E.T. v. the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County

majority opinion

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

E.T. v. The Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (A-69-24) (089237)

Argued November 17, 2025 -- Decided August 19, 2026

JUSTICE WAINER APTER, writing for the Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether New Jersey courts can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA) as to plaintiffs’ allegations that they were sexually abused by a part-time counselor at the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (BGCHC) between 1976 and 1984.

After the Legislature amended the Child Sexual Abuse Act in 2019 to allow “survivors of child sexual abuse” to bring certain actions for redress “any time before reaching” age 55, nine plaintiffs sued BGCHC, BGCA, and others for damages resulting from child sexual abuse that they allege took place between 1976 and 1984. Plaintiffs allege that a part-time counselor at BGCHC sexually abused them both at BGCHC-sponsored activities and at his apartment. BGCA moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion court determined that there was no general jurisdiction over BGCA in New Jersey but denied the motion to dismiss as to specific personal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional discovery followed.

Discovery revealed that BGCHC, which remains a defendant in this case, is a nonprofit corporation headquartered and incorporated in New Jersey. It is subject to personal jurisdiction here. BGCA, however, was federally chartered by Congress in the District of Columbia and is headquartered in Georgia. It is governed by a Board of Directors with “powers, duties, and responsibilities . . . as provided in the constitution and bylaws of the corporation.” 36 U.S.C. § 31104. Congress explicitly provided that “[t]he corporation is liable for the acts of its officers and agents acting within the scope of their authority.” Id. § 31110. It did not provide that BGCA is liable for the acts of its Member Organizations or their officers, employees, or agents. The Court reviews provisions of the BGCA constitution that governed the relationship between BGCA and BGCHC at the relevant times, as well as testimony about organizational structure, on pages 8 to 14 of its opinion.

The motion judge determined that BGCA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. The Appellate Division reversed. 478 N.J. Super. 102, 106 (App. Div. 2024). The Court granted leave to appeal. 260 N.J. 589 (2025).

HELD: There is no specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA in this case because plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to any act that BGCA affirmatively took in or directed toward New Jersey.

1. Rule 4:4-4(b)(1) has been construed as vesting New Jersey’s courts with jurisdiction over non-residents to the outer limits permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and New Jersey courts are bound by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting those limits. The Supreme Court has recognized two forms of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. General or all-purpose jurisdiction permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation for any and all claims against it if the corporation’s contacts with the forum State are so constant and pervasive, so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State. In contrast, under Supreme Court case law, specific jurisdiction permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation if (1) the defendant takes some act to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of that State’s laws; and (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum State. If both requirements are met, courts then consider whether exercising jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Under the first part of that test, the defendant must have deliberately reached into the forum State; in other words, absent a duty to act, “purposeful availment” of the privileges of a forum State cannot normally include what a nonresident defendant has failed to do. Under the second part, there must be a strong connection between the defendant’s affirmative acts directed toward the forum State and the plaintiff’s lawsuit. The Court discusses in detail Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), which plaintiffs argue to support specific personal jurisdiction as to their claims. (pp. 18-23)

2. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the evidence uncovered during jurisdictional discovery establishes that BGCA maintained contacts with New Jersey during the relevant time period, as by: providing BGCHC with template and sample activities and programming; providing support in other areas, including resource development, budgeting, and working with volunteers, including BGCHC’s board; and making professional development and training opportunities available to BGCHC employees. BGCHC in turn paid annual membership dues to BGCA. And BGCHC was required to use, and did use, BGCA’s name and logo on “everything.” But plaintiffs’ claims do not “arise out of or relate to” those contacts. This is not a lawsuit brought by BGCHC against BGCA for breach of contract, reimbursement of overpaid dues, or any problem related to the sample activities and programming, support, professional development, or training opportunities that BGCA made available to BGCHC. It is not a trademark or intellectual property suit related to BGCHC’s use of BGCA’s name or logo. And it is not a suit by a person alleging

that an employee or agent of BGCA sexually abused them at a BGCA-sponsored event in New Jersey or that BGCA purposefully sent a known sexual abuser, who worked as its employee or agent, to New Jersey. And they do not allege that their abuse took place during a BGCA trip or an event that BGCA purposefully planned in New Jersey. (pp. 23-28)

3. Instead, according to plaintiffs, their claims “focus[] on a theory that BGCA established youth serving organizations in New Jersey through its local clubs but failed to implement policies and procedures to safeguard and prevent against child sexual abuse against minors that were members of the clubs.” The Court explains that neither it nor the United States Supreme Court has ever held that a failure to promulgate policies or procedures can constitute purposeful availment, and it notes that the cases relied on by the dissent do not do so, either. The Court finds the cases cited by the dissent distinguishable and disagrees that the record shows BGCA controls BGCHC or “came into New Jersey to establish” “place[s] of safe recreation,” noting that only local member clubs like BGCHC did that. (pp. 28-40)

4. Despite plaintiffs’ argument that the “the uniqueness of this case is that the claim is so intertwined with the contact,” plaintiffs’ counsel explicitly conceded at oral argument that under their theory, specific personal jurisdiction against BGCA would be appropriate in any State in a negligence suit brought by the victim of a motor vehicle crash if the vehicle were driven by an employee or agent of any local Boys and Girls Club, and the victim alleged that BGCA had failed to promulgate safe driving regulations that could have averted the crash. Specific jurisdiction is supposed to be different from general jurisdiction in a key way: it is supposed to “cover[] defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” - Ford,

- - 592 U.S. at 359. Here, plaintiffs’ theory would subject

BGCA to specific personal jurisdiction in all fifty States, on any claim in which an agent or employee of a local club was alleged to cause some harm, as long as the plaintiff alleged that the harm could have been avoided had BGCA promulgated some kind of policy or procedure. That is the opposite of specific personal jurisdiction. It is far more expansive than even general jurisdiction. A court does not weigh considerations of fair play and substantial justice until it has found that the defendant has experienced sufficient minimum contacts. Because that threshold is not met in this case, the Court does not reach the question of fair play and substantial justice, which the dissent discusses, but it notes that plaintiffs’ claims will still be heard in New Jersey, though not against BGCA. (pp. 40-45)

AFFIRMED.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting, expresses the view that this case is not about haling national organizations into court for any conceivable harm caused by their local affiliates, but rather the particular failure of an organization that promotes

its Member Organizations as “safe haven[s]” for New Jersey children to keep those children safe from sexual abuse. Justice Hoffman writes that BGCA purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey forum through significant affirmative acts, including its promotion, control over, and support of BGCHC and other New Jersey Member Organizations. Justice Hoffman also asserts that, similar to - Ford,

--plaintiffs’ claims

both “arise out of” and “relate to” BGCA’s promotion, control over, and support of BGCHC -- specifically through BGCA’s (i) branding, (ii) membership requirements, and (iii) proffered trainings and programming. Finally, Justice Hoffman explains why, in the dissent’s view, “fair play and substantial justice” necessitate a finding of specific jurisdiction in New Jersey -- plaintiffs’ place of residence at the time of their alleged childhood sexual abuse, the location of the alleged abuse, and the only forum in which plaintiffs’ claims can be heard.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,

and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER’s opinion. JUSTICE

HOFFMAN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE FASCIALE joins.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-69 September Term 2024

089237

E.T.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

The Boys and Girls Club

of Hudson County, f/k/a,

The Jersey City Boys Club,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant-Respondent.

A.M.,

Plaintiff,

Boys and Girls Clubs of

Hudson County,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant.

A.R.,

Plaintiff,

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

Hudson County f/k/a Jersey

City Boys’ Club, and Arthur

Freudenberg,

Defendants.

A.R.2,

Plaintiff,

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Club of

Hudson County f/k/a Jersey

City Boys Club, and Arthur

Freudenberg,

Defendants.

E.R., and R.R.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

The Boys and Girls Club of

Hudson County, f/k/a The

Jersey City Boys Club,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant-Respondent.

J.A., A.M., and G.M.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

The Boys and Girls Club of

Hudson County, f/k/a, The

Jersey City Boys Club,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant-Respondent.

On appeal from the Superior Court,

Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at

478 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 2024).

Argued Decided

November 17, 2025 August 19, 2026

J. Silvio Mascolo argued the cause for appellants

(Rebenack Aronow & Mascolo, attorneys; J. Silvio

Mascolo, of counsel and on the brief).

Michael L. Eber (Caplan Cobb) a member of the Georgia

bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for

respondent (Fishman McIntyre Levine Samansky,

attorneys; Mitchell B. Levine, on the brief).

JUSTICE WAINER APTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case tests the limits of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs allege that they were sexually abused by a part-time counselor

at the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (BGCHC) between 1976 and

1984. They sued BGCHC, the Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA or the

Corporation), and others for damages.

BGCHC is headquartered and incorporated in New Jersey. All accept

that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, and it remains a

defendant in this case.

BGCA, however, was federally chartered by Congress in the District of

Columbia and is headquartered in Georgia. Plaintiffs claim that specific

personal jurisdiction over BGCA is proper in New Jersey because BGCA

“established youth serving organizations in New Jersey through its local clubs

but failed to implement policies and procedures to safeguard and prevent

against child sexual abuse against minors that were members of the clubs.”

We find that the facts elicited during jurisdictional discovery do not

show that plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to any act that BGCA took to

purposefully avail itself of the laws of New Jersey. We therefore hold that

New Jersey courts cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA in

this case.

In 2019, the Legislature amended the Child Sexual Abuse Act to allow

“survivors of child sexual abuse” to bring certain civil actions for redress “any

time before reaching the age of fifty-five.” W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506,

511 (2023); N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1). The amendment expressly “reviv[ed]

claims that would have been barred under the prior two-year statute of

limitations.” W.S., 252 N.J. at 511.

Nine plaintiffs, in what became six consolidated lawsuits, then sued

BGCHC, BGCA, and others for damages resulting from child sexual abuse that

they allege took place between 1976 and 1984. Plaintiffs allege that Arthur

Freudenberg, a part-time counselor at BGCHC, used his position to gain their

trust and then sexually abused them both at BGCHC-sponsored activities and

at his apartment. In the 1980s, Freudenberg was charged with 493 counts of

aggravated sexual assault of boys ages 11 to 13. He was sentenced to 20 years

in prison.

BGCA moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion

court initially relied on Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), to hold

that BGCA was not subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey because it

was not incorporated here, had no principal place of business here, and did not

maintain “continuous and systematic contacts with New Jersey.” Plaintiffs

alleged that the court could “exercise general jurisdiction over BGCA because

the local clubs serve as alter ego[s] or agents of BGCA.” The motion court

disagreed, holding that plaintiffs’ theory “would render BGCA at home in

every state where it has a local affiliated member,” which would violate

Daimler. The motion court also cited BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S.

402, 414 (2017), for the proposition that general jurisdiction did not exist over

BNSF in Montana even though BNSF had “over 2,000 miles of railroad track

and more than 2,000 employees in Montana.”

However, the court denied the motion to dismiss as to specific personal

jurisdiction, finding that “[f]actual disputes exist regarding BGCA’s

involvement in the operations of BGCH[C].” The court therefore ordered that

all six cases be consolidated for limited jurisdictional discovery. That

discovery revealed the following facts.

BGCHC is a New Jersey nonprofit corporation. Its principal place of

business is in New Jersey.

BGCA is a “federally chartered corporation” that was incorporated by

Congress in 1956. 36 U.S.C. § 31101. It is “incorporated and domiciled in the

District of Columbia.” Ibid. Its principal place of business was originally in

New York, id. § 31107, but is now in Georgia. The purpose of BGCA is “to

promote the health, social, educational, vocational, and character development

of youth throughout the United States.” Id. § 31102(1). BGCA is governed by

a Board of Directors with “powers, duties, and responsibilities . . . as provided

in the constitution and bylaws of the corporation.” Id. § 31104. “[E]ligibility

for membership in the corporation” is likewise provided for in the constitution

and bylaws, although Congress prescribed that “[e]ach member has one vote

on each matter submitted to a vote at a meeting of the members.” Id. § 31103.

Congress explicitly provided that “[t]he corporation is liable for the acts

of its officers and agents acting within the scope of their authority.” Id.

§ 31110. It did not provide that BGCA is liable for the acts of its Member

Organizations or their officers, employees, or agents.

This case is governed by BGCA’s 1971 constitution, which was in effect

until 1990. Because the constitution governed the relationship between BGCA

and BGCHC, we discuss its provisions in detail.

Article III provided that “[t]he membership of the Corporation shall

consist of organizations which operate one or more Boys’ Clubs in accordance

with requirements and standards established by the National Council of the

Corporation.” These are known as Member Organizations.

Article IV provided:

The policies of the Corporation shall be determined by

a National Council which shall also, as provided in this

Constitution, establish requirements and standards for

membership in the Corporation; elect directors and

officers of the Corporation and members-at-large of the

National Council; determine annual membership dues

to be paid by Member Organizations; and act on all

matters which may properly come before it.

[(emphasis added).]

The National Council consisted of two delegates from each Member

Organization. All decisions of the National Council required a “majority vote

of the Member Organizations present.”

Pursuant to Article VII, the day-to-day “business, property and affairs of

the Corporation shall be managed by a Board of Directors . . . elected at the

annual meeting of the National Council.” Although officers and members of

the Corporation’s Board of Directors were permitted to attend National

Council meetings, they were not permitted to vote; only the two delegates

chosen by each Member Organization were permitted to vote. Similarly,

although “[e]ach professional member of the National Staff of the Corporation

shall be entitled to be present at any meeting of the National Council,” none

shall “be entitled to vote.”

The Board had “the power to establish policies not inconsistent with

those established by the National Council.” It also had the authority to “cancel

the membership of [a] Member Organization and withdraw the privileges of

membership” if, in its judgment, the Member Organization did not “meet the

established requirements and standards” set by the National Council.1

The dissent asserts that the Board could also enact membership

requirements. See post at ___ (slip op. at 40-44). Pursuant to Articles IV and VII of the 1971 constitution, that is incorrect. Only the National Council had authority to “establish requirements and standards for membership in the Corporation.” Although the constitution granted the Board no fewer than ten

Pursuant to Article IX, “[t]he officers of the Corporation shall be a

Chairman of the Board, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents,” etc., “all of

whom shall be elected by the National Council at its annual meeting.”

Pursuant to Article X, the Board “shall appoint a National Director of the

Corporation” who “shall direct the work and employees of the Corporation

subject to, and in accordance with, the instructions of the Board.”

Pursuant to Article XV, the constitution could be “amended upon a twothirds (2/3) affirmative vote of the Member Organizations present . . . at any

meeting of the National Council.”

Membership requirements set by the National Council provided that each

local Member Organization was required to have a “board of directors,

executive committee, administrative committee or otherwise named governing

body of responsible citizens” known as a “local governing body.” The local

governing body

shall have control of the Boys’ Club buildings or

designated Boys’ Club rooms; shall have control of the

expenditures of the Boys’ Club within an established

budget; shall have the authority to determine policies

and establish programs; shall have the authority to

appoint the executive, fix his compensation and

different powers, including the power to “adopt the annual budget of the Corporation; borrow money; raise and disburse funds; invest and reinvest funds of the Corporation; sell, buy and exchange properties and securities of the Corporation; make contracts” and more, not one involved setting membership requirements.

prescribe his duties and the terms of his employment;

shall have the authority to fix the compensation of other

employees; and shall have the authority, or delegate the

authority to the executive, to hire and discharge

employees and prescribe their duties.

Each local Member Organization was also required to employ “a fulltime Executive Director who shall have executive and administrative control

of activities and personnel . . . in accordance with policies and procedures

established by the local governing body.” While the Executive Director “shall

be acceptable to Boys’ Clubs of America,” the person “shall be responsible

directly to the local governing body,” not to BGCA.

Member Organizations were required to “display the emblem of Boys’

Clubs of America on the outside of their buildings” and on printed materials.

There were also minimum requirements for each individual club, including:

(1) “sufficient floor area and room spaces, suitably equipped for carrying on a

diversified and constructive program of activities which must be approved by

Boys’ Clubs of America”; (2) “sufficient full-time, part-time and volunteer

workers who are qualified in personality, character, experience, education and

training for the leadership and guidance of boys”; and (3) “at least one hundred

boy members enrolled in any twelve-month period.” Individual clubs were

also required to “be maintained in a satisfactory state of cleanliness and

sanitation,” “comply with state laws and local ordinances for protection and

safety,” and “be adequately heated and lighted.”

Member Organizations were required to pay dues “to the Corporation in

such amounts and on such terms and conditions” as the National Council

determined. Beginning in 1971, Member Organizations were required to pay

up to 1.5% of their total annual operating expenses to the Corporation in dues.

Annual dues from all Member Organizations across the country accounted for

approximately 17% of BGCA’s budget.

Gary Greenberg, a former Executive Director of BGCHC, testified that

he used BGCA “as a resource” to help oversee and improve existing programs

and initiate new programs at BGCHC. He testified that between 1977 and

1983, BGCA provided BGCHC with “template and sample activities and

programming” on topics including “physical education, social recreation,

leadership and character development, alcohol abuse and prevention” and

more. BGCA also provided support in other areas, including resource

development, budgeting, and working with BGCHC’s board. And BGCA

made professional development and training opportunities available to

BGCHC staff. BGCHC, Greenberg stated, paid annual membership dues to

BGCA. BGCHC was also required to use, and did use, BGCA’s name and

logo on “everything,” from the building to letterhead to information sent to

parents and the community, in order “to create a brand . . . that people can rely

on, that people feel confident in.”

John Miller, BGCA’s senior vice president of field relations, testified

that, as set forth in the provisions of the 1971 constitution quoted above, the

National Council, not BGCA, set all membership requirements for local

Member Organizations. According to Miller, the National Council was made

up of Member Organizations and was supported -- not controlled -- by BGCA:

Miller testified that the National Council had the “sole authority to set”

membership requirements by majority vote, so all membership requirements

had to be agreed upon by “the majority of member organizations.” BGCA was

then responsible for managing and enforcing “the membership requirements as

they [were] passed by the national council,” but it did not have authority to

“make membership requirements on [its] own” or “force” local Member

Organizations “to meet any other requirement other than those . . . passed by

the national council.”2 Miller additionally testified that local Member

Plaintiffs assert that Miller “conceded that BGCA could have imposed a requirement that would have prevented employees and volunteers from using their position with its clubs to invite its child members to their home without another adult present.” That is incorrect. Rather, in response to a series of questions about whether the National Council could have passed a membership requirement preventing employees or volunteers from inviting child members to their homes, Miller stated that the National Council -- not BGCA -- could have done so: “The local organization, independent and autonomous, is a member of the national council, so the majority of those organizations will

Organizations had “the responsibility and the authority” to hire, evaluate, and

train all staff.

Miller also testified that, between 1978 and 1983, even if BGCA

“learned that a local club was employing a convicted sex offender,” it “did not

have the authority” “to require the local club to remove that person” from their

position. This was so because BGCA could not “control what [a local

Member] [O]rganization does outside of the membership requirements which

they have agreed to abide by.”

After jurisdictional discovery was complete, a different motion judge

held that BGCA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey

because BGCA “purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey forum” and “that

availment relates to the claims by Plaintiffs.” The motion court found that

BGCA provided local Member Organizations “marketing support, strategic

planning support, leadership development and training, facility, [and]

consultations,” and Member Organizations in turn paid dues to BGCA.

Member Organizations also used “the BGCA logo and branding” to “benefit

from . . . name recognition and public trust.” The motion court held: “BGCA

determine the membership requirements that Boys and Girls [Clubs] of America, the corporate office, can manage and enforce.”

marketed its youth clubs in New Jersey, and an employee abused a patron.

Accordingly, BGCA is subject to personal jurisdiction.”

In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. E.T. v. Boys &

Girls Club of Hudson Cnty., 478 N.J. Super. 102, 106 (App. Div. 2024). The

Appellate Division agreed with the motion court that “BGCA had contacts

with New Jersey through its relationship with” BGCHC, including receiving

dues from BGCHC and providing support, training, and leadership

development to BGCHC. Id. at 112. It also acknowledged that BGCHC used

“the BGCA brand to market its services to the local community” and accessed

“BGCA’s programmatic and financial guidance.” Id. at 113. According to the

Appellate Division, however, these contacts did not mean “that BGCA availed

itself to New Jersey with respect to specific personal jurisdiction regarding

plaintiffs’ allegations of Freudenberg’s sexual abuse,” because BGCA’s

support of BGCHC did not “relate to Freudenberg’s alleged sexual abuse.” Id.

at 112, 114.

The Appellate Division emphasized that there was no evidence “BGCA

maintained control over the hiring, training, supervising, or termination of any

[BGCHC] employee,” including Freudenberg. Id. at 113. Instead, local

Member Organizations “solely hire, evaluate, and train their employees

without the oversight of BGCA.” Ibid. In addition, BGCHC’s “executive

director managed the local club’s operations and reported to the club’s

trustees, not to BGCA.” Ibid. The appellate court therefore concluded that

New Jersey could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 115.

We granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal. 260 N.J. 589 (2025).

II.

Plaintiffs argue that the Appellate Division misconstrued “[t]he

gravamen” of their claim. According to plaintiffs, the Appellate Division’s

conclusion that BGCA had no control over Freudenberg “is a red herring.”

Instead, “[t]he gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim . . . [and] the argument here that

the Boys and Girls Club of America has purposefully availed itself” of New

Jersey “is . . . essentially: You, Boys and Girls Club of America, have

oversight, have control, over these local clubs. And you, Boys and Girls Club

of America, failed to have policies and procedures in place to prevent the harm

here. This entire specific jurisdiction issue that’s before this court depends on

this.”3 In plaintiffs’ view, BGCA “has used local Boys and Girls of America

clubs to market, sell, and maintain its product throughout the country,

The dissent accuses us of mischaracterizing “plaintiffs’ ‘theory,’” and “conflat[ing] the basis of plaintiffs’ tort claims with their argument regarding purposeful availment.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 16-17). Every one of plaintiffs’ arguments discussed in this opinion is quoted directly from their brief in support of their Motion for Leave to Appeal or the oral argument that plaintiffs’ counsel presented to the Court.

including in New Jersey, since 1956,” and has “profited from the operation of

its local clubs in New Jersey and the sale of its product to the children of New

Jersey.” “Just as Ford touted its brand across Montana and Minnesota” in Ford

Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021),

plaintiffs maintain that BGCA required all local Boys and Girls Clubs “to use

BGCA’s name and logo ‘on everything’” so that parents would believe the

clubs were “safe for their minor children to attend because of the very safety

standards, policies, and procedures” that parents “assumed BGCA required

[the clubs] to follow.”

BGCA argues this case bears no resemblance to Ford Motor Co.

because, unlike Ford, BGCA does not manufacture, market, or sell any

“products” and earns no profits at all. More fundamentally, BGCA maintains,

an “alleged failure to adopt policies on sexual abuse does not amount to

purposeful availment” of the laws of any particular State. According to

BGCA, “a contrary holding would eviscerate the distinction between general

and specific jurisdiction” and would subject it to jurisdiction “in any forum

where any of its affiliates own and operate a local club -- regardless of the

claim.” And even if the failure to adopt a policy could constitute purposeful

availment, BGCA contends, it had no ability to adopt the policies plaintiffs

allege could have prevented the abuse here, because “only the local clubs

themselves, working collectively and democratically through the National

Council -- and not BGCA -- could pass membership requirements.”

III.

Personal jurisdiction “presents a mixed question of law and fact that

must be resolved at the outset, before the matter may proceed.” D.T. v.

Archdiocese of Phila., 260 N.J. 27, 41 (2025) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Zahl v. Eastland, 465 N.J. Super. 79, 92 (App. Div. 2020)).

We review a trial court’s legal determinations de novo. Ibid. Our review of a

“court’s factual findings with respect to jurisdiction,” however, “is limited to

determining whether those findings are supported by substantial, credible

evidence in the record.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 358 (App. Div. 2017)).

Under Rule 4:4-4(b)(1), a New Jersey court may exercise personal

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant “consistent with due process of

law.” “That Rule ‘effects the so-called long-arm jurisdiction of the State and

has been construed as vesting New Jersey’s courts with jurisdiction over nonresidents to the outer limits permitted by due process.’” D.T., 260 N.J. at 41

(quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.1.1 on R. 4:4-4

(2024)).

The United States Supreme Court’s modern personal jurisdiction cases

have “grappled . . . with the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment

on state courts.” Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 11 (2025)

(emphases omitted). The reason the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause constrains when state courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over outof-state defendants is “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of

the respective States.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). It

“ensure[s] that the States[,] through their courts, do not reach out beyond the

limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal

system.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292

(1980). In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

prevents States “from transcending the limits of their authority.” Fuld, 606

U.S. at 15 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306 (1914)).

Because we exercise personal jurisdiction to the outer limits permitted

by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, we are bound by United

States Supreme Court precedent interpreting those limits. “The Supreme Court

has recognized two forms of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants:

general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.” D.T., 260 N.J. at 42. The two

are distinct and should not be “[c]onfus[ed] or blend[ed].” Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).

“[G]eneral or all-purpose jurisdiction” permits a court to exercise

jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation for “‘any and all claims against

[it]’” if the corporation’s contacts with the forum State “are so constant and

pervasive,” “‘so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home

in the forum State.’” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122, 127 (second and third

alterations in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). A corporation’s

“place of incorporation and principal place of business,” each of which is

“easily ascertainable,” “are paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.” Id.

at 137 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

In contrast, specific jurisdiction, or “case-linked” jurisdiction, permits a

court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation if (1) the

defendant takes “some act” to “purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and

protections of [that State’s] laws,” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; and (2) the claim

“‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s’” purposeful availment of the

forum State, Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (alterations in original) (quoting

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8

(1984)). If both of these requirements are met, courts then consider whether

exercising jurisdiction “would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S.

102, 113 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945)).

Under the first part of that test, “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between

the defendant and the forum State . . . must come about by an action of the

defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112 (quoting

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The defendant

must have “deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home” and into the forum

State in order to purposely avail itself of that State’s laws. Ford Motor Co.,

592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). In other

words, “absent a duty to act, ‘purposeful availment’ of the privileges of a

forum state cannot normally include what a nonresident defendant has failed to

do.” Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 127 (1994)

(emphasis omitted).

Under the second part of the test for specific personal jurisdiction, there

must be a strong connection between the defendant’s affirmative acts directed

toward the forum State and the plaintiff’s lawsuit. See Ford Motor Co., 592

U.S. at 365, 371.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on Ford Motor Co., so we discuss that case in

detail. Ford is a “a global auto company . . . incorporated in Delaware and

headquartered in Michigan.” Id. at 355. The plaintiffs brought products

liability suits against Ford in Montana and Minnesota after accidents that

occurred in those States in a Ford Explorer and a Ford Crown Victoria,

respectively, caused death and serious injury. Id. at 356. Ford argued that it

could only be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Montana and

Minnesota if it had “designed, manufactured, or . . . sold in the State the

particular vehicle involved in the accident” -- which it had not. Ibid.

The Supreme Court rejected “Ford’s causation-only approach.” Id. at

361. It quoted the “arise out of or relate to” language discussed above and

held that although the “first half of that standard asks about causation . . . the

back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will support

jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Id. at 362.

The Court detailed the “strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation’” that supported specific jurisdiction in that case:

(1) “Ford urge[d] Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including

. . . Explorers and Crown Victorias,” “[b]y every means imaginable -- among

them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail”; (2) Ford

Explorers and Crown Victorias were sold “at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84

in Minnesota”; and (3) Ford dealers in Montana and Minnesota “regularly

maintain[ed] and repair[ed] Ford cars, including those whose warranties ha[d]

long since expired,” which “ma[d]e Ford money.” Id. at 365 (quoting

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414).

“In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana

and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned

and injured them in those States.” Ibid. Therefore, the Court held, even

though Ford sold the actual cars involved in the accidents outside of Montana

and Minnesota, those States’ courts could exercise specific personal

jurisdiction over Ford in the product liability suits. Id. at 371.

IV.

We hold that specific personal jurisdiction does not exist over BGCA in

this case because plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to any act that

BGCA affirmatively took in or directed toward New Jersey.

Plaintiffs argue that they have provided “overwhelming evidence that

BGCA purposefully availed itself to New Jersey.” We agree with plaintiffs

that the evidence uncovered during jurisdictional discovery establishes that

BGCA maintained contacts with New Jersey during the relevant time period.

Between 1977 and 1983, BGCA provided BGCHC with “template and

sample activities and programming” around topics including “physical

education, social recreation, leadership and character development, alcohol

abuse and prevention,” and more. BGCA provided support in other areas,

including resource development, budgeting, and working with volunteers,

including BGCHC’s board. And it made professional development and

training opportunities available to BGCHC employees. BGCHC, in turn, paid

annual membership dues to BGCA. And BGCHC was required to use, and did

use, BGCA’s name and logo on “everything.”

But plaintiffs’ claims do not “arise out of or relate to” those contacts.

This is not a lawsuit brought by BGCHC against BGCA for breach of contract,

reimbursement of overpaid dues, or any problem related to the sample

activities and programming, support, professional development, or training

opportunities that BGCA made available to BGCHC. See, e.g., Burger King,

471 U.S. at 479-80 (holding that a Michigan franchisee of a Florida company

was subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida for breach of contract claims

related to the franchise agreement).

It is not a trademark or intellectual property suit related to BGCHC’s use

of BGCA’s name or logo. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football

Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 411-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that personal

jurisdiction existed in Indiana over a trademark infringement suit brought by

the Indianapolis Colts, previously known as the “Baltimore Colts,” against the

Canadian Football League’s Baltimore team, which wanted to call itself the

“Baltimore CFL Colts”).

And it is not a suit by a person alleging that an employee or agent of

BGCA sexually abused them at a BGCA-sponsored event in New Jersey. It

therefore bears no resemblance to the cases cited by the dissent in which

“courts in New Jersey and across the country have found specific jurisdiction

over out-of-state institutions accused of negligence for failing to prevent

childhood sexual abuse.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 20).

Instead, in the cases cited by the dissent, the childhood sexual abuse

arose out of or was directly related to specific affirmative acts that the out-ofstate defendants took in the forum State. In Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of

Greensburg, plaintiff sued the Diocese of Greensburg, Pennsylvania in

Washington, D.C., alleging he was sexually abused by a priest during “churchsponsored events” the Diocese organized and ran in D.C. 581 F. Supp. 3d 176,

191 (D.D.C. 2022). A federal district court held that specific personal

jurisdiction was proper because the Diocese purposefully organized overnight

trips to D.C. each year, and the sexual abuse allegedly occurred during those

trips. Id. at 191-93.

Similarly, in WCVAWCK-Doe v. Boys & Girls Club of Greenwich, Inc.,

plaintiff alleged that he was sexually assaulted by another member of the Boys

and Girls Club of Greenwich, both at the Club in Connecticut, and once while

they were on a fieldtrip to New York as part of the Club’s summer camp. 188

N.Y.S.3d 98, 103 (App. Div. 2023). The New York Appellate Division held

that there was no specific personal jurisdiction over the Club in New York for

the acts of abuse that allegedly took place in Connecticut. Id. at 110.

However, it found that “[t]he Club’s presence in New York was the result of a

purposeful, deliberate action on its part of planning a trip to [a New York]

amusement park as part of its summer camp program,” and New York could

therefore exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Club “limited to the

one act of sexual abuse alleged to have occurred in New York.” Id. at 109-10.

In Doe 1 v. World Wrestling Entertainment, LLC, 811 F. Supp. 3d 706,

(D. Md. 2025) and Farrell v. United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee,

567 F. Supp. 3d 378 (N.D.N.Y. 2021), the connection between the claims, the

defendants, and the forum States were even stronger. In Doe 1, plaintiffs, who

served as “Ring Boys” for World Wrestling Entertainment, LLC (WWE),

alleged they were sexually abused by Mel Phillips, a WWE ringside announcer

who plaintiffs alleged WWE knew sexually abused “Ring Boys.” 811 F. Supp.

3d at 717-18, 731-32. A federal court held that specific personal jurisdiction

against WWE in Maryland was proper because WWE intentionally hosted

events in Maryland, and the sexual abuse took place both during and after

those WWE events. Id. at 717, 731-32. And in Farrell, a federal district court

held that specific personal jurisdiction against U.S. Speedskating (USS)

existed in New York because plaintiff alleged that she was sexually abused by

someone the court specifically found was acting as an agent for USS at a USS

Olympic training facility in New York. 567 F. Supp. 3d at 383, 387-88.

Finally, in Doe 70 v. Diocese of Metuchen, the Appellate Division

concluded that the Catholic Diocese of Richmond was subject to specific

personal jurisdiction in New Jersey because, after it learned that one of its

priests had the “propensity to sexually abuse children,” it intentionally “sen[t]”

him to work in New Jersey, and plaintiff alleged he was abused by the priest in

New Jersey. 477 N.J. Super. 270, 275-76, 282-83, 286 (App. Div. 2023).

Similarly, in DeLonga v. Diocese of Sioux Falls, a federal district court held

that specific personal jurisdiction against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee

existed in South Dakota because the Archdiocese, after learning that a priest

had sexually abused at least two children, offered him a position in

Milwaukee, where he allegedly abused plaintiff, and then sent him back to

South Dakota, where he allegedly abused plaintiff again. 329 F. Supp. 2d

1092, 1094-99 (D.S.D. 2004).

In each of those cases, the defendants either: (1) purposefully sent a

known sexual abuser who worked as its employee or agent to the forum State

and the employee or agent then committed the sexual abuse in the forum State;

(2) purposefully planned trips to or events in the forum State and the abuse

then took place during such a trip or event; or (3) both.

Here, plaintiffs do not allege that BGCA purposefully sent a known

sexual abuser, who worked as its employee or agent, to New Jersey. And they

do not allege that their abuse took place during a BGCA trip or an event that

BGCA purposefully planned in New Jersey.

Instead, according to plaintiffs, their claims “focus[] on a theory that

BGCA established youth serving organizations in New Jersey through its local

clubs but failed to implement policies and procedures to safeguard and prevent

against child sexual abuse against minors that were members of the clubs.”

For example, plaintiffs assert that “BGCA could have but did not have a policy

that prohibited a volunteer or employee of the local club from taking a minor

home or spending time alone” with a minor.

We have never held that a failure to promulgate policies or procedures

can constitute purposeful availment. Neither has the United States Supreme

Court. Recall that purposeful availment means the defendant takes “some act”

to “purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of [that State’s]

laws.” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (for purposes

of specific personal jurisdiction, claim must relate to “an action of the

defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State” (emphasis omitted));

Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (claim must relate to defendant “deliberately

‘reach[ing] out beyond’ its home” and into the forum State (quoting Walden,

571 U.S. at 285)).

According to the dissent, “[b]oth the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court

have repeatedly found purposeful availment in cases where the plaintiff’s

underlying claim was based on the defendant’s failure to act.” Post at ___

(slip op. at 17). As to specific personal jurisdiction, unless that action was

contractually or statutorily required in the forum State, the dissent is wrong.

Four of the cases the dissent cites stand for the unremarkable proposition

that a defendant who enters into a contract with a person or company in the

forum State, allows the other party to perform, and then breaches the contract,

causing harm in the forum State, is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a

breach of contract suit brought in the forum State.

Burger King involved “a Michigan resident who allegedly had breached

a franchise agreement with a Florida corporation by failing to make required

payments in Florida.” 471 U.S. at 464. The Supreme Court held that specific

personal jurisdiction over the Michigan resident in the Florida breach of

contract suit was proper. Id. at 487. In McGee v. International Life Insurance

Co., likewise, a California man entered into a contract for life insurance with

International Life Insurance Company (International), a Texas corporation.

355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957). The man paid his monthly premiums by mailing

checks to International’s Texas office. Id. at 221-22. When the man died,

International refused to pay benefits to his beneficiary mother, claiming the

man had committed suicide. Id. at 222. The mother sued International in

California for breach of contract. Ibid. The Supreme Court held that specific

personal jurisdiction over the breach of contract case was proper in California.

Id. at 223.

The three cases that the dissent cites from our Court are similar. In

McKesson Corp. v. Hackensack Medical Imaging, Hackensack Medical

Imaging (HMI) purchased “contrast agents” from a Texas company, leaving

over $20,000 in invoices unpaid. 197 N.J. 262, 267-69 (2009). We held that

Texas properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over HMI in the breach

of contract suit. Id. at 273-74, 278-79. In Farone v. Habel, defendant and her

husband owned a diner in Harrison, New Jersey. 22 N.J. 66, 68 (1956).

Plaintiff worked as the manager of the diner. Ibid. After defendant’s husband

died, defendant fired plaintiff and took over operation of the diner. Ibid.

Plaintiff sued the husband’s estate for $1,875 in unpaid wages. Id. at 69. We

held that specific personal jurisdiction existed against defendant as executor in

New Jersey because she owned and operated a diner here, and her supervision

of the diner was both “for the benefit of the estate” as well as for her personal

benefit. Id. at 74; see also Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 266-67, 272-73 (1971) (plaintiff, a New Jersey company, sold rivets to a New York

company; when the New York company failed to pay $1,713.50 for “materials

sold and delivered” to New York, we held that personal jurisdiction against the

New York company was proper in the breach of contract suit brought in New

Jersey).

Here, plaintiffs do not allege that BGCA entered into a contract with

them in New Jersey that it then breached. In fact, as the dissent points out,

BGCA “provides no direct services to youth and has no youth membership,”

post at ___ (slip op. at 12), so there could be no contract for BGCA to breach.

The dissent’s final purported “failure to act” case is the foundation of

modern personal jurisdiction doctrine: International Shoe. International Shoe

was a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Missouri that

employed “eleven to thirteen salesmen” in Washington State between 1937

and 1940. 326 U.S. at 313. Washington sued to collect “unpaid contributions

to the state unemployment compensation fund” that it claimed International

Shoe owed under Washington’s Unemployment Compensation Act. Id. at 311-31

12. It construed the payments as “a tax on the privilege of employing . . .

salesmen within the state measured by a percentage of the wages, here the

commissions payable to the salesmen,” for “unemployment benefits.” Id. at

321. International Shoe agreed that it employed salespeople to sell shoes in

Washington but claimed it could not be subject to personal jurisdiction or

required to pay into the fund because it “was not a corporation of the State of

Washington and was not doing business within the state.” Id. at 312-14. The

Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the “Appellant having rendered itself

amenable to suit upon obligations arising out of the activities of its salesmen in

Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in personam to collect the

tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of employing appellant’s salesmen

within the state.” Id. at 321.

In this context, International Shoe stands for the proposition that if a

company employs people in a State, it can be forced to answer a suit in that

State for its failure to pay required taxes on those employees’ wages. That

would help the dissent if this case had been brought by the State of New Jersey

against BGCA for failing to pay required unemployment taxes for New Jersey

employees (of which, of course, BGCA has none). It was not.

The dissent next claims that “[c]ourts have often -- and uncontroversially

-- found specific jurisdiction where a plaintiff brought suit against a defendant

for the failure to implement adequate policies, procedures, or trainings.” Post

at ___ (slip op. at 19). None of the cases the dissent cites were briefed by any

party, likely because each found specific personal jurisdiction when an out-ofstate entity took affirmative action in the State, and the plaintiff’s claim arose

out of or was related to that affirmative action.

In Ryan v. Newark Group., Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant

general partnership and two of its general partners contaminated plaintiffs’

land and drinking water in Massachusetts when they processed wastewater in

Quincy, Massachusetts. 814 F. Supp. 3d 78, 92, 94, 100 (D. Mass. 2025). The

district court found that personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts was proper over

the general partners and the partnership because the claims arose out of and

related to defendants’ in-state wastewater processing. Id. at 99-100.

In Doohan v. CTB Investors, LLC, the plaintiffs alleged that two

Maryland companies violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which

prohibits the use of “an automated telephone dialing system” to send nonemergency text messages “without the prior express consent of the recipient,”

when they sent or coordinated the sending of “unconsented text messages” to

Missouri residents advertising a Missouri bar. 427 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1041-43,

1046 (W.D. Mo. 2019). The district court held the companies were subject to

specific personal jurisdiction in Missouri because one owned and managed a

Missouri entity that was involved in crafting and sending the illegal text

messages, and the other was registered as a foreign company in Missouri and

employed Missouri residents to coordinate the text message campaign. Id. at

1047-51.

In Selke v. Germanwings GmbH, Virginia residents bought airline

tickets, in Virginia, from an agent (United Airlines) of Germanwings and its

parent company Lufthansa. 261 F. Supp. 3d 645, 650-51, 653-54 (E.D. Va.

2017). On one of their flights, the co-pilot “locked himself in the cockpit” and

intentionally crashed the plane into the French Alps, killing all six crew

members and 144 passengers. Id. at 651. The federal district court held that

(1) Germanwings was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Virginia

because it purposefully sold tickets on the flights in question to decedents

(plaintiffs’ relatives) through its agent in Virginia; and (2) Lufthansa was

subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Virginia because it maintained

offices and employees in the State, operated regularly scheduled flights to and

from the State, and authorized United to act as its agent to sell the tickets in

question in the State. Id. at 650, 653-59.

In McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff’s husband, an

Oklahoma resident, suffered a stroke on a Continental flight from Houston,

Texas to Newark, New Jersey. 133 F. Supp. 2d 514, 517 (S.D. Tex. 2001).

Plaintiff sued MedAire, an Arizona company that contracted with Continental

“to provide medical advice in the event of in-flight medical emergencies,”

alleging that MedAire’s advice, which allowed the plane to “continue[] to its

planned destination” despite her husband’s stroke, caused her husband’s death.

Id. at 517, 519 & n.1. The court held that specific personal jurisdiction in

Texas was proper because “MedAire entered into a contract with Houston,

Texas-based Continental to provide in-flight medical assistance in Texas and

elsewhere,” and the plaintiff’s allegations arose out of advice that MedAire

provided pursuant to that contract. Id. at 518-21.

In Facebook, Inc. v. Doe, plaintiff, a resident of Texas, alleged that she

was a victim of sex trafficking in Texas after her abuser targeted her on

Facebook. 650 S.W.3d 748, 758-59 (Tex. App. 2022). She sued Facebook for

violating a Texas anti-trafficking statute, alleging that Facebook “intentionally

or knowingly benefit[ed] from participating in a venture that traffic[ked]

another person.” Id. at 752 & n.2 (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 98.002(a)). A Texas court held that personal jurisdiction in Texas was

proper because Facebook “does substantial business in Texas; serves the

market for its social-networking website in Texas through its employees and

offices in Texas; markets its social-networking website in Texas; seeks new

users in Texas; [and] accesses and generates substantial profits from Texans’

data,” id. at 757, and plaintiff’s claims related to those activities, id. at 758.

And in Frederic v. Zodiac Development, plaintiff, a Louisiana resident,

was injured when installing glass at a building in Louisiana. 839 So. 2d 448,

450 (La. Ct. App. 2003). He sued one of the partners that owned the Louisiana

property. Ibid. A Louisiana court found specific personal jurisdiction was

proper because the partner was “responsible for the managerial and

administrative functions” of the Louisiana property, and the suit “ar[ose] out

of and/or . . . related to” those “contacts with Louisiana.” Id. at 454.

In all of these cases, the plaintiffs’ suits arose out of or related to

affirmative acts the defendants took in the forum State, including processing

wastewater, coordinating an illegal text message campaign, selling airline

tickets, entering into a contract and providing medical advice, marketing a

product, and managing a building. Most of the cases also involved defendants

with significant forum-state operations, and lawsuits that arose out of or

related to the actions of defendants’ in-state agents or employees.

Here, plaintiffs do not allege that their claims arise out of or relate to any

BGCA employees or agents in New Jersey (of which there were none), any

BGCA operations in New Jersey (of which there were none), or even the sale

of any BGCA “product” in New Jersey (of which there was none). It is

therefore not the majority, but the dissent, whose jurisdictional analysis “is

contrary to decades of precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court, this

Court, and other courts throughout the country.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 23).

The dissent analogizes this case to Ford, asserting that “[s]imilar to Ford

Motor Company, BGC of America ‘systematically served a market’ in New

Jersey” and that, “in serving this market, BGC of America’s ‘product’ of safe

spaces for children ‘malfunctioned’ because it failed to prevent multiple acts

of childhood sexual abuse over the better part of a decade.” Post at ___ (slip

op. at 29-30) (quoting Ford, 592 U.S. at 365). According to the dissent,

BGCA’s “branding, like Ford’s advertisements, ‘relates to’ plaintiffs’ claims”

because “[j]ust as the Ford plaintiffs ‘may [have] ma[d]e [their] purchase

because [they] saw ads for the car in local media,’ so too may plaintiffs have

joined [BGCHC] because of their ‘recognition’ of, and ‘trust’ in,” BGCA.

Post at ___ (slip op. at 31) (second, third, and fifth alterations in original)

(quoting Ford, 592 U.S. at 367). Finally, the dissent asserts, “just as the Ford

plaintiffs’ purchase of the defective vehicles led to their respective accidents,

plaintiffs likewise claim that their enrollment in a Member Organization with

insufficient policies, procedures, and trainings led to eight years of childhood

sexual abuse.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 31-32).

The analogy fails. Ford is a for-profit corporation. It sells 2.5 million

“new cars, trucks, and SUVs” each year through “over 3,200 licensed [Ford]

dealerships” across the United States. 592 U.S. at 355. The Supreme Court

held that it “systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota” by

paying for “billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail” urging

“Montanans and Minnesotans” to buy Fords. Id. at 365. It also sold its cars

through “36 Ford dealerships in Montana and 84 Ford dealerships in

Minnesota.” Ibid. The two Ford vehicles in question allegedly malfunctioned

in the forum States, causing death and serious injury. Id. at 356. The Supreme

Court held that even though the plaintiffs bought their individual Fords out of

State and then brought them into the forum States, there was specific personal

jurisdiction over Ford in the resulting product liability suits. Id. at 371.

BGCA is a nonprofit organization. It does not sell anything in New

Jersey. It has no licensed product dealerships in New Jersey, because it has no

product to sell. There was thus no BGCA “product” that could have

“malfunctioned.” But see post at ___, ___ (slip op. at 7, 29-30). Jurisdictional

discovery revealed not a single billboard, TV or radio spot, print ad, or piece

of direct mail that BGCA paid for in New Jersey, so plaintiffs could not have

possibly joined BGCHC because of BGCA’s paid advertising. But see post at

___ (slip op. at 31-32). And it was not any BGCA “product” that caused

plaintiffs’ injury -- it was sexual abuse. While the Ford plaintiffs alleged that

they purchased defective Ford vehicles, plaintiffs here purchased nothing from

BGCA. But see post at ___ (slip op. at 32).

The dissent repeatedly asserts that specific personal jurisdiction is

proper because BGCA “controlled” BGCHC, and this “control” constitutes

purposeful availment, which then “relates to” BGCA’s “alleged failure to

protect vulnerable children from sexual abuse.” See post at ___ (slip op. at

24); see also post at ___, ___, ___, ___, ___, ___ (slip op. at 4, 6, 7, 16, 37,

40).

But this contention ignores the facts recited by the motion court. The

dissent quotes one sentence from the Consolidated Financial Statements of the

Boys and Girls Clubs of America and Subsidiaries for the years ending

December 31, 2020 and 2019 for the proposition that BGCA “enters into

membership agreements with local Clubs to provide services that ultimately

further the mission of [BGCA] yet provide reciprocal value to the Club.” Post

at ___ n.3 (slip op. at 11 n.3). But the dissent disregards the next full

paragraph quoted by the motion court:

The accompanying consolidated financial statements

do not include the financial position and operating

results of the local member clubs, each of which is an

autonomous corporation organized under the laws of

the jurisdiction in which it is located. Each local

member club operates under a charter granted by

BGCA and has its own independent board of directors,

which controls the local Boys & Girls Club, its

programs, and staff. BGCA, the national organization,

does not exercise supervision, direction, or control of

these chartered local member clubs.

[(emphases added).]

The dissent’s quotations from Greenberg’s deposition, and the many

materials the dissent quotes from that are not in the record, see post at ___ &

n.1, ___ & nn.10-12 (slip op. at 8 & n.1, 33-35 & nn.10-12), cannot detract

from those essential facts.

Similarly, the dissent’s repeated assertion that BGCA “came into New

Jersey to establish,” “provid[e],” and “offer” “place[s] of safe recreation” for

New Jersey children, see post at ___, ___, ___ (slip op. at 4, 7, 29), is simply

false. BGCA did not establish, provide, or offer a single Boys and Girls Club

in New Jersey. Only local member clubs, including BGCHC, did.

At argument, plaintiffs’ counsel argued that “the uniqueness of this case

is that the claim is so intertwined with the contact.” The dissent likewise

contends that

[t]his case is not about haling a national organization

into court for any conceivably preventable harm caused

by a local branch, regardless of the nature of that

national organization’s in-state activities. Rather, it is

about the specific failure of an organization that

purports to establish “safe haven[s]” for children in

“needy areas” -- and promotes itself based upon that

promise -- to reasonably ensure that those children

remain safe from sexual abuse at its clubs.

[Post at ___ (slip op. at 26) (alteration in original); see

also post at ___, ___ (slip op. at 5, 50).]

However, plaintiffs’ counsel explicitly conceded at oral argument that

under their theory, specific personal jurisdiction against BGCA would be

appropriate in any State in a negligence suit brought by the victim of a motor

vehicle crash if the vehicle were driven by an employee or agent of any local

Boys and Girls Club, and the victim alleged that BGCA had failed to

promulgate safe driving regulations that could have averted the crash. It is

hard to see why, in the dissent’s view, that express concession is wrong. But

see post at ___ n.9 (slip op. at 25 n.9).

Similarly, it is hard to see how BGCA’s failure to “reasonably ensure

that . . . children remain safe” would not create specific personal jurisdiction

against BGCA in every State in which it has a local club, as long as a child is

injured either at the local club or by a local club’s employee or agent, and the

lawsuit alleges that BGCA failed “to take reasonable efforts to secure [the

children’s] safety.” See post at ___, ___ (slip op. at 26, 49).

The dissent emphasizes that “the ‘core’ of many -- if not most -- of

[BGCA’s] membership requirements was the ‘safety of young people’ enrolled

at [local clubs] throughout New Jersey and the United States.” See post at ___

(slip op. at 33). However, if that were sufficient to create specific personal

jurisdiction, it would subject BGCA to specific personal jurisdiction in all 50

States in any case in which a child’s parents alleged that BGCA’s “safety

requirements were not ‘sufficient’” to keep their child safe, and their claim

“‘relates to’ this patent insufficiency.” See post at ___ (slip op. at 33).

We agree with BGCA that an alleged failure to keep children safe “does

not amount to purposeful availment” of the laws of any particular State. We

also agree that “a contrary holding would eviscerate the distinction between

general and specific jurisdiction” and would subject BGCA to jurisdiction “in

any forum where any of its affiliates own and operate a local club -- regardless

of the claim.”

Specific jurisdiction is supposed to be different from general jurisdiction

in a key way: it is supposed to “cover[] defendants less intimately connected

with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 359.

Here, plaintiffs’ theory would subject BGCA to specific personal jurisdiction

in all fifty States, on any claim in which an agent or employee of a local club

was alleged to cause some harm, as long as the plaintiff alleged that the harm

could have been avoided had BGCA promulgated some kind of policy or

procedure.

That is the opposite of specific personal jurisdiction. It is far more

expansive than even general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136

(“The Ninth Circuit’s . . . theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to

general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an

outcome that would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general

jurisdiction’ we rejected in Goodyear[, 564 U.S. at 929].”); BNSF, 581 U.S. at

414 (general jurisdiction did not exist over BNSF in Montana even though

BNSF had “over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees

in Montana” because “[a] corporation that operates in many places can

scarcely be deemed at home in all of them”).

Finally, the dissent explains at length “why ‘fair play and substantial

justice’ necessitate a finding of specific jurisdiction in New Jersey.” Post at

___ (slip op. at 7); see also post at ___ (slip op. at 44-49). But to the extent

the dissent is arguing that notions of “fair play and substantial justice” can

permit a State to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a

case that does not arise out of or relate to the defendant’s affirmative contacts

with the State, the dissent is wrong.

As even the dissent seems to acknowledge, the “third prong of specific

jurisdiction,” in which “‘[t]he burden . . . shifts’” to the defendant to “‘present

a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render

jurisdiction unreasonable,’” applies only to a “‘nonresident defendant who has

been found to have minimum contacts with the forum’” and only when the

lawsuit arises out of or relates to those contacts. See post at ___ & n.17 (slip

op. at 44-45 & n.17) (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting

McKesson, 197 N.J. at 278). Indeed, we have previously held that “a court

may not weigh” the “considerations of fair play and substantial justice . . .

until it has found that the defendant has experienced sufficient minimum

contacts to satisfy the threshold determination.” Waste Management, 138 N.J.

at 121.

Because we find the threshold not met in this case, we do not reach the

question of fair play and substantial justice except to note the following. The

dissent repeatedly emphasizes that the New Jersey Child Victims Act’s

retroactive reopening of the statute of limitations makes “New Jersey the only

state in the nation that can hear plaintiffs’ claims.” See post at ___ (slip op. at

47); see also post at ___, ___, (slip op. at 4, 49). And it repeatedly accuses us

of abdicating our “obligation to provide a forum of redress to plaintiffs.” Post

at ___ (slip op. at 5); see also post at ___, ___ (slip op. at 5-6, 50). To be

clear: Plaintiffs’ claims will be heard in New Jersey. They simply will not be

heard against BGCA.

We hold that there is no specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA in this

case because plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to any act that

BGCA affirmatively took in or directed toward New Jersey. We therefore

affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRELOUIS, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER’s opinion.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE FASCIALE joins.

E.T.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

The Boys and Girls Club

of Hudson County, f/k/a,

The Jersey City Boys Club,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant-Respondent.

A.M.,

Plaintiff,

Boys and Girls Clubs of

Hudson County,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant.

A.R.,

Plaintiff,

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

Hudson County f/k/a Jersey

City Boys’ Club, and Arthur

Freudenberg,

Defendants.

A.R.2,

Plaintiff,

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Club of

Hudson County f/k/a Jersey

City Boys Club, and Arthur

Freudenberg,

Defendants.

E.R., and R.R.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

The Boys and Girls Club of

Hudson County, f/k/a The

Jersey City Boys Club,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant-Respondent.

J.A., A.M., and G.M.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

The Boys and Girls Club of

Hudson County, f/k/a, The

Jersey City Boys Club,

Defendant,

and

Boys and Girls Clubs of

America,

Defendant-Respondent.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting.

This case is about an out-of-state corporation that came into New Jersey

to establish “place[s] of safe recreation” for children; allegedly failed to

protect those New Jersey children from almost a decade of sexual abuse; and

now seeks to evade the jurisdiction of New Jersey’s courts -- the only

jurisdiction in which plaintiffs’ claims can be heard.

Plaintiffs allege that the Boys and Girls Club of America (BGC of

America) -- which promoted, trained, and, to a significant degree, controlled

the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (BGC of Hudson County) -- was

negligent for “failing to implement sufficient policies and procedures to

prevent child sexual abuse” and “failing to train the staff to recognize and

prevent child sexual abuse.” The insufficiency of BGC of America’s policies,

procedures, and trainings, plaintiffs allege, led to childhood sexual abuse at the

hands of a staff member from BGC of Hudson County.

The majority states that recognizing specific jurisdiction over BGC of

America would “test[] the limits of personal jurisdiction” and prove “far more

expansive than even general jurisdiction.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 4, 43). The

majority is mistaken, and the impact of this error on these plaintiffs is grave.

This case is not about haling national organizations into court for any

conceivable harm caused by their local affiliates; rather, this case is about the

particular failure of an organization that promotes its Member Organizations as

“safe haven[s]” for New Jersey children to keep those children safe from

sexual abuse. By denying specific jurisdiction, the majority declines to fulfill

its obligation to provide a forum of redress to plaintiffs and, in doing so,

ignores the history of BGC of America’s significant ties to New Jersey, as well

as decades of United States and New Jersey Supreme Court precedent.

In signing into law the New Jersey Child Victims Act, which extended

the statute of limitations to allow these plaintiffs to bring these claims,

Governor Philip D. Murphy stated: “I cannot deny victims the ability to seek

redress in court for sexual abuse that often leaves trauma lasting a lifetime. I

am confident that our judicial system is the right forum to assess these claims

fairly and impartially.” Governor’s Statement on Signing S. Comm. Sub. for

S. 477 (May 13, 2019). We, too, should not deny these victims their only

opportunity to seek redress against BGC of America, and we, too, should be

just as confident that ours is a correct, fair, and impartial forum.

In Section I.A., I explain how BGC of America purposefully availed

itself of the New Jersey forum through significant affirmative acts, including

its promotion, control over, and support of BGC of Hudson County and other

New Jersey Member Organizations. For example, BGC of Hudson County and

other New Jersey Member Organizations were “required to use, and did use,

[BGC of America]’s name and logo on ‘everything,’ from the building to

letterhead to information sent to parents and the community, in order ‘to create

a brand . . . that people can rely on, that people feel confident in.’” ----Ante at

___ (slip op. at 12-13). Moreover, BGC of America required BGC of Hudson

County and other New Jersey Member Organizations to comply with policies

that “had a foundation of safety, safety of young people . . . at [their] core.”

And, BGC of America provided training to BGC of Hudson County and other

New Jersey Member Organizations, including programming on analogous

safety issues, such as “alcohol abuse and prevention.” It is no surprise that

both the majority and BGC of America concede that there are New Jersey

contacts and focus instead on the relationship between those contacts and

plaintiffs’ claims.

Accordingly, in Section I.B., I explain why plaintiffs’ claims both “arise

out of” and “relate to” BGC of America’s promotion of, control over, and

support of BGC of Hudson County. BGC of America “systematically served a

market” in New Jersey by providing “place[s] of safe recreation during the

afternoon and evening hours” in “communities where boys have needs and

problems.” This “product” allegedly “malfunctioned” by failing to prevent

multiple acts of childhood sexual abuse over the better part of a decade. The

U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial

District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), provides ample support for the

inescapable conclusion that BGC of America’s failure to establish the “safe

haven” it promised “relates to” plaintiffs’ claims.

And, in Section I.C., I explain why “fair play and substantial justice”

necessitate a finding of specific jurisdiction in New Jersey -- plaintiffs’ place

of residence at the time of their alleged childhood sexual abuse, the location of

the alleged abuse, and the only forum in which plaintiffs’ claims can be heard.

For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.

BGC of America is a national nonprofit organization that aims to create

safe environments for child development. According to BGC of America’s

1957 Annual Report, the first “Boys’ Clubs” were created in New England

during the 1860s to provide “a place of safe recreation during the afternoon

and evening hours” to “restless, adventurous boys roaming the streets with

nothing to do and getting into trouble because of it.” In its 1964 publication,

“Goals of Boys’ Clubs of America Over the Next Decade,” BGC of America

recognized that “[s]everal million boys are growing up in the needy areas of

our cities and towns throughout the United States” and that it has “a very

special interest in these particular youngsters as it is they more than all others

who most need the sympathetic help and constructive guidance Boys’ Clubs

can provide.” That publication stated that BGC of America’s “FIRST GOAL”

is to “bring the services of Boys’ Clubs of America to the largest possible

number of new boys throughout the country, especially those in needy areas.”

These founding principles endure: today, BGC of America promotes itself as a

“safe haven” and claims to provide “safe, inclusive places [where] youth build

the skills and resilience to thrive in school, the workplace and in life.”1

Zena N-A, Zena’s Safe Haven, Boys & Girls Clubs of Am. (Oct. 2023), https://www.bgca.org/news-stories/2023/October/zenas-safe-haven/; see also Child Safety at Boys & Girls Clubs, Boys & Girls Clubs of Am.,

https://www.bgca.org/about-us/child-safety/ (last visited July 28, 2026) (noting that “Child Safety Is Job No. 1”; “Ensuring child safety is fundamental to the mission of Boys & Girls Clubs”; and “Clubs provide safety, mentorship and a sense of community during critical out-of-school hours”).

Because BGC of America is incorporated in the District of Columbia and

its principal place of business is in Georgia, it is necessary to examine whether

a New Jersey court’s jurisdiction over BGC of America would be “consistent

with due process of law.” Rule 4:4-4(b)(1). The U.S. Supreme Court has

articulated three prongs that must be satisfied for a finding of specific

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant to comport with the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. First, the defendant must “purposefully

avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” J. McIntyre Mach.,

Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357

U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Second, plaintiffs’ claims must “arise out of or relate

to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (quoting

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).

Third, the assertion of jurisdiction must “not offend ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,

480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945)).

BGC of America satisfies each of these three requirements in this case,

which I address in turn.

The first prong of specific jurisdiction, purposeful availment, is satisfied

where an out-of-state defendant has “purposefully established minimum

contacts within the forum” by “deliberately . . . engag[ing] in significant

activities within a State,” or by “creat[ing] continuing obligations between

[itself] and residents of the forum.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471

U.S. 462, 474-76 (quotations omitted).

I first show that BGC of America purposefully availed itself of the New

Jersey forum through its numerous and consistent in-state contacts.2 I then

address the majority’s concern over finding purposeful availment where a

defendant “fail[s] to promulgate policies or procedures.” Ante at ___ (slip op.

at 28).

Neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the relevant timeframe for assessing minimum contacts. See generally Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 101, 133-42 (2010). For purposes of this dissenting opinion, “[a]lthough [my] minimum contacts analysis focuses on the time-frame leading up to [the alleged abuse], [I] consider subsequent conduct by [BGC of America] for the limited purpose of supporting reasonable inferences that relate back to its conduct at the critical time.” Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 399 N.J. Super. 539, 548 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 201 N.J. 48 (2010), rev’d, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).

The majority begins its analysis by conceding that “the evidence

uncovered during jurisdictional discovery establishes that [BGC of America]

maintained contacts with New Jersey during the relevant time period.” Ante at

___ (slip op. at 23). At oral argument, BGC of America’s counsel agreed:

“We don’t dispute that there’s some level of purposeful availment.” The

Appellate Division likewise found that BGC of America “had contacts with

New Jersey through its relationship with the Hudson County BGC.” E.T. v.

Boys & Girls Club of Hudson Cnty., 478 N.J. Super. 102, 112 (App. Div.

2024).

Those concessions are unsurprising. BGC of America achieves its

nationwide purpose by reaching directly into states like New Jersey and

establishing contractual relationships (i.e., “membership agreements”) with

Member Organizations like BGC of Hudson County.3 In establishing safe

The symbiotic value of this long-standing contractual relationship is made clear by the “Consolidated Financial Statements” of the Boys and Girls Clubs of America and Subsidiaries for the years ending December 31, 2020 and 2019: “[BGC of America] enters into membership agreements with local Clubs to provide services that ultimately further the mission of [BGC of America] yet provide reciprocal value to the Club.” See also Calabrese v. Policemen’s Benev. Ass’n, 157 N.J. Super. 139, 147 (Law Div. 1978) (“The constitution and by-laws of a voluntary association become part of the contract entered into by a member when he joined such association.”).

environments for the “health, social, educational, vocational, and character

development” of children, BGC of America asserts that it “provides no direct

services to youth and has no youth membership.” Rather, its 1971 constitution

states that BGC of America’s “purposes shall be achieved by providing . . .

assistance to communities in the establishment of new Boys’ Clubs,” such as

those in New Jersey and elsewhere.

According to BGC of Hudson County’s former Executive Director, Gary

Greenberg, between 1977 and 1983, this tangible “assistance” from BGC of

America included “templates and sample activities and programming

includ[ing] physical education, social recreation, leadership and character

development, . . . and other activities,” as well as, notably, programs designed

to deal with “alcohol abuse and prevention.” BGC of America further

assigned field service representatives and directors of development to BGC of

Hudson County that were “always available for support.” Per BGC of

America’s Senior Vice-President of Field Services, John Miller, “part of the

benefit of being a member of this federated organization are services that are

provided to those members, everything from marketing support, strategic

planning support, leadership development and training, [and] facility

consultations.”

In exchange for these resources, BGC of Hudson County submits to

BGC of America’s membership requirements, which set numerous standards

for Member Organizations’ operations and governance. Between 1976 and

1984, BGC of America’s standards required BGC of Hudson County and other

New Jersey Member Organizations to: “be identifi[able] as a Club for boys”;

have the words “Boys’ Club” in their titles; and display the BGC of America

emblem “on the outside of [their] buildings” and “on all appropriate printed

matter.”

BGC of America’s 1981 Manual on Boys Club Operations explained that

this branding was mutually “advantageous” to BGC of America and its

Member Organizations, as it “gives the visual unity needed for widespread

national recognition and awareness” and “indicates that the club maintains

recognized national standards and programs, leadership and facilities and is

backed up by a representative board of nationally and locally respected

citizens.” Greenberg recognized that this requirement was designed “to create

a brand . . . that people can rely on, that people feel confident in, that [creates]

a sense of uniformity wherever Boys and Girls Clubs are.” Likewise, Miller

noted that BGC of America’s required branding has “market value in terms of

name recognition and public trust.”

BGC of America’s other membership requirements were comprehensive

and rigorous. BGC of Hudson County had to submit a financial audit and a

report of its organization, membership, activities, and attendance to BGC of

America annually, as well as a “separate self-evaluation . . . based on standards

approved by the National Council” every three years. BGC of Hudson County

staff were required by BGC of America to be “qualified in personality,

character, experience, education and training for the leadership and guidance

of boys.” BGC of Hudson County was also required to maintain “a

satisfactory program of varied and diversified activities” in clubhouse facilities

“maintained in a satisfactory state of cleanliness and sanitation” and made

available to club members “at least ten months in the year, five days per week

and four hours per day.” Per Greenberg, BGC of America provided “guidance

as to what physically would need to be in a Boys and Girls Club” and “had to

approve of the area and spaces in which the programs of the club would be

carried out.” According to Miller, many of these membership requirements

“had a foundation of safety, safety of young people, safety of staff members at

[their] core.”

BGC of America also benefited financially from its relationship with

BGC of Hudson County and its other Member Organizations. As the majority

notes, “[b]eginning in 1971,” “[a]nnual dues from all Member Organizations

across the country accounted for approximately 17% of BGCA’s budget.”

Ante at ___ (slip op. at 12).

During this period, BGC of America worked to dramatically expand its

number of Member Organizations -- in New Jersey and elsewhere. In its 1964

publication, “Goals of Boys’ Clubs of America Over the Next Decade,” BGC

of America stated that its “objective” was the establishment of “1,889 NEW

Boys’ Club units,” which, when added to the “existing 635 Boys’ Club units,”

would “serv[e] some 2 1/4 million boys.” According to the New Jersey

Department of the Treasury’s website, BGC of America now supports twentyseven Boys and Girls Clubs in New Jersey; seven of these still-active clubs

were incorporated prior to 1976.4

The above facts confirm that BGC of America purposefully availed itself

of the privilege of conducting its activities in New Jersey. BGC of America’s

symbiotic and codependent contractual relationships with BGC of Hudson

County, as well as its other New Jersey Member Organizations, demonstrate

its desire to “deliberately reach[] out beyond its home” and “enjoy[] the

Business Name Search, N.J. Dep’t of the Treasury Div. of Revenue & Enter. Servs., https://www.njportal.com/DOR/BusinessNameSearch/

Search/BusinessName (last visited July 28, 2026) (search for “boys % girls club”). Screenshots of the Department of the Treasury’s website were submitted as part of the record.

benefits and protection of [New Jersey’s] laws.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 359-60

(quotations omitted). These mutually advantageous contractual relationships

“created continuing obligations between [BGC of America] and residents of

the forum.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quotation omitted). BGC of

America’s promotion, control over, and support of BGC of Hudson County

and its other New Jersey Member Organizations simply cannot be dismissed as

the type of “random, isolated, or fortuitous” contacts that do not support

specific jurisdiction. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag.,

Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Rather, these New Jersey contacts were part

of BGC of America’s systematic, intentional, and ambitious effort to grow its

membership -- and its corresponding revenue -- “throughout the United

States.” 36 U.S.C. § 31102.

After discarding the above contacts as not “relating to” plaintiffs’ claims

-- a conclusion I refute in Section B below -- the majority returns to the

purposeful availment prong to reject what it characterizes as plaintiffs’

“theory” that “a failure to promulgate policies or procedures can constitute

purposeful availment.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 28) (internal quotation

omitted).

That is not plaintiffs’ “theory.”

The majority conflates the basis of plaintiffs’ tort claims with their

argument regarding purposeful availment. As the majority notes, “according

to plaintiffs, their claims ‘focus[] on a theory that [BGC of America] . . . failed

to implement policies and procedures to safeguard and prevent against child

sexual abuse.’” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 28) (first alteration in original)

(emphasis added). Contrastingly, plaintiffs’ theory of purposeful availment

relies on BGC of America’s significant affirmative in-state contacts,

“including [BGC of America]’s marketing, sale, and maintenance of its

product.” Contrary to the majority’s characterization, plaintiffs have not once

argued that a failure to implement policies, procedures, or trainings can alone

satisfy purposeful availment.5

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly found

purposeful availment in cases where the plaintiff’s underlying claim was based

on the defendant’s failure to act. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. 462 (failure to

It is the majority that offers support for the idea that a failure to act can, by itself, actually constitute purposeful availment. It states: “absent a duty to act, ‘purposeful availment’ of the privileges of a forum state cannot normally include what a nonresident defendant has failed to do.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 21) (emphasis added) (quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 127 (1994)). Here, plaintiffs have consistently alleged that BGC of America “had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the training of counselors, employees, volunteers and staff in the prevention of sexual abuse and protection of the safety of children in its care.”

pay franchise fees); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (failure

to pay out life insurance claim); Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310 (failure to pay

employment tax); McKesson Corp. v. Hackensack Med. Imaging, 197 N.J. 262

(2009) (failure to pay invoice for medical supplies); Avdel Corp. v. Mecure,

58 N.J. 264 (1971) (failure to pay for construction materials); Farone v. Habel,

22 N.J. 66 (1956) (failure of executor to pay money owed by estate). In these

cases -- and consistent with plaintiffs’ argument -- specific jurisdiction was

found because of the defendant’s other, affirmative in-state contacts,

regardless of the characterization of plaintiff’s claim.

Indeed, framing the alleged inadequacy of BGC of America’s policies,

procedures, and trainings as a “failure” rather than an affirmative “act” is

immaterial in the context of a specific jurisdiction analysis. For example, in

Haw v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Maryland Appellate Court

found that a plaintiff claiming the defendant was negligent in “fail[ing] to

establish an effective concussion-management protocol,” “[wa]s not

attempting to rely on the absence of activity to establish minimum contacts,”

but rather “ha[d] identified activities of the [defendant] purposefully directed

at Maryland,” including “rules and guidelines related to the health and safety

of players.” 309 A.3d 64, 105 (Md. App. Ct. 2024).

Haw is not an outlier. Courts have often -- and uncontroversially --found specific jurisdiction where a plaintiff brought suit against a defendant

for the failure to implement adequate policies, procedures, or trainings. E.g.,

Ryan v. Newark Grp., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 3d 78, 105 (D. Mass. 2025) (finding

specific jurisdiction where plaintiffs alleged defendant was negligent “by

failing to institute proper procedures and training to prevent, minimize, and/or

promptly and effectively respond to the release of PFAS from its waste

products into the environment”); Doohan v. CTB Invs., LLC, 427 F. Supp. 3d

1034, 1043 (W.D. Mo. 2019) (finding specific jurisdiction where plaintiffs

alleged a statutory violation for defendant’s “fail[ure] to implement adequate

procedures to prevent calls or text messages to persons who request not to

receive calls or text messages”); Selke v. Germanwings GmbH, 261 F. Supp.

3d 645, 651 (E.D. Va. 2017) (finding specific jurisdiction where “[p]laintiffs

allege[d] that by not maintaining safety measures requiring two crew members

. . . [defendants] negligently operated Flight 9525”); McCaskey v. Cont’l

Airlines, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding specific

jurisdiction where plaintiff alleged defendant was negligent for its “failure to

train its employees and/or its failure to implement and/or comply with proper

protocols”); Facebook, Inc. v. Doe, 650 S.W.3d 748, 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2022)

(finding specific jurisdiction where plaintiff alleged defendant violated a

human-trafficking statute by failing to provide “public service announcements

regarding the dangers of entrapment, grooming, and recruiting methods used

by sex traffickers”); Frederic v. Zodiac Dev., 839 So. 2d 448, 454 (La. Ct.

App. 2003) (finding specific jurisdiction where plaintiff alleged defendant was

negligent for “the delegation of power and responsibility to incompetent

personnel as well as [the] alleged failure to provide . . . proper work

instructions and safety procedures”). I can find no basis to contravene this

well-established precedent.

Likewise, courts in New Jersey and across the country have found

specific jurisdiction over out-of-state institutions accused of negligence for

failing to prevent childhood sexual abuse. See, e.g., Doe 70 v. Diocese of

Metuchen, 477 N.J. Super. 270 (App. Div. 2023); Doe 1 v. World Wrestling

Ent., LLC, 811 F. Supp. 3d 706 (D. Md. 2025); Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese

of Greensburg, 581 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D.D.C. 2022); Farrell v. U.S. Olympic &

Paralympic Comm., 567 F. Supp. 3d 378 (N.D.N.Y. 2021); DeLonga v.

Diocese of Sioux Falls, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D.S.D. 2004); WCVAWCKDoe v. Boys & Girls Club of Greenwich, Inc., 188 N.Y.S.3d 98 (App. Div.

2023).

The majority dedicates much of its analysis to distinguishing the above

cases. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 25-36). These distinctions, however, do

little to address the underlying legal principles of these cases, and the

significance of these distinctions is overstated.

The majority asserts that the above cases from the U.S. Supreme Court

and this Court are distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases asserted

contractual or statutory claims. See ante at ___ (slip op. at 29-32). Likewise,

it asserts that the above childhood sexual abuse cases are distinguishable

because “plaintiffs do not allege that [BGC of America] purposefully sent a

known sexual abuser . . . to New Jersey” or “allege that their abuse took place

during a [BGC of America] trip or an event that [BGC of America]

purposefully planned in New Jersey.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 28). And it

even goes on to distinguish Ford on the ground that “Ford is a for-profit

corporation,” whereas “[BGC of America] is a nonprofit organization.”6 Ante

at ___ (slip op. at 38).

The majority also attempts to distinguish the above cases regarding failures to implement adequate policies, procedures, or trainings “because each found specific personal jurisdiction when an out-of-state entity took affirmative action in the State, and the plaintiff’s claim arose out of or was related to that affirmative action.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 33). But that is precisely what happened here: plaintiffs’ alleged childhood sexual abuse “arose out of or related to” the allegedly deficient policies, procedures, and trainings BGC of America “affirmative[ly]” targeted at the New Jersey forum. See infra § I.B.

But the Due Process clause does not distinguish its specific jurisdiction

requirements based on whether a plaintiff’s claims stem from a contract or

statute, as opposed to a tort.7 Nor does it require one set of rules for childhood

sexual abuse occurring at an event sponsored by a defendant and another for

childhood sexual abuse occurring at a building branded by a defendant. And it

certainly does not announce separate rules for for-profit and nonprofit

corporations.8 Rather, in all cases, it simply requires (1) purposeful availment,

In emphasizing that the above cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court involve an “action [that] was contractually or statutorily required in the forum State,” ante at ___ (slip op. at 29), the majority seems to suggest that an entirely different set of jurisdictional requirements apply to tort claims --or, at the very least, tort claims stemming from nonfeasance (i.e., a harmful omission) as opposed to misfeasance (i.e., a harmful affirmative act). There is no support for basing a specific jurisdiction analysis on such a distinction, as the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently “reject[ed] any talismanic jurisdictional formulas.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 485.

A test relying on a nonfeasance/misfeasance formulation would be

particularly poor. As Justice Cardozo observed: “A time-honored formula often phrases the distinction as one between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Incomplete the formula is, and so at times misleading.” H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928). Such a formulation would unnecessarily and illogically disallow specific jurisdiction over a vast subset of tort claims. That formulation would also be unworkable: it would allow, for example, specific jurisdiction over a car manufacturer that included defective airbags in its vehicle but disallow specific jurisdiction if the same manufacturer failed to include airbags at all.

“There is no general policy or special consideration providing any type of deference for nonprofits that commit tortious behavior from avoiding being

(2) a relationship between plaintiff’s claims and defendant’s in-state contacts,

and (3) fair play and substantial justice. Those requirements, as I discuss at

length, are satisfied here. Moreover, as this Court has observed: “If lower

courts felt free to limit Supreme Court opinions precisely to the facts of each

case, then our system of jurisprudence would be in shambles, with litigants,

lawyers, and legislatures left to grope aimlessly for some semblance of reliable

guidance.” State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 183 (2011) (quoting McCoy v. Mass.

Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)).

The majority’s concern over finding purposeful availment where a

defendant “fail[ed] to promulgate policies or procedures,” ante at ___ (slip op.

at 28), is without merit. To the extent the majority means to preclude the

exercise of specific jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff’s claim is based on a

defendant’s failure to act, regardless of the quantum of contacts and their

relationship to the claim at hand, the majority’s holding is contrary to decades

of precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, and other

courts throughout the country.

haled to court.” Christie v. Nat’l Inst. for Newman Stud., 258 F. Supp. 3d 494, 508 (D.N.J. 2017).

Turning to the second prong of specific jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ claims

“arise out of or relate to” BGC of America’s contacts with the New Jersey

forum. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the “first half of that

standard asks about causation; . . . the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates

that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.”

Ford, 592 U.S. at 362.

After explaining how plaintiffs’ claims satisfy both “hal[ves]” of this

test, I address the majority’s related proposition that BGC of America could

not exert “control” over BGC of Hudson County or its safety policies. See

ante at ___ (slip op. at 39).

BGC of America’s purpose of creating “a place of safe recreation” for

children in “needy areas” -- achieved through its promotion, control over, and

support of BGC of Hudson County and other New Jersey Member

Organizations -- “relates to” their alleged failure to protect vulnerable children

from sexual abuse.

The majority fears that finding specific jurisdiction here “would

eviscerate the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction and would

subject [BGC of America] to jurisdiction in any forum where any of its

affiliates own and operate a local club -- regardless of the claim.” Ante at ___

(slip op. at 42) (internal quotation marks omitted). An identical concern was

raised by Ford Motor Company in Ford. See Pet’r’s Br. 25-26, Ford Motor

Co., 592 U.S. 351 (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369) (comparing the plaintiffs’ noncausation test to “a ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ that would make

‘any substantial manufacturer or seller of goods . . . amenable to suit, on any

claim for relief, wherever its products are distributed’” (quoting Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011))). Not a

single U.S. Supreme Court Justice agreed with Ford’s argument. I, too, do not

find this argument persuasive.9

To the extent the majority is searching for a limiting principle here, it need not be concerned. A faithful application of Ford “does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum.” 592 U.S. at 362.

The majority pictures that, under this dissent’s reasoning, “specific personal jurisdiction against [BGC of America] would be appropriate in any State in a negligence suit brought by the victim of a motor vehicle crash if the vehicle was driven by an employee or agent of any local Boys and Girls Club, and the victim alleged that [BGC of America] had failed to promulgate safe driving regulations that could have averted the crash.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 41). But the majority finds no support for painting with such a broad brush. An analysis of specific jurisdiction “is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating circumstances’ are present.” Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). The particular facts of BGC of America’s in-state contacts, as well as the motor vehicle accident victim’s

This case is not about haling a national organization into court for any

conceivably preventable harm caused by a local branch, regardless of the

nature of that national organization’s in-state activities. Rather, it is about the

specific failure of an organization that purports to establish “safe haven[s]” for

children in “needy areas” -- and promotes itself based upon that promise -- to

reasonably ensure that those children remain safe from sexual abuse at its

clubs.

Just as a driver trusts her vehicle to safely transport her from one place

to another, caregivers “throughout the United States” entrust BGC of America,

through Member Organizations like BGC of Hudson County, to safely

supervise their children’s “health, social, educational, vocational, and

character development.” 36 U.S.C. § 31102. There is therefore a robust

relationship between the BGC of America’s contacts and its alleged negligent

failure to establish adequate child safety policies. Ford illustrates this

relationship.

In Ford, two plaintiffs, in Montana and Minnesota, respectively, brought

negligence claims against Ford Motor Company for injuries resulting from

particular allegations, would govern whether specific jurisdiction would be appropriate in such a case.

alleged defects in their vehicles. 592 U.S. at 356. Crucially, neither vehicle

was designed, manufactured, or sold in either state; rather, “[o]nly later resales

and relocations by consumers had brought [those particular] vehicles to

Montana and Minnesota.” Id. at 356-57.

While plaintiffs argued that Ford’s in-state contacts nonetheless related

to their accidents, Ford argued that specific jurisdiction would be appropriate

“only if the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff[s’] claims.”

Id. at 361.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this “causation-only approach,”

finding specific jurisdiction appropriate because “Ford had advertised, sold,

and serviced those two car models in both States for many years.” Id. at 361,

365. The Court emphasized that “specific jurisdiction attaches . . . when a

company like Ford serves a market for a product in the forum State and the

product malfunctions there” and that “Ford had systematically served a market

in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege

malfunctioned and injured them in those States. So there is a strong

‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ -- the

‘essential foundation’ of specific jurisdiction.” Id. at 363, 365 (quoting

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).

The Court reasoned that Ford’s contacts may have induced plaintiffs to

purchase the vehicles because they “saw ads for the car in local media” or

“may [have] take[n] into account [the] raft of Ford’s instate activities designed

to make driving a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to

service the car; that other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and

that Ford fosters an active resale market for its old models.” Id. at 367. The

Court continued:

The plaintiffs here did not in fact establish, or even

allege, such causal links. . . . But the possibilities listed

above -- created by the reach of Ford’s Montana and

Minnesota contacts -- underscore the aptness of finding

jurisdiction here, even though the cars at issue were

first sold out of state.

[Ibid.]

Thus, even though there was no causal link between Ford’s in-state actions and

the alleged negligent conduct at issue, the mere “possibilit[y]” that Ford’s

contacts may have persuaded plaintiffs’ purchase of the defective cars was

sufficient to grant specific jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Ford invariably leads to a finding

that plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of” or -- at a minimum -- “relate to” BGC of

America’s New Jersey contacts. Similar to Ford Motor Company, BGC of

America “systematically served a market” in New Jersey, -see

--id.

- at 365, by,

per its 1957 Annual Report, offering “place[s] of safe recreation during the

afternoon and evening hours” in “communities where boys have needs and

problems.”

The majority’s attempts to distinguish Ford are ineffective. The

majority notes that “Ford is a for-profit corporation,” whereas BGC of

America “is a nonprofit organization.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 38). But

plaintiffs’ claims relate to BGC of America’s allegedly inadequate policies,

procedures, and trainings for the prevention of childhood sexual abuse -- not

BGC of America’s 501(c)(3) status. See Christie, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 508

(“There is no general policy or special consideration providing any type of

deference for nonprofits that commit tortious behavior from avoiding being

haled to court.”).

The majority further asserts that BGC of America “has no licensed

product dealerships in New Jersey, because it has no product to sell.” Ante at

___ (slip op. at 38). But the fact that BGC of America did not sell a literal

malfunctioning car does not make the principles of Ford any less relevant. See

Benally on Behalf of Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of W. Art, 858 F.2d

618, 623 (10th Cir. 1988) (“When a wrong results from purposeful, organized

activity, in terms of a state’s interest in redressing harm to its citizens, it makes

little difference whether that activity was of a commercial character or not.”).

Likewise, BGC of America asserts that it “earns no profits at all.” Ante

at ___ (slip op. at 17). But BGC of America’s business model is premised on

the creation of new Membership Organizations, like BGC of Hudson County,

“throughout the United States.” 36 U.S.C. § 31102. As noted above, supra

§ I.A.1., dues from BGC of Hudson County and other Member Organizations

accounted for slightly over one-sixth of BGC of America’s annual budget. In

fact, during the relevant period, BGC of America sought to quadruple its

number of Member Organizations. That goal was basically accomplished in

New Jersey: there are currently twenty-seven Member Organizations in New

Jersey, as compared to the seven that existed prior to 1976.

Plaintiffs allege that, in serving this market, BGC of America’s

“product” of safe spaces for children “malfunctioned” because it failed to

prevent multiple acts of childhood sexual abuse over the better part of a

decade. Specifically, and as elaborated upon below, BGC of America’s (i)

branding, (ii) membership requirements, and (iii) proffered trainings and

programming “relate to” the failure to protect plaintiffs from the sexual abuse

they allegedly endured as children.

First, BGC of America’s branding, like Ford’s advertisements, “relates

to” plaintiffs’ claims. According to former Executive Director Greenberg,

BGC of America’s logo was on “everything” at BGC of Hudson County, from

the “signage outside on the front of the building” to “our letterhead . . . on

information that we send to the parents and to the community at large.”

Consistent with BGC of America’s aim to expand its membership, BGC of

America’s Senior Vice President Miller confirmed that “the purpose of this

[branding] requirement was to help build the [BGC of America] movement by

making sure that kids, parents and the local community knew that the local

club was a part of [BGC of America].” He further explained that BGC of

America’s logo “has both market value in terms of name recognition and

public trust.” (emphases added). And, BGC of America’s 1981 Manual on

Boys Club Operations states that the BGC of America logo “indicates that the

club maintains recognized national standards and programs, leadership and

facilities and is backed up by a representative board of nationally and locally

respected citizens.”

Just as the Ford plaintiffs “may [have] ma[d]e that purchase because

[they] saw ads for the car in local media,” 592 U.S. at 367, so too may

plaintiffs have joined BGC of Hudson County because of their “recognition”

of, and “trust” in, BGC of America’s “national standards and programs” --many of which were geared toward ensuring the safety and security of

children. And, just as the Ford plaintiffs’ purchase of the defective vehicles

led to their respective accidents, plaintiffs likewise claim that their enrollment

in a Member Organization with insufficient policies, procedures, and trainings

led to eight years of childhood sexual abuse.

At oral argument, BGC of America’s counsel argued that “obviously

there is a benefit in having a national brand in that it will encourage people to

use the benefits of the local clubs” but that “the logo and the branding itself

don’t say anything specifically about safety.” This argument strains credulity:

the mere fact that the word “safety” is not written into the BGC of America

logo cannot mean that the BGC of America has abandoned this core element of

its mission. BGC of America’s founding purpose was to create “place[s] of

safe recreation,” and it continues to promote itself as a “safe haven” for

children. As Greenberg noted, the national logo is part of “a brand . . . that

people can rely on . . . that [creates] a sense of uniformity wherever Boys and

Girls Clubs are . . . . that people have confidence in and believe in.”

ii.

Second, BGC of America’s other 1971 membership requirements

similarly “relate to” plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, Miller concedes such a

relationship. When asked if BGC of America had ever specifically adopted

membership requirements “to help protect the children . . . from the danger of

being sexually abused,” he stated:

Obviously there was some membership requirements in

place prior to that regarding compliance with state,

local, state and federal law. There were requirements

around facility and spaces to ensure safety of young

people. I think there w[as] the implementation of a

self[-]evaluation of the [Member O]rganization. Those

were elements that had a foundation of safety, safety of

young people, safety of staff members at its core.

[(emphases added).]

In other words, the “core” of many -- if not most -- of BGC of America’s

membership requirements was the “safety of young people” enrolled at BGC

of Hudson County, as well as other Member Organizations throughout New

Jersey and the United States.

Plaintiffs specifically allege that these safety requirements were not

“sufficient” and that the sexual abuse they suffered “relates to” this patent

insufficiency. A comparison of BGC of America’s 1971 and current

membership requirements clearly illustrates this point. For instance, in 1971,

BGC of America directed BGC of Hudson County to “render a report annually

of its organization, membership, activities, attendance and finances to [BGC of

America].” Today, BGC of America additionally requires “[e]ach organization

[to] undergo an annual organizational and site safety assessment.”10 In 1971,

Key Governance Documents, Boys & Girls Clubs of Am. at 19 (last

amended May 17, 2024) https://bgcaboards.org/wp-content/uploads/

2024/08/BGCA-Key-Governance-Documents.pdf. While these documents

BGC of America mandated that BGC of Hudson County workers be “qualified

in personality, character, experience, education and training for the leadership

and guidance of boys.” BGC of America currently requires “all staff members

and volunteers with direct, repetitive interaction with young people” to

become qualified in “child abuse prevention,” “mandated reporting,” and

“grooming prevention.”11 In 1971, BGC of America required BGC of Hudson

County’s facilities to “be identifi[able] as a Club for boys” and “maintained in

a satisfactory state of cleanliness and sanitation.” Current facility standards

direct BGC of Hudson County to “prominently display . . . ethics hotline, crisis

were not included in the record, BGC of America’s counsel made repeated references during oral argument to “polic[ies] at the national level that dealt with child abuse prevention” enacted after 1984. Likewise, Miller referenced “continued quality improvement” to membership requirements throughout “the early 90’s, mid 90’s, early 2000’s, obviously mid 2000’s, late 2000’s.” And, the trial court’s June 2, 2022 opinion denying BGC of America’s motion to dismiss discussed safety policies listed on BGC of America’s website. Because BGC of America’s current governing documents have been

consistently referenced throughout the course of litigation, and because the veracity of these documents “cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute” or “be reasonably questioned,” judicial notice pursuant to N.J.R.E. 202(b) and 201(b)(2) to (3) is appropriate. See In re Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 457 n.2 (2006); Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep’t, 175 N.J. 244, 273 (2003).

Key Governance Documents, Boys & Girls Clubs of Am. at 19 (last

amended May 17, 2024) https://bgcaboards.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/ 08/BGCA-Key-Governance-Documents.pdf.

text-line and safety helpline information.”12 Consistent with plaintiffs’ claims,

BGC of America’s current membership requirements on annual reporting,

personnel qualifications, and facility standards beg plaintiffs’ very question as

to whether the corresponding 1971 requirements were negligently deficient --clearly demonstrating that the claims of childhood sexual abuse “relate to”

these deficiencies.13

iii.

Third, BGC of America’s training and programming “relate to”

plaintiffs’ claims. For instance, quoting former Executive Director Greenberg,

the majority notes that, “between 1977 and 1983, [BGC of America] provided

[BGC of Hudson County] with ‘template and sample activities and

programming’ on topics including . . . ‘alcohol abuse and prevention.’” Ante

at ___ (slip op. at 12). Neither the majority nor BGC of America’s counsel

attempts to explain how BGC of America was capable of providing

Key Governance Documents, Boys & Girls Clubs of Am. at 19 (last

amended May 17, 2024) https://bgcaboards.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/ 08/BGCA-Key-Governance-Documents.pdf.

I do not opine on whether BGC of America was negligent, as the issue of liability is not before this Court and such analysis would be inappropriate at this stage of litigation. Rather, I suggest only that, if such membership requirements were negligently deficient, they would “relate to” -- or even have a causal relationship with -- the abuse plaintiffs allegedly suffered.

programming on “alcohol abuse and prevention” but not sexual abuse and

prevention. And I cannot conceive of any reasonable explanation.

Moreover, BGC of America’s conduct two years after plaintiffs’ alleged

abuse ended shows that it could have offered training for the prevention of

childhood sexual abuse earlier. In 1986, BGC of America published an article

entitled “Personnel Practices for the Prevention and Detection of Child Sexual

Abuse” in its quarterly magazine. The article notes that BGC of America “has

suggested new hiring procedures, new employment application forms, an

interview process guide and suggestions for checking references.” The article

also offers “Eleven Steps to Child Safety,” the first of which states that

Member Organizations’ “[s]taff and volunteers should be trained to identify

signs of child abuse and how and when to report instances to the child welfare

authorities and the police.”

At oral argument, BGC of America’s counsel candidly admitted: “I

think that the jurisdictional analysis is quite different after these policies were

enacted in the late 1980s.” But it is unclear why BGC of America’s decision

to address this problem soon after the alleged instances of childhood sexual

abuse occurred would change the jurisdictional analysis, as the relationship

between BGC of America and BGC of Hudson County did not change during

that period. Indeed, because BGC of America could have provided similar

instructional materials earlier, plaintiffs’ claims “relate to” the potentially

deficient trainings and programming proffered during the period of plaintiffs’

alleged sexual abuse.

As the above analysis demonstrates, BGC of America “systematically

served a market,” id. at 365, by promoting, controlling, and providing

resources to BGC of Hudson County and all other New Jersey Member

Organizations. These contacts -- many of which were focused directly on

safety and security -- plainly “relate to” plaintiffs’ claims of childhood sexual

abuse.

In concluding that “plaintiffs’ claims do not ‘arise out of or relate to’

[BGC of America’s] contacts,” ante at ___ (slip op. at 24), the majority

declines to properly engage with the relationship between plaintiffs’ claims

and BGC of America’s New Jersey contacts.14 Instead, the majority dismisses

The majority also distinguishes some of the cases I cite in Section I.A.2. based on the fact that, in those cases, “the childhood sexual abuse arose out of or was directly related to specific affirmative acts that the out-of-state defendants took in the forum.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 25) (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme Court has never required that a relationship between a plaintiff’s claims and a defendant’s in-state contacts be “direct.” Rather, the Court has noted that specific jurisdiction can “arise[] from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Regardless, here,

the possibility of such a relationship in two sentences, stating that “[t]his is not

a lawsuit brought by [BGC of Hudson Country] against [BGC of America] for

breach of contract, overpaid dues, or any problem with the sample activities

and programming, support, professional development, or training opportunities

that [BGC of America] made available to [BGC of Hudson County]” and that

“[i]t is not a trademark or intellectual property suit related to [BGC of Hudson

County]’s use of BGCA’s name or logo.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 24).

This is precisely the type of analysis that Ford rejected. The majority’s

examples include only instances in which “the defendant’s forum conduct

[would] g[i]ve rise to the plaintiff ’s claims.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 361. Indeed,

one can imagine the majority criticizing the Ford plaintiffs in the same manner

they criticize plaintiffs here. After all, the Ford plaintiffs did not bring a claim

for breach of contract against an in-state Ford dealership, nor did they allege

negligent repair by Ford’s in-state service centers. But, as the majority itself

notes, “[t]he Supreme Court rejected ‘[this] causation-only approach.’” Ante

at ___ (slip op. at 22) (quoting Ford, 592 U.S. at 361). Instead, the U.S.

plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of” -- and thus “directly relate to” -- the allegedly insufficient policies, procedures, and trainings BGC of America directed toward BGC of Hudson County.

Supreme Court held that “some relationships will support jurisdiction without

a causal showing.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 362.

As demonstrated above, plaintiffs’ claims and BGC of America’s

contacts with New Jersey, at the very least, “relate to” each other. See supra

§ I.B.1.b. But even accepting the majority’s more stringent “causation-only

approach,” specific jurisdiction is still appropriate because plaintiffs’ claims

also “arise out of” BGC of America’s New Jersey contacts. Plaintiffs allege

that BGC of America was negligent for “failing to implement sufficient

policies and procedures to prevent child sexual abuse” and “failing to train the

staff to recognize and prevent child sexual abuse.” Stating plaintiffs’ claims

another way, had BGC of America’s policies, procedures, and trainings been

“sufficient,” the multiple instances of alleged sexual abuse over the better part

of a decade may not have happened. Because plaintiffs’ alleged abuse may not

have occurred but for the alleged deficiencies in BGC of America’s in-state

conduct, plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of” just as much as they “relate to” BGC

of America’s New Jersey contacts.

The majority also attempts to disavow a relationship between BGC of

America’s New Jersey contacts and plaintiffs’ claims by asserting that BGC of

America could not exercise “control” over BGC of Hudson County. See ante

at ___ (slip op. at 39). But BGC of America’s plenary policymaking authority

through both its National Council and its Board of Directors -- as well as its

ability to terminate membership for noncompliance with said policies --evidence BGC of America’s ability to exercise control over the safety policies

of its Member Organizations.

BGC of America was able to exercise control over its Member

Organizations’ safety policies through its National Council’s power to

“establish requirements and standards for membership in the Corporation.”

And, indeed, it did enact membership requirements that “had a foundation of

safety, safety of young people . . . at [their] core.” See supra § I.A.1. The

majority notes -- without a hint of skepticism -- Senior Vice-President Miller’s

statement that Member Organizations were “supported -- not controlled -- by

[BGC of America]” because “the National Council, not [BGC of America], set

all membership requirements for local Member Organizations.” Ante at ___

(slip op. at 13). But the idea that BGC of America is not legally responsible

for the corporate policies established by its own membership (i.e., the National

Council) is contrary to the fundamental tenets of corporate law.15 However,

BGC of America specifically asserts that it could not have prevented the alleged abuse here because “only the local clubs themselves, working collectively and democratically through the National Council -- and not [BGC of America] -- could pass membership requirements.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at

even accepting the novel theory that policies established by a corporation’s

membership are not attributable to the corporation itself, the majority is still

incorrect in its conclusion that BGC of America could not exercise “control”

17-18). The idea that a corporation’s policies should be attributed to its constituent membership (i.e., the National Council) and not the corporation itself is wholly inconsistent with basic corporate law. This Court has made clear that “a corporation is deemed an aggregation of individuals, a statutory partnership with assignable membership and limited liability of the members.” Fountain v. Fountain, 9 N.J. 558, 567-68 (1952). And, this Court has emphasized the “fundamental propositions that a corporation is a separate entity from its [members], and that a primary reason for incorporation is the insulation of [members] from the liabilities of the corporate enterprise.” Dobco, Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Improvement Auth., 250 N.J. 396, 401 (2022) (quoting Richard A. Pulaski Constr. Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 195 N.J. 457, 472 (2008)). Indeed, such members cannot typically be sued except “to prevent an independent corporation from being used to defeat the ends of justice, to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or otherwise to evade the law.” Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 (1983) (citation omitted).

By suggesting that only the National Council can be held responsible for the failure to promulgate adequate child safety policies, BGC of America attempts to flip corporate law on its head. Instead of attributing the corporate membership’s decision to the corporation, the corporation would now be insulated from the legal consequences of its membership’s decisions. Far from “prevent[ing] an independent corporation from being used to defeat the ends of justice . . . or otherwise to evade the law,” id. at 500, BGC of America’s theory would allow a corporation to evade legal accountability in New Jersey simply by sharing decision-making authority with its membership. That proposed legal scheme would create a loophole in the Fourteenth Amendment, making specific jurisdiction over a corporation impossible if the tortious decision at issue was made by the corporation’s membership. There is no support in the law for BGC of America’s unprecedented perspective regarding the

intersection of corporate and jurisdictional law.

over BGC of Hudson County via the Board’s plenary policymaking authority

memorialized in the 1971 constitution.

The majority, quoting Article IV of the 1971 constitution, claims that

“[o]nly the National Council had authority to ‘establish requirements and

standards for membership in the Corporation.’”16 Ante at ___ n.1 (slip op. at 9

n.1). But BGC of America’s Board “is the governing body of the corporation”

and maintains all “powers, duties, and responsibilities . . . as provided in the

constitution and bylaws of the corporation.” 36 U.S.C. § 31104(a). Under the

1971 constitution, that included “the power to establish policies not

inconsistent with those established by the National Council” and the ability to

“withdraw the privileges of membership” of Member Organizations that “[did]

not meet the established requirements and standards of membership.”

The majority does not explain -- and cannot explain -- how the

enactment of policies preventing the sexual abuse of children could ever be

To support its claim, the majority notes that the Board had “no fewer than ten different powers, including the power to ‘adopt the annual budget of the Corporation; borrow money; raise and disburse funds; invest and reinvest funds of the Corporation; sell, buy and exchange properties and securities of the Corporation; make contracts’ and more” that do not “involve[] setting membership requirements.” Ante at ___ n.1 (slip op. at 9 n.1). But the majority does not explain how the Board’s additional enumerated powers would diminish the Board’s “power to establish policies not inconsistent with those established by the National Council.”

“inconsistent with” the membership requirements established by the National

Council in 1971. Instead, it notes Miller’s claim that, “even ‘if [BGC of

America] learned that a local club was employing a convicted sex offender,’ it

‘did not have the authority’ ‘to require the local club to remove that person’

from their position.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 14). Not only is this claim not

credible, it is also contradicted by the record. As the majority itself

acknowledges, Member Organization staff were required to be “qualified in

personality, character, experience, education and training for the leadership

and guidance of boys.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 11). It strains credulity that

BGC of America’s Board could not proffer a policy regarding staff

“qualifi[cations] in personality [and] character” precluding the hiring and

retention of a sex offender prior to or during the time period of plaintiffs’

alleged sexual abuse as children.

When former BGC of Hudson County Executive Director Greenberg was

asked if he could “think of any reason why [BGC of America] . . . could not

have imposed requirements on [BGC of Hudson County] regarding protecting

children . . . from the danger of child sexual abuse,” he simply responded:

“No.” (emphasis added).

Greenberg is correct. It is, in short, inconceivable that policies to protect

children from sexual abuse -- in an organization designed to provide “safe

place[s] of recreation” for vulnerable children -- would be considered

“inconsistent with” that organization’s membership requirements or any other

existing policies.

BGC of Hudson County was obligated to follow BGC of America’s

membership requirements or else risk losing all the benefits that national

affiliation provided, including “marketing support, strategic planning support,

leadership development and training,” and, critically, the “name recognition”

BGC of America provided. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 14) (quoting the motion

court’s decision). BGC of America’s plenary policymaking authority and its

ability to terminate membership for noncompliance with membership

requirements evidence BGC of America’s ability to exercise control over the

safety policies of its Member Organizations.

Lastly, the requirement of “fair play and substantial justice” -- though

not addressed by the majority -- necessitates a finding of specific jurisdiction

here. In assessing this third prong of specific jurisdiction, “[t]he burden . . .

shifts, for it is the ‘nonresident defendant . . . [who] “must present a

compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render

jurisdiction unreasonable.”’” McKesson Corp., 197 N.J. at 278 (alterations in

original) (quoting Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 328 (1989)).

Defendants have failed to proffer any case whatsoever -- let alone “a

compelling case” -- as to why jurisdiction here would be “unreasonable.”

Rather, in light of the significant interests of both plaintiffs and New Jersey

itself, a finding of specific jurisdiction is the only reasonable way to ensure

“substantial justice” is achieved.17

In determining whether the assertion of specific jurisdiction comports

with “fair play and substantial justice,” courts assess several factors, including:

(1) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief”; (2) “the interests of the forum

State”; (3) “‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most

efficient resolution of controversies’”; (4) “‘the shared interest of the several

The majority argues that “a court may not weigh’ the ‘considerations of fair play and substantial justice . . . until it has found that the defendant has experienced sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy the threshold

determination.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 44) (quoting Waste Mgmt., 138 N.J. at 121); see also McKesson Corp., 197 N.J. at 278 (noting that this prong applies to a “nonresident defendant who has been found to have minimum contacts with the forum” (quoting Lebel, 115 N.J. at 328)).

While the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “fair play and substantial justice” may be evaluated “[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State,” it has also noted that “[t]hese considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77. Thus, even if a defendant does not quite satisfy the purposeful availment prong of specific jurisdiction, an analysis of fair play and substantial justice is appropriate. Regardless, as discussed above in Section I.A.1., BGC of America clearly does satisfy the purposeful availment prong.

States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies’”; and (5) “the

burden on the defendant.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). And, while BGC of America’s

contacts are more than sufficient here, it is significant that “[t]hese

considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction

upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be

required.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.

Plaintiffs and New Jersey maintain a strong interest in the assertion of

specific jurisdiction. Plaintiffs, who were New Jersey residents at the time,

were allegedly abused by a staff member of BGC of America’s New Jersey

Member Organization. This alleged abuse occurred at both the BGC of

America-branded facilities of BGC of Hudson County and at the staff

member’s New Jersey residence. New Jersey is clearly the most appropriate

forum in this matter. See id. at 473 (“A State generally has a ‘manifest

interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing

injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.” (quoting McGee, 355 U.S. at 223)).

Because resolution of these New Jersey claims is most “convenient” in New

Jersey, finding specific jurisdiction here is wholly consistent with “‘the

interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of

controversies.’” Id. at 473, 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.

at 292).

These interests are strongly bolstered by the fact that plaintiffs bring suit

pursuant to the New Jersey Child Victims Act, which the Legislature enacted

to reopen the statute of limitations for the very claims plaintiffs bring. See

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a). This makes New Jersey the only state in the nation that

can hear plaintiffs’ claims. While the District of Columbia and Georgia

recognize sexual abuse tort claims, only New Jersey’s statute of limitations

covers plaintiffs’ claims. Compare N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a), with D.C. Code

§ 12-301(a)(11),18 and Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33.1(a)(2).19

The District of Columbia’s statute of limitations would likely control if plaintiffs brought suit in that forum. See Olivarius v. Stanley J. Sarnoff Endowment for Cardiovascular Sci., Inc., 858 A.2d 457, 463 (D.C. 2004) (“Under customary choice of law principles, the laws of the forum . . . apply to matters of procedure . . . [and a] limitation on the time of suit is procedural and is governed by the law of the forum.” (quoting Huang v. D’Albora, 644 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1994))); Material Supply Int’l, Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 992 (1998) (“[I]n diversity case[s] federal court[s] looks to forum state’s choice-of-law rules; D.C. treats statute of limitations as procedural and applies its own rule.” (citing A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).

Georgia’s statute of limitations would likely control if plaintiffs brought suit in that forum. See Auld v. Forbes, 848 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Ga. 2020) (“It is well settled that the Statute of Limitations of the country, or state, where the action is brought and the remedy is sought to be enforced, controls, in the event of the conflict of laws.” (quoting Taylor v. Murray, 204 S.E.2d 747, 748 (Ga. 1974)); Erler v. Hasbro, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2020)

By providing a forum in which to hear victims’ claims, the State of New

Jersey has clearly expressed its intent to provide “victims the ability to seek

redress in court for sexual abuse that often leaves trauma lasting a lifetime.”

Governor’s Statement on Signing S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477. New Jersey’s

objective is consistent with “the shared interest of the several States in

furthering [the] fundamental substantive social polic[y]” of vindicating the

rights of childhood sexual abuse victims. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480

U.S. at 113. Jurisdiction in the only forum in which these claims against BGC

of America can be heard is wholly appropriate.

BGC of America, on the other hand, would not be unduly burdened by a

New Jersey court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction here. BGC of America

operates “throughout the United States,” 36 U.S.C. § 31102, and maintains

contractual relationships with twenty-seven Member Organizations in New

Jersey. BGC of America exercises control over these clubs’ governance and

operations, offers training to their workers, and employs field staff that, per

Greenberg, are assigned and “always available” to BGC of Hudson County and

other New Jersey Member Organizations. And, “because ‘modern

transportation and communications have made it much less burdensome for a

(“The Court’s jurisdiction in this matter is based on diversity of citizenship; thus, the Court must apply the choice-of-law rules of Georgia.”).

party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity,’

it usually will not be unfair to subject [the defendant] to the burdens of

litigating in another forum for disputes relating to such activity.” Burger King,

471 U.S. at 474 (quoting McGee, 355 U.S. at 223). Finding specific

jurisdiction in the only state in which these claims of sexual abuse of multiple

child-residents could be heard does not violate the notion of “fair play and

substantial justice.”

II.

This Court should not abdicate its duty to provide a forum of redress for

plaintiffs’ claims of almost a decade of sexual abuse when they were children.

This case is not about extending jurisdiction over a national organization for

every tortious act of every affiliate. Rather, it is about the failure of an

organization -- to which caregivers entrusted the safety of their children -- to

take reasonable efforts to secure their safety from childhood sexual abuse.

While it is not the place of this Court to opine whether BGC of America was

negligent, this question does deserve an answer, and plaintiffs are entitled to

such an answer from a New Jersey court.

BGC of America purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey forum by

promoting, controlling, and training its New Jersey Member Organizations.

Plaintiffs’ claims clearly “arise out of or relate to” these contacts, as plaintiffs

allege that, had BGC of America’s policies, procedures, and trainings been

“sufficient,” the years of sexual abuse they suffered as children would not have

occurred. And it is consistent with the notion of “fair play and substantial

justice” for these claims to be heard in New Jersey -- the state whose residents

were allegedly sexually abused as children and the only forum available to

plaintiffs to vindicate their interests.

Because the precedent of both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court

supports the exercise of specific jurisdiction, I would reverse the judgment of

the Appellate Division.

E.T. v. the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain