Fareed Hayat v. Casey Diaz

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1235

FAREED N. HAYAT, an individual,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SGT. CASEY DIAZ, BROOKE DOLAN, NATHAN LENHART, individually and

in official capacity; MARCUS G. JONES, in official capacity; MONTGOMERY

COUNTY, MARYLAND, a municipal entity; NICOLE MIN, individually and in

official capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Lydia Kay Griggsby, District Judge. (8:20-cv-02994-LKG)

Argued: May 8, 2026 Decided: August 20, 2026

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge

Wilkinson joined. Judge Benjamin wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Kylie O’Donnell, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Aaron Ramirez, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY

ATTORNEY, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Aderson B. François,

Laila Ahmed, Student Counsel, Thomas Stanley-Becker, Student Counsel, Yisroel

Margolin, Student Counsel, Douglas Wickman, Student Counsel, Civil Rights Clinic,

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. John USCA4 Appeal: 25-1235 Doc: 59 Filed: 08/20/2026 Pg: 2 of 49

P. Markovs, County Attorney, Edward B. Lattner, Deputy County Attorney, Kristen J.

Nunley, Assistant County Attorney, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, Rockville,

Maryland, for Appellees.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After the Emergency Communications Center in Montgomery County, Maryland,

issued a priority call to Montgomery County police officers to “respond priority for a

kidnapping” after a witness saw someone put three children into the trunk of a vehicle, the

officers traced the driver to Fareed Hayat, who lived nearby in Silver Spring. When

officers approached Hayat, who was standing on the porch of his house with his wife, he

acted suspiciously, stating that there was “no kidnapping here,” cutting off a conversation

between his wife and the officers, and attempting to retreat into his home, telling them,

“You cannot come into our house.” After the officers initiated a Terry stop ∗ and prevented

Hayat from shutting the door, they entered into the front hall of the house to handcuff Hayat

and complete their investigation. They determined that Hayat had not kidnapped the

children and released him.

Hayat commenced this action against the police officers, the Chief of Police, and

Montgomery County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, his Fourteenth Amendment

right to familial privacy, his federal property rights under § 1982, and his rights under state

constitutional and tort law. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss

and for summary judgment, ruling that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion

of child kidnapping to justify their initiation of a Terry stop before Hayat retreated into his

house; that the officers were justified in entering the house to complete the Terry stop; and

∗

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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that an additional exigency existed to confirm the welfare of the children in circumstances

where Hayat was “imped[ing] their ability to check” on the children.

For the reasons given herein, we affirm.

I

In the evening of October 22, 2017, the Montgomery County Emergency

Communications Center advised Montgomery County police officers over the radio of a

“respond priority for a kidnapping” near Piney Branch Road and University Boulevard. A

“priority call” is the “highest level of urgency and police response,” and “kidnapping in

progress calls are rare.” The Communications Center explained that the “complainant was

told by another driver that [the other driver] saw someone grab three children and put them

in the trunk of a vehicle.” The complainant provided a description of the suspect as a Black

man and the vehicle as black with Maryland license plate number 6CC8056, which was

headed northbound on University Boulevard toward Wheaton. Police Sergeant Robert

Sheehan responded over the radio that “the car comes back to a 2013 Tesla, to a Black

male, 1 Eastmoor Drive in Silver Spring,” and Officer Jorge Moran added that “Teslas

have rear-facing seats in the trunk, so they might be able to sit there.”

The information reported by the Communications Center was based on a 911 call

from a person who identified himself as “Luis” and who said that he was relaying

information that he had received from an eyewitness, who was shortly thereafter identified

as Edgar Ayala Solano.

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Soon after the emergency dispatch, Officer Moran advised on the air that he had

made in-person contact with Solano, reporting:

I have the original complainant here. He says that he was at the IHOP in

Langley Park, that he saw the Black male open the trunk, yell at the kids, and

then close the trunk, but like I said, they might have possible rear-facing seats

in the trunk that are legal.

As Officer Moran later described this conversation in more detail, Solano, speaking in

Spanish, stated “that he witnessed a gentleman come out, open up a trunk, tie up children

inside, yell at them, and slammed and shut [the trunk] before driving off.” Solano also told

Moran that he believed the children were in danger, which is why he wrote down the tag

of the vehicle and followed it to an intersection, where he attempted to locate a police

officer and where he instructed another citizen, Luis, to call the police.

Sergeant Casey Diaz and Officer Nicole Min responded to the child-kidnapping

dispatch and drove to 1 Eastmoor Drive, Silver Spring, in a marked police cruiser. Before

approaching the residence, Diaz shut off his police cruiser lights and siren to avoid alerting

the subject of their presence. Diaz then led the way, walking up a driveway to the residence

where he observed a Black male and female, later identified as Hayat and his wife,

Norrinda Hayat, standing on the steps.

As Sergeant Diaz and Officer Min — both dressed in uniform — approached the

Hayats, the officers observed that the couple “did not appear surprised by [the officers’]

arrival, and instead, appeared to have anticipated” it. Diaz “found it suspicious” in that the

individuals had not requested police assistance yet were “apparently anticipating police

arrival.” The following conversation then ensued, as recorded by Diaz’s body camera:

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Sgt. Diaz: Hi, how are you doing? Everything okay here?

Hayat: [indiscernible]

Sgt. Diaz: Were you guys just at the IHOP down in Langley Park?

Hayat: What’s the problem?

Sgt. Diaz: We got a call of a kidnapping, or something like that, were you

guys down at the IHOP?

Hayat: There is no kidnapping here, sir.

Sgt. Diaz: What?

Hayat: There is no kidnapping here, sir.

Sgt. Diaz: Okay, well I just need to make sure everybody is ok.

Hayat: Okay . . . how are you going to do that?

Sgt. Diaz: Well, we are talking. We are talking.

Hayat: Everything is ok here.

Sgt. Diaz: Well, I need to check. Are there any kids here?

Hayat: Yes.

Sgt. Diaz: Well, can we see them?

Hayat: You cannot come into our house. We are both lawyers. I am a

professor at the University of Howard, she is a professor at

UDC. This is our home. You do not have a warrant. You are

not coming in our home.

[Overheard in the background] Mrs. Hayat: I am a professor of law.

Sgt. Diaz: Can you come down here for a second?

Hayat: I cannot.

Mrs. Hayat: Can you explain to us what is going on here?

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Sgt. Diaz: Yeah, somebody saw something involving some kids at an

IHOP . . .

At that point, Hayat abruptly cut off their conversation, put his arm around his wife and

ushered her back into the home, and attempted to shut the door, while saying to her,

“Norrinda, walk into our home please. Walk into our home.”

Sergeant Diaz, who had years of experience as an officer and in conducting

interviews, found the circumstances of this encounter especially suspicious. First, after he

told Hayat that there had been a report of a kidnapping and asked him whether he had been

at the IHOP, Hayat did not answer the question. Rather, he responded immediately, “There

is no kidnapping here.” Diaz found this response to be “evasive and showed signs of

deception because [Hayat] never acknowledged whether or not he had been at the IHOP,”

and he “did not act surprised or deny that he had been at the IHOP” once he learned the

investigation was about a kidnapping. Hayat also “avoided” answering the question by

using “his background as a law professor as a deflection.” Diaz further found suspicious

the fact that Hayat stopped his wife from speaking about the incident and ushered her back

into the house. Diaz concluded that Hayat was preventing Mrs. Hayat “from sharing

information she may have had about the children’s welfare” and that Hayat “seemed

particularly concerned about her learning details of the kidnapping report that [Diaz] was

trying to share with her.” Indeed, as Diaz observed, Hayat “became even more agitated

when [Mrs. Hayat] asked [Diaz] to explain what was going on.” Finally, Diaz found it

suspicious that when he “asked to see the children to verify their welfare, [Hayat] became

even more defensive,” relaying his attorney background.

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Sergeant Diaz concluded that he had to “complete [his] investigation and determine

whether a kidnapping ha[d] occurred” and ascertain “the welfare of the children.” He also

concluded it was important for him to pursue his suspicion that Mrs. Hayat might “have

some information as to what happened at the IHOP, . . . [and] the welfare of the children

involved.”

When Hayat cut off Mrs. Hayat’s attempt to enter the conversation and ushered her

back into the house, Hayat attempted to close the door. Sergeant Diaz, however, prevented

the door from being closed and issued several commands to Hayat to open the door. Officer

Min assisted Diaz in attempting to open the door, as Hayat physically resisted by pushing

back against the door and yelling, “You are not allowed in our house.” While Diaz and

Min were pushing open the door, Officers Nathan Lenhart and Brooke Dolan arrived at the

scene and assisted in pushing the door open and gaining entry into the vestibule of Hayat’s

house. Hayat yelled at the officers, repeatedly stating that he was a law professor and that

they could not be in his home.

After the officers entered the home and Hayat continued to physically resist them,

they placed him in handcuffs. Hayat sustained a bloody lip, but there are no allegations

that officers otherwise physically assaulted him. After Hayat had calmed down, officers

removed the handcuffs and allowed him to remain seated in the house and to use his cell

phone. Mrs. Hayat eventually allowed Officer Dolan to observe the children to confirm

that they were okay. Sergeant Diaz spoke with Hayat’s brother, who had also arrived at

the house, and the brother advised Diaz that the children inside the home were either the

Hayats’ children or his (the brother’s) children and that they therefore belonged at the

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residence. The officers did not conduct a search of the house but rather concluded, after

additional conversations, that a kidnapping had not occurred and departed from the house.

Hayat commenced this action against the four police officers who had entered his

home, the Chief of Police, and Montgomery County, alleging federal and state

constitutional claims, a federal statutory claim, and state tort claims. After the district court

dismissed most of the claims, it granted the defendants summary judgment on those that

remained. With regard to Hayat’s Fourth Amendment claim — the only claim on appeal

— the district court concluded that the officers had lawfully entered the Hayats’ house

pursuant to a Terry stop that the officers had begun outside the house. The court explained

that the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion involving the kidnapping of children

before they entered into the house and that “a suspect’s retreat into their home [could not]

thwart a Terry stop.” The court also noted that the law enforcement officers were justified

in entering a home on the exigency of preventing serious injury and “to check on the

welfare of the children.”

From the district court’s judgment dated February 12, 2025, Hayat filed this appeal,

challenging only the district court’s denial of his Fourth Amendment claim.

II

Hayat contends that the Montgomery County police officers violated his Fourth

Amendment rights when investigating the kidnapping report. He argues that the officers

did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop; that, in any event,

no Terry stop was conducted outside his home because he was first seized inside his home;

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that even if the Terry stop had been conducted outside his home, officers could not have

entered his home and continued the Terry stop inside the home without a warrant; and that

exigent circumstances did not justify the officers’ entry into his home.

The applicable foundational principles are not disputed. The Fourth Amendment

provides, as relevant here, “The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . .

against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. And

consistent with that language, the Supreme Court has held that “the Fourth Amendment

has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances,

that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Thus, at its core, the Fourth Amendment guarantees a person

the right “to retreat into his [or her] own home and there be free from unreasonable

governmental intrusion.” Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107, 113 (2026) (quoting Caniglia v.

Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 198 (2021)). Such an intrusion without a warrant is “presumptively

unreasonable.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.

But the requirement of a warrant is subject to exceptions for exigencies, among them

when an officer has “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone inside

needs emergency assistance, is “seriously injured,” or is “imminently threatened with such

injury,” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006); see also Michigan v. Fisher,

558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (per curiam), or when a defendant retreats into his home to “thwart

an otherwise proper arrest” that had been set in motion, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.

38, 42 (1976); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).

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It is also now well established that, outside the home, police officers do not violate

the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures if they conduct a brief,

investigative stop of a person when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion “that

criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Such a stop is, to

be sure, a “seizure” of the person because the officers, “by means of physical force or show

of authority, ha[ve] in some way restrained the liberty” of the person, id. at 19 n.16, but it

is justified by the public interest in law enforcement.

With these fundamental principles, we must determine, in response to Hayat’s

arguments, (1) whether the police officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a

kidnapping may have taken place; (2) whether officers initiated a Terry stop outside of

Hayat’s home; and (3) whether, in the circumstances where the first two are true, the

officers were justified in entering Hayat’s home without a warrant to complete the Terry

stop. Hayat also argues (4) that no exigent circumstances were present. We take Hayat’s

arguments in order.

A

Hayat contends first that Sergeant Diaz did not have a “reasonable articulable

suspicion” that criminal activity may have been afoot when he confronted Hayat and

therefore that any purported Terry stop was unjustified.

“Reasonable suspicion” requires a showing that an objectively reasonable officer

would have had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person

stopped of criminal activity.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014) (cleaned

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up). The police officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The inquiry must consider “the totality of the circumstances.”

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 (cleaned up). While the officer “must be able to articulate more

than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”’ of criminal activity,” Illinois

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27), what he must

show is “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,”

and “obviously less” than is necessary for probable cause, United States v. Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). In short, the officer “bears the burden of proving that reasonable

suspicion justified a warrantless seizure.” United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 237 (4th

Cir. 2018).

We conclude that the facts known to Sergeant Diaz were more than sufficient to

create a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity involving Hayat may have been afoot

and that therefore a Terry stop of him was justified.

First, Montgomery County police officers, including Sergeant Diaz, received a

dispatch of a child kidnapping, which was an unusual and serious crime, and the dispatch

was prompted by a 911 call received from a person named “Luis,” who was relaying an

eyewitness’s account of the purportedly criminal conduct. Luis reported that Solano, the

eyewitness, “saw someone grab three children and put them in the trunk of a vehicle” and

that the “someone” was a Black male, driving a black Tesla with a Maryland license plate

number 6CC8056.

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Second, the license plate number was linked to a 2013 Tesla vehicle, owned by

Fareed Hayat, a Black male, living nearby at 1 Eastmoor Drive in Silver Spring. Officer

Moran shared over the radio that some Teslas have rear-facing seats in the trunk.

Third, in response to the dispatch, Officer Moran was able to find and interview

Solano and thus reported over the radio:

I have the original complainant here. He says that he was at the IHOP in

Langley Park, that he saw the black male open the trunk, yell at the kids, and

then close the trunk, but like I said, they might have possible rear-facing seats

in the trunk that are legal.

Solano also advised Officer Moran that, based on his observations, he had believed that the

children were in danger, prompting him to write down the tag of the vehicle and follow it

to an intersection, where he attempted to locate an officer. He stated that he then instructed

Luis to call the police.

Fourth, upon visiting the address provided over the radio, Sergeant Diaz and Officer

Min were surprised to see, as they approached the house, that a Black male and female

(Hayat and Mrs. Hayat) were standing on the porch and seemed unsurprised by their

arrival, indeed acting as if they were “anticipating” it.

Fifth, when the officers questioned Hayat about the child kidnapping, Hayat was

unresponsive, refusing to confirm whether he had been at the IHOP, refusing to let officers

see the children in the house, and refusing to let his wife speak to the police, ending the

encounter abruptly with an attempt to retreat into his house.

Sixth, Sergeant Diaz concluded, based on his personal experience — having worked

for 12 years as a police officer with specialized training in conducting interviews and

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interrogations, including “recognizing the signs of deception,” and having conducted more

than 200 interviews during those years — that his interchange with Hayat had not dispelled

his initial suspicion but instead heightened it. Sergeant Diaz explained his reasons in detail,

as follows:

(1) Hayat “matched the limited description of the subject provided by the caller” in

that he was a Black male at the address to which the Tesla was registered;

(2) The Hayats “did not appear surprised” by his arrival and “appeared to have

anticipated” it despite not having called for police and Sergeant Diaz having

switched off his lights and siren;

(3) Hayat “did not act surprised” by the report of a kidnapping and “avoided”

answering whether he had been at the IHOP;

(4) Hayat used his status as a law professor to “deflect[]” Sergeant Diaz’s questions;

(5) Hayat confirmed that there were children in the house but denied Sergeant

Diaz’s request to see them;

(6) Hayat proactively told Sergeant Diaz that he could not enter the home, despite

Diaz not having requested permission to do so; and

(7) When Mrs. Hayat asked Sergeant Diaz to explain the situation and Diaz began

conversing with her, Hayat “seemed particularly concerned” about Mrs. Hayat’s

“learning details of the kidnapping report that [Diaz] was trying to share with

her,” and Hayat prevented her from sharing information “she may have had

about the children’s welfare” by “abruptly” and “suddenly” ending the

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conversation, and beginning to close the door with himself, Mrs. Hayat, and the

children inside.

Hayat argues nonetheless that the tip on which the dispatch of child kidnapping

depended was unreliable and uncorroborated, undermining the reasonableness of Sergeant

Diaz’s suspicion. It is true that a tip “must contain sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ to

enable officers to evaluate the veracity of the tip before stopping whomever the tip

identifies.” United States v. Brown, 401 F.3d 588, 596 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Alabama

v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)); Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397. But the tip in this case

bore nearly every indicum of reliability identified by the Supreme Court in Navarette as

sufficient.

In Navarette, the Court highlighted the following factors as indicating reliability:

(1) “officers’ corroboration of certain details;” (2) a tip that alleges an eyewitness account

of the alleged crime; (3) a contemporaneous tip, which is “especially reliable;” and (4) “the

caller’s use of the 911 emergency system,” because “[a] 911 call has some features that

allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making

false reports with immunity.” Id. at 398–400. The Court then applied those factors to its

case, explaining that “[b]y reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle

— a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925, . . . the tipster necessarily claimed

eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving,” which lent “significant support

to the tip’s reliability.” Id. at 399. In addition, circumstances indicated that she had

“reported the incident soon after she was run off the road,” thus constituting

contemporaneous reporting. Id.

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The tip here had all the same indicia of reliability as in Navarette. The tipster, Luis,

made a 911 call reporting that Solano had told him to call the police after Solano had

witnessed a man grabbing three children and putting them in the trunk of a vehicle. Luis

passed on a description of the driver, the vehicle, the license plate number, and the travel

direction. Additionally, Officer Moran was then able to locate and interview Solano shortly

after the incident, and Solano described the events consistent with Luis’s initial report.

Finally, the license plate number was immediately traced to a man and a vehicle fitting the

descriptions given by the tipsters. Thus, in effect, a police officer corroborated Luis’s tip

through an almost contemporaneous person-to-person interview with the actual

eyewitness. We conclude therefore that the tips here were reliable and amply met the

standard set forth in Navarette. Accord United States v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 394 (4th

Cir. 2020).

Hayat also challenges Sergeant Diaz’s characterizations of his interaction with

Hayat, claiming that he, Hayat, was calm, polite, and not suspicious. But Sergeant Diaz

saw things differently based on his years of training and experience. Moreover, after

reading the transcript of the conversation, which Hayat does not dispute, and reviewing the

body camera videos, we agree with Diaz’s characterization of what actually took place.

Indeed, Hayat has challenged neither the video nor the transcription. And it is these

objective data that inform us of what a reasonable officer would have concluded. See

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25.

Finally, Hayat argues that the fact that he told Sergeant Diaz there had been “no

kidnapping here” should have “dispel[led] the reasonable suspicion” of a kidnapping.

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Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. But it would be “hardly surprising that the appearance of” a

police officer questioning a suspect about a kidnapping would “inspire” that suspect to

deny involvement in the crime. Id. Moreover, the whole purpose of a temporary stop

under Terry is to permit a police officer to “detain [a suspect] to resolve [any] ambiguity”

in the suspect’s conduct. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).

In short, Solano reported having witnessed events that suggested that a child

kidnapping had taken place, multiple pieces of corroborated information linked Hayat to

the incident, and Sergeant Diaz was unable to dispel the suspicion in his conversation with

Hayat. Rather, the conversation heightened Diaz’s suspicion. In the totality of these

circumstances, we conclude that Diaz had reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal

activity may have been afoot to justify a Terry stop of Hayat.

Had Sergeant Diaz walked away after Hayat retreated into his house, Diaz would

not have known whether he was releasing a vile criminal or an innocent person. Moreover,

had he walked away and had Hayat indeed been engaged in child kidnapping, the public,

as well as the victims, would justifiably have been outraged by the police conduct.

Common sense would have dictated that Diaz had a reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity was afoot and yet he did not do his duty to dispel that suspicion. See Mora v. City

of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 222 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that courts must “approach the

Fourth Amendment . . . with at least some measure of pragmatism”). “[W]here a police

officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his

experience that criminal activity may be afoot,” he may temporarily seize the person to

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dispel his suspicion, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, and the public rightfully expects that law

enforcement officers will do so.

At bottom, we reject Hayat’s argument that Sergeant Diaz and the other officers

investigating the kidnapping report did not have the proper level of suspicion to conduct a

Terry stop.

B

Hayat next contends that a Terry stop was not conducted outside his house and that

officers could not have legally entered his house to conduct such a stop. He explains that

“for a Terry stop to occur, there must be, at a minimum, a show of authority such that a

reasonable person would not feel free to go” and that “Sergeant Diaz did not show any such

authority before Professor Hayat reentered his home.” Accordingly, he argues that there

was no seizure by Diaz before Hayat retreated into his home.

To be sure, “[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s

prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in

other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.” United

States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002). And for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,

the Hayats were in a public place as the officers approached them. See, e.g., United States

v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976). But if “the police conduct would have communicated

to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about

his business,” then the police would have seized him. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,

437 (1991) (cleaned up). In sum, “a person is seized by the police and thus entitled to

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challenge the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by

means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of

movement through means intentionally applied.” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,

254 (2007) (cleaned up).

In this case, Sergeant Diaz’s encounter with Hayat did indeed begin as a voluntary

encounter in a public place. It began simply with Diaz’s asking of questions. But when

Hayat stopped answering questions, told his wife to go inside the home, and then began

retreating into his home, Diaz vocally told the Hayats to stop and physically prevented

them from closing the door, as shown on Diaz’s body camera. As Diaz explained

I believed that children were inside of the residence and were in immediate

threat of serious danger, including serious injury or threat of serious injury.

Therefore, when [Hayat] suddenly attempted to end my investigation and

closed me outside the home with the children inside, I attempted to prevent

[Hayat] from closing the door.

And indeed, Hayat was unable to close the door against the officers, as the officers entered

Hayat’s home and secured Hayat with handcuffs in the vestibule.

Thus, when Sergeant Diaz, as a uniformed police officer, gave verbal commands

and took physical action indicating that the Hayats were not free to disengage, Diaz made

a “show of authority” “sufficient to make it apparent that [Hayat was] not free to ignore

the officer and proceed on his way,” as required to support a seizure. United States v. Gray,

883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (“It

must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his

freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person”). Thus, before the officers entered

Hayat’s home, they initiated — albeit did not complete — a Terry stop.

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Hayat repeatedly makes the argument that because he was a law professor, he knew

his Fourth Amendment rights and that, with that knowledge, he felt free to leave the

encounter. But this argument fails to recognize that the “seizure” inquiry is not based on

what the suspect felt, but on what a reasonable person would have felt in the circumstances

— an objective standard. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.

C

Hayat also contends that even if a Terry stop had been initiated outside his home, it

could not have been continued into his home without probable cause and a warrant. Of

course, a Terry stop may be conducted when the officer is able to point to reasonable

articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, and entry into the home may be

justified generally by a warrant issued pursuant to probable cause. Thus, the Terry stop

cannot be a substitute for the probable cause and warrant necessary for entry into a home.

But the issue here is not whether reasonable suspicion can suffice to authorize

officers to enter a home. Rather, it is whether a Terry stop properly initiated outside the

home must end by the suspect’s flight into the home. We conclude that the Constitution

does not provide such exceptional and mechanical protection of the home in the exigent

circumstances where a suspect flees into his home from an ongoing Terry stop and where

children’s welfare may be threatened.

To be sure, in prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures of a person’s house,

the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and sanctity of the home, and such a search or

seizure in the home without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. Payton, 445 U.S. at

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585–86. But in exigent circumstances arising from the need to act quickly, such as in the

context of a fleeing suspect, the immediate destruction of evidence, or the protection of

persons at risk of injury, the Court has found entry into the home without a warrant to be

reasonable. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.

Thus, in circumstances similar to those before us — where the police were informed

that an armed robbery of a cab company had taken place and that a cab driver had followed

the suspect to a home five minutes away, providing the police with a description — the

Supreme Court held that the police “acted reasonably when they entered the house and

began to search for a man of the description they had been given.” Warden v. Hayden,

387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). The Court explained:

The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course

of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives

of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house

for persons and weapons could have ensured that Hayden was the only man

present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used

against them or to effect an escape.

Id. at 298–99. The Court thus recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit

police, with reliable information, from acting quickly to enter a home without a warrant

when the exigency of quick action so requires.

Applying Warden to similar circumstances in United States v. Santana, the Supreme

Court stated that the “need to act quickly [in the circumstances presented in Santana] [was]

even greater than in [Warden] while the intrusion [was] much less.” 427 U.S. at 42. The

Court nonetheless found Warden to be supportive. In Santana, after an undercover officer

paid Patricia McCafferty for heroin, McCafferty went into the house of “Mom Santana,”

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gave her the money, and brought out the heroin to give to the undercover agent, which she

did while the two were in a car. Id. at 40. After the undercover agent received the heroin,

he arrested McCafferty, who then told him that Mom Santana had the money. Accordingly,

officers returned to Mom Santana’s house and saw her standing in the doorway. Id. They

shouted “police,” showed their badges, entered the house without a warrant, and recovered

the money from Mom Santana. Id. The Supreme Court held that the entry into the house

did not violate the Fourth Amendment under a “hot pursuit” exception. Id. at 42–43.

Defining “hot pursuit” freely, however, the Court recognized that the hot pursuit in Santana

“ended almost as soon as it began,” as the suspect retreated only a few steps into her home.

Id. at 43. But the Court recognized that the officers needed to act quickly, id. at 42–43,

concluding “that a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public

place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” Id. at 43. While the Court

characterized the exception as the “hot pursuit” exception, it noted that in substance it was

similar to the circumstances in Warden, explaining more precisely that the decision in

Warden “was based upon the exigencies of the situation and did not use the term hot pursuit

or even involve a hot pursuit in the sense that that term would normally be understood.”

Id. at 42 n.3 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

In any event, both Warden and Santana stand for the commonsense proposition that

a person who has become a suspect for criminal activity may not rely on the constitutional

protections of his house to thwart the officers’ attempt to make an arrest.

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Consistent with Warden and Santana, we have held that a Terry stop initiated

outside the home similarly could be completed inside the home without a warrant when the

suspect retreated into the home. As we explained:

In this case, the appellants do not dispute, nor could they, that Officer

Washington was entitled to conduct a Terry stop of Juan once he arrived at

the scene of the Juan/Jessica domestic dispute. Officer Washington

approached Jessica first [and ordered Juan to stand by], but before he had a

chance to question Juan, Juan entered the Rivera apartment. Under these

circumstances, Officer Washington, as well as Officer Trumble, was entitled

to enter the Rivera apartment to conduct the Terry stop inside the Rivera

apartment.

Rivera v. Washington, 57 F. App’x 558, 562 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). While Rivera

was an unpublished opinion, which we do not recognize as binding precedent, we

nonetheless adopt its holding here and conclude that when an officer has reasonable

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the activity involves risk of injury, he may,

to allay his suspicion and the concern for injury, extend his Terry stop of the suspect into

the suspect’s home following the suspect’s retreat.

The principles underlying Warden, Santana, and Rivera apply here. Similar to the

facts in Warden, the police here received reliable information that Hayat was a suspect of

child kidnapping; based on the information they received, they initiated a Terry stop

outside Hayat’s house; and when Hayat attempted to retreat to his house, they continued

the Terry stop inside the house. Because of the need to act quickly, to retain control over

the suspect, and to be able to protect the children alleged to have been kidnapped, the

officers extended the temporary stop into Hayat’s home to where he had fled. This is just

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the type of exigency of which the Warden Court spoke. Indeed, the exigency exception to

the Fourth Amendment is yet broader. As the Supreme Court stated in Brigham City:

Because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

“reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions

[that are characterized as exigencies, such as] to fight a fire and investigate

its cause, to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, . . . to engage in

“hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, . . . to render emergency assistance to an

injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury [and] . . . to

determine whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is

about to (or soon will) occur.

547 U.S. at 403–04 (citations omitted). In this case, at least two types of exigency were

implicated — the retreat into the home to avoid the continuation of a Terry stop and the

concern for the welfare of allegedly kidnapped children. Accordingly, we reject Hayat’s

argument that the officers should have abandoned their Terry stop and obtained a warrant

before entering his home.

D

Finally, Hayat argues that the Montgomery County police officers did not have a

basis to conclude that exigent circumstances existed to justify their entry into his home

without a warrant. As he states the argument, the police officers “had no objectively

reasonable basis on which to justify an entry based on the emergency aid exception.” He

grounds his argument mainly on the fact that the tip given to the police was not adequately

corroborated and therefore was unreliable.

First, we reject his claim that the tip was unreliable. As we explain above, the

officers had objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity involving Hayat may

have been afoot and that the tips they received were reliable.

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In addition, however, Hayat also parses various pieces of information received by

the officers to address their sufficiency, but in doing so he overlooks the totality of the

circumstances. The initial tipster in this case received information from an eyewitness, and

the police were able to corroborate both reports by interviewing the eyewitness almost

contemporaneously about what he had seen transpire. Solano described the vehicle and

the driver, and he specifically provided the vehicle’s license plate number. He also

described the incident as he saw it. The officers did not find him disingenuous or

manipulative, and they concluded that they could not dismiss the report without further

investigation. Clearly, “reasonable suspicion need not rule out the possibility of innocent

conduct.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403 (cleaned up). Moreover, child kidnapping is not a

crime about which to guess wrong, and when circumstances indicate that such a crime

might be taking place, officers could legitimately be concerned about the safety and welfare

of the children involved. Cf. Pleasants v. Town of Louisa, 524 F. App’x 891, 896 n.3 (4th

Cir. 2013) (where child welfare is concerned, “that a police officer errs on the side of

believing a statement and subsequently checking on the child is often the preferable

choice”).

The officers initially began their investigation by identifying the driver, the vehicle,

and the address connected to them. After finding the address linked to the vehicle, they

confronted Hayat with straightforward questions designed to dispel their concerns. But

Hayat immediately thwarted their efforts, refusing to answer easy questions and then

attempting to retreat into his house, which the officers forcefully attempted to prevent. In

these circumstances, the officers’ suspicion was legitimately heightened. They did not

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know whether Hayat was trying to escape or do something to the children. And if the

officers had abandoned their efforts, as Hayat would have had them do to get a warrant, an

actual perpetrator could well have escaped with the children.

Thus, the reasonable suspicion and the nature of the crime created circumstances

that justified the officers’ completion of their Terry stop in Hayat’s house and checking on

the children. “Under the circumstances of this case, the exigencies of the situation made

[the] course imperative.” Warden, 387 U.S. at 298 (cleaned up).

* * *

Why Hayat refused to cooperate with police officers when first being questioned to

dispel their concerns is not apparent but curious, and the resulting engagement in Hayat’s

home was unfortunate in light of the investigation’s ultimate conclusion that Hayat was not

in fact engaged in child kidnapping. In the circumstances, however, we conclude that

Hayat’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

AFFIRMED

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DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority mischaracterizes a consensual encounter between Fareed Hayat and

Officer Casey Diaz on the porch of Hayat’s home. In doing so, it abridges Hayat’s right to

terminate such an encounter, refuse police questioning, and retreat into his home by

converting that encounter into an investigative detention. The majority takes it a step

further by creating a rule that an incomplete Terry stop is enough to permit police officers

to enter an individual’s home—one that stands in blatant conflict with minimum

protections of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia warned us that the warrant

requirement was “riddled with exceptions [such] that it was basically unrecognizable” and

the majority’s decision today manufactures another exception complicating the warrant

requirement further. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring in the judgment). Because privacy protections are most heightened in the home,

an area profoundly safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, I respectfully dissent.

I. Background

An anonymous caller, referred to as Luis, called in to the Montgomery County

Emergency Communications Center (“ECC”) to report that he “was told by another driver

that he saw someone grab three children and put them in the trunk of a vehicle” outside an

IHOP in Silver Spring, Maryland. ECC Audio, at 00:00:29-00:00:36. 1 But because Luis

1

Volume II of the joint appendix contains an audio file of the emergency dispatch

call to MCPD officers. It is cited as ECC Audio, at 00:00:00-00:00:00.

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was only “told about [the] kidnapping” secondhand, J.A. 46 2, he told the ECC dispatcher

that he did not see anything. 3

The ECC dispatcher alerted Montogomery County Police Department (“MCPD”)

officers to “respond priority for a kidnapping.” ECC Audio, at 00:00:18-00:00:28. ECC

noted the report was for “[a] suspect vehicle, black, [license plate number], driven by a

black male, northbound university towards Wheaton, unknown location in route.” ECC

Audio, at 00:01:19-00:01:32.

MCPD Officer Robert Sheehan ultimately traced the license plate “to a 2013 Tesla,

[registered] to a black male [at] 1 Eastmoor Drive in Silver Spring.” ECC Audio, at

00:02:03-00:02:10. MCPD Officer Jorge Moran sought to make in-person contact with

Edgar Ayala Solano, who originally told Luis what he witnessed. On his way to the IHOP,

Moran advised all officers on the dispatch line that “Tesla’s have rear-facing seats in the

trunk, so they might be able to sit there.” ECC Audio, at 00:02:40-00:02:47. Solano

detailed to Moran that he was parked at the IHOP when “he observed the rear hatch of a

black door sedan open” and that “2 children [were] strapped in[] the car.” J.A. 42. Moran

informed the dispatch line that Solano “was at the IHOP in Langley Park, that he saw the

2

Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains

the record on appeal from the lower court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize

the “J.A.” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.

3

Later in his call to ECC, Luis advised that he was following the suspect vehicle

on University Boulevard E, and that the vehicle was a “a white range rover with tinted

windows” driven by “a black male.” J.A. 42. When MCPD Officer Craig Rosia located

Luis and the white Range Rover, Luis immediately drove off because he “did not wish to

be seen.” Id. Luis provided no information after this point but Rosia concluded there were

no children in the white Range Rover.

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black male open the trunk, yell at the kids, and then close the trunk, but like [he] said, they

might have possible rear-facing seats in the trunk that are legal.” ECC Audio, at 00:04:28-00:04:50. 4

Officers responded to 1 Eastmoor Drive, the registered address for the suspect

vehicle. Diaz arrived first. Diaz turned his patrol lights and sirens off shortly before he

parked outside of the home on the street. As Diaz approached the home, only a white

BMW SUV was parked in the driveway. Bodycam Footage, at 00:38. 5 There was no black

Tesla in sight. As Diaz walked up the driveway, he was met by Hayat and his wife,

Norrinda, standing on their front porch. The following exchange ensued:

Diaz: Hi, how are you doing? Everything okay here?

Hayat: [indiscernible]

Diaz: Were you guys just at the IHOP down in Langley Park?

Hayat: What’s the problem?

Diaz: We got a call of a kidnapping, or something like that, were you

guys down at the IHOP?

Hayat: There is no kidnapping here, sir.

Diaz: What?

Hayat: There is no kidnapping here, sir.

4

Importantly, neither Luis nor Solano ever called this incident a kidnapping. The

only report of kidnapping MCPD officers received was the ECC dispatcher who instructed

them to “respond priority for kidnapping.” ECC Audio, at 00:00:18-00:00:28. That

instruction was one created by ECC; Luis never reported that a kidnapping had occurred.

5

Volume II of the joint appendix contains Diaz’s bodycam footage from when he

encountered the Hayats at their home. It is cited as Bodycam Footage, at 00:00.

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Diaz: Okay, well I just need to make sure everybody is ok.

Hayat: Okay . . . how are you going to do that?

Diaz: Well, we are talking. We are talking.

Hayat: Everything is ok here.

Diaz: Well, I need to check. Are there any kids here?

Hayat: Yes.

Diaz: Well, can we see them?

Hayat: You cannot come into our house. We are both lawyers. I am

a professor at [Howard University], she is a professor at UDC.

This is our home. You do not have a warrant. You are not

coming in our home.

Norrinda [overheard in the background]: I am a professor of law.

Diaz: Can you come down here for a second?

Hayat: I cannot.

Norrinda: Can you explain to us what is going on here?

Diaz: Yeah, somebody saw something involving some kids at an

IHOP . . .

Hayat v. Diaz, 766 F. Supp. 3d 512, 520 (D. Md. Feb. 12, 2025) (alteration in original).

Hayat instructed his wife to go back inside the home by stating “Norrinda, walk into

our home please. Walk into our home.” Id. Hayat directed Diaz that “[i]f you would like

to come into our home without a warrant . . . ,” trailing off as he closed the door to his

home. Id. Diaz then rushed to the door and grabbed the door handle to prevent Hayat from

fully closing and locking the door. Bodycam Footage, at 01:40-01:41. Diaz first yelled

“open the door,” followed by Officer Nicole Min, who arrived to assist Diaz, who also

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yelled for Hayat to “open the door.” Bodycam Footage, 01:43-01:47. Both Diaz and Min

continued their attempts to open the door and eventually gained entry to the house. Hayat

was forced to the ground and handcuffed and, shortly after, MCPD officers observed the

Hayat’s children and confirmed that no kidnapping occurred. [J.A. 279.]

II. Procedural History

Though Hayat raised several claims before the district court, as relevant on appeal,

the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant officers on his Fourth

Amendment claim. See Hayat, 766 F. Supp. 3d at 533. 6 That is, the district court

concluded that “Diaz had reasonable articulable suspicion that kidnapping had been

committed by [Hayat], to support a Terry stop before he entered” the Hayats’ home such

that “the [d]efendant [o]fficers were justified in following [Hayat] into [his home] to

continue investigating the suspected kidnapping.” Id. at 532–33. The district court

concluded that “[d]efendant [o]fficers’ entry into the [home] to continue the Terry stop was

constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment” without any findings as to

whether Diaz made an official show of authority such that Hayat would not have felt free

to leave. Id. at 533.

6

Like the majority, the district court failed to engage in the appropriate Fourth

Amendment inquiry here. Though it made factual findings and concluded that Diaz had

reasonable suspicion, Hayat, 766 F. Supp. 3d at 530–32, it made no findings as to whether

Diaz made a show of authority such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

It then proceeded to, like the majority, conflate the Terry inquiry with the emergency aid

exception, finding that it was constitutionally permissible for officers to enter the home to

continue a Terry stop. Id. at 533.

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III. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Aleman v.

City of Charlotte, 80 F.4th 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate

only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “[A] fact is material if it ‘might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ and . . . a genuine dispute exists

‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.’ ” Cooper v. Doyle, 163 F.4th 64, 77 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

IV. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment affords “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. At the Fourth Amendment’s “ ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man

to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ”

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.

505, 511 (1961)). And it is settled law that police may not enter a home without a warrant

without some warrant exception. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)

(“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent

exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”).

The majority ignores clearly established Fourth Amendment precedent by

concluding (1) that Diaz had reasonable suspicion that Hayat kidnapped children, (2) that

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Diaz initiated but did not complete a Terry stop outside Hayat’s home, (3) that Terry

permitted the officers to enter Hayat’s home to complete the Terry stop, and (4) that exigent

circumstances otherwise justified the officers’ entry. I disagree with each of those

conclusions.

A. Diaz Didn’t Have Reasonable Suspicion That Hayat Kidnapped Children

To conclude Diaz had sufficient reasonable suspicion that Hayat committed a

kidnapping, the majority weaves together a version of events in this case that, at most,

gives consideration only to Diaz’s subjective characterization of the facts before us.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Diaz did not have reasonable suspicion that

Hayat kidnapped children because that suspicion was grounded on wholly innocent facts

without explanation of why those innocent facts were indicative of more sinister activity.

When an officer “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude

in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot,” an officer may perform a

brief investigatory seizure. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). But to justify such an

intrusion, the “officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id.

at 21. To be clear, an officer must have a “ ‘particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” United States v. Black, 707

F.3d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir.

2009)). Officers need more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ ”

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, and we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine

whether an officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion, United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d

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84, 89 (4th Cir. 2016). When a suspect engages in evasive behavior or acts nervously, it is

relevant to the circumstances surrounding an officer’s suspicion. See United States v.

Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 806 (4th Cir. 2004). But we do not categorize “whatever facts are

present no matter how innocent as indicia of suspicious activity.” See United States v.

Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011).

We agree that Diaz’s purported reasonable suspicion began when MCPD officers

received an ECC dispatch for a kidnapping based on a secondhand caller, Luis. 7 Luis

informed ECC that he “saw someone grab three children and put them in the trunk of a

vehicle” and that the “someone” was a Black male, driving a black Tesla with a Maryland

license plate number 6CC8056. Sheehan ran a license plate match linking the Tesla to a

Black male residing at 1 Eastmoor Drive.

But the majority conveniently leaves out Moran’s advice to those on the dispatch

line that “Tesla’s have rear-facing seats in the trunk, so [the children] might be able to sit

there.” ECC Audio, at 00:02:40-00:02:47. This fact diminishes the likelihood that the

children put in the “trunk” of the vehicle were kidnapped and instead indicated that they

were buckled into rear-facing seats. And further, the suspect vehicle, a black Tesla, was

not in the driveway, nor did Diaz ask where that vehicle might be.

The majority’s greatest misstep, however, lies in its characterization of otherwise

innocent actions by Hayat and his wife as suspicious. The majority categorizes four other

major facts as sufficient grounds to create reasonable suspicion here: (1) the Hayats’

7

Recall that Luis nor Solano ever characterized what was witnessed as a kidnapping.

See Diss Op. at 29 n.4.

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presence on the porch of their home when Diaz first arrived at their home; (2) the Hayats’

lack of surprise with Diaz arrived, “as if [the Hayats] were anticipating it”; (3) Hayat’s

refusals to confirm whether he had been at IHOP, to show the officers the children in the

house, or to allow his wife to speak to the police; and (4) Diaz’s exchange with the Hayats

based on his “specialized training” as an officer in “recognizing the signs of deception.”

Maj. Op. at 13–14.

None of those facts are enough to conclude Diaz had reasonable suspicion here. At

the start, assuming that two individuals on the porch of their own home must be awaiting

police arrival is nonsensical. Suggesting that the Hayats’ presence on their porch indicated

the couple knew about an ongoing reported kidnapping is merely a label on their activity,

it is not “indicative of some more sinister activity.” Foster, 634 F.3d at 248; see J.A. 290.

I am particularly “skeptical of [the] ‘Government[’s] attempts to spin . . . largely mundane

acts into a web of deception.’ ” Foster, 824 F.3d at 89 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Foster,

634 F.3d at 248).

Neither the Hayats’ lack of surprise when confronted by Diaz nor Hayat’s refusal to

cooperate with Diaz’s questioning and requests should be regarded as suspicious either.

Courts are “ ‘not to overplay a suspect’s nervous behavior in situations where citizens

would normally be expected to be upset.’ ” United States v. Slocumb, 804 F.3d 677, 683

(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Glover, 662 F.3d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 2011)). The

majority determines that Hayat’s calm, as opposed to nervous, behavior when Diaz

approached Hayat’s porch reasonably contributed to Diaz’s suspicion. But that would

mean that whether a suspect acts nervous or calm, an officer could deem that reaction

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suspicious. This is absurd. If we are not to overplay a suspect’s nervous behavior when

we would otherwise expect them to be nervous, the same is true for when a suspect exhibits

calm behavior.

In Slocumb, the court held that without adequate explanation of why a defendant’s

activity would be indicative of more sinister criminal activity, it could not find that officers

had reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant. Id. at 683–84. There, officers encountered

the defendant in a parking lot known for drug activity, late at night, while he and his

girlfriend transferred an infant between two vehicles. Id. at 679–80. In a conversation

lasting less than a minute, the defendant explained that he was in the parking lot because

his girlfriend’s vehicle had broken down and he came to pick her up. Id. at 680. During

that interaction, officers noticed that the defendant “appeared to be hurrying [his

girlfriend],” that he “did not make eye contact,” and that he “gave mumbled responses.”

Id. at 680. Accordingly, officers concluded his explanation did not match his conduct. Id.

at 682. But the court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was “insufficient” as “the

only substantial basis for particularized suspicion” because the defendant did not flee or

“take off in ‘headlong flight’ ” nor exhibit “ ‘extreme’ or unusual nervousness or acts of

evasion,” and the officers gave no further explanation why that activity was suspicious. Id.

at 683–84 (first quoting United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2011),

then Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), and finally United States v. Foreman,

369 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 2004)).

Here, Hayat’s conduct was the district court’s only substantial basis for

particularized suspicion that Hayat was engaged in criminal activity. See Hayat, 766 F.

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Supp at 532 (concluding that even though the officers’ knowledge that Tesla’s have rearfacing seats could diminish an officer’s suspicion, “Diaz’s reasonable suspicion [was]

based upon the conduct of [Hayat] once he arrived at the [Hayats’ home]”). When Diaz

approached the Hayats’ home, he only knew there was a reported kidnapping associated

with a vehicle with legal rear-facing seats registered to 1 Eastmoor Drive. Upon reaching

the porch of the home, Hayat did not immediately walk into his home. He entertained

Diaz’s presence and denied that any kidnapping occurred. Hayat refused to answer

whether he was at IHOP and declined to let officers into his home to see his children.

Hayat’s instruction to his wife to walk back inside and Hayat’s eventual retreat into his

home was without hurry or suspicion.

Like Slocumb, Hayat “acknowledged [Diaz], was not noticeably nervous, and did

not hastily flee the area.” Slocumb, 804 F.3d at 683 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Foster, 634 F.3d at 248). He exercised his right to refuse “to answer any question

put to him . . . and . . . go on his way.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)

(plurality opinion). “[A] refusal to cooperate” with a police request by itself is not enough

to justify a seizure, see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991), and our skepticism

of the Government’s attempt to spin certain actions by a suspect is “amplified when these

mundane acts are incident to the refusal to consent to a [police request],”Massenburg, 654

F.3d at 489 (citing Foster, 634 F.3d at 248).

The majority regards Diaz’s characterizations of his encounter with Hayat as

dispositive of what a reasonable officer would have concluded. Maj. Op. at 16. But Hayat

did not exhibit any conduct this court has deemed to be suspicious. An officer “must do

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more than simply label a behavior as suspicious to make it so.” Foster, 634 F.3d at 248.

He must “articulate why a particular behavior is suspicious or logically demonstrate, given

the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is likely to be indicative of some more

sinister activity than may appear at first glance.” Foster, 634 F.3d at 248. And Diaz’s

characterization of Hayat’s otherwise innocent conduct as showing “signs of deception”

does not change the result. All he offers is his knowledge, training, and experience

conducting interviews and interrogations. J.A. 54. “Although we generally defer to

officers’ claimed training and experience, we withhold that deference when failing to do

so would erode necessary safeguards against ‘arbitrary and boundless’ police

prejudgments.” Wingate v. Fulford, 987 F.3d 299, 307 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Black, 707

F.3d at 541). After all, the “very function of the [Fourth] Amendment . . . [is] to ensure

that the quick ad hoc judgments of police officers are subject to review and control by the

judiciary.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

We are not to “divide-and-conquer” independent facts to disregard an officer’s

purported suspicion when those facts taken together might “ ‘warrant[] further

investigation.’ ” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274–75 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392

U.S. at 22). But taken together, the totality of the circumstances here do no support a

conclusion that Diaz had reasonable suspicion that Hayat was engaged in kidnapping.

B. There Was No Terry Stop

Even if I were to agree that Diaz had reasonable suspicion that Hayat was engaged

in kidnapping, he made no seizure based on that suspicion such that a Terry stop was

initiated. In concluding that Diaz effectuated a seizure, the majority disregards the mandate

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that an officer must have both reasonable suspicion and make an official show of authority

such that a suspect would not feel free to leave.

A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when “ ‘in view

of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed

that he was not free to leave.’ ” United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989)

(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion)). There

are several factors pertinent to our analysis of whether a reasonable person would feel free

to leave. Those factors “include, but are not limited to, the number of police officers

present during the encounter, whether they were in uniform or displayed their weapons,

whether they touched the defendant, whether they sought to block his departure or restrain

his movement, whether the officers’ questioning was nonthreatening, and whether they

treated the defendant as though they suspected him of ‘illegal activity rather than treating

the encounter as “routine” in nature.’ ” United States v. Williams, 180 F.4th 613, 622 (4th

Cir. 2026) (quoting Gray, 888 F.2d 322–23).

Diaz made no official show of authority before Hayat retreated into his home.

Taking each of the relevant factors in turn, the circumstances here would communicate to

a reasonable person they are free to leave. For much of the exchange with Hayat, Diaz was

the only officer at the scene. When he arrived, Diaz did not activate his sirens or lights.

Diaz was in uniform but never displayed a weapon while talking with Hayat and his wife

on their porch. There was no sense of urgency nor were any commands made by Diaz

when approaching and later talking with the Hayats. No physical contact was made

between Diaz and Hayat until Diaz attempted to prevent Hayat from closing the door to his

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home. Diaz did not inform Hayat or his wife that they were suspects. He only mentioned

that MCPD received a report of kidnapping and asked Hayat about whether there were

children inside of his home. And finally, he never requested any identification from Hayat.

I agree with the majority that Diaz’s encounter with Hayat began as an otherwise

lawful, voluntary encounter. But where we depart is the majority’s characterization that

Hayat was seized when Diaz prevented Hayat from closing the door to his home. The

majority does not tell us when this encounter turned from consensual to investigatory

detention. Likely, because this encounter was never converted to such. Instead, the

majority concludes that Diaz “gave verbal commands and took physical action indicating

that the Hayats were not free to disengage” such that Diaz made a sufficient show of

authority that Hayat was not free to leave. Maj. Op. at 19. But that is not how this inquiry

works. Diaz made no official show of authority before Hayat retreated into his home.

Unlike the majority describes, Diaz never “vocally told the Hayats to stop” before they

reentered their home. Maj. Op at 19. He only yelled “open the door” and physically

prevented Hayat from closing the door once Hayat and his wife had fully reentered their

home. Bodycam Footage, at 01:43-01:47. How could Hayat’s “freedom to walk away” be

“restrain[ed]” such that he was seized when he had already reentered his home? Terry, 392

U.S. at 16.

Because Diaz made no show of authority before Hayat reentered his home such that

a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, Hayat was never detained and was

permitted to retreat into his home. After all, this encounter began on Hayat’s porch, a

“classic example of an area adjacent to the home” which we refer to as curtilage. Jardines,

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569 U.S. at 6–7 (“This area around the home is ‘intimately linked to the home, both

physically and psychologically,’ and is where ‘privacy expectations are most

heightened.’ ” Id. at 7 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986))). Recall

that when officers do not have a warrant and knock on the door of a home, “they [may] do

no more than any private citizen might do.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469–70. The

majority’s conclusion flouts that rule.

Imagine the Hayats were inside of their home and officers knocked on their front

door. Under the majority’s logic, if the Hayats opened the door and spoke with Diaz briefly

but then decided to terminate the encounter, Diaz could grab the handle of the Hayats’ front

door to prevent them from closing the door and that would be a sufficient show of authority

that would rid the Hayats’ of their right to retreat into their home. That can’t be right. See

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“The right of officers to thrust themselves

into a home is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses

to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”). Even though Hayat

initially consented to this encounter, he was not obligated to “allow the officers to enter the

premises” of his home and importantly was permitted to “refuse to answer any questions

at any time.” King, 563 U.S. at 470. Diaz’s subsequent entry into the home after Hayat’s

denial of that encounter was thus a Fourth Amendment violation that should not be cast

otherwise as an investigatory detention.

C. Terry Does Not Permit Police Officers to Follow a Suspect Into Their Home

The majority takes its analysis a step further away from the precedent of this court.

After it imagines a valid Terry stop was initiated here, the majority proceeds to hold that

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an officer’s initiation of a Terry stop is enough for that officer to follow a suspect into their

home. The majority creates a rule that “when an officer has reasonable suspicion that

criminal activity is afoot and that the activity involves risk of injury, he may, to allay his

suspicion and the concern for injury, extend his Terry stop of the suspect into the suspect’s

home following the suspect’s retreat.” Maj. Op. at 23. It casts Warden, Maryland

Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38

(1976), Supreme Court cases concerned with the exigent circumstances analysis, as the

foundation for its adoption of Rivera v. Washington, 57 F. App’x 558, 562 (4th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam), a case not concerned with exigency at all. In doing so, the majority imports

the exigent circumstances inquiry into a Terry analysis, violating the clear lines drawn by

Fourth Amendment precedent.

Warden lays the foreground for officers to enter a home without a warrant based on

“the exigencies of the situation [that] ma[ke] that course imperative.” 387 U.S. at 298

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456

(1948)). And in Santana, the Court again reaffirmed destruction of evidence and hot

pursuit of a fleeing suspect as exigent circumstances permitting warrantless entry.

Santana, 427 U.S. at 42–43. There, officers had probable cause that Santana was engaged

in drug trafficking. Id. at 40. Arriving at Santana’s home, officers saw her standing in the

home’s open doorway, immediately exited their vehicle, and yelled “police.” Id. at 40.

Santana retreated into the home and officers followed her inside. Because there was “a

realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence,” the Court

upheld the warrantless entry recognizing a “need to act quickly.” Id. at 42–43. The Court

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concluded that retreat into one’s home “could ‘not defeat an arrest’ that had ‘been set in

motion in a public place.’ ” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 304 (2021) (emphasis

added) (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 42–43).

As shown, both Warden and Santana are concerned with exigent circumstances

where officers entered a home without a warrant to effectuate arrests of fleeing suspects.

The majority is correct that these cases “stand for the commonsense proposition that a

person who has become a suspect for criminal activity may not rely on the constitutional

protections of his house to thwart the officers’ attempt to make an arrest.” Maj. Op. at 22.

The hot pursuit warrant exception persists for that exact reason. But these cases apply

when an officer attempts to make an arrest, not when an officer makes a brief investigatory

stop to allay their suspicion. See United States v. Leggette, 57 F.4th 406, 411 (4th Cir.

2023) (“Indeed, by their very definition, Terry stops are not the equivalent of an arrest.”).

And both cases were decided before the Supreme Court articulated that the curtilage of

one’s home, which includes the porch, “is where ‘privacy expectations are most

heightened,’ ” making them less persuasive here. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7 (quoting Ciraolo,

476 U.S. at 213); contra Santana, 427 U.S. at 42 (“While it may be true that under the

common law of property the threshold of one’s dwelling is ‘private,’ as is the yard

surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that under the cases interpreting the Fourth

Amendment Santana was in a ‘public’ place. She was not in an area where she had any

expectation of privacy.”).

Diaz was not chasing a fleeing suspect here. Nor was Diaz set to make an arrest.

Diaz and Hayat had a “voluntary encounter in a public place,” Hayat’s porch, and Hayat

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terminated that encounter by entering his home. Maj. Op. at 19. And “[w]here a suspect

. . . chooses to end a voluntary conversation with law enforcement and go inside [their]

home, that does not constitute flight.” Lange, 594 U.S. at 329 (2021) (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–498). Even if I were to conclude that Diaz

made an official show of authority to have initiated a Terry stop, which clearly is not the

case, a thwarted stop does not arise to the same level as a thwarted arrest.

But instead, the majority next marshals Rivera v. Washington, 57 F. App’x 558(4th

Cir. 2003) (per curiam), an unpublished, nonbinding decision, to conclude that “when an

officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the activity involves

risk of injury, he may, to allay his suspicion and the concern for injury, extend his Terry

stop of the suspect into the suspect’s home following the suspect’s retreat.” Maj. Op. at

23.

In Rivera, officers responded to a domestic disturbance call after a resident heard a

heated argument in their apartment complex parking lot between a couple. 57 F. App’x at

560. The responding officer told the couple he needed to interview them and ordered the

plaintiff, Rivera, to “stand by” while the officer questioned his girlfriend. Id. Rivera

ignored the officer’s orders and entered the backdoor of his apartment. Id. After the officer

completed questioning the girlfriend, he walked to the open back door and repeatedly asked

Rivera to exit the apartment so he could speak with him. After Rivera refused to exit, the

officer entered the apartment, began to pull Rivera out of the apartment, and was met with

Rivera’s resistance. The court held that the officers did not violate Rivera’s constitutional

rights because “courts have recognized that a person cannot avoid a Terry stop simply by

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retreating into a home.” Rivera, 57 F. App’x at 562. But Rivera’s conclusion relied on a

district court case that did not concern a Terry stop made inside of one’s home. 8

The majority nonetheless deems Rivera instructive in this case, even though its use

of Rivera conflates a Terry stop—a brief seizure occurring in a public place—with

warrantless entry into a home pursuant to an exigent circumstance. Implicit in a Terry stop

is an officer’s need to investigate criminal activity that might be afoot. And separate and

apart from Terry, officers are permitted to make entry into a home when they have “ ‘an

objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that . . . entry was direly needed to prevent or

deal with serious harm.” Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107, 117 (2026) (quoting Brigham

City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006)).

In Case, the Supreme Court expressly declined to apply the reasonable suspicion

standard to home entries and instead reaffirmed that Brigham City “formulated its own

standard for dealing with household emergencies—again, whether an officer has ‘an

objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that an occupant is seriously injured or

imminently threatened with such harm.” Id. at 116 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at

8

The court relied on our summary affirmance of Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712

F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, 908 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990). In Harbin, the district

court found the police lawfully “stopped” a plaintiff in his home after they received a report

that the plaintiff was brandishing a gun nearby. Id. at 68–69. The officers followed a man

who matched the suspect’s description to his home. Id. at 69. As the man crossed the

threshold of his home into his living room through an open door, the officer yelled for him

to stop and turn around with his hands above his head. Id. The man did so and stepped

out onto the porch of his home. Id. Importantly, the officers never entered the suspect’s

home nor did the encounter last more than five minutes. Therefore, the court found the

encounter was reasonable.

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400). And most importantly, the Court indicated that emergency aid situations necessitate

a different lens than that “generally used to consider investigative activity.” Case, 607

U.S. at 507 (determining the probable-cause standard, which is related to criminal

investigations, does not fit into the emergency-aid context, which is a not concerned with

criminal activity or investigation).

By permitting officers to allay suspicion by entering a home without a warrant using

reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity that might involve risk of injury, the

majority “erroneously [seeks] to apply a lower standard akin to reasonable suspicion” to

the exigent circumstances inquiry and cast that rule as part of the court’s Terry

jurisprudence. Case, 607 U.S. at 120 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Because the majority’s

approach is grounded in nonbinding, inapplicable precedent and conflicts with

longstanding Supreme Court precedent requiring a warrant or warrant exception to enter a

home, I must dissent.

D. There Were No Exigent Circumstances Justifying Entry Into Hayat’s Home

And finally, the majority is confident that exigent circumstances justified the

officers’ entry into Hayat’s home to check on the children inside. The majority concludes

that Diaz’s suspicion that Hayat was engaged in kidnapping combined with the nature of

the crime constituted exigent circumstances justifying entry into the Hayats’ home. But in

reaching that conclusion, the majority disregards the exigent circumstances inquiry, as

clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.

There are three recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement wherein officers

may enter a home without one, best known as exigent circumstances. Officers may enter

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“to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, “to

render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from

imminent injury,” id., or when in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, Santana, 427 U.S. at 42–

43. Neither the destruction of evidence nor hot pursuit exceptions are relevant here. The

district court, albeit indirectly, relied on the emergency aid exception to justify the

warrantless entry into Hayat’s home.

The emergency aid exception permits officers to enter a home without a warrant if

they have an objectively reasonable basis that their intervention is necessary to prevent

serious harm. Case, 607 U.S. at 118–19. If a general emergency is “enveloped by a

sufficient level of urgency,” that situation may constitute an exigent circumstance. United

States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2013). But not all dangerous emergencies

immediately justify a warrantless entry. Such encroachment onto one’s property is “strictly

circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.

385, 393 (1978) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26).

For many of the same reasons that I conclude Diaz did not have reasonable

suspicion, I find he did not have an objectively reasonable basis for entering Hayat’s home

pursuant to exigent circumstances. To begin, the Supreme Court has made clear that

Brigham City’s reasonableness standard is a heightened inquiry compared to the reasonable

suspicion inquiry. See Case, 607 U.S. at 116 (“Brigham City did not adopt Terry’s

reasonable-suspicion standard for home entries.”).

The tip given by Luis and the eyewitness account by Solano only confirmed that a

Black male was seen putting three children in a trunk at an IHOP, yelling at those children,

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and closing the trunk. Those facts alone could reasonably lead one to conclude that a

kidnapping was afoot, but that suspicion was allayed once officers knew that the suspect

vehicle was a Tesla with legal rear-facing seats. Beyond that, the officers did not obtain

additional information or observe any conduct that would cause Diaz or any other officer

to suspect that Hayat was engaged in a kidnapping. See Brown, 401 F.3d 588, 596 (holding

that a “brief, general description” of the defendant, his whereabouts, and an allegation he

was carrying a firearm was not enough for reasonable suspicion because the officers had

not acquired additional information nor did they “observe any conduct by [the defendant]

that would cause them to suspect that he was carrying a firearm”).

And what’s more, there was no indication from the eyewitness or the anonymous

tip that the children were in immediate danger. Hayat’s choice “to end a voluntary

conversation with law enforcement and go inside [his] home” did not constitute flight or

indicate that the children in the home might be in danger. Lange, 594 U.S. at 329 (Roberts,

C.J., concurring) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–498).

A tip indicating a Black male yelled at children in the trunk of a Tesla with legal

rear-facing seats without any identifying information about those children or other conduct

that would have heightened the danger faced by those children, is not enough to meet the

standard here. This is an objective inquiry, not one “depend[ing] on the officers’ subjective

intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises.”

Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009). It does not matter what Diaz necessarily

thought, but what would have been objectively reasonable to think under the circumstances

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before us. And under these circumstances, I believe Diaz’s entry was not objectively

reasonable.

V. Conclusion

For the above reasons, I would have reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment. The majority deeply mischaracterizes the facts of this case to achieve its desired

holding—a conclusion that disregards the Fourth Amendment and renders its protections

toothless. What I can’t understand is how the majority begins by parroting Fourth

Amendment guarantees while in the same breath denying Hayat those basic rights. “[T]he

principles we express [must] comport with the actions we take.” Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583

(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). And the actions taken by the majority abrade

clearly established Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent.

Today’s decision is in direct conflict with the basic principles and safeguards of the

Fourth Amendment. And the “majority attempts to gloss over the violence that today's

decision does to the Fourth Amendment with empty admonitions.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at

450 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I respectfully dissent.

49