost three years at the time of trial, and the mother points to no adverse consequences to the children resulting from his new schedule. In fact, the children seem to be improving. The older child’s grades have improved, and counseling has helped improve her mental health. The younger child’s speech and other developmental issues have also improved.
The mother’s major concern seems to be that the father is delegating his parental duties to his long-term significant other. While the best scenario is generally to have the biological parent provide the care during that parent’s scheduled time, the demands of jobs and other responsibilities needed to maintain a household do not lend themselves to a one-size-fits-all model to follow. What works for one family may not work for another. And the circumstances of this case show that the father has made his unpredictable job schedule work for this family, in part by enlisting the help of a long-term significant other who has demonstrated an ability to effectively provide that help. We decline to fault the father for enlisting the help of a capable thirdparty to help him fulfill his parenting responsibilities under the circumstances here, just as we have done in other cases when the
circumstances warrant it. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olson, No. 17-1807, 2018
4
WL 4628137, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018) (declining to modify a joint-physical-care order based on the stepmother providing care for the child when the father worked); In re Marriage of Peterson, No. 09-1557, 2010 WL 1875761, at *4–6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2010) (finding joint physical care appropriate despite the father’s mother providing care for the child when the father was working); In re Marriage of Koedam, No. 03-0084, 2004 WL 242908, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004) (finding no change of
circumstances based on the father shifting some care functions to the children’s stepmother while he worked).
As to the circumstances that cause us to reach the conclusion that delegation of some parenting duties to the father’s significant other does not warrant modification, we note that the father still attends to the children’s needs. He has scheduled doctor’s appointments for both children to address various medical issues. For the older child, he secured a referral for counseling, made her attend tutoring sessions after school, and works with her on her schoolwork. For the younger child, he initiated speech therapy and got a referral to a facility he thought was better able to address the child’s other developmental issues. Additionally, the father’s significant other is an adequate caregiver who has been present in the children’s lives since before the order the mother now seeks to modify, and no evidence suggests that she won’t continue to be a stable presence in the father’s and children’s lives. As a substitute teacher, she has flexible work hours allowing her to ensure the children make it to appointments, and the mother has even hired her to babysit in the past. Given these circumstances, we find no basis to modify the joint-physical-care arrangement based on the father’s delegation of some parenting duties to his long-term significant other.
The mother also claims the older child prefers to live with her. Even
5
assuming such a preference was established,1 we, like the district court, find she is happy, well cared for, and doing well in the current arrangement, so we give little weight to her preference. See In re Marriage of Mayfield, 577 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (giving little weight to a child’s preference in a modification action when that child was thriving in the current
arrangement).
The mother failed to carry her burden to show the father’s job change affected the welfare of the children and that she is better able to minister to the children’s needs. We find both parents provide adequate care and the children love both parents. Therefore, it is in the children’s best interests to maintain the joint-physical-care arrangement, and we affirm the district court’s decision to deny the mother’s request for modification.
IV. Attorney Fees
The mother also asks for trial attorney fees, and both parties ask for appellate attorney fees. Because the mother is not the prevailing party, we cannot award her trial attorney fees. See Iowa Code § 598.36 (2024) (“In a proceeding for the modification of an order or decree under this chapter the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party . . . .”). The same is true for her claim for appellate attorney fees, so we deny her claim for those fees as well. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Erlandson, 973 N.W.2d 601, 609
1
The only evidence of the older child’s alleged preference to live with her mother is the mother’s testimony and a text message the child sent to a church friend in which she complains about having to go to her father’s. We are not persuaded by the mother’s inherently self-serving testimony or an isolated text message of a teen complaining about a parent to a friend. And the child’s private conversation with the court shows she is happy and well cared for in both homes. All evidence considered, the mother failed to establish the alleged preference.
6
(Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (acknowledging that appellate attorney fees were available to a party “[b]ecause he prevailed” on appeal).
Because the father prevailed at trial and on appeal, we have discretion to grant his fee request. See Erlandson, 973 N.W.2d at 609. In exercising that discretion, we consider “the parties’ respective abilities to pay, whether the party resisting the modification was successful, and whether a party was obliged to defend the court’s decision on appeal.” Id. Here, the father was obliged to defend the district court’s decision, and he was successful in doing so. But given the income disparities between the parties, we find the mother has limited ability to pay and the father has significantly greater ability to meet his attorney-fee-payment obligation. As such, we deny each party’s claim for appellate attorney fees.
V. Conclusion
Having denied all claims on appeal, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
7