Judgment rendered August 19, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 56,983-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
JOHN-PAUL MOORE YOUNG Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
CITY OF SHREVEPORT AND Defendants-Appellees MAYOR TOM ARCENEAUX
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 655,703
Honorable Don C. Burns, Judge, Ad Hoc
*****
JOHN-PAUL MOORE YOUNG In Proper Person,
Appellant
MAYER, SMITH & ROBERTS, LLP Counsel for Appellees By: David F. Butterfield
*****
Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.
ROBINSON, J.
John-Paul Moore Young (“Young”) filed a petition for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief on February 26, 2025, against the City of
Shreveport (the “City”) and its mayor, Tom Arceneaux (“Mayor
Arceneaux”), regarding the interpretation of the criminal trespass statute, La.
R.S. 14:63. Young is a Caddo Parish police juror but filed suit in his
individual capacity. An amended petition was filed on May 1, 2025,
following the trial court’s granting of the City’s exceptions of no right of
action and no cause of action. The City reasserted the previous exceptions
as well as the exceptions of lack of standing, prescription, and failure to
demonstrate a justiciable controversy. Following a hearing on September 5,
2025, the court granted the City’s exceptions of no right of action, no cause
of action, and lack of standing. Exceptions of prescription and failure to
demonstrate a justiciable controversy were not addressed. A final judgment
was entered on September 15, 2025, from which Young appeals.
For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the trial court’s sustaining of
Mayor Arceneaux’s and the City’s exceptions of no right of action, lack of
standing, and no cause of action, and its judgment dismissing Young’s case
with prejudice.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Young owns two properties in the Highland neighborhood of
Shreveport. His property located at 424 College Street is his domicile and is
located within approximately 250 feet of three vacant houses that he alleges
are frequently entered by trespassers. A house approximately 450 feet from
his home was completely burned by trespassers in January 2024, and trespassers allegedly continued to enter the garage apartment of the property.
Young is also a fifty-percent owner of property located at 916 Kirby Place,
which is currently being renovated. He alleges the property has been
violated multiple times by a trespasser who cut the gate lock, replaced it
with a different lock, and posted a “Keep Out” sign.
On July 22, 2022, Young reported a trespass to the Shreveport Police
Department (“SPD”) and provided security camera photographs of the
trespasser. According to Young, the responding officer, Officer J.D. Claitt
(“Officer Claitt”), immediately recognized the trespasser from the
photographs as a serial trespasser known to SPD who had burned down
multiple houses in the Highland neighborhood. He claims that Officer Claitt
acknowledged that the report, combined with her own recognition of the
subject, clearly met the threshold for probable cause, but she stated that she
was not permitted to make an arrest for trespass under SPD’s noticerequirement policy. She allegedly told Young that she could not arrest the
trespasser at that time or on future occasions, even if she personally
observed him on the property, unless Young were simultaneously present to
provide concurrent notice for the trespasser to vacate the property. Young
claims that Officer Claitt explained that SPD policy required a direct
complaint from the property owner, and her only suggestion for removing
the trespasser was to have him evicted by court order as if he were a tenant.
Mayor Arceneaux issued a written memorandum on March 3, 2025,
declaring an official interpretation of the criminal trespass statute, La. R.S.
14:63, which stated that SPD officers cannot legally arrest trespassers
pursuant to the statute without some communication from the lawful
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possessor that notice of trespass has been given. Chief of Police Wayne
Smith (“Chief Smith”) confirmed the interpretation at a March 10, 2025,
Shreveport City Council Property Standards Committee meeting.
The relevant portions of La. R.S. 14:63 are as follows:
A. No person shall enter any structure, watercraft, or movable
owned by another without express, legal, or implied
authorization.
B. (1) No person shall enter upon immovable property owned by
another without express, legal, or implied authorization.
…
C. (1) No person shall remain in or upon property, movable or
immovable, owned by another without express, legal, or implied
authorization.
(2) For purposes of this Subsection:
(a) “Remain in or upon property”, in addition to its common
meaning, signification, and connotation, includes:
(i) The continued presence of an occupant, as defined by Code of
Civil Procedure Article 4704, for longer than five days after
being served with written notice to vacate in accordance
with Code of Civil Procedure Article 4702 or 4703.
(ii) The continued presence of a squatter who has been directed
to vacate by a lawful possessor either verbally, by written notice,
or by posting of conspicuous signage advising that the property
is privately owned and unlawful trespass is prohibited.
…
(b) “Squatter” means any person who remains in or upon
property to which the person lacks a right of possession,
ownership, occupancy, or a lease interest.
…
J. Although not required by this Section, notice that entrance
upon any structure, watercraft, movable, or immovable property
owned by another is prohibited may be indicated by either of the
following:
(1) A sign or signs posted on or in the property at a place or places
where such sign or signs may be reasonably expected to be seen.
(2) The placement of identifying purple paint marks on the trees
or posts on the property …
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Young filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against Mayor Arceneaux and the City on February 26, 2025, to obtain a
judgment that a finding of probable cause is permitted under La. R.S. 14:63
without affirmative notice from a property owner, per Subsection (J) of the
statute, as well as injunctive relief ordering Mayor Arceneaux and the City
to refrain from instructing SPD officers that La. R.S. 14:63 does not permit a
finding of probable cause without affirmative notice from a property owner
that trespass is prohibited. Young ultimately abandoned his request for
injunctive relief. Following a hearing on April 1, 2025, the trial court
granted the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action, finding
that there were no allegations of a specific property right but allowed Young
to amend his petition. Following a hearing on the amended petition on
September 5, 2025, in which Young referred to specific instances of trespass
on property he owned, and the interaction with Officer Claitt, the court again
granted the exceptions.
The trial court determined that Young was not challenging the law
itself, but the applicability or enforcement of the law, by asking the court to
use its discretion to instruct Mayor Arceneaux and the City how to apply the
law. It found that he had no right to do so, because merely owning property
does not create a special individual interest. It found Young did not set forth
grounds to show he had standing to champion a cause pertaining to the
population at large; therefore, he had no cause of action. The court noted
Young was simply dissatisfied with the law and was asking the court to
make a discretionary political decision, but the judiciary does not have
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authority to tell another body of government how to make decisions and
officers had discretion to make arrests.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The trial court’s judgment was entered on the exceptions of no right of
action, lack of standing, and no cause of action. No evidence was
introduced, and the court did not reach the point in which a decision was
made whether to grant or refuse to render a declaratory judgment. The
exceptions present questions of law decided on the face of the pleadings;
therefore, a de novo standard of review is to be applied. Mott v. River Par.
Maint., Inc., 432 So. 2d 827 (La. 1983). A court of appeal reviews de novo
a lower court’s ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action because
the lower court’s decision is generally based only on the sufficiency of the
petition. Blackett v. City of Monroe, 33,339 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/7/00), 766
So. 2d 768.
No Right of Action/Lack of Standing
The peremptory exception of no right of action, La. C.C.P. art.
927(A)(6), is based on La. C.C.P. art. 681, which provides that “an action
can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he
asserts.” Acadiana Renal Physicians, AMC v. Hodges, 24-302 (La. App. 3
Cir. 2/12/25), 406 So. 3d 598. The function of the exception is a
determination of whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to
whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. Id.;
Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.
2d 1211; Alston v. Stamps, 38,628 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/23/04), 877 So. 2d 259,
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writ denied, 04-1923 (La. 11/8/04), 885 So. 2d 1132. The peremptory
exception of no right of action assumes that the petition states a valid cause
of action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff is a member of
the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id.;
Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 20-2224 (La. 7/1/08), 986
So. 2d 47; Badeaux, supra; Alston, supra; Blackett, supra. When evaluating
the exception, the court accepts that allegations of the petition as true. Id.
The exception of no right of action calls into question whether the plaintiff
has standing or interest required under the law to bring the suit. League of
Women Voters v. City of New Orleans, 381 So. 2d 441 (La. 1980). Whether
the defendant may be able to defeat the plaintiff’s cause of action is
immaterial to the determination of an exception of no right of action.
Acadiana Renal Physicians, supra.
For declaratory judgment actions specifically, La. C.C.P. art. 1872
defines the relevant plaintiff class as any person “whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute.” Id. A party is entitled to
relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in
an immediate and genuine situation, and the declaratory judgment will
remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute. Manning v. State, 19-698
(La. App. 3 Cir. 9/23/20), 304 So. 3d 981, writ denied, 20-1239 (La.
12/22/20), 307 So. 3d 1038.
A public right or duty may not be compelled or enforced by a private
citizen without a showing of a personal grievance or interest in the outcome.
League of Women Voters, supra. Without a showing of some special
interest in the performance sought of a public board, officer, or commission,
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which is separate and distinct from the interest of the public at large,
plaintiff will not be permitted to proceed. Id. In other words, without some
peculiar, special, and individual interest, a citizen has no standing in court to
champion a cause or subject-matter which pertains to the whole people in
common. Id.
Young argues that he has a right of action because he has a
particularized injury that satisfies the “special and individual interest”
standard. He claims that he has continuously suffered direct, personal, and
ongoing harm, not merely the generalized harm shared by the public,
because the specific property he owns has been directly targeted by an
identified serial trespasser known to SPD, he was personally refused current
and future enforcement of La. R.S. 14:63 without his concurrent notice to
the trespasser to vacate the property due to Mayor Arceneaux’s and the
City’s policy, and he has suffered an ongoing loss of security and property
value. Young asserts that a declaration that the policy contradicts La. R.S.
14:63(J) would redress his injuries by restoring officers’ lawful discretion to
find probable cause and make arrests without awaiting concurrent owner
notification.
Even though there was a trespassing incident at Young’s property, by
his own admission, it is an issue common among the entire Highland
neighborhood. Likewise, Young’s loss of security and any decline in
property value would also be common to the neighborhood. He is not
involved in any particular action that would be directly impacted by the
application of the trespass statute, such as the prosecution of a trespasser of
his property. A past trespassing incident does not rise to the level of Young
7
having a peculiar, special, and individual interest that would entitle him to
champion the cause of other like property owners in the Highland
neighborhood. Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining the
exception of no right of action.
No Cause of Action
The peremptory exception of no cause of action, La. C.C.P. art.
927(A)(5), refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiff’s right
to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Terrebonne Par.
Consol. Gov’t v. La. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 21-0486 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/21),
340 So. 3d 940. The purpose of the exception is to test the legal sufficiency
of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts
alleged in the petition. Id. An exception of no cause of action is strictly
triable upon the face of the pleadings. Id. The trial court explained the
difference between the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of
action, citing Badeaux, supra:
This Court has recognized that one of the primary differences
between the exception of no right of action and no cause of action
lies in the fact that the focus in an exception of no right of action
is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring a suit,
while the focus in an exception of no cause of action is on
whether the law provides a remedy against the particular
defendant.
There is no right or cause of action when there is no justiciable
controversy. Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So. 2d 908 (1971). The
Supreme Court in Abbott defined “justiciable controversy”:
A “justiciable controversy” connotes, in the present sense, an
existing actual and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one
that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute which
involves the legal relation of the parties who have real adverse
interests, and upon which the judgment of the court may
effectively operate through a decree of conclusive character.
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Further, the plaintiff should have a legally protectable and
tangible interest at stake, and the dispute presented should be of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment. Id. at 918.
A court must deny a request for declaration of rights if the issue presented is
academic, theoretical, or based upon a contingency that may or may not
arise. Tugwell v. Members of Board of Highways, 228 La. 662, 83 So. 2d
893 (1955).
Young argues that he is not seeking enforcement of the statute by way
of requiring officers to make an arrest; rather, he is simply seeking a
declaration that an officer may find probable cause under La. R.S. 14:63
without a concurrent complaint or notice from the property owner. By his
own characterization of the remedy he seeks, Young indicates that there
must still be a finding of probable cause, regardless of whether a declaratory
judgment interpreting the statute is issued. There are several factors that
would impact a determination of probable cause for trespass. Officers are
also afforded discretion as to whether to make an arrest. Further, Young
does not allege that he provided any notice at all to trespassers to vacate his
property, either verbally or in writing, including by posting any signs
indicating his properties were privately owned and unlawful trespass was
prohibited, nor does he allege that any of his neighbors reported trespassers
on his property. Therefore, it is speculation that Mayor Arceneaux’s and the
City’s policy regarding notice given to trespassers based on an alleged
misinterpretation of the statute was the reason SPD failed to make an arrest
in Young’s particular situation. It is also hypothetical whether any change in
the interpretation or enforcement of the trespass statute will affect property
values or have any impact on trespass in the neighborhood.
9
Given the numerous other factors involved in making arrests pursuant
to the trespass statute, a declaratory judgment interpreting the notice
provisions of La. R.S. 14:63 would not have provided a remedy that
significantly impacted a finding of probable cause to make arrests.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in sustaining the exception of no cause
of action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the trial court’s sustaining of
Mayor Arceneaux’s and the City’s exceptions of no right of action, lack of
standing, and no cause of action, and its judgment dismissing Young’s case
with prejudice. All costs of this proceeding are assessed to Young.
AFFIRMED.
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