IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 26-0545
Filed August 19, 2026
In the Interest of A.M., A.M., A.M., A.M., A.M.,
A.P., and A.P., Minor Children,
A.M., Mother,
Appellant,
J.M., Father,
Appellant,
D.P., Father,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
The Honorable Erica Crisp, Judge.
AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS
Jeremy M. Evans of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for
appellant mother.
Sarah E. Dewein of Cunningham and Kelso, P.L.L.C., Urbandale,
attorney for appellant father J.M.
Lori M. Holm, Des Moines, attorney for appellant father D.P.
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Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.
Paul L. White of Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines,
attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.
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BULLER, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to seven children born in 2011, 2013, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2023, and 2024. The father to the youngest five children, J.M., separately appeals the termination of his parental rights. The father to the two oldest children, D.P., also separately appeals the termination of his parental rights and requests a six-month extension and guardianship in lieu of termination. All three parents argue termination is not in the best interests of the children. We affirm on all three appeals.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) most recently became involved with this family in October 2024 after HHS learned of unsanitary conditions that posed a health risk to the children in the mother and J.M.’s home. HHS was previously involved with the family in another county for similar concerns. HHS personnel noted—and documented— feces throughout the home, on the children’s beds, and on the children themselves. The home was also covered in large piles of garbage, food, waste, and other hazards. The mother and J.M. were charged with, and later pled guilty to, misdemeanor child endangerment.
The six older children were removed at that time. When the youngest child was born two months later, the child was immediately removed from the mother’s custody. The six older children were adjudicated children in need of assistance in December 2024, and the youngest in February 2025.
HHS and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) expressed concern about the mother and J.M.’s ability to maintain a healthy and non-hazardous home, and to care for the children’s health needs. HHS recommended all
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three parents complete mental-health evaluations (and follow any subsequent recommendations from the evaluations) and participate in parenting courses. HHS also recommended that D.P. complete a substance-abuse evaluation, which he eventually did, with no substance-abuse treatment recommendations or concerns.
The mother and J.M. attended mental health therapy. And all three parents completed or were participating in at least one parenting course. But none of the parents progressed past fully supervised visits; and the mother and J.M. struggled to keep track of and parent all seven children at once. Visits were reported to be chaotic, with the two oldest children often parenting the younger children. While the parents engaged in services, they were unable to implement significant changes in their lives. At the termination trial, the HHS case manager testified she believed one major barrier to reunification was the mother’s and J.M.’s lack of follow-through or participation in HHS recommended activities to improve budgeting, nutrition, and active parenting skills.
Since removal, the mother and J.M. moved into a new two-bedroom home and conditions inside the home have begun to deteriorate. Just weeks before the termination trial, the case manager visited the home and saw “a few layers of food items on the couch.” And “[t]here were a lot of things on the floor. There were piles of clothes. There w[ere] just piles of debris throughout both [bed]rooms, a number of pop bottles, and just stuff everywhere.” She considered the state of the home reminiscent of the unsanitary conditions that led to the initial HHS report and the opening of the case—despite a year of services provided by HHS and only the mother and J.M. occupying the home. The case manager had concerns about mother
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and J.M. failing to accept responsibility for the conditions leading to removal of the children.
D.P., the father of the oldest two children, had not been in touch with them for years before this case began. Since becoming involved with HHS, he has not been able to maintain steady housing or transportation. D.P. also resides more than a hundred miles away from the children, and his transportation issues and the children’s busy schedules led to him only attending “seven to ten” fully supervised visits after his reintroduction to the children. The case manager noted D.P. “object[ed] to providing” food for the children during visitations and usually didn’t pay for the children to be provided food. At one visit, one of the children used their own money to buy the children’s meals during a visit. The HHS case manager testified that placement with D.P. could not be considered because “[h]e has never presented [as] having a permanent living environment.”
Each child is in individual therapy; two children have been diagnosed with an adjustment disorder, and several have displayed concerning behaviors at times. At the time of removal, none of the children were up to date on their immunizations, and the children had never seen a dentist though several have an inherited medical disorder affecting their teeth. At the termination trial, the children were in three licensed pre-adoptive foster homes: the two youngest children were placed together, the three middle children were together, and the two oldest children were in the third home. All seven children have been stable, safe, and secure since entering their foster homes. The foster families have worked with HHS to address the children’s medical needs. All of the foster parents have collaborated to arrange sibling visits to maintain the bond among the children. The two
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oldest children want to remain in their foster home and graduate from the school they attend under that placement.
HHS, the county attorney, and the children’s GAL recommended termination of parental rights for all three parents. The juvenile court terminated parental rights for the mother under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(e), (f ) (as to the five older children), and (h) (as to the youngest two children) (2025). The fathers’ rights were terminated under the same grounds: D.P. as to the oldest two children under paragraphs (e) and (f ); J.M. as to the five younger children under paragraphs (e), (f ) (the middle three children), and (h) (the youngest two children). The mother and the two fathers separately appeal, and we review de novo. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016).
II. Statutory Grounds
All three parents challenge the statutory grounds for termination. When a juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights on multiple grounds, we need only find one statutory ground supported by clear and convincing evidence to affirm. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Because paragraphs (f ) and (h) differ only in the applicable age of the children and the amount of time the children have been removed from the parents’ physical custody—neither of which the mother disputes—we consider them together now. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ), (h).
On these grounds, the mother only disputes whether the children could be safely returned to her custody as of trial. She claims the State failed to show “proof of present inability,” instead of “predicted future shortcomings” that the mother’s home “could possibly become more dirty.” But when HHS visited her new home before the termination trial, the same unsanitary conditions that necessitated removal were reemerging, and it did
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not appear the home was set up in a way to allow seven children to return to the mother’s custody. And during supervised visits, she struggled to pay attention to and safely parent all the children, relying significantly on the older children to help with the younger children. These are the conditions that led to HHS’s involvement and child endangerment charges against the mother and J.M. On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court that the children could not be returned to the mother’s custody.
J.M. only challenges whether his five children could be safely returned to his custody as of the hearing. He argues he and the mother “worked diligently to ensure that they were engaged in services.” But the case manager testified that both J.M and the mother minimized their problems and lacked follow-through when it came to internalizing and consistently applying parenting skills and cleaning routines. J.M. did not demonstrate the ability to supervise and provide adequate care to his five children, manage their behaviors, and keep them safe from harm. The juvenile court found the new home “ha[d] already begun to deteriorate” into unsafe conditions, a significant concern given the five young and active children with limited abilities to self-protect. On our review we agree; children cannot be safely returned to a hazardous home environment. See In re R.H., No. 25-1486, 2026 WL 685853, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2026).
D.P. nominally challenges the termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), but he does not raise a substantive argument as to any element of any ground under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). We recognize there are some statements in the fact section of D.P.’s petition on appeal that could arguably go toward this issue, but listing off facts is not the same as presenting an argument. See L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 854 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Where a party has failed to present any substantive
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analysis or argument on an issue, the issue has been waived.”). And in any event, D.P.’s position at trial and on appeal functionally or literally concedes he cannot safely resume custody of the children, foreclosing a challenge under the elements. See In re E.W., No. 22-0604, 2022 WL 2824733, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022); In re M.L.H., No. 16-1216, 2016 WL 4803999, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 14, 2016). There is no basis for relief on this issue.
III. Best Interests
All three parents next challenge whether termination was in the children’s best interests. Section 232.116(2) requires us to “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” In conducting this analysis, we examine the children’s “long-range as well as immediate interests,” the children’s “integration into a pre-adoptive home,” and “look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (cleaned up).
The mother and J.M. both urge that termination is not in the best interests of the children because of the risk of sibling separation, the loss of the parent-child bond, and it “is not necessary to ensure the children’s safety.” See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (holding that the parent-child bond can be considered as part of the best-interests analysis). But the foster parents are committed to maintaining sibling contact between the placements, and the juvenile court ordered ongoing contact between all siblings as part of its termination orders. While we do not doubt the mother and J.M. and the children share a bond, the record shows they struggle to pay individual attention to each of the children
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or manage them as a group. And we agree with the juvenile court’s concerns about the deteriorating condition of the home and the mother and J.M.’s failure to take responsibility for the unsanitary conditions or internalize or apply the skills taught through HHS services. We also credit the HHS case manager and service provider’s testimony that they believed the children would not be safe if returned to the parents’ care.
On the other side of the ledger, the placement homes provide stable, safe, and nurturing environments. The children have been progressing in their emotional regulation, social skills, and academics since entering foster care. All of the children have attended dental appointments and are current with their immunizations. Several have ongoing medical needs, which are being addressed by their foster families. All available evidence suggests the children will continue to flourish in these homes and that remaining there is in the best interests of the children. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010) (finding that a child is best left with the foster parents when it is clear they will continue to successfully develop there).
D.P. also summarily challenges whether termination of his rights is in the best interests of the oldest children. He asserts that termination “is far more detrimental to the children than any danger perceived by not terminating.” But D.P. had only begun building any kind of relationship with the children, lacked permanent housing, and had not demonstrated the ability to meet the children’s physical, mental, or emotional needs. And D.P. never progressed beyond fully supervised visits with the children. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding that a parent’s failure to progress beyond fully supervised visits prevents a return to custody), abrogated on other grounds by, L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529. Both children have expressed a desire to stay with their placement and a desire to stay at their
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schools until they graduate. We find that termination is in the best interests of the children.
IV. Remaining Claims
D.P. asserts the court should have granted him a six-month extension under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b). But an extension is only available if “the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end” of the extension. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). D.P. failed to secure housing. D.P. admits that he is not ready to have the children in his care and that he is unsure when in the future he will be ready. On our review, we agree with the juvenile court that D.P. would not be able to provide a safe and stable home for the children within the six-month extension period.
D.P. also argues that the two oldest children should have been placed in a guardianship with their current placement in lieu of termination. Guardianship, however, “is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). We consider all the surrounding circumstances, including the age of the children, the length of removal, the relationship between the parent and the potential guardian, “and the availability of other viable permanency options.” See id. at 478. Here, the children are young teens, have been removed and in foster care for more than a year, and each have articulated a desire to stay with their current placement. The children’s current placement is with the same person D.P.—apparently unilaterally—volunteered as the potential guardian. Cf. In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (finding a guardianship appropriate when the mother and child had a close bond, the child wanted to maintain the relationship with the mother, and the mother and grandmother-guardian had “a close, mature, and healthy
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relationship that is free of conflict”). The children’s current placement offers stability and permanency unavailable under a temporary guardianship.
AFFIRMED ON ALL APPEALS.
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