Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 361
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-434
DEBORAH ELIZABETH GOUCH- Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026
ONASSIS (FORMERLY FOSTER)
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
APPELLANT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
SMITH DISTRICT
V. [NO. 66FDR-02-51]
CHARLES RAY FOSTER, SR. HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Deborah Elizabeth Foster (Gouch-Onassis) appeals from an order of the
Sebastian County Circuit Court granting the motion of appellee Charles Ray Foster, Sr., to
dismiss her request to reopen their 2002 divorce case. This is Deborah’s second appeal to this
court on related issues. See Foster v. Foster, 96 Ark. App. 109, 239 S.W.3d 1 (2006). We affirm.
I. Background Facts
The parties were divorced September 6, 2002, by a decree granting an absolute divorce,
dividing the property and debts, and granting temporary custody to appellee. No visitation or
child support was awarded at that time. As stated in the decree, the circuit court retained
jurisdiction “of this matter and the parties to make further orders in the future as may be proper
in law and equity.” Id. at 110, 239 S.W.3d at 2. In 2005, Deborah sought a portion of Charles’s
military retirement to which he became entitled after the decree was filed. She also sought alimony from Charles. On August 9, 2005, the circuit court entered an order stating that
Deborah’s motion was barred by res judicata; thus, she was not entitled to a portion of Charles’s
military retirement. Deborah appealed, and this court affirmed the circuit court’s order holding
that res judicata barred review. See Foster, supra.
On January 27, 2025, Deborah filed a motion to reopen the divorce proceedings
requesting that certain portions of the divorce decree regarding property division be modified,
including, but not limited to, her entitlement to half of Charles’s military retirement. In
response, Charles filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Deborah’s request should be denied
and motion dismissed on the basis of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of
limitations. The circuit court entered its order on May 15, 2025, dismissing the action with
prejudice. Deborah timely appealed the order of dismissal; this appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
When the issues on appeal do not involve factual questions but rather the application of
the legal doctrine of res judicata, this court simply determines whether the appellee was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Daily v. Langham, 2017 Ark. App. 310, 522 S.W.3d 177. When
a complaint is dismissed on a question of law, this court conducts a de novo review; the circuit
court’s ruling is given no deference on appeal. Duggar v. City of Springdale, 2020 Ark. App. 220,
599 S.W.3d 672.
III. Discussion
Here, after the court held a hearing on Charles’s request to dismiss on the basis of res
judicata, the circuit court granted his request and dismissed the case with prejudice. No factual
findings were made.
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Res judicata means that “a thing or matter has been definitely and finally settled and
determined on its merits by the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.” Baptist Health v.
Murphy, 2010 Ark. 358, at 7, 373 S.W.3d 267, 278. The claim-preclusion aspect of res judicata
bars relitigation of a subsequent suit when (1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the
merits; (2) the first suit was based on proper jurisdiction; (3) the first suit was fully contested in
good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of action; and (5) both suits involve
the same parties or their privies. Id. Res judicata bars relitigation of not only claims that were
actually litigated in the first suit but also those that could have been litigated. Id. When a case is
based on the same events as the subject matter of a previous lawsuit, res judicata will apply even
if the subsequent lawsuit raises new legal issues and seeks additional remedies. Id.
On appeal, Deborah raises a litany of issues regarding her entitlement to years’ worth of
alimony and Charles’s military retirement benefits. As discussed above, this court has already
held that the divorce decree herein was a final judgment and that res judicata prevents the
relitigation of any issues that Deborah raised in 2002 or that she could have raised. See Foster,
supra. Therefore, we decline to further address this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit
court’s order of dismissal with prejudice.
Affirmed.
TUCKER and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Deborah Elizabeth Gouch-Onassis, pro se appellant.
Gean, Gean & Gean, by: David Charles Gean, for appellee.
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