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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 19, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ESTATE OF WILFORD DEWEESE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-1161
RONNIE HANCOCK; DANIEL
LEBARON; LEVI HOOVER; JEFFREY
SCHUELKE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:24-CV-00960-DDD-NRN)
Raymond K. Bryant, Civil Rights Litigation Group, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellant.
Jonathan N. Eddy, SGR, LLC, Denver, Colorado (Eric M. Ziporin, SGR, LLC, Denver, Colorado; Bryan E. Schmid and Steven W. Martyn, El Paso County Attorney’s Office, Colorado Springs, Colorado, with him on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees.
Before MATHESON, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
CARSON, Circuit Judge.
When a government official asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the
plaintiff bears the burden to show that the law clearly established that the official’s
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actions violated a constitutional right. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must
usually identify an on-point Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision.
That decision must be particularized to the facts of the case and cannot be overly
generalized.
Wilford Deweese stopped at a bar in Manitou Springs, Colorado, for a drink.
After getting into an altercation at the bar, he attempted to pull a gun out of his
pocket. Someone called 911. Officers found Deweese in a courtyard down the
street. After Deweese refused to comply with requests to surrender for nearly twenty
minutes, officers sent in a canine to attack and bite him. When Deweese pulled out
his gun to shoot the dog, officers shot and killed him. Deweese’s estate sued the
officers. The officers asserted qualified immunity. The district court granted
qualified immunity, determining that the officers’ conduct did not violate clearly
established law. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
Wilford Deweese, a sixty-seven-year-old man from Florida, stopped in
Manitou Springs, Colorado, on his way to Florida from California. 1 That evening, he
went to a bar, ordered a single eight-ounce beer, and waited in line to play pool.
While waiting, Deweese made some comments that offended the bartender, who
1
Because the district court granted qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, we accept Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007)). Our recitation of the facts reflects this principle.
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subsequently refused to serve him, so he paid his tab and left. Deweese tried to go to
another bar a few blocks away, but the bartender there decided she did not want him
in the bar based on his appearance. So Deweese continued down the street but
realized he had left some of his belongings at the first bar.
As Deweese returned to the first bar, the bartender confronted him. The two
began to argue, and the bartender attempted to push him out of the bar. A bar patron
got involved and pushed Deweese to the ground. Deweese got up and attempted to
pull a gun out of his pocket to show that he could defend himself. At the first sight
of the gun, the bartender yelled, “He’s got a gun, call 911.” Deweese left the bar,
and someone called 911.
Deweese walked several blocks down Manitou Avenue and ended up in a
small, open courtyard area between two buildings. A paved ramp with railings ran
along one side of the courtyard next to a building, running perpendicular to the
sidewalk before making a ninety-degree turn down into the courtyard. Manitou
Springs Police Officers—Defendants Levi Hoover and Jeffrey Schuelke—found
Deweese standing at the back of the ramp where it made the ninety-degree turn.
The officers immediately pointed their firearms at Deweese. Because it was
dark, they also shone lights on him. They yelled various commands at Deweese,
including to stop moving, show his hands, walk towards them, and drop what he was
holding. Deweese yelled out to the officers that he had done nothing wrong and that
someone assaulted him. Officers responded that they could not work with him or
listen to his side of the story unless he complied with them. At some point, Deweese
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used his phone to call a friend, seeking contact information for an attorney. At
another point, he showed the officers the contents of a plastic bag he was holding,
taking out a book and a bottle. Deweese also lifted his shirt to show that he had
nothing in his waistband.
But Deweese did not comply or respond to all of the officers’ commands, such
as to come toward them, and the officers viewed him as noncompliant. So the
officers requested backup. El Paso County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to the
scene, including Defendant Daniel LeBaron. Around seven minutes after officers
first made contact with Deweese, someone radioed to them that another officer was
on his way with a less lethal 40 mm canon. About six minutes after that, Defendant
Officer Ronnie Hancock arrived with his police canine, Jinx. Officer Hancock began
issuing commands to Deweese.
The four officers discussed what they should do as Deweese continued to stand
in the same position. Eventually, Officer Hancock got Jinx out of his vehicle and
assumed command of the scene. Officer Hancock yelled out that if Deweese did not
walk out with his hands up, he would send the dog in to bite him. Deweese
responded, yelling that he would defend himself from the dog by shooting it if they
sent the dog to attack him. After a few more minutes of Deweese not moving,
Officer Hancock released the dog and yelled out for it to “attack” Deweese. The
officers ran behind the dog with their firearms ready. As the dog approached
Deweese, Deweese backed up a few feet before pulling out the handgun from his
pocket and firing it at the dog. Immediately upon seeing Deweese’s gun aimed at the
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dog, Officer LeBaron fired his weapon at Deweese. 2 The other three officers also
fired their weapons at Deweese. Deweese died on the scene from the gunshots.
Deweese’s Estate (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against the four officers,
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and under C.R.S. § 13-21-131 for violations of Article II
of the Colorado Constitution. His first claim alleged excessive force, conspiracy, and
failure to intervene regarding the officers’ use of the canine, Jinx. The second claim
alleged that the officers used excessive deadly force when they shot Deweese and
recklessly incited the need for the deadly force.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the law entitled them to qualified
immunity. They argued that (1) their conduct did not violate Deweese’s
constitutional rights, and (2) at the time, the law did not clearly establish their actions
were unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Defendants’ second argument
and granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss the federal claims on qualified immunity
grounds. The district court then declined to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. 3 Plaintiff appealed.
2
Plaintiff’s complaint does not make clear whether Deweese or Officer LeBaron shot first. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as we must, we assume that Officer LeBaron shot first, consistent with Plaintiff’s allegation that Officer LeBaron “fired immediately upon seeing Mr. Deweese’s gun aimed at the canine.”
3
Plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of the state-law claims.
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II.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil
damages as long as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Johnson v.
City of Cheyenne, 99 F.4th 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). This defense is designed to protect “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Grissom v. Roberts,
902 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104
(2018)). “We review the district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss based
on qualified immunity de novo.” Johnson, 99 F.4th at 1216 (citing Frey v. Town of
Jackson, 41 F.4th 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2022)).
Once Defendants raised qualified immunity, Plaintiff bore the burden to allege
sufficient facts to show that Defendants “plausibly violated [Deweese’s]
constitutional rights, which were clearly established at the time of the violation.” Id.
(quoting Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 579 (10th Cir. 2012)). To satisfy this
burden, “[Plaintiff] must show ‘(1) the officers’ alleged conduct violated a
constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly established at the time of the violation,
such that every reasonable official would have understood, that such conduct
constituted a violation of that right.’” Flores v. Henderson, 101 F.4th 1185, 1193
(10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Reavis ex rel. Est. of Coale v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978, 984
(10th Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff must satisfy both prongs to overcome qualified immunity.
Id. (quoting Arnold v. City of Olathe, Kan., 35 F.4th 778, 788 (10th Cir. 2022)).
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We may affirm the grant of qualified immunity on either prong. Id. (quoting Wise v.
Caffey, 72 F.4th 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2023)).
When an appeal arises from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true “all
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint” and view them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Johnson, 99 F.4th at 1217 (quoting Schwartz, 702 F.3d at 579). We
also draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Diversey v. Schmidly,
738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of
Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1126–27 (10th Cir. 1998)).
The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims because, at the time it
occurred, the alleged constitutional violation was not clearly established. We agree
and thus do not address the first qualified immunity prong.
To satisfy its burden on the second prong of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must
(1) identify “an on-point Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision,” or
(2) “show[] the clearly established weight of authority from other circuits [has] found
the law to be as [Plaintiff] maintains.” Flores, 101 F.4th at 1197 (quoting Perry v.
Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2018)). Even if the above conditions
are not met, in certain “rare” or “extreme circumstances,” “a government official may
still have notice that their conduct violates a constitutional right because it is so
apparent as to apply with obvious clarity.” Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251,
1265 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1015 (10th Cir. 2021)).
We must not “define the relevant constitutional right at a high level of generality,”
and “the clearly established law must be particularized to the facts of the case.”
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Flores, 101 F.4th at 1197 (quoting Perry, 892 F.3d at 1123). “This directive ‘is
particularly important in excessive force cases.’” Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders,
989 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons,
586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (per curiam)). We address Plaintiff’s arguments as to each
claim in turn.
A.
Plaintiff’s first claim alleges that the officers violated Deweese’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force by using the police canine, Jinx, to
attack and bite Deweese. 4 Plaintiff argues that the law clearly established at the time
of Defendants’ conduct that “using severe force, such as a canine, to attack a
stationary, non-threatening, subject violated the Fourth Amendment.”
Plaintiff first cites our decision in Luethje v. Kyle, 131 F.4th 1179 (10th Cir.
2025). There, officers responded to a 911 call reporting a man breaking into a front
window of a home. Luethje, 131 F.4th at 1185. With no further information, an
officer ordered his police canine through the broken window to locate and attack
anyone in the home. Id. Once inside, the canine bit the home’s resident as he slept
4
Plaintiff also argued that the officers engaged in a conspiracy to violate Deweese’s Fourth Amendment rights by using the canine and that the officers failed to intervene to stop the canine from being used to attack him. The district court determined that all three of these claims failed together—that if it was not clearly established that Defendants’ use of the canine was unlawful, then it was not clearly established that the officers’ alleged conspiracy to do the same was unlawful or that the officers were required to intervene. Plaintiff does not dispute that determination on appeal, so we treat these three claims in the same fashion.
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in his bed. Id. at 1185–86. We held that “a reasonable officer would have known in
February 2022 . . . that using a police canine to bite and restrain a non-violent,
non-resisting suspect was unconstitutional.” Id. at 1199.
In reaching this conclusion, we relied on four cases. First, Morris v. Noe,
where we held two officers’ conduct unconstitutional when they tackled a domestic
disturbance suspect to the ground who “carried no weapon” and “made no overt
threats . . . .” Id. at 1199 (quoting Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir.
2012)). Second, Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, where we determined an officer’s
conduct constituted excessive force when he—without explanation or warning—
grabbed and tackled a man while he was returning inside a courthouse to pay a fine.
Id. (discussing Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1280–85 (10th Cir.
2007)). Third, Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, where we held officers used
excessive force when they “used a taser without warning against a woman suspected
of a misdemeanor . . . .” Id. (discussing Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 625 F.3d
661, 666–67 (10th Cir. 2010)). And finally, Buck v. City of Albuquerque, where “we
held it was clearly established that using ‘tear gas, pepper spray and non-lethal
projectiles’ on peaceful protestors who posed no threat to officers [and who were
given no chance to comply with orders] violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
(quoting Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1290–91 (10th Cir. 2008)).
But Luethje and the four cases it relied on differ from this case in important
ways. First, none of these cases involved a suspect who possessed a firearm, let
alone one reported as showing it to people while involved in a fight. And second,
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these cases emphasized that the officers did not warn the suspects of the impending
use of force or give them a chance to comply. In Luethje, we said that our case law
clearly established “that it violates the Fourth Amendment to use force without
warning against a non-violent, non-resisting suspect who is given no chance to
comply . . . .” Id. at 1200 (emphasis added). Here, the officers negotiated with
Deweese extensively and warned that if he did not walk out with his hands up, they
would send the dog in to bite him. Unlike the cases upon which Plaintiff relies,
officers here gave Deweese a chance to comply before using force, and Deweese did
not comply. The cases we relied on in Luethje would not, therefore, put a reasonable
officer on notice that it is unconstitutional to order a police canine to attack an armed
suspect who failed to comply with lawful orders after officers warned him of their
impending use of force. Thus, this case law did not clearly establish at the time of
the challenged conduct that the officers’ actions would violate the Fourth
Amendment.
The other cases on which Plaintiff relies also do not show that Defendants’
conduct violated clearly established law. First, Plaintiff argues that our decision in
Vette clearly established that Defendants’ use of force here was unconstitutional.
But as we noted in Luethje, “[o]ur case law distinguishes pre-restraint and postrestraint force.” Id. at 1198. And Vette is a post-restraint case which held that
officers who used a police canine “after an individual ha[d] been subdued” violated
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1200 (quoting Vette, 989 F.3d at 1172). Here,
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Defendants had not yet subdued Deweese when they sent in the canine. Thus, Vette
does not clearly establish that the officers’ conduct was unconstitutional.
Plaintiff also cites several district court cases, arguing that “[t]he prevailing
weight of district courts within this circuit” clearly established the law here. But
district court decisions are legally insufficient to clearly establish a proposition.
Only “prior Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent, or the weight of authority”
from other circuit courts can clearly establish law in qualified immunity cases. See
Vette, 989 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Emmett v. Armstrong, 973 F.3d 1127, 1137
(10th Cir. 2020)); Est. of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 761 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2014)
(disregarding the district court cases the plaintiff cited because they “cannot clearly
establish what the law is” (citing Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1397
(10th Cir. 1992))). The district court decisions upon which Plaintiff relies, therefore,
do not clearly establish the law in this area.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the weight of authority from other circuits clearly
established that Defendants acted unconstitutionally. In its opening brief, Plaintiff
lists six cases (one of which is unpublished) from four other circuits. But each of
these cases suffers from some of the same factual distinctions as the cases discussed
above. See Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522–23 (5th Cir. 2016) (officers had no
reason to believe suspect was armed and suspect complied with officer orders to
submit); Campbell v. City of Springboro, Ohio, 700 F.3d 779, 785–87 (6th Cir. 2012)
(officers did not warn the suspects and had no reason to believe the suspects were
armed); Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000)
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(suspect did not pose a threat to officers and immediately submitted to their orders);
Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (officers had no basis to believe
suspect was armed or a threat). Thus, the weight of authority from other circuits
could not have put Defendants on notice that their actions were unconstitutional.
B.
Plaintiff next asserts that Defendants violated Deweese’s Fourth Amendment
rights through their use of deadly force. Plaintiff argues that Defendants shooting
Deweese violated his constitutional rights and that, even if they perceived Deweese
as threatening, Defendants recklessly incited the need to use deadly force. Plaintiff
again fails to show that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law.
Plaintiff first argues that the law clearly established that officers may not shoot
a suspect absent probable cause of an immediate threat to human life. But this is
exactly the kind of highly generalized proposition that precedent prohibits.
See White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79–80 (2017) (“Pauly II”); Flores, 101 F.4th
at 1197–99. Plaintiff must still point us to binding case law that is “particularized to
the facts of the case.” Flores, 101 F.4th at 1197 (quoting Perry, 892 F.3d at 1123).
Although Plaintiff attempts to cobble together several general principles from various
cases, Plaintiff cites no case that clearly establishes that shooting a suspect who
points a gun at a police canine in the presence of officers is unlawful.
Plaintiff also argues that the law clearly established that a “police onslaught”
provoking a defensive reaction is unconstitutional. It argues that Defendants
recklessly incited the need to use deadly force when they sent in the canine and
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“rushed” in behind it with weapons drawn. Although “an officer’s actions leading up
to the use of force[] is absolutely relevant in determining whether a police officer
acted unreasonably in effecting a seizure,” Plaintiff must still show that the law
clearly established “that an officer’s particular use of excessive force” was
unconstitutional. Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1223 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Pauly III”)
(citing Pauly II, 580 U.S. at 79). Plaintiff primarily relies on our decisions in Allen
v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997), and Estate of Ceballos v. Husk,
919 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2019), which relied on and interpreted Allen. But neither is
persuasive.
In Allen, police learned of a man who allegedly threatened his family, left his
home with a firearm, and went to his sister’s house threatening suicide. 119 F.3d
at 839. When police arrived, the man was in his car with one foot out of the car and a
gun in his right hand resting on the console. Id. The plaintiff alleged that police
repeatedly screamed at the man to drop his weapon and get out of the car. Id. at 839,
841. One officer went around to the passenger’s side to seize the gun while another
officer held the man’s left arm. Id. at 839. When the officer attempted to open the
passenger side door, the man pointed his gun at him before swinging it around toward
the other officers. Id. Officers and the man exchanged shots, and the man died. Id.
The entire exchange lasted about ninety seconds. Id. Because a reasonable jury
could have concluded “that the officers’ actions were reckless and precipitated the
need to use deadly force,” we determined that the officers were not entitled to
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qualified immunity. Id. at 841 (citing Sevier v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 60 F.3d 695,
699 (10th Cir. 1995)).
We relied on and interpreted that holding in Ceballos. There, a man’s wife
called police reporting that her husband was in the driveway with two baseball bats,
“acting crazy,” drunk, and likely on drugs. Ceballos, 919 F.3d at 1209. Once at the
scene, officers saw the man pacing in the driveway, yelling and swinging a baseball
bat. Id. at 1210. Officers approached from the street with weapons drawn and
repeatedly shouted commands for the man to drop the bat, but he did not comply. Id.
An officer “shot and killed an emotionally distraught Ceballos within a minute of
arriving on scene.” Id. at 1216. We concluded that Allen clearly established the
officer’s conduct as unlawful because the officer “approached Ceballos quickly,
screaming at Ceballos to drop the bat and refusing to give ground as Ceballos
approached the officers.” Id. We also found it significant that the officers in both
Allen and Ceballos knew that the decedent’s “capacity to reason was diminished,
whatever the underlying reason might have been—mental health problems, emotional
distress, drunkenness, or drugs.” Id. at 1217. Thus, we concluded that the law
clearly established “that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when his or her
reckless or deliberate conduct results in the need for lethal force or when the officers
rely on lethal force unreasonably as a first resort in confronting an irrational suspect
who is armed only with a weapon of short-range lethality and who has been confined
on his own property.” Id. at 1219.
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Neither of these cases clearly establish that Defendants’ conduct here
recklessly incited the need for lethal force. In both Allen and Ceballos, officers
hastily confronted a suspect that the officers knew had a diminished capacity to
reason. Despite this knowledge, the officers used lethal force as a “first resort.” In
Allen, officers shot the suspect within ninety seconds. In Ceballos, the encounter
lasted one minute.
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Deweese suffered from diminished capacity
at the time of the shooting. Plaintiff’s complaint cuts against that being a reasonable
inference because Plaintiff specifically alleged that Deweese only had a single,
eight-ounce beer before every other bartender refused to serve him. 5 Defendants also
did not use deadly force as a “first resort.” Instead, they interacted with Deweese for
over thirteen minutes. During this time, Deweese was armed and noncompliant.
When Defendants finally confronted Deweese, they first deployed canines—after
5
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in distinguishing Allen by inferring Deweese was not intoxicated and not drawing that inference in Plaintiff’s favor. But inferring that Deweese was intoxicated is not a reasonable inference from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff does not allege that Deweese was intoxicated or “irrational.” Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Deweese ordered only a single, eightounce beer before the bartender refused to serve him more. He also alleges that the bartender at the second bar kicked him out before he barely got in the door. Thus, it would not be reasonable to infer that Deweese was intoxicated or had otherwise diminished capacity. We do not address Plaintiff’s other arguments related to the district court’s inferences, as we do not rely on those same inferences on this de novo review. We also do not address Plaintiff’s argument that the district court “confused the qualified immunity analysis between the constitutional violations at issue.” We address each of Plaintiff’s claims separately.
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they warned they would do so. 6 Defendants only resorted to deadly force when
Deweese pointed his weapon. Thus, Allen and Ceballos did not clearly establish that
Defendants’ actions recklessly incited the need for deadly force.
Defendants also did not resort to lethal force “as a first resort in confronting an
irrational suspect who is armed only with a weapon of short-range lethality and who
has been confined on his own property.” Id. As discussed above, Defendants did not
use lethal force as a “first resort,” nor did Plaintiff allege that he was an “irrational
suspect.” Deweese was also not “armed only with a weapon of short-range
lethality”—he was armed with a gun. And officers found Deweese not on his own
property but in a public space. For these reasons, Allen and Ceballos did not clearly
establish that Defendants’ actions violated Deweese’s Fourth Amendment rights. 7
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ conduct here was an egregious or
obvious violation of Deweese’s rights sufficient to overcome qualified immunity
6
Plaintiff does not argue that the officers’ use of the canine alone constituted deadly force.
7
Plaintiff also cites our decision in Pauly III. Although Plaintiff does not analogize that case to the facts here, that case is sufficiently distinct. There, officers approached a suspected misdemeanant’s house after dark, threatened to come in without announcing themselves as police, and shot the suspect without warning when he “aimlessly” pointed a gun out of the window. Pauly III, 874 F.3d at 1215 & n.5, 1222. Plaintiff also cites our decision in Bond v. City of Tahlequah, Okla., 981 F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, judgment rev'd, 595 U.S. 9 (2021), arguing that we can consider it for qualified immunity purposes despite it being reversed on different grounds. But even if we assume Plaintiff is correct, that case is also factually distinct. See Bond, 981 F.3d at 823–24 (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that officers acted unreasonably when they cornered an intoxicated, unarmed man into his garage and shot him after he picked up a hammer in selfdefense of an impending taser, all in less than one minute).
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without a case on point. But this argument fails as well. A right can be clearly
established in “the rare case or ‘extreme circumstance[]’ where the conduct in
question has not previously been held unlawful, but a government official may still
have notice that their conduct violates a constitutional right because it is so apparent
as to apply with obvious clarity.” Brown, 124 F.4th at 1265 (quoting Frasier, 992 F.3d
at 1015). This is not that case. See, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 9 (2020)
(per curiam) (holding that “any reasonable officer should have realized” that such
“particularly egregious” conduct—holding a prisoner in a feces-covered cell for six
days—“offended the Constitution”). Thus, the law entitles Defendants to qualified
immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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