Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 360
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-26-41
MELISSA BRUNSON Opinion Delivered August 19, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 23JV-24-307]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE DAVID M. CLARK,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
Appellant Melissa Brunson appeals from the Faulkner County Circuit Court’s order
granting permanent legal custody of her minor child (MC) to MC’s father, Aaron Hamilton;
leaving visitation—and any restrictions deemed appropriate—to Hamilton’s discretion; and
closing the case. Brunson argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that the trial
court’s custody and visitation decisions are in MC’s best interest. We affirm.
I. Background
On December 2, 2024, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for dependency-neglect and emergency less than custody with respect to MC, who
was almost six years old. In an affidavit attached to the petition, family-service worker (FSW)
Laquanta Lewis attested that DHS was contacted on November 17 by a reporter who stated that a welfare check had been requested on MC; that the reporter had gone to the home,
and Brunson “was making statements that weren’t making any sense,” such as claiming to
have been raped on the battlefield during the Civil War and that various people had drugged
and raped her; that MC, however, appeared to be a “perfectly healthy little girl”; that the
home had food, water, and electricity; and that Brunson appeared to have been experiencing
a “mental episode.” Lewis further attested that on November 19, she went to Greenbrier
Westside Elementary School to speak with MC but that MC was not at school. Lewis stated
that Brunson was not at home and that, when she called her, Brunson would not disclose
her location and “wasn’t talking in a normal mental state.” Lewis stated that she and another
social worker later went to Brunson’s home with a police officer; that Brunson was again not
in a good mental state; that Brunson became upset and hit the police officer; that Brunson
was arrested; and that MC was met at the DHS office by her maternal grandparents. Lewis
attested that on November 21, she went to Hamilton’s home and found that both he and
his home were appropriate.1 Lewis alleged in the petition that MC’s health and safety were
in danger due to Brunson’s mental instability and requested an order prohibiting Brunson
from removing MC from Hamilton’s home and asked that any contact between Brunson
and MC be supervised.
1
Lewis included information that MC’s older two half siblings were in the physical custody of their legal father, Scott Trower. On November 20, 2024, Trower had been granted temporary full custody of his children.
2
The trial court entered an ex parte order for emergency less than custody after finding
probable cause to believe that MC was dependent-neglected. The trial court ordered that
MC would remain in Hamilton’s physical custody and that Brunson was prohibited from
having any unsupervised contact with MC unless ordered by the court. The parties later
stipulated that probable cause existed at the time a hold was placed on MC and that probable
cause continued to exist given the allegations in DHS’s petition.
On January 21, 2025, the trial court entered an order adjudicating MC dependentneglected due to Brunson’s ongoing mental-health issues that posed a risk to MC if returned
to Brunson’s custody. The trial court found that Brunson had been involuntarily committed
three times since November 2024. The trial court further found that, although Brunson was
no longer confined, she appeared to still be “suffering from a disconnect from reality.” The
trial court found that it was in MC’s best interest to remain in Hamilton’s custody but set
the goal of reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship. The trial court ordered that
Brunson’s visitation with MC was to be supervised as previously ordered and that Hamilton
had discretion to allow additional visitation. Brunson was ordered to cooperate with DHS
and keep DHS informed; submit to a psychological evaluation and follow the
recommendations; participate in counseling; take medications as prescribed; refrain from
using illegal drugs and alcohol; obtain stable employment and housing; maintain a clean,
safe home; and demonstrate the ability to protect MC.
The case was reviewed, and the trial court found in an order entered on April 22 that
reunification continued to be the goal with a concurrent goal of guardianship. The trial court
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found that Brunson had complied with the case plan and court orders and. ordered that
Brunson’s visitation be expanded such that it was unsupervised and that the parties work
toward overnight visitation.
On May 19, however, Hamilton moved to terminate Brunson’s unsupervised
visitation because of recommendations from Brunson’s psychological evaluation and
statements she had made during the evaluation. For example, Brunson claimed that she had
been raped and MC had been sexually abused at his (Hamilton’s) instruction; that God had
told her (Brunson) that her name is “Mary”; that she disagreed with her diagnoses of bipolar
disorder and reported psychosis; and that she disliked taking her prescribed medications.
Moreover, the report recommended that Brunson’s visitation be supervised for four to six
months while she is participating in therapy and taking her medications.
Another review hearing was held, and the trial court entered an order on July 22
finding that MC should remain in Hamilton’s custody but continuing the goal of
reunification and guardianship. The trial court found that visitation with Brunson should
be supervised until she is in therapy and taking her medications. The trial court found that
Brunson had substantially complied with the case plan and court orders but that she had
stopped seeing her therapist and quit taking her medications—she was, instead, seeking
alternative treatment.
On October 21, another review hearing was held. FSW Cavorcia Carter testified that
DHS had canceled Brunson’s last two visits with MC because Brunson self-reported sexually
abusing MC and one of MC’s half siblings. Carter testified about Brunson’s overall
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compliance with the case plan but stated that DHS was still concerned with her mentalhealth issues. She said that Brunson was in counseling but not taking her medications to
address her mental-health needs. Carter testified that Brunson had made some concerning
statements at the most recent staffing, such as that she is the daughter of Princess Diana and
that she had been raped in an underground tunnel by President Trump. Carter said that
MC’s placement with Hamilton was going well and that MC could not be returned to
Brunson’s custody. She testified that Brunson was doing chakra balancing and energy work
as well as meditation and dream work to address her mental-health issues. Carter also stated
that Brunson’s visits with MC go very well and that she did not fear for MC’s safety as long
as Brunson’s visits are supervised. Carter further testified that she did not think Hamilton
would be “fair” in allowing Brunson to visit with MC.
Twyliah Acklin, an advocate at Rise House where Brunson was staying, testified that
Brunson is “very pleasant,” follows the rules, and does her chores. She said that Brunson is
employed and was recently promoted to manager. She said that residents can live at Rise
House for about a year and that Brunson had been there for approximately nine or ten
months.
Brunson testified that she was asking for supervised visitation but did not think that
Hamilton would allow her to see MC if the case is closed. Brunson stated that she is living
in a domestic-violence shelter due to the nature of her relationship with Hamilton. She stated
that her sexual-abuse report had been taken out of context and explained that she was
speaking about systemic abuse. Brunson then testified about an occasion when she was a
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teenager and had confided in a teacher about being abused. She testified that she had been
turned over to the Conway Police Department; that her parents had bandanas covering their
noses and mouths; that she had been drugged and taken across the street to a furniture store
that had a tunnel leading to an area underneath the courthouse; that there had been multiple
other children there; that she had been gang-raped; that her legs had been pulled out of their
sockets; that her tooth had been knocked out; that she had been taken to the hospital for
treatment under the name Mary Payton to protect her from the people in power; and that
her mother had wrecked her car in order to get her (Brunson) treatment. Brunson also
testified that she had been forced to sexually abuse her children—she said that she would
never do that of her own accord. Brunson said that it had taken a long time in therapy to
“dig back” into her memories because she had been forced to take anti-psychotic drugs,
which gave her brain fog.
On October 21, the trial court entered a review-hearing order/dismissal and caseclosure order. The trial court found that placement of MC in the permanent legal custody
of Hamilton was in her best interest and necessary to protect her health and safety and that
returning her to Brunson’s custody was contrary to MC’s welfare. The trial court found that
visitation between Brunson and MC was appropriate but that visitation would be at
Hamilton’s discretion and subject to any reasonable restrictions he deemed appropriate. The
trial court found that Brunson had failed to comply with the case plan and court orders.
Specifically, Brunson did not have her own housing; she self-reported sexual abuse of MC
and MC’s half sibling; Brunson failed to address her mental-health issues by refusing bipolar
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treatment, not attending counseling, and not taking her medications; and Brunson made
unfounded claims. The trial court found that Brunson had made no progress in alleviating
or mitigating the causes for MC’s removal from her home. By contrast, the trial court found
that both Hamilton and DHS had complied with the case plan and court orders. The trial
court then dismissed the matter and closed the case.
II. Standard of Review
In juvenile proceedings, the standard of review on appeal is de novo, although we do
not reverse unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Mixon v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 554, 590 S.W.3d 746. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We give due deference to the
superior position of the trial court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The
primary consideration in child-custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the children
involved; all other considerations are secondary. Id.
III. Discussion
Brunson does not dispute that the trial court had authority to award custody of MC
to Hamilton as a noncustodial parent, and she acknowledges that the trial court had
authority to permit visitation with MC at Hamilton’s discretion. Brunson argues, however,
that there was insufficient evidence that these decisions were in MC’s best interest. We
disagree.
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Regarding the trial court’s custody decision, Brunson argues that it was premature
given that custody had been awarded to Hamilton only ten and a half months after the case
was opened. She asserts that MC was stable in her placement with Hamilton and that there
would have been no danger in allowing her additional time to work toward reunification
with MC. She argues that, given her history of compliance, giving her more time to benefit
from the services could have alleviated DHS’s concerns about her mental-health issues.
While we agree with DHS’s position that we could affirm given that no legal authority
is cited for Brunson’s arguments, Lloyd v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 461,
655 S.W.3d 534, we point out that the trial court, which was not obligated to keep the case
open for any specific length of time, said that keeping the case open for another forty-five
days was not going to make a difference with respect to Brunson’s mental-health issues.
While Brunson was initially complying with the case plan, by the time of the last review
hearing, she was backsliding in that she had stopped taking her medications to treat bipolar
disorder and was, instead, relying on chakras balancing and dream work. Moreover, the trial
court heard for itself Brunson’s alarming statements, prompting the trial court to tell her
that she is “not in touch with reality.” We hold that the trial court did not clearly err in
determining that permanent custody with Hamilton was in MC’s best interest. Moreover,
when a court grants permanent custody to a noncustodial parent, the case must be closed
because at that point, permanency has been achieved, and the child is no longer dependentneglected. Rodriguez v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 469, 700 S.W.3d 455.
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As for the trial court’s determination with respect to visitation, Brunson argues that
not having a set visitation schedule is not in MC’s best interest. She asserts that there is no
guarantee that Hamilton will permit her to visit MC and that even FSW Carter was
concerned that Hamilton will not allow her to visit with MC without a court order in place.
Brunson points out that Hamilton canceled a visit shortly before the final hearing. Moreover,
she argues that it is unlikely she will be able to challenge the visitation order in the future
given that she is indigent and considering that the burden will be on her to prove that the
visitation should be changed. According to Brunson, the focus was on her behavior when
consideration should have been given to the impact the visitation order will have on MC.
She asserts that both the trial court and DHS thought that visitation was appropriate and
that DHS reported that her visits with MC went very well.
Again, we could affirm on the basis that Brunson fails to cite any convincing authority
on the subject of visitation.2 Lloyd, supra. Hamilton had good reason to cancel Brunson’s visit
with MC shortly before the last review hearing given Brunson’s statement that Hamilton had
arranged for her and MC to be sexually abused. Furthermore, Brunson had self-reported
sexually abusing MC and MC’s half sibling. At the final hearing, it was clear that, given her
2
Brunson does cite Rhine v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. App. 649, at 10, 386 S.W.3d 577, 582–83, for the proposition that “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” Rhine, however, involved a parent whose rights had been terminated after what we deemed slight lapses in judgment. That case is inapposite to the custody and visitation situation here—Brunson’s parental rights remain intact.
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irrational testimony, Brunson was not taking her prescribed medications. As for whether
Hamilton will be fair with visitation in the future, whether it will be financially feasible for
Brunson to challenge the visitation order later, and whether Brunson will be able to satisfy
her burden of proving a change of circumstances pertinent to visitation, we will not speculate
on such matters. We are simply not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial
court made a mistake in concluding that it was in MC’s best interest to permit Brunson
visitation with MC at Hamilton’s discretion and subject to any reasonable restrictions
Hamilton deems appropriate.
Affirmed.
WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services; and Linda Hamilton, Attorney ad Litem, for appellee minor child.
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