Keaton Taylor v. State of Arkansas

2026-08-19

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Taylor's motion, holding that postconviction motions seeking a waiver of the 70 percent service requirement are governed by the 90-day filing deadline for postconviction relief petitions, and Taylor's motion filed over six years after sentencing was untimely.

Keaton Taylor pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery in 2018 when he was a juvenile and received a 25-year sentence with a requirement to serve 70 percent before parole eligibility. In January 2025, over six years later, Taylor filed a motion asking the circuit court to waive the 70 percent service requirement, arguing that he qualified for discretionary waiver under a statute that permits courts to waive this requirement for juvenile offenders who were mere accomplices. The circuit court dismissed the motion as untimely without addressing its merits, citing lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, Taylor challenged the circuit court's dismissal, arguing that the statute contained no express time limitation. The court of appeals rejected this argument, relying on prior Arkansas Supreme Court precedent establishing that motions seeking a waiver under this statute constitute collateral attacks on judgments and therefore must be filed within 90 days of sentencing under the state's postconviction relief rules. Because Taylor's motion was filed well beyond this deadline, the circuit court properly lacked jurisdiction to consider it.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a postconviction motion for waiver of mandatory 70 percent sentence service is subject to the 90-day filing deadline for collateral attacks on judgments
Whether the sentencing court loses jurisdiction over such motions after the 90-day period has elapsed
Whether a juvenile offender's eligibility for discretionary sentencing waivers depends on timely filing a motion during the postconviction relief period

Procedural posture

Taylor appealed the Columbia County Circuit Court's dismissal of his postconviction motion seeking waiver of a mandatory 70 percent sentence service requirement to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Division III.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 365

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION III

No. CR-25-254

KEATON TAYLOR Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026

APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

V. [NO. 14CR-16-59]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID W. TALLEY, JR.,

APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

In May 2018, Keaton Taylor pled guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery

and was sentenced to an aggregate of twenty-five years’ imprisonment followed by a thirtyyear suspended imposition of sentence. In January 2025, Taylor requested that the Columbia

County Circuit Court waive a statutory requirement that he serve 70 percent of his sentence.

The circuit court dismissed Taylor’s motion as untimely. On appeal, Taylor argues that the

circuit court clearly erred in finding that the relevant statute included a time limitation. We

affirm.

On May 17, 2018, Taylor pled guilty to the murder and aggravated robbery of Douglas

Harwell, and the circuit court entered a sentencing order the same day. The crimes occurred

on April 14, 2016, when Taylor was sixteen years old. See Despain v. State, 2018 Ark. App.

32, at 1–2, 539 S.W.3d 613, 615 (recounting the circumstances of the murder). On January 25, 2025, Taylor asked the court to waive the provision set forth in Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-93-618(a) requiring that he serve 70 percent of his sentence before

being eligible for parole as authorized by subsection 618(c). The relevant provisions of section

16-93-618 provide:

(a)(1) Notwithstanding any law allowing the award of meritorious good time or

any other law to the contrary, and subject to provisions requiring that an offender

serve a greater percentage of his or her sentence in § 16-93-609 or delayed release

under § 5-4-405, a person who is found guilty of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere

to subdivisions (a)(1)(A)–(I) of this section [includes Taylor’s offenses of first-degree

murder and aggravated robbery] for an offense committed before January 1, 2025,

shall not be eligible for parole or community correction transfer, except as provided

in subdivision (a)(3) of this section or subsection (c) of this section, until the person

serves seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which the person is

sentenced, including a sentence prescribed under § 5-4-501[.]

section under the following circumstances:

(1) The defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense;

(2) The juvenile was merely an accomplice to the offense; and

(3) The offense occurred on or after July 28, 1995.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-618(a), (c) (Supp. 2025).

Taylor alleged in his motion that he was a juvenile at the time of the offense, that he

was merely an accomplice to the crimes, and that the offense occurred after July 28, 1995.

Thus, he contended that the circuit court had discretion pursuant to section 16-93-618(c) to

waive the 70 percent service provision. Without addressing the merits of Taylor’s motion,

the circuit court dismissed the motion, stating, “Having sentenced [Taylor] in 2018, this

Court no longer has jurisdiction to consider the Motion.” Taylor’s appeal followed.

We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s

findings are clearly erroneous. Boykins v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 264, at 1. A finding is clearly

erroneous when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the

definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake. Hawkins v. State, 2025

Ark. App. 86, at 3.

The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a postconviction motion seeking a waiver

pursuant to section 16-93-618 is a motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner

and therefore subject to the filing deadlines set forth in Rule 37.2 of the Arkansas Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Johnson v. State, 2014 Ark. 526, at 3, 452 S.W.3d 87, 89 (interpreting

section 16-93-618’s predecessor statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-611, which

was replaced word for word in 2011 by section 16-93-618). Johnson pled guilty to first-degree

murder and aggravated assault in 1997. Id. at 1, 452 S.W.3d at 88. He was fourteen at the

time of the crimes. Id., 452 S.W.3d at 88. In 2013, Johnson filed a petition requesting a

waiver of the 70 percent service requirement. Id. at 2, 452 S.W.3d at 88. The circuit court

treated the motion as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37, found it was

not filed within ninety days of the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 37.2(c), 1 and denied

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c)(i) (2025) provides:

If a conviction was obtained on a plea of guilty, or the petitioner was found

guilty at trial and did not appeal the judgment of conviction, a petition claiming relief

the motion because it had no jurisdiction in the matter. Id. at 2, 452 S.W.3d at 88. The

supreme court affirmed, holding that a pleading that mounts a collateral attack on a

judgment is governed by the provisions of Rule 37.1 regardless of the label on the petition.

Id. at 3, 452 S.W.3d at 89.

Johnson applies here. Taylor’s motion, filed more than six years after he was convicted,

was filed well past the ninety-day deadline set forth in Rule 37.2(c)(i) for filing a

postconviction petition for relief from a guilty plea. Because Taylor’s motion was untimely,

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court’s dismissal

was not clearly erroneous.

Taylor attempts to distinguish Johnson, arguing that Johnson was sentenced before the

statute was amended to allow a sentencing court to waive the 70 percent service requirement

for juveniles and that Johnson was asking the court to apply the statute retroactively to his

case.2 Taylor’s argument has no merit. The supreme court in Johnson stated that “[i]n addition

to the lack of jurisdiction based on the untimeliness” of Johnson’s motion, the motion was

also properly dismissed because the statute cannot be applied retroactively to waive the 70

percent requirement. Id. at 5, 452 S.W.3d at 90. The retroactive holding was an alternative

under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days

of the date of entry of judgment. If a petition is filed before the entry of judgment,

the petition shall be treated as filed on the day after the entry of judgment.

The Arkansas General Assembly amended the statute in 1999.

ruling that in no way alters the primary holding in that case, which was that the untimely

motion deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.