UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Case No. 26-mj-140
MELISSA FARRIS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Melissa Farris stands charged by criminal complaint with two felony offenses: (1) willful
injury or depredation of property of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361; and
(2) destruction of a veterans’ memorial in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1369. The charges stem from
Ms. Farris’s alleged vandalism of the World War II Memorial on the National Mall by placing
bubbles into the Memorial’s fountain and spray-painting part of its facade, including with the
phrase, “Clean Hands Dirty $.” After finding probable cause to believe Ms. Farris committed the
charged offenses, this Court approved a criminal complaint and issued a warrant for her arrest. But
as it happens, Ms. Farris greatly simplified the U.S. Marshals’ job in executing on that warrant
because she voluntarily turned herself into law enforcement that same morning. During her first
appearance in this courthouse, the government moved for Ms. Farris’s detention pending trial and
asked the Court to schedule a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), which provides
that a court “shall” hold such a hearing in a case that involves “a serious risk that [the defendant]
will flee.” Following argument, the Court DENIED the government’s motion for a detention
hearing and released Ms. Farris while she awaits trial, subject to various conditions imposed
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The Court largely explained its ruling from the bench. This
Memorandum Order supplements that decision.
BACKGROUND
Given the early posture of this case, the Court recites the relevant background based on the
allegations in the sworn affidavit accompanying the government’s criminal complaint.
The World War II Memorial is part of the National Mall and honors the millions of
American service members who bravely served this nation during World War II. On the afternoon
of Thursday August 13, 2026, at approximately 2:00 PM, members of the U.S. Park Police
(“USPP”) and U.S. Park Rangers responded to a call about a disorderly person disrupting visitors
around the World War II Memorial. Upon arriving at the scene, a Park Ranger observed a
substantial amount of foam bubbles in one of the memorial’s fountains. More, one of the balcony
walls of the memorial had been sprayed painted with the words “Clean Hands Dirty $” in orangecolored paint, with additional green-colored and pink-colored paint sprayed and splattered nearby.
A witness who observed at least part of the vandalism took a photograph of the suspect, which he
provided to law enforcement. After USPP circulated the photograph, a USPP officer recognized
the individual as someone they had cited a few days earlier for improperly camping on federal
property, not far from the World War II Memorial. That individual was Ms. Farris.
Ms. Farris apparently maintains a public profile on Facebook and Instagram. Law
enforcement reviewed those publicly available social media accounts and identified videos that
Ms. Farris appears to have created, including several showing the World War II Memorial’s
fountain filled with bubbles and a nearby wall marked with spray paint. In one video, Ms. Farris
can reportedly be heard telling the camera, “Nobody cares, why doesn’t anybody care, this is
unreal.” In another, Ms. Farris can reportedly be heard saying, “I was just allowed to deface Federal
f***ing property, and nobody batted an eye, and that is very strange.”
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According to the government’s affidavit in support of the charges, a preliminary estimate
of the cost to clean up and restore the World War II Memorial exceeds $1,000.00.
* * *
Based on these representations, this Court approved a criminal complaint and an arrest
warrant for Ms. Farris, charging her with: (1) willful injury and depredation of property of the
United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361; and (2) destruction of a veterans’ memorial in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1369. (See ECF No. 1, Compl.) The complaint and arrest warrant were
docketed around 11:30 AM on Friday August 14, 2026. But a couple hours earlier—at
approximately 9:30 AM that same day—Ms. Farris had voluntarily surrendered herself at the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Alexandria, Virginia, just across the Potomac
River from Washington, D.C. Once the U.S. Marshals Service processed the arrest warrant, Ms.
Farris was presented to a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Virginia, who temporarily
placed Ms. Farris into the custody of USMS for purposes of transporting her to this District.
Ms. Farris presented for her initial appearance in this courthouse on Monday August 17,
2026. During that hearing, the government moved for Ms. Farris’s ongoing detention pending trial
and requested a detention hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), arguing that the case
involved a “serious risk” that Ms. Farris will flee. In response, the defense contested that
proposition, especially considering that Ms. Farris had just turned herself into law enforcement the
very morning after the charged conduct. Ultimately, after a lengthy presentation from the
government—which included arguments based on evidence extracted from Ms. Farris’s phone
pursuant to an authorized search warrant—the Court denied the government’s motion for a
detention hearing. Instead, it released Ms. Farris on conditions of release that were recommended
by the Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia and agreed to by the defense,
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including that Ms. Farris: promptly return to the Toledo, Ohio area where she has more stable
residential and family ties, report to supervision with the Pretrial Services Agency for the Northern
District of Ohio, stay away from the Washington, D.C. area except for required court appearances,
and other relatively standard conditions. (ECF No. 10.)
Again, the Court set forth its reasoning in detail on the record during the hearing. Once the
Court ruled, the government moved orally for an emergency stay so it could pursue an appeal with
the Chief District Judge. The Court denied the stay request from the bench. Thereafter, the
government did not immediately appeal, choosing instead to seek reconsideration with the
undersigned. (ECF No. 11.) The Court denied the reconsideration motion by Minute Order.
The Court now issues this Memorandum Order to supplement its reasoning for denying the
government’s motion for a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A).
DISCUSSION
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully
limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). “The Bail Reform Act of
1984 authorizes one of those carefully limited exceptions.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d
1273, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Through that statute, Congress provided that federal courts should
convene a hearing on pretrial detention in certain types of cases; even then, courts should order
detention before trial only if “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). Simply put, pretrial detention is not automatic—far from it.
More than that, and relevant here, even the occurrence of a detention hearing is not
automatic. The Bail Reform Act provides for two general paths to a detention hearing. Through
the first path, the government can obtain a detention hearing in certain cases based on the specific
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type of offense involved—e.g., cases that involve crimes of violence, offenses with a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment or death, drug-related offenses with a maximum term of
imprisonment of at least ten years, felony offenses involving a minor victim or the possession or
use of a firearm, and other enumerated categories. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E). Through the
second path, a court can convene a detention hearing in a case that involves a “serious risk that
[the defendant] will flee” or “a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct
justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective
witness or juror.” Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B). These are the only paths to a detention hearing
authorized by the Bail Reform Act. United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(explaining that “a judicial officer must find one of [the] circumstances triggering a detention
hearing” under Section 3142(f) because “[a]bsent one of these circumstances, detention is not an
option”); see also United States v. Morgan, 2014 WL 3375028, at *2–4 (C.D. Ill. July 9, 2014)
(collecting cases standing for the same proposition). Outside those enumerated circumstances, the
government is not automatically entitled to a detention hearing in any case it wishes. See also
United States v. Martinez-Cermeno, 2025 WL 327832, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2025) (walking
through this same analysis and explaining that Congress “did not provide that [c]ourts always must
conduct detention hearings whenever the government requests one”).
Finally, even without convening a detention hearing, courts can still impose release
conditions on a defendant awaiting trial to the extent necessary to “reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required” or mitigate any risk to “the safety of any other person or the
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1). But in fashioning any such conditions, the court should
impose the “least restrictive” conditions necessary to achieve those goals. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
* * *
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In this case, the government cannot seek a detention hearing under subsection (f)(1) of the
Bail Reform Act because the property-destruction offenses with which Ms. Farris is charged are
not among those enumerated by the statute as triggering an entitlement to a hearing. She is not
charged, for instance, with a crime of violence, a felony involving a minor victim or a firearm, or
any of the other categories of offenses specified in subsection (f)(1). That leaves the government
to press for a detention hearing on the basis that the case “involves a serious risk that [Ms. Farris]
will flee,” as contemplated by subsection (f)(2)(A). 1
So what is a “serious risk of flight” in this context? For starters, the term “serious” must
carry some weight in the analysis because Congress chose to use that specific modifier in
subsection (f)(2)(A), but not when addressing related questions of flight and nonappearance in
other subsections of the Bail Reform Act. Compare id. § 3142(f)(2)(A), with id. § 3142(d)(2)
(allowing for temporary detention in some circumstances where a judicial officer finds that a
defendant “may flee”), and id. § 3142(e)(1) (allowing for pretrial detention after a hearing if a
judicial officer “finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required”). As another court recently put it, “Congress’s deliberate use
of the adjective ‘serious’ to modify ‘risk of flight’ further heightens the threshold” necessary to
trigger a detention hearing, “given that the adjective does not appear in other parts of the Bail
Reform Act.” United States v. Mejias-Mejias, 771 F. Supp. 3d 688, 691 (D. Md. 2025) (quoting
United States v. Rodriguez-Fuentes, 2025 WL 711955, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2025)). And this
makes sense as a practical matter because virtually “every case involves some degree of flight risk,
and [yet] the Bail Reform Act nevertheless favors release.” United States v. White, 2021 WL
1
The government did not argue that the case presents a “serious risk” of obstruction of justice or threat to any witness or juror, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B), and the Court does not see any independent basis to be especially concerned along those lines, so its analysis focuses on serious risk of flight.
6
2155441, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021); see also United States v. Runsdorf, 2022 WL 303548,
at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2022) (similar).
Based on its review of the caselaw, this Court borrows language used by several other
courts in framing the necessary showing: “a ‘serious risk of flight’ under § 3142(f)(2)(A) is a great
risk—beyond average—that the defendant will intentionally and actively move within or outside
the jurisdiction to avoid court proceedings or supervision.” United States v. Figueroa-Alvarez, 681
F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1138 (D. Idaho 2023); accord United States v. Molina-Orantes, 798 F. Supp.
3d 1204, 1214 (D. Or. 2025); United States v. Romero-Martinez, 2024 WL 965150, at *4 (D. Conn.
Mar. 6, 2024); see also Rodriguez-Fuentes, 2025 WL 711955, at *2 (finding that subsection
(f)(2)(A) requires “more than mere uncertainty or the possibility of nonappearance” but rather a
“substantial” risk that a “defendant will take deliberate, voluntary action to flee to evade judicial
oversight”); United States v. Andrade-Aguilera, 2026 WL 915669, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2026)
(similar). In analyzing whether the government has made this required showing, the Court is not
restricted to any rigid test, but it is mindful that other courts have looked to factors such as a
defendant’s past efforts to evade arrest or law enforcement, a defendant’s incentive and ability to
flee, unstable residential ties to a community, and other similar considerations. See Mejias-Mejias,
771 F. Supp. 3d at 691 (citations omitted).
* * *
Applying these principles here, the Court concludes the government fails to sufficiently
show that this case presents a “serious risk that [Ms. Farris] will flee.” § 3142(f)(2)(A).
Given that the Court must focus on whether there is a serious risk that Ms. Farris will take
active steps to avoid court proceedings and judicial oversight, it begins with an important fact that
the government largely tries to avoid: Ms. Farris’s voluntary surrender to law enforcement last
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Friday. The very morning after she reportedly vandalized the World War II Memorial—less than
twenty-four (24) hours later, and seemingly before this Court even issued a warrant for her arrest—
Ms. Farris turned herself in to U.S. Marshals at a federal courthouse. As plenty of courts have
recognized, a defendant’s self-surrender to authorities typically cuts against a risk-of-flight
finding. See, e.g., United States v. Doost, 2025 WL 1555157, at *3 (D.D.C. June 2, 2025) (“A
significant factor weighing against any finding that [the defendant] presents a flight risk is that he
voluntarily surrendered to federal agents soon after being notified of the pending warrant for his
arrest.”); United States v. Djoko, 2019 WL 4849537, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 2019) (finding no
basis for detention hearing under Section 3142(f)(2)(A) because, among other reasons, the
defendant “voluntarily surrender[ed] to authorities”); United v. Fiandor, 874 F. Supp. 1358, 1361
(S.D. Fla. 1995) (“A defendant’s voluntary surrender undoubtedly is probative of whether he or
she presents a flight risk.”); cf. Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1285 (Katsas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[B]oth [defendants] voluntarily surrendered to the FBI, as the district court
recognized in concluding that neither posed a flight risk.”). This same takeaway applies here. To
state the obvious, a defendant who voluntarily (and rather quickly) surrenders to law
enforcement—at a federal courthouse, no less—is far more likely to be someone who continues to
appear for further court proceedings, rather than someone who presents a risk—much less a
“serious” risk, as the statute requires—that they will flee from judicial oversight or supervision.
The government attempts to downplay the significance of Ms. Farris’s surrender by
pointing to evidence that in the hours after her alleged vandalism, she apparently researched ways
to travel to Toledo, Ohio. (Ms. Farris had reportedly been staying in the Washington, D.C. area
without housing for several weeks, but she has family and more stable residential ties in the Toledo
area.) More specifically, the government proffered that in the afternoon and evening hours of
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August 13, 2026, Ms. Farris conducted internet searches on her phone for directions to Ronald
Reagan National Airport and for bus schedules and a bus ticket to Toledo. As the government
paints things, these internet searches are evidence that Ms. Farris already tried to flee. But not
really. Because whatever Ms. Farris might have looked up on her phone in the afternoon or evening
of August 13, the reality is that she did not leave the D.C. area or otherwise try to evade law
enforcement after she was accused of engaging in the offense conduct. To the contrary, the very
next morning, she presented herself at a federal courthouse and turned herself in to U.S. Marshals.
If the Court were viewing Ms. Farris’s search history in a vacuum, it might weigh more heavily
the government’s concerns about that evidence. But the Court has to consider the relevant facts
holistically, not in isolation. And that Ms. Farris promptly surrendered to law enforcement—
apparently even believing she was likely to be sent to jail, given some of her comments in videos
posted on social media—undercuts any argument that her apparent travel-related searches the day
before should be viewed as strong evidence that she presents a serious risk of flight.
Undeterred, the government tries to analogize this case to United States v. Grabinski, 2025
WL 819570 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2025). Relevant to the government’s argument, after the charges in
Grabinski were dismissed without prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, the case was reindicted on identical charges, at which point the defendant turned himself in after learning about
his arrest warrant. See id. at *1–2. According to the government, the defendant in Grabinski
similarly emphasized his voluntary surrender as an argument against detention, but Judge Richard
Leon was unpersuaded. That point is true as far as it goes. But Grabinski was a very different case.
For one, Mr. Grabinski was detained on basis of dangerousness, not simply flight risk. For another,
the government was clearly entitled to a detention hearing in Grabinski under Section
3142(f)(1)(A) based on the charged offenses, which included a charge of attempted arson under
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18 U.S.C. § 844(i) stemming from the defendant allegedly throwing a Molotov cocktail (unlit) into
the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. After such a hearing, Judge Leon concluded that he
could not fashion conditions of release to reasonably protect the safety of the community and
detained on that basis. But even in the full detention-hearing context, his ruling was not focused
heavily on risk flight, and it certainly did not consider how the defendant’s self-surrender might
have influenced that consideration—let alone at the threshold stage requiring a “serious” flight
risk. So even assuming the government is not attempting to equate the throwing of a Molotov
cocktail into a foreign embassy (as charged in Grabinski) with the spray painting of a veterans’
memorial (as charged here), Grabinski is little help to the government’s effort to undercut the
evidentiary weight of Ms. Farris’s voluntary surrender to authorities in this case.
Next, the government argues that Ms. Farris presents a serious flight risk because she has
no ties to the Washington, D.C. community. Ms. Farris responds by pointing to more concrete ties
in the Toledo, Ohio area, where she has stable housing along with family and community support.
And Ms. Farris plans to return to Toledo and remain there while her case is pending (which the
Court is ordering that she do, as explained below). Given Ms. Farris’s ties to another community
in a relatively nearby state, her lack of community ties in this District is less concerning to the
Court from a risk-of-flight perspective. As another court explained it, “[t]he fact that [she] lacks
community ties specifically in this district … is not very probative of whether [s]he would
intentionally not show up here and instead choose the path of a fugitive.” White, 2021 WL
2155441, at *14. After all, “the risk at issue here is risk of flight,” and “to the extent that a defendant
has community ties somewhere in this country, [they are] less likely to choose the path of a fugitive
reflected by a decision intentionally not to appear in court in a federal criminal case wherever it is
pending.” Id. If anything, given the nature of Ms. Farris’s charged offenses, the Court believes it
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far better for her to remain outside the District of Columbia—and away from other federal
monuments and memorials—while she awaits trial. And while Ms. Farris’s unhoused status during
her recent presence in this District over the last several weeks might present certain additional
challenges, the fact that she has a more stable set-up in Ohio—with nearby family support and
related assistance—goes a long way toward mitigating any such challenges.
Finally, the government argues that Ms. Farris has a history of noncompliance with court
orders related to a few prior offenses out of Michigan and Ohio, including a 2005 conviction for
misdemeanor marijuana possession, a 2011 conviction for driving while impaired, and a 2015
conviction for disorderly conduct. According to the government, Ms. Farris incurred several
probation violations in connection with those charges, including a bench warrant for nonappearance that reportedly remained outstanding for several months. This Court, to be clear, takes
seriously the need to comply with court-ordered conditions, and it understands the government’s
argument that Ms. Farris’s past alleged non-compliance reflects a risk of future non-compliance.
But in the present posture, the Court is focused on whether Ms. Farris presents a serious risk of
flight, and it simply cannot conclude that her reported missteps on probation more than a decade
ago suffice to make that showing, especially given her recent surrender at a federal court.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the government fails to show that this case presents
a serious risk of flight, which means that it is not entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether Ms.
Farris should be detained in jail while she awaits trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A). 2
* * *
2
Toward the close of the hearing, counsel for Ms. Farris suggested that the Court could simply assume the right to a detention hearing and analyze the Section 3142(g) factors to evaluate whether Ms. Farris presented a risk of non-appearance or flight so great that the Court could not mitigate it with conditions. While the Court appreciates the practicality of that approach—and defense counsel’s effort to streamline things—the Court is not generally in the habit of honoring statutes in the breach. If the government is not entitled to a detention hearing, the inquiry ends there. And that is the Court’s conclusion in this case.
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Even though the Court found no basis to convene a detention hearing, it still considered
and ultimately adopted the recommended conditions of release proposed by the Pretrial Services
Agency for the District of Columbia, which are fully set forth in a separate order. At a high level,
the Court ordered that Ms. Farris return to the Toledo, Ohio area and report to the Pretrial Services
Agency for the Northern District of Ohio by no later than Thursday August 20, 2026, and to
undergo a mental health screening as directed by Pretrial Services and to follow any recommended
referral for mental health services. Ms. Farris is restricted from traveling outside the general
Toledo, Ohio area without advance approval by Pretrial Services. In addition, the Court ordered
Ms. Farris to stay away from the District of Columbia (and, by implication, the World War II
Memorial—and any other memorials) pending the completion of this case except for court-related
appearances. The Court required that she surrender any passports or international travel document,
that she not possess any firearms or other weapons, and that she not use or unlawfully possess any
narcotic drug or other controlled substance.
Beyond those restrictions, the government asked the Court—in the alternative to holding
Ms. Farris in jail while her case proceeds—to impose GPS location monitoring and appoint a thirdparty custodian. The Court declined to adopt those conditions because it is required to impose the
“least restrictive” conditions necessary, and it believes that those additional conditions are more
restrictive than necessary given the overall backdrop of the case.
CONCLUSION
Many Americans—particularly veterans and those with close ties to veterans—are rightly
upset by what Ms. Farris is charged with doing to the World War II Memorial. The Court’s ruling
today, however, focuses strictly on the narrow and preliminary question of whether the government
can hold her in jail while she awaits trial on the charges. On that score, the U.S. Supreme Court
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has described pretrial detention as a “carefully limited exception,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755, which
means that this Court—like all federal courts—has “a grave constitutional obligation to ensure that
the facts and circumstances of each case warrant this exceptional treatment.” Munchel, 991 F.3d
at 1285. For the reasons explained, this case does not.
Accordingly, the government’s motion for a detention hearing is DENIED.
Dated: August 18, 2026
MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH
United States Magistrate Judge
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