IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0845
Filed August 19, 2026
State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Aaron Joseph Gilman,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County,
The Honorable John M. Wright, Judge.
AFFIRMED
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Chicchelly, J., and Telleen, S.J.
Opinion by Telleen, S.J.
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TELLEEN, Senior Judge.
Aaron Gilman recorded himself for over half an hour as he performed various sex acts on his visibly and audibly unconscious wife, including penetrating her with his penis and sexual devices, fondling her, and masturbating over her. Fort Madison police recovered this footage from an SD card after investigating an unrelated crime, and following a jury trial, Gilman was ultimately convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse (counts I and II) and two counts of invasion of privacy (counts III and IV). Gilman now appeals his convictions, arguing the State presented insufficient evidence that the victim “was physically helpless and did not consent to the sex acts and the filming.” Alternatively, he requests resentencing due to the district court’s consideration of an improper factor during sentencing. Because the State presented substantial evidence of Gilman’s guilt and the district court did not abuse its discretion during sentencing, we affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS
As described above, Fort Madison police obtained the footage of Gilman’s sex acts while investigating another crime. The SD card law enforcement obtained featured videos of Gilman committing various sex acts on his wife who, in two of those videos, clearly appears to be either unconscious or asleep at the time of the acts. Gilman’s wife has since passed away.
In both videos, the victim lies motionless on a bed. In one video his wife is completely unclothed except for a t-shirt, and in the other video she is wearing lingerie. In the first video, Gilman lubricates his wife’s genitals multiple times before penetrating her with his penis, all while her eyes are closed and she is audibly snoring. This video contains moments where Gilman zooms the camera into his wife’s face, which displays her continued
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snoring and closed eyes. It also contains extended periods of time in which Gilman silently watches pornography on a tablet. Gilman’s wife never moves during this video.
The second video, in which Gilman’s wife is wearing the lingerie, shows Gilman again lubricating his wife’s genitals before inserting various sexual devices, as well as his penis, into her vagina. This video again shows that Gilman’s wife’s eyes are closed. At one point, his wife’s legs move slightly, but she continues to audibly snore.
At trial, Gilman did not dispute that the videos depicted him and his wife and that he had engaged in the sex acts. He instead testified that he remembered taking the first video, that his wife had been awake during the video, and that the sex acts were consensual. He argued that he and his wife had simply been “role-playing,” with her pretending to sleep and snore for the entire twenty-three minutes of the video as part of the act. Gilman further explained that while he didn’t remember taking the second video, he later viewed it with his wife.
The jury convicted Gilman as charged, and he now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for errors of law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Iowa 2022). We do the same for appeals challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). But “[w]e will not reverse the [sentencing] decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” Id.
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DISCUSSION
When considering a sufficiency-of-evidence challenge, “we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict binds this court if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202. We define substantial evidence as “evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In making that determination, we assess all evidence “in the light most favorable to the State” and draw all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. Id. We do not “resolve conflicts in the evidence,” “pass upon the credibility of witnesses,” “determine the plausibility of explanations,” or “weigh the evidence,” as that is the province of the jury. State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from it.” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). We ask only if the evidence “supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court’s marshalling instruction provided that to convict Gilman of third-degree sexual abuse, the State was required to prove that “[o]n or about June 8, 2015, to February 12, 2022, [Gilman] performed a sex act with [his wife]” and “[t]he sex act was performed while [Gilman’s wife] was physically helpless.” The term “physically helpless” was defined as being “unable to communicate an unwillingness to act because the person is unconscious, asleep, or otherwise physically limited.”
To convict Gilman of invasion of privacy, the State was required to prove:
1. On or about June 8, 2015 to February 12, 2022, [Gilman]
knowingly filmed [his wife];
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2. [Gilman] did so for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of any person;
3. [Gilman’s wife] did not consent to the filming or could not
consent to the filming;
4. [Gilman’s wife] was in a state of full or partial nudity; and
5. [Gilman’s wife] had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in
a state of full or partial nudity.
Gilman disputes only that the sex act was performed while his wife was “physically helpless” as to the first charge and that she did not or could consent to the filming as to the second charge. Those disputes are based on Gilman’s claim that he and his wife were “role-playing” and consensually filming pornographic videos together.
The primary obstacle to the success of Gilman’s role-playing argument is that he is proposing a different conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence rather than arguing that the finding actually made is not supported by the evidence. See Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339. Gilman points out that he testified that he and his wife were role-playing and that they produced amateur pornographic videos as a component of their “exciting” sex lives. He also contends that the fact that his wife was already wearing lingerie at the start of the second video proves that the encounter was consensual. He also takes issue with the lack of explanation for how his wife could have stayed asleep through both of the videos. Indeed, these are conclusions the jury could have drawn from the evidence presented. But the determinations the jury actually made—that Gilman’s sex acts were not consensual and his wife was physically helpless—are also easily drawn from the evidence presented.
The jury viewed the videos in question. They saw Gilman engage in the sexual acts with his wife while her eyes were closed and she was snoring
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and not moving. Gilman’s arguments in no way foreclose a determination that the acts were nonconsensual. Even if his wife was still wearing lingerie from a previous consensual encounter, the subsequent sex acts are still not consensual if she was physically helpless during the acts. And the jury was not required to credit Gilman’s self-serving testimony. See State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993). The State provided the jury with overwhelming evidence of Gilman’s guilt. Gilman’s presentation of an alternative theory does not negate the evidence the State presented. We affirm Gilman’s convictions.
Gilman alternatively argues the district court considered an improper factor while imposing his sentence and he should be resentenced. Gilman contends that the district court wrongly used his decision to submit to a jury trial as a factor against him during sentencing.
A sentence that falls within the statutory limits is presumed to be valid and will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion or reliance on improper factors. State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 554 (Iowa 2015). The presumption of validity is only overcome by an “affirmative showing [that] the sentencing court relied on improper evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he relevant factors when imposing sentence include the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant’s age, character and propensities and chances of the defendant’s reform.” Id. (cleaned up). So long as the sentencing court stays within the statutory limits and those parameters of consideration, we will not “second guess” the proper exercise of its “inherent latitude.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.
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Here, when reading the district court’s statements in full, we see no context in which its comments could be construed as criticizing Gilman for submitting his charges to a jury. The court stated:
Pursuant to this Court’s discretion, the sentences under counts I
and II shall run consecutive to each other. Counts III and IV shall run
concurrent with each other and concurrent with counts I and II, for a total
of twenty years.
The reason for that is as follows, Mr. Gilman. I take into
consideration, again, the history of criminal convictions. While they are
relatively few, as pointed out by the prosecutor, you still have a history of
criminal convictions.
Second and primarily, I take into consideration, again, the heinous
nature of these crimes. A picture is worth a thousand words, and those
videos showed us more than just a thousand words. They showed us truly
who you are. Even though the testimony here today paints you as a loving
father, loving husband, and this is not in your nature, it was in your nature,
and you filmed it, and you gave it to the jury to decide how deranged you are in
this sense. So I take into consideration the fact that you filmed your sexual
abuse of your wife when deciding to run these sentences consecutive to
each other.
(Emphasis added). To us, the above statements by the court simply suggest that the court was informing Gilman that it was considering the heinous nature of his acts, and that neither the court nor the jury was persuaded by Gilman’s loving-husband claims after viewing the graphic videos of his acts. That statement does not imply that the court was using Gilman’s decision to submit to a jury trial against him.
For these reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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