Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 363
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-26-90
MARVIN MOORE Opinion Delivered: August 19, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
V. SMITH DISTRICT
[NO. 66FJV-25-20]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT,
CHILD JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Appellant, Marvin Moore (“Moore”), appeals the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s
November 10, 2025 review and closing order returning custody of Minor Child (“MC”)
(DOB 07/31/17) to the child’s mother, Jamie Schuh (“Schuh”).1 On appeal, Moore argues
that the circuit court erred by (1) returning custody of MC to Schuh and (2) establishing an
unreasonably restrictive visitation schedule. We affirm.
On January 23, 2025, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
exercised a seventy-two-hour hold on MC after receiving a report that Schuh was being
1
Schuh is not a party to this appeal.
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arrested on a felony warrant from North Dakota, and no caregiver was available to take
custody of MC. At that time, Moore was living in Georgia.
On January 24, DHS filed a petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody.
The circuit court entered an ex parte order for emergency custody on January 27 after finding
probable cause to believe MC was dependent-neglected, and remaining in Schuh’s custody
was contrary to MC’s welfare.
On February 3, the circuit court held a probable-cause hearing and found there was
probable cause that the emergency conditions that necessitated MC’s removal from the
custody of Schuh continued, it was contrary to MC’s welfare to be returned home, and it
was necessary for MC to continue in DHS custody. The circuit court also ordered DHS to
refer Moore for an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) home study
in Georgia.
On February 7, the circuit court entered an order for expedited placement decision
under the ICPC to assess Moore and his wife as a potential placement for MC. A second
order for expedited placement decision was entered on March 3.
On March 10, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing. The parties stipulated
and the circuit court found that MC was a dependent juvenile as defined in the Arkansas
Juvenile Code. The circuit court set the goal of the case as reunification. Schuh was ordered
to resolve her criminal charges, and both Schuh and Moore were ordered to have housing
and stable income and to attend counseling and visitation.
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On April 17, Schuh, who was incarcerated in North Dakota, requested a continuance
of a June 9 review hearing because she was scheduled to be released on June 24. The circuit
court granted the motion.
On April 25, Moore filed a motion for placement pursuant to ICPC, requesting that
the circuit court place MC in his home in Georgia because the ICPC home study had been
approved. The circuit court held a hearing on Moore’s motion for placement on May 19.
After the hearing, the circuit court denied placement with Moore and ordered him to
complete a psychological evaluation and comply with any resulting recommendations. The
circuit court further provided that DHS could allow visitation at its discretion if Moore’s
mental health was determined sufficient for visitation purposes.
On August 11, 2025, the circuit court held a review hearing. The circuit court
changed the goal of the case to “reunification with a fit parent” with a concurrent goal of
adoption following termination of parental rights. The parents were ordered to comply with
“family time rules,” and Moore was additionally ordered to complete anger-management
classes and follow any recommendations.
The circuit court found Schuh in compliance with the case plan and court orders:
she had participated in parenting classes and counseling, and she had housing, a job, and
transportation through her employer. Although the circuit court found Moore to be
compliant with the case plan, it noted that he was unemployed, was seeking Social Security
disability benefits, and did not provide his psychological evaluation to DHS until the day of
the hearing.
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The circuit court ordered DHS to review Moore’s psychological evaluation to
determine whether it satisfied DHS’s standards and, if not, required Moore to complete
another evaluation approved by DHS. The circuit court also expressed concern that Moore
had not attempted an in-person visit while MC was placed with his family in Arkansas.
On October 14, 2025, during a staffing, DHS informed the parties that it intended
to recommend that custody of MC be returned to Schuh and that the case be closed. Moore
objected and began directly emailing DHS’s attorney despite his counsel advising him not to
do so. Two days later, Moore filed a pro se notice of objection and request for stay of
permanency determination alleging misconduct by DHS and opposed DHS’s
recommendation that custody of MC be returned to Schuh. As a result, Moore’s counsel
moved to withdraw from the case, stating that Moore filed the pro se pleading without his
knowledge or consent.
On October 20, the circuit court held a review hearing. At the outset of the hearing,
the circuit court denied the motion to withdraw by Moore’s counsel and stated that it would
not consider Moore’s pro se motions because he was represented by counsel.
Shelly McGahey (“McGahey”), a social service specialist and the caseworker for the
case, testified that DHS recommended reunification and that MC be returned to Schuh’s
custody. According to McGahey, MC had been placed in a trial home placement, and he
was doing “remarkable.” She also stated that the school reported that he “was doing
amazing.”
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McGahey testified that Schuh completed parenting classes, attended counseling,
maintained employment, and had appropriate housing. She stated that Moore completed a
free psychological evaluation on his own; however, DHS requested that he complete a
department-approved evaluation. DHS set up another psychological evaluation via telehealth
for Moore, but he did not want to do another evaluation. She testified that she offered
Moore transportation assistance, including a bus pass to Arkansas, so he could complete the
evaluation and visit MC. Moore responded that he could not spend four to five days traveling
by bus and refused to travel by plane. McGahey also testified that Moore told her he could
not travel to Arkansas because his daughter has therapy four times a week, and his other
children are in school.
When asked whether she remained comfortable with DHS’s recommendation that
MC be returned to Schuh’s custody, McGahey answered affirmatively. She explained that
DHS visited the home at least weekly and that MC appeared “happy” and “at peace” during
those visits. McGahey further testified that Moore had become angry after family time with
MC and that he sent her “disconcerting” text messages afterward. She stated that Moore had
accused her of allowing other people to participate in his visit despite no one else being
present.
McGahey testified that she was concerned that Moore and MC did not know each
other, and it would not be in MC’s best interest to live with someone whom he does not
know. She further testified that neither Moore nor his wife work, yet Moore remained
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unwilling to travel to Arkansas to visit MC. McGahey also stated that, on one occasion, MC
refused to participate in a scheduled visit with Moore.
McGahey acknowledged that Moore completed anger-management classes and
testified that his income came from adoption assistance for two children and SSI benefits
received on behalf of another child. She stated that Moore had been waiting approximately
a year for a decision about his own SSI application and that she did not know when he was
last employed. McGahey also testified that the Georgia authorities approved Moore’s home
study but did not believe it was in MC’s best interest to live in Moore’s residence because it
was a two bedroom with two adults and three children living there.
McGahey testified that MC was asked to draw a house and put things inside that
made him feel safe. MC placed Schuh in his safe house and Moore in his worry house that
he drew. She further testified that she believed MC should be allowed to speak with Moore
if he wanted.
Schuh testified that she completed a Nurturing Parenting Program, she had
appropriate housing for MC that DHS had visited, and MC was in school. She further
testified that she felt like there was nothing DHS needed to provide her to be able to have
custody of MC and close the case. She acknowledged that she would comply with any
visitation the circuit court ordered for Moore. Schuh stated that she would encourage
communication between MC and Moore so long as interactions remained emotionally safe
and appropriate for MC. She expressed concern regarding Moore’s anger and the manner in
which he communicates with MC. Schuh also requested that any in-person visitation in
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Arkansas be supervised by STEPS or another third party. She explained that MC had not
seen Moore in person since he was approximately eight months old despite the fact that she
and MC lived in a home owned by Moore’s father and stepmother for approximately six
years. Schuh additionally testified that she was concerned for MC’s safety because Moore
was unpredictable, suffered from schizophrenia, and believed that “people are after him.”
Moore testified that he was not in agreement with DHS’s recommendation to return
custody of MC to Schuh. He stated that DHS was “corrupt” and fabricated excuses
throughout the case. When asked whether he believed that Schuh would facilitate visitation
between MC and him if she was awarded custody and the case was closed, he stated that he
“believes that it may happen for a little while, and then it will kind of fade off because she
won’t be having any type of accountability for missing them or controlling the situation.”
Moore further testified that he cannot travel to Arkansas for visitation due to his specialneeds daughter and cannot travel for multiple days. He stated that he had not seen MC in
person since he was seven months old and acknowledged that he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder with bipolar in the past but was not taking
medication for those conditions.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the attorney ad litem recommended that MC be
returned to Schuh and the case be closed. The attorney ad litem explained that MC expressed
that he does not want to have visits with his father and believed that his father was the reason
that he entered DHS custody. The attorney ad litem further recommended that any
continued phone calls between MC and Moore be supervised by a third party at Moore’s
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expense. The attorney ad litem also noted that Schuh had stated she would allow MC to
contact his father in the future if MC later decided he wanted communication with him.
Following the hearing, the circuit court found that MC was no longer in need of DHS
services and granted permanent custody of MC to Schuh after finding it was in MC’s best
interest. The circuit court found that Schuh had complied with the case plan and that Moore
failed to complete an approved psychological evaluation and refused to visit MC in Arkansas.
The circuit court additionally noted that Moore had not seen MC since he was seven months
old.
The circuit court ordered Moore to receive visitation two times a week via phone,
Zoom, or Microsoft Teams on Mondays from 7:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and Fridays from
6:30 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. The circuit court further ordered that any in-person visit in
Arkansas would need to be supervised through STEPS at Moore’s expense and upon thirty
days’ notice to Schuh.
This court reviews findings in dependency-neglect proceedings de novo, but we will
not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Whitt v. Ark. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 449, at 4, 441 S.W.3d 33, 35. A finding is clearly erroneous
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We give great
deference to the circuit court because it is in a far superior position to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. Id.
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For his first point on appeal, Moore argues that the circuit court erred in returning
custody of MC to Schuh.
Here, the circuit court returned custody to Schuh and closed the case at a review
hearing held approximately eight months after the case had begun. Therefore, the applicable
statute is Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-323 (Supp. 2025), the relevant portions of
which are as follows:
(e)(1) In each case in which a juvenile has been placed in an out-of-home
placement, the court shall conduct a hearing to review the case sufficiently to
determine the future status of the juvenile based upon the best interest of the juvenile.
(2)(A) The court shall determine and include in its orders the following:
(vi)(a) Whether the juvenile should be returned to his or her parent or parents
and whether or not the juvenile's health and safety can be protected by his or her
parent or parents if returned home, either permanently or for a trial placement.
(b) At any time the court determines that the health and safety of the child can be
adequately protected and it is in the best interest of the child, the court shall return
the child to a parent or parents from whom custody was removed.
In addition to the requirements set forth in section 9-35-323, Arkansas Code
Annotated section 9-35-330(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2025) further provides that the circuit court is
required at every stage of the case to “consider the least restrictive placement for the juvenile
and assess safety concerns that prevent either a trial home placement or the juvenile from
being returned to or placed in the custody of the parent of the juvenile.”
Moore contends that the circuit court improperly focused on reunification with
Schuh rather than evaluating both parents as potential custodial placements before awarding
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Schuh permanent custody and closing the case. He further contends that the circuit court
focused on Schuh’s reunification progress and the parties’ compliance with the case plan
and failed to conduct the analysis required under section 9-35-323.
Moore relies on prior findings and hearings from the earlier stages of the dependencyneglect proceedings to argue that the circuit court treated the case solely as a reunification
matter involving Schuh. The order on appeal, however, arose from the October 20, 2025,
review hearing conducted pursuant to section 9-35-323, which required the circuit court to
determine whether returning MC to a parent protected MC’s health and safety and was in
MC’s best interest. See Ark Code Ann. § 9-35-323(e)(2)(A)(vi).
The written order from the October 2025 hearing states that the circuit court
considered “the testimony, exhibits, statements of the parties and counsel, the record herein,
and other things and matters presented” as well as “the best interests, welfare, case plan,
health and safety, and appropriate statutory placement alternatives.” The order further states
that the circuit court determined that Schuh had complied with the case plan, that MC was
no longer in need of DHS services, and that placement in Schuh’s permanent custody served
MC’s best interest. The order additionally addressed Moore’s lack of visitation and failure
to complete a DHS approved psychological evaluation. Thus, the order reflects that the
circuit court considered MC’s health, safety, and best interest in determining whether
custody should be returned to Schuh and complied with section 9-35-330(c)(2)(A).
The circuit court also considered both parents as potential placement options and
did not base its decision solely on the parties’ compliance with the case plan. MC had lived
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with Schuh his entire life and was doing well in her care. Schuh had employment,
appropriate housing, transportation, and a successful trial home placement with MC. By
contrast, Moore was unemployed, had not seen MC in person since he was seven months
old, and remained unwilling to travel to Arkansas for visitation. MC expressed that he felt
safe with Schuh and worried about Moore. Accordingly, the circuit court’s decision
considered the parties’ respective relationships with MC, placement stability, and MC’s wellbeing in Schuh’s care, not merely compliance with the case plan.
Moore additionally argues that “reunification with a fit parent” is not a permanency
goal recognized under the Juvenile Code and improperly caused the circuit court to focus
exclusively on reunification with Schuh. However, Moore failed to preserve that argument
for appellate review because he did not challenge the prior order below or designate the
relevant review hearing in his notice of appeal. See Velazquez v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011
Ark. App. 168, at 5. Regardless of the phrasing used, the circuit court considered both
parents and conducted the analysis required under section 9-35-323 before returning custody
to Schuh.
For Moore’s second point on appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred in
establishing an unreasonably restrictive schedule between him and MC. Specifically, Moore
contends that once the circuit court awarded Schuh permanent custody and closed the
dependency-neglect case, the Juvenile Code no longer governed visitation, and the circuit
court was required to apply the domestic relations visitation standards in Arkansas Code
Annotated section 9-13-101(b)(1)(A)(vii).
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“Permanent custody” means custody that is transferred to a person as a permanency
disposition in a juvenile case and the case is closed. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(44) (Supp.
2025). Thus, when a circuit court grants permanent custody in a dependency-neglect
proceeding, permanency has been achieved, and the child is no longer dependent-neglected.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 469, 700 S.W.3d 455.
The fixing of visitation rights is a matter that lies within the discretion of the circuit
court, with the primary consideration being the best interest of the child. Donham v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 698, at 9, 536 S.W.3d 675, 680 (affirming a visitation
determination entered in dependency-neglect proceeding in which permanent custody was
awarded).
Moore’s reliance on section 9-13-101 is unpersuasive because the challenged visitation
provisions were entered as part of the dependency-neglect proceeding. In determining
visitation, the circuit court considered the evidence presented at the review hearing,
including MC’s best interest, the parties’ circumstances, and the recommendations of DHS
and the attorney ad litem.
The circuit court further recognized that any future modification of visitation would
occur through a domestic-relations action after the closure of the dependency-neglect
proceeding. In its order, the circuit court provided that either Schuh or Moore could petition
to modify the order in a domestic-relations case and directed that any such petition include
a reference to the juvenile case number and provide notice to DHS.
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Here, the evidence supports the circuit court’s visitation determination. Although
Schuh testified that she would comply with any visitation order entered by the circuit court,
the evidence reflected continued tension between her and Moore. DHS recommended, and
Schuh requested, that STEPS facilitate visitation as a neutral third party. The attorney ad
litem further advised the circuit court that MC did not want to visit Moore, and DHS
testified that MC had refused a visit with him.
The record further demonstrates that Moore had limited involvement in MC’s life
and had not seen him in person since he was approximately seven months old. Moore also
refused opportunities to travel to Arkansas for visitation despite challenging the circuit
court’s visitation determination, and he failed to complete a DHS approved psychological
evaluation. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not clearly err in establishing
the visitation arrangement set forth in the review order. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and TUCKER, JJ., agree.
Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee
Arkansas Department of Human Services; and Linda Hamilton, Attorney ad Litem, for
appellee minor child.
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