IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0372
Filed August 19, 2026
State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
George Kirn Laurie Jr.,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
The Honorable Joel Dalrymple, Judge.
AFFIRMED
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.
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TABOR, Chief Judge.
George Laurie appeals his convictions of willful injury causing serious injury and first-degree harassment. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, admissibility of an out-of-court statement, and the consecutive nature of his sentences. Finding substantial evidence of his guilt, that any alleged error in admitting hearsay evidence was harmless, and no abuse of discretion in the sentencing decision, we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
In September 2024, J.H. was unhoused. One evening, he went to a Waterloo bar to drink beer and watch a Hawkeye football game on television. After the game ended, he walked back to where he was camped under a bridge. On his walk, he encountered a man later identified as Laurie. J.H. hadn’t met Laurie before that night, but his spirits were high after the Hawkeye victory, so he asked Laurie if he wanted to smoke pot. Laurie agreed, and they went to a nearby park. At the park, they smoked and drank more beer. The next thing J.H. remembers is waking up in the intensive care unit at the hospital in Waterloo.
At the park, a passerby found J.H. with stab wounds to his left arm and chest and called 911. Emergency services arrived. The passerby had seen J.H. with Laurie but did not witness the stabbing. To police, he described Laurie as a tall, skinny white male with sideburns, long hair and glasses. The passerby said Laurie was wearing a red, white, and black striped shirt. Officers later stopped Laurie because he matched the passerby’s description, the only difference being that Laurie then wore a dark long-sleeved shirt. Laurie claimed he was somewhere else at the time of the stabbing, but police collected a knife from him that appeared to have blood on it.
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The officers then took Laurie to the police station, directing him to the interview room. Laurie told a detective, “You want a murder case? I’ll give you a murder case. Starting with you.” The detective asked what he said, and Laurie replied, “You heard me. I ain’t stutter.” Later in that conversation, Laurie pointed at another officer and said, “Fuck the badge.”
During their investigation, the police obtained a warrant to collect the suspect’s DNA. Lab testing of the knife grip revealed the DNA profiles of two individuals, Laurie being the major contributor. Lab testing of the knife blade also revealed the DNA profiles of two individuals, J.H. being the major contributor.
Meanwhile, officers reviewed video footage from street cameras near the park. The footage showed J.H. walking with Laurie near the park; Laurie was wearing a striped shirt. The park itself was just out of frame. Later, the footage showed Laurie leave the park alone, walk under a bridge, and reappear in the dark long-sleeved shirt he was wearing when stopped by police. Officers discovered the striped shirt at his camp.
The State charged Laurie with willful injury causing serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2024), and harassment in the first degree, in violation of 708.7(2). The first charge related to the assault on J.H., and the second charge related to Laurie’s threat to the detective. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where several witnesses testified, including J.H., who had survived the attack with emergency surgery. The passerby did not testify because he had moved out of state, so an officer relayed the description he gave of Laurie. Laurie objected to the testimony as inadmissible hearsay, but the district court overruled the objection. The jury found Laurie guilty of both charges.
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For the first count, the district court imposed a prison term not to exceed fifteen years. Because Laurie had a dangerous weapon, the sentence included a five-year minimum under Iowa Code section 902.7. For the second count, the court imposed a prison term not to exceed two years. The court ordered Laurie to serve these terms consecutively.
Laurie appeals.
II. Analysis
Laurie raises three issues on appeal. First, he claims the State offered insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Second, he contends the district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence. Third, he argues the district court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. We begin with his sufficiency claim.
A. Sufficiency of the evidence
We review a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim for correction of legal error. State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). We are bound by the jury’s verdicts if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Slaughter, 3 N.W.3d 540, 546 (Iowa 2024). Substantial evidence exists if the record is “sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). The evidence must do more than raise “suspicion, speculation, or conjecture.” State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1992). We consider the entire record, not just the evidence supporting the convictions, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, which means making legitimate inferences that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record. State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021).
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Laurie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both counts, so we review the record for each.
Willful Injury Causing Serious Injury. The jury instructions required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. On or about the 21st day of September, 2024, [Laurie] did an act:
a. Which was intended to cause pain or injury to [ J.H.], or
b. Which was intended to result in physical contact which
was insulting or offensive to [ J.H.], or
c. Which was intended to place [ J.H.] in fear of an
immediate physical contact which would have been painful,
injurious, insulting or offensive to [ J.H.]
2. [Laurie] had the apparent ability to do the act.
3. [Laurie] intended to cause a serious injury to [ J.H.]
4. [Laurie’s] act caused:
a. A serious injury to [ J.H.] . . . .
Laurie argues the State offered insufficient evidence to prove elements one and three: that he assaulted J.H. or that he did so with specific intent to cause a serious injury. We reject that argument.
Starting with the first element, the record contains ample evidence that Laurie committed the assault. True, J.H. did not remember being stabbed. And as Laurie points out, J.H. could only narrow down a six-man photo lineup to three suspects—including Laurie. But the gaps in J.H.’s identification of Laurie do not negate the strong evidence in the rest of the record. Street camera footage shows Laurie and J.H. together before the assault and Laurie walking away and dumping his shirt after the assault. What’s more, a passerby placed Laurie with J.H. right before the crime. Then
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police found Laurie with a bloodied knife, and lab testing revealed his DNA on the knife handle and J.H.’s DNA on the blade. We find sufficient evidence to convince a jury of the first element beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to specific intent, Laurie argues the record contains no evidence of a “prior negative relationship” or “bad blood between the two that one could infer that Laurie had the specific intent to cause [ J.H.] serious injury.” But “[s]pecific intent is seldom capable of direct proof.” State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998). The district court instructed the jury, “[Y]ou should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific intent. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of his acts.” See Crawford, 974 N.W.2d at 518. Here, Laurie stabbed J.H. in the chest and left arm. A reasonable jury could conclude that the natural consequence of stabbing someone in the chest is a serious injury. See State v. Purnell, No. 18-1220, 2019 WL 5790882, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019).
Substantial evidence supports Laurie’s guilt on this charge.
Harassment in the First Degree. The jury instructions required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. On or about the 22nd day of September, 2024, [Laurie]
purposefully and without legitimate purpose had personal contact with
[the officer.]
2. [Laurie]:
a. Communicated a threat to commit the crime of murder,
as defined in [the next instruction] . . . .
3. [Laurie] did so with the specific intent to threaten, intimidate, or
alarm [the officer.]
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On this charge, Laurie argues the State offered insufficient evidence to prove the second and third elements. Regarding the threat element, Laurie urges us to consider the surrounding circumstances. Because he made the alleged statement in the interview room, Laurie maintains his words were ambiguous and could not be interpreted as a threat to commit murder. But trying to intimidate an officer—even at the police station—does not excuse the threat as baseless; if anything, it amplifies the threat’s severity. See State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Iowa 2001) (finding it “reasonable for the jury to find that [the defendant] intended to threaten, intimidate, or alarm [the sergeant],” even though the defendant was handcuffed). Laurie told an officer that he would “give [him] a murder case” and said the case would start with the officer, doubling down by remarking, “You heard me.” It’s reasonable for the jury to find the State satisfied this element of the crime. See State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Iowa 2021) (describing “a threat to commit bodily injury” as needing to “be definite and understandable by a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence” (citation omitted)). As to specific intent, substantial evidence supports a finding that Laurie intended to threaten, intimidate, or alarm the officer. Laurie was agitated, jabbed his finger in the direction of an officer’s badge, and showed general contempt for law enforcement.
Sufficient evidence supports both guilty verdicts.
B. Hearsay
The district court allowed the State to admit into evidence the passerby’s description of Laurie through the officer’s testimony. Laurie contends this was error and the description is inadmissible hearsay offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)(2).
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We review hearsay rulings for correction of legal error. State v. Sievers, 20 N.W.3d 203, 208 (Iowa 2025). Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 2020). “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial[,] offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. (cleaned up).
To counter Laurie’s argument, the State argues that the prosecutor did not offer the statement for the truth of the matter asserted but to explain the officers’ responsive conduct and how the investigation proceeded. See State v. Hollins, 397 N.W.2d 701, 705−06 (Iowa 1986).
We need not evaluate the admissibility of the evidence. Instead, we find that any alleged error in overruling Laurie’s objection was harmless. See State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196, 209 (Iowa 2008) (“[E]rror in an evidentiary ruling that is harmless may not be a basis for relief on appeal.”). Error is harmless if the State presents overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 210. The State offered ample evidence of Laurie’s identity as the perpetrator. His DNA was on the knife handle, J.H.’s DNA was on the blade, the knife was bloodied, and street-camera footage placed the two of them together just before the assault. Plus, Laurie had a shirt like the one in the video. Because the evidence was overwhelming, Laurie cannot show prejudice from the admission of the passerby’s statement.
C. Sentencing
Lastly, Laurie contests his consecutive sentences. He claims the sentencing court failed to perform “a holistic evaluation of [his] circumstances” and instead based its decision on “a punitive response” to Laurie’s criminal history.
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When a sentence is within statutory limits, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 455 (Iowa 2024). An abuse occurs when the district court “exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court must provide reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016). Here, the court pointed to the callous nature of the assault crime, that J.H. was “stabbed in the chest [and] left there to die.” The court then noted Laurie’s criminal history:
By way of why it’s consecutive, the Court does believe that with a
prior firearm conviction, with a prior felony drug conviction, a prior willful
injury conviction in 2004, that consecutive sentences are appropriate. And
so that the record’s clear, it’s the prior criminal history coupled with these
egregious facts that the Court does believe consecutive sentences are
appropriate.
The court made it explicit that it was not relying solely on Laurie’s criminal record. Instead, the court gave “sufficient and thoughtful consideration” in making its sentencing decision to address both the nature of the offenses and Laurie’s history. See State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010). We find no abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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