IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-1386
Filed August 19, 2026
State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Frankie Mack Robinson,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Paul D. Scott, Judge.
AFFIRMED
Erin M. Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.
Frankie Robinson strangled the mother of his son and threw her to the ground—all while on probation for two prior convictions for assaulting her and while subject to a no-contact order protecting her. After a bench trial, the district court found him guilty of domestic-abuse assault, third or subsequent offense. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1(2), 708.2A(4) (2024). And the court sentenced Robinson to five years in prison, with a five-year mandatory minimum, to be served consecutive to his prison terms on the two prior convictions. Robinson appeals his sentence, arguing that the court abused its discretion in selecting a five-year mandatory minimum rather than a one-year mandatory minimum and failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence. Because the district court did not abuse its considerable sentencing discretion and its written sentencing order expressly stating the reasons for the consecutive sentence together with the more individualized discussion during the sentencing hearing adequately explained its reasons for the consecutive sentence, we affirm Robinson’s sentence.
I. Selecting the Mandatory Minimum Sentence
We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And even when the court would have been justified in imposing the sentence sought by the defendant, “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the five-year mandatory minimum sentence. See Iowa Code § 902.13 (requiring the court to select a mandatory minimum sentence for a person convicted of a third or subsequent offense of domestic-abuse assault under section 708.2A(4)). Robinson does not point to any unreasonable or untenable grounds of the court’s decision. The court summed up its reasons for selecting the five-year mandatory minimum:
I’m sentencing you to that, in part, because of the fact that this has been
an ongoing abusive situation. I am sentencing you to that because you were
on probation for the exact same thing that you are getting sentenced to here
today, and at some point, it’s got to end, so it’s ending here, and it’s ending
now, and it’s ending today here in this hearing.
And it explained that in making all its decisions “in fashioning the appropriate sentence,” it “considered the nature and circumstances of the offenses, your history and characteristics, . . . the harm to the victim, the necessity for the protection of the community from further offenses by you,” and “all of the sentencing options that are available.” The court also acknowledged, as Robinson had told the court during his allocution, that Robinson had suffered the loss of his cousin and sister around the same time as the offense and that those losses “coming in tandem, in such close proximity” must have been “traumatic.”
Robinson mainly disagrees with the court’s weighing of all these factors and the mandatory minimum it ultimately selected, arguing that the court should have given greater weight to “mitigating factors” including the “recent tragedies in his life,” the “obstacles of his youth,” his remorse, and his desire “to get his life together.” But such disagreement is insufficient to show an abuse of discretion. See Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863 (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we might
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have weighed the various factors differently.”). Seeing no abuse in the district court’s exercise of its considerable sentencing discretion, we affirm the imposition of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence.
II. Reasons for Imposing a Consecutive Sentence
Robinson next argues that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing this sentence consecutive to the sentences for his prior convictions. A sentencing “court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence imposed and shall particularly state the reason for imposition of any consecutive sentence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). This rule “ensures defendants are well aware of the consequences of their criminal actions” and “affords our appellate courts the opportunity to review the discretion of the sentencing court.” State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 456 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up).
“[S]omething more specific” than “a boilerplate statement of
reasons” is required. Id. at 457 (cleaned up). But “a terse and succinct statement may be sufficient, so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (cleaned up). We may look to both “the oral colloquy and the written sentencing order” when deciding “whether sufficient reasons have been given.” Luke, 4 N.W.3d at 458. And the court is “entitled to rely on the same reasons . . . given for a prison term as reasons for consecutive sentences.” Id.
Here, the court’s sentencing order said that it was imposing
consecutive sentences based on “the separate and serious nature of the offenses,” “to provide [Robinson] maximum incentive to comply with the
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terms and conditions of probation,”1 and because “the crime was committed while [Robinson] was on probation.” The court further explained its view of the seriousness of the offense at the sentencing hearing, describing it as “egregious” and “violent” and causing “substantial and significant” harm to the victim. And the court expressed its concern about Robinson’s repeated domestic-abuse assaults on the victim—including the separate offenses to which it was imposing this sentence consecutively and for which Robinson had been on probation while committing this offense. These explanations for imposing the consecutive sentence were sufficient. We thus affirm the district court’s imposition of the consecutive sentence.
AFFIRMED.
1
Because Robinson was not placed on probation again, we interpret this reason to be referring to showing Robinson the consequences for violating his probation and thus deterring any violations of future probation.
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