United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 25-1830, 25-1833, 25-1834, 25-1835
KELLY HURLEY; JOSEPH CATANESE; NICHOLAS CATANESE; NICOLE
SKEFFINGTON,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ROBERT CURTIS; CHRIS BARTOLOMEI; RONALD CARPENTER; MELISSA
MARTIN,
Defendants, Appellees,
v.
JUSTIN WASKIEWICZ,
Defendant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Myong J. Joun, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Lipez and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Richard K. Latimer for appellants.
Matthew J. Hamel, with whom Jason W. Crotty and Pierce Davis
& Perritano LLP were on brief, for appellees.
August 21, 2026
RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. On three separate dates,
police officers entered a "sober home" to respond to reports of
overdoses or to execute arrest warrants. The plaintiffs -- former
residents and the homeowner -- sued the officers, alleging
violations of the Fourth Amendment and Massachusetts state law,
but the district court granted summary judgment to the officers.
We affirm after concluding that some of the plaintiffs' claims are
without merit, others are waived, and the remainder are barred by
qualified immunity.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
Because the plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment
ruling against them, we recount the facts in the record in the
light most favorable to them, drawing all reasonable inferences in
their favor. See Boudreau v. Lussier, 901 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir.
2018).
From 2016 to 2020, plaintiff Joseph Catanese owned and
operated Genesis House in Falmouth, Massachusetts. Genesis House
was a sober home, certified by the Massachusetts Alliance for Sober
Housing (MASH), a state accreditation program. Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 17, § 18A. Under state law, a "sober home" is intended to
provide "an alcohol and drug free environment for people recovering
from substance use disorders." Id. § 18A(a).
- 3 -During the four years Catanese owned Genesis House,
residents regularly called 911 to report overdoses, medical
emergencies, disturbances, disorderly conduct, and assaults at the
property. The Falmouth Police Department (FPD) was often
dispatched in response to these calls.
This appeal involves three visits by FPD officers to
Genesis House between October 2019 and January 2020. According to
Catanese, FPD officers searched Genesis House and detained its
residents during these visits because of a "vendetta" against him,
arising from his decisions to report police corruption and discuss
that corruption with Boston Globe journalists.
1. October 2019 Entry
On October 26, 2019, FPD Officer Robert Curtis was
dispatched to Genesis House to respond to an overdose. According
to the 911 call and testimony from plaintiff Nicholas Catanese,1 a
non-resident named Jesse Watts had allegedly injected himself with
heroin and/or fentanyl in a second-floor bathroom and then walked
into a bedroom where he collapsed in a chair. After finding Watts,
Nicholas administered Narcan, a drug that treats opioid overdoses,
and helped Watts out to his vehicle once he regained consciousness.
1 Nicholas Catanese is Joseph Catanese's son and was a
resident of Genesis House at the time. We refer to him as Nicholas to avoid any confusion.
- 4 -When Officer Curtis arrived -- without a warrant -- he
entered the property and "demanded to know where [Watts] had
overdosed." Nicholas showed him the way. Curtis then searched
the bathroom where the overdose had occurred, the bedroom belonging
to Watts's girlfriend, and the area around the chair in the room
where his report indicated that Watts had collapsed.2 Per
departmental policy, Curtis was looking for evidence of narcotics
and for Watts's cell phone but found nothing. Other officers
"detained" plaintiff Kelly Hurley in the kitchen during this
search, and these officers and Curtis then "interrogated" her and
Nicholas about Catanese before leaving.
2. December 2019 Entries
About one month later, on December 4, 2019, FPD
Detectives Chris Bartolomei and Ronald Carpenter, along with other
FPD officers, entered Genesis House three separate times. Their
first entry was to assist the Massachusetts State Police (MSP)
Violent Fugitive Apprehension Squad in executing an arrest warrant
at Genesis House for Herman Andrade.
Although the police did not locate Andrade at Genesis
House, they did make other arrests at the property that day. As
it turned out, Nicholas had an open arrest warrant pending against
2 Nicholas and Officer Curtis provided conflicting accounts
about where Watts had collapsed. Nicholas testified that Watts
had collapsed in his girlfriend's room, whereas Curtis indicated that Watts had collapsed in a different upstairs bedroom.
- 5 -him, and he was at the house when the police were searching for
Andrade. According to Nicholas, he was in a bedroom when the
police initially entered the house. After hearing the "commotion,"
he walked into the kitchen where Detective Bartolomei "said hello"
to him before another officer told him "to go to the living room
and stay there on the couch." He was arrested "[a]bout ten to
fifteen minutes" later.
Soon after leaving Genesis House, the police officers
learned that another individual who was at the property, Tekeea
Newcomb, had provided a fake name to avoid arrest on an outstanding
probation warrant. So, the FPD returned to Genesis House later
that same day to effectuate her arrest. During booking at the
police station, Newcomb told the officers that Andrade had been
hiding in the cellar of Genesis House while the police were
searching for him earlier.
Based on Newcomb's tip, FPD officers, including
Detective Bartolomei, proceeded to Genesis House for a third time
that day. Andrew Plante, the house manager, immediately called
Catanese, and the two remained on the phone while the officers
searched the area underneath the stairs to the cellar. The
officers did not locate Andrade, and Bartolomei informed the
residents that they would be arrested if the police later learned
that they had helped Andrade evade detection. According to
- 6 -Catanese, Bartolomei told the residents they were "all fucked" and
threatened to lock them up.
During these three searches on December 4, Detective
Bartolomei became "troubled by the condition of Genesis House,"
especially given the "increase in overdoses in Falmouth," so he
called Catanese on a recorded FPD phone line. Bartolomei told
Catanese that he should be "embarrassed to call that a sober
[home]" and said he was "going to shut [Catanese] down
and . . . make sure [he] never get[s] a sober [home] again."
3. January 2020 Entries
On January 23, 2020, another Genesis House resident
called 911 to report that Plante, the house manager, had overdosed.
FPD Officer Melissa Martin responded. She entered without a
warrant and remained at Genesis House, even after EMTs transported
Plante to the hospital, to conduct a limited search and to question
the residents, including plaintiff Nicole Skeffington, about the
overdose.
Detective Carpenter arrived at Genesis House shortly
after Officer Martin to assist with the investigation, again
without a warrant. When he entered, Martin briefed him on the
events and the limited search she had conducted. The officers
then separated Skeffington and another resident to question them
individually.
- 7 -According to Skeffington, Detective Carpenter asked her
"questions about [Catanese] and the house" because he "thought
that [Catanese] was running" a "shady operation." In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Carpenter then "proceeded
to search the entire house." During discovery, however,
Skeffington admitted that she did not actually see Carpenter
conduct a search.
Because of "the nature of [the 911] call and the
possibility that [Plante] may not survive," MSP troopers were also
dispatched to the scene. They arrived well after Officer Martin
and Detective Carpenter and allegedly searched the entire house,
taking pictures and videos.
After all the officers left the premises, Catanese
arrived at Genesis House. He quickly realized that at least some
of the officers must have entered the closet where he kept his
personal effects, because "it had been rifled through with [his]
papers in disarray."
B. Procedural History
In October 2022, Catanese, Nicholas, Hurley, and
Skeffington filed suit in Massachusetts state court against
Officers Curtis and Martin, Detectives Bartolomei and Carpenter,
- 8 -and others.3 The plaintiffs alleged that the searches and seizures
by the police officers at Genesis House between October 2019 and
January 2020 violated their rights under the U.S. Constitution and
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. They also alleged other
Massachusetts state law claims, including: false arrest, false
imprisonment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with economic relations,
trespass, malicious destruction of property, and conspiracy. The
defendants removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts on the basis of the federal
search and seizure claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary
judgment, contending that they had acted lawfully and that even if
they had not, they were entitled to qualified immunity. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56. The district court held a hearing and then entered
a short electronic order in May 2025, granting summary judgment to
the defendants on all claims except the Fourth Amendment, false
arrest, and false imprisonment claims against Officer Martin and
Detective Carpenter arising out of the January 2020 entry.
3 The district court ultimately granted partial summary
judgment to MSP Trooper Justin Waskiewicz as to claims against him arising out of his entry on January 23, 2020. The remaining claims against Waskiewicz proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a
verdict in his favor. The plaintiffs do not pursue their claims against Waskiewicz in this appeal.
- 9 -The district court based its initial summary judgment
ruling on the merits, without reaching the issue of qualified
immunity. It concluded that there were "genuine disputes of
material facts as to the length" of the detention "and the extent
of [the] searches" during the January 2020 entry, but that the
plaintiffs had "failed to demonstrate their [other] claims as
alleged." The court explained that a longer decision would follow
if the parties requested it, but no such request was filed. Thus,
because they were not involved in the January 2020 entry, all
claims against Officer Curtis and Detective Bartolomei were
dismissed under the terms of this initial order.
One month later, before trial was set to begin, the
district court "revisit[ed]" the summary judgment motions as to
the January 2020 entry. Hurley v. Curtis, 786 F. Supp. 3d 277,
281 (D. Mass. 2025). It did so because its earlier "docket order
did not address [the] [d]efendants' claims of qualified immunity."
Id. The court determined that Officer Martin and Detective
Carpenter were entitled to qualified immunity because "no
reasonable juror could find that [they had] violated [the]
[p]laintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights in either the search or
detention" of the Genesis House residents in January 2020. Id. at
284. The court also concluded that Skeffington had waived her
false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Id. at 287. Thus, it
- 10 -granted summary judgment to Martin and Carpenter on all outstanding
claims against them.
The plaintiffs timely appealed both summary judgment
orders.4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the officers, considering the facts in the record in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and drawing all
reasonable inferences in their favor. See Boudreau, 901 F.3d at
71. We will affirm only if there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the officers are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See John B. Cruz Constr. Co. v. Beacon Cmtys. Corp., 169
F.4th 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2026). "A genuine dispute is one where the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point
in" favor of the party opposing summary judgment, and a material
fact is one "that has the potential of affecting the outcome of
the case." Id. (citation modified).
"To survive summary judgment, a party must highlight
'specific facts showing that a trier of fact could reasonably find
in [its] favor.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson
4The plaintiffs asked the district court to reconsider its
dismissal of their Fourth Amendment claims against Detective
Carpenter. The court denied that motion, and the plaintiffs do
not appeal that ruling. We rely on the court's reasons for denying the reconsideration motion later in our analysis.
- 11 -v. Johnson, 23 F.4th 136, 141 (1st Cir. 2022)). "[C]onclusory
allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation"
will not do. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 23
F.4th at 141). Ultimately, we may affirm on any ground apparent
from the record. See J.S.H. v. Newton, 164 F.4th 142, 148 (1st
Cir. 2026).
III. DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the officers on all claims arising
from the officers' entries into Genesis House, including the
federal and state search and seizure claims.5 They also challenge
the court's grant of summary judgment to the officers on Catanese's
state law conspiracy claim. As we will explain, the plaintiffs
fail to demonstrate any error in the district court's rulings.
5 The plaintiffs repeatedly invoke the Fourteenth Amendment
in their opening brief. But the plaintiffs did not include any
Fourteenth Amendment claims in their complaint; instead, the only federal claims they alleged were under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The district court dismissed the Fifth Amendment
claims on waiver grounds and because none of the officers are
federal actors. Hurley, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 282 n.1. The plaintiffs do not challenge that ruling. Thus, we limit our federal
constitutional analysis to their Fourth Amendment claims.
The plaintiffs also fail to develop any meaningful challenge
to the district court's rulings dismissing the following state law claims: false arrest, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with economic relations, trespass, and malicious destruction of
property. Thus, we find these claims waived and do not analyze
them further. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
- 12 -A. The Entries into Genesis House
The plaintiffs maintain that they were subject to
invalid searches and seizures. Importantly, however, they make
several concessions that narrow the scope of this appeal. They
agree that Officer Curtis's entry into Genesis House and his
initial search inside the property on October 26, 2019 were valid.
They also agree that the arrest warrant justified the police's
initial entry and search for Andrade on December 4, 2019. Finally,
they agree that Officer Martin's entry and initial search on
January 23, 2020 were legal. Thus, we focus on the officers' later
conduct during the entries into Genesis House on the key dates.
To set the stage, we review the basic legal principles
governing the plaintiffs' search and seizure claims. The
plaintiffs brought these claims under both federal and
Massachusetts state law. Although there are some differences
between the relevant bodies of caselaw, the plaintiffs have not
developed any argument that those differences matter here such
that the searches and seizures at issue could be permissible under
federal law but invalid under Massachusetts law.6 Thus, we proceed
to analyze the plaintiffs' claims under federal law.
6 Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
"sometimes . . . provide[s] more substantive protection to individuals than that provided by the Fourth Amendment."
Commonwealth v. Alexis, 112 N.E.3d 796, 803 (Mass. 2018). For example, it imposes a "more stringent standard[]" in defining the
- 13 -The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "At the very core of the
Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion."
United States v. Giambro, 126 F.4th 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2025)
(citation modified). Warrantless entries into and searches of the
home, therefore, are "per se unreasonable" and are "subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Those
exceptions include consent and the need to render emergency aid.
See United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 948 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.
2020) (collecting cases); Giambro, 126 F.4th at 54 (discussing
emergency aid exception).
For starters, "[c]onsent is a well-recognized exception
to the requirement that police must have a warrant to search one's
home." United States v. Coombs, 857 F.3d 439, 448 (1st Cir. 2017).
Such a search "may not exceed the scope of the consent obtained,"
moment of seizure. Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 152 N.E.3d 108, 117
(Mass. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyles, 905 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 n.1 (Mass. 2009)). Both Massachusetts law and federal law,
however, require courts to focus on the "objective reasonableness" of officers' actions in analyzing search and seizure claims and allow for warrantless searches under the consent and emergency aid exceptions. See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 N.E.3d 767, 774 & n.11 (Mass. 2018); Commonwealth v. Arias, 119 N.E.3d 257, 267
(Mass. 2019).
- 14 -meaning "consent to enter a home does not, by itself, give law
enforcement officers carte blanche to rummage through the premises
and perform a general search." United States v. Gamache, 792 F.3d
194, 198 (1st Cir. 2015). "The scope of consent is measured by a
test of objective reasonableness" and is generally limited by the
"expressed object," or purpose, of the search. United States v.
Marshall, 348 F.3d 281, 286-87 (1st Cir. 2003).
Next, the emergency aid exception to the warrant
requirement applies when officers have "an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of
immediate aid." Giambro, 126 F.4th at 54 (citation modified). In
determining whether an emergency exists that triggers the
exception, we consider the totality of the circumstances known to
the officer at the time. See Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107, 118
(2026). "[A]n emergency[] aid entry provides no basis to search
the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the
emergency while maintaining the officers' safety." Id. at 117.
As to seizures, an individual is seized if "the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439
(1991). To determine if a warrantless seizure is "justified," we
again consider "the totality of [the] circumstances." Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013). Generally, an officer cannot
- 15 -enter someone's home to execute a seizure without a warrant. See,
e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). But there are
exceptions to that rule, including when an officer has consent to
enter or an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
occupant needs emergency aid. See United States v. Weidul, 325
F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2003); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403-04 (2006).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the plaintiffs'
claims about the entries into Genesis House between October 2019
and January 2020.
1. October 2019 Entry
Hurley, Nicholas, and Catanese contend that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to Officer Curtis, because
he "continued" to search and interrogate the residents on
October 26, without their consent, after the exigency relating to
Watts's overdose ended. We disagree.
As to the allegation that Officer Curtis "continued" to
search after Watts was taken to the hospital, the plaintiffs have
failed to introduce enough facts to overcome summary judgment.
Indeed, the record here is devoid of any facts about the scope of
a "continued" search by Curtis.
- 16 -To support their search claims, the plaintiffs point to
just two aspects of the record.7 To begin, they highlight
Nicholas's statement that "[a]fter the police completed the search
of the upstairs bath and [the] bedroom" where Watts was staying,
"they remained on the premises" and "began to search the house
again," even after an ambulance took Watts to the hospital. Next,
the plaintiffs emphasize Hurley's testimony that "the police were
at Genesis [H]ouse for more than an hour. A search was conducted
by Officer Curtis and other unknown officers, after [the] initial
emergency had ended with a non-resident taken from the driveway by
[an] ambulance to [the] hospital after an overdose in his car."8
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, this testimony is just too conclusory to create a
genuine dispute about whether Officer Curtis's "continued" search
of Genesis House on October 26 ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
See Est. of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 171 (1st Cir.
2008) (affirming summary judgment to defendants on Fourth
Amendment claim because "the summary judgment record" failed to
support the plaintiffs' version of the facts); Tower v.
Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290, 297 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming summary
The plaintiffs do also point us to one other portion of the
7
record. But that part of the record relates to the events of
January 23, not October 26.
We note that Hurley's testimony contradicts Nicholas's
8
statement that the overdose occurred in a bathroom at Genesis
House.
- 17 -judgment to defendants on Fourth Amendment claim because
plaintiffs relied on "a mere scintilla of evidence" in alleging
"that an overly extensive search took place"). The statements by
Nicholas and Hurley do not identify the scope of any "continued"
search, the rooms or possessions searched, or the duration or
length of the search. Without such details, their claims that any
such search was unreasonable under the emergency aid exception
must fail as a matter of law.
Although we are under no obligation to "scour the record"
in evaluating the plaintiffs' claims, we note that an independent
review of the record reveals nothing to support these claims. See
Wilson v. Bradlees of New Eng., Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 23 n.24 (1st
Cir. 2001). The plaintiffs do not contest that it was objectively
reasonable under the emergency aid exception for Officer Curtis to
search "the upstairs bathroom where [the overdose] occurred" and
"the room occupied by [Watts's] girlfriend." The only evidence in
the record of any search beyond those two rooms is Curtis's
statement that he also searched "the area around the chair in [the]
room where Mr. Watts collapsed." But the plaintiffs offer no
argument whatsoever as to why a search of that additional room
would have violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we conclude that
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to
Curtis on the plaintiffs' claims based on a "continued" search.
- 18 -We turn next to Officer Curtis's alleged seizure of
Nicholas and Hurley for questioning. According to Nicholas,
"Curtis and the other officers . . . interrogated [him and
Hurley], asking questions about [his] father, Joseph Catanese,
trying to get [them] to implicate him in drug use at Genesis
House." In Nicholas's view, the officers "were not asking for
information that could help the ER doctors treat Jesse Watts."
Hurley, for her part, testified: "The police detained me, not
letting me leave, while they interrogated everyone present in the
kitchen. They kept asking me who owned the house, when they
already knew it was Joe Catanese and were trying to get me to
implicate him."
But once again, the plaintiffs' statements are too
conclusory to send their seizure claims to trial. As the Supreme
Court has reiterated time and again, "the ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,'" as measured in
objective terms. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 464 (2011)
(quoting Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403). Even assuming that Officer
Curtis did seize the plaintiffs and did not have their consent to
do so throughout the interaction, the plaintiffs offer no facts to
demonstrate that Curtis's brief questioning following a confirmed
drug overdose at Genesis House was objectively unreasonable. See
Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (stating that "exigent circumstances" may
justify a warrantless seizure). The only specific question the
- 19 -plaintiffs recall Curtis asking is "who owned the house." They
offer no precedent or developed argument about why it would violate
the Fourth Amendment for officers responding to an overdose at a
sober home to pose such a question. Similarly, even if Curtis
were asking questions with the goal of "implicating" Catanese in
illegal drug use, the plaintiffs do not explain why such inquiry
would be objectively unreasonable, given that Catanese was the
"[o]perator" of Genesis House and held "primary responsibility"
for maintaining "an environment supportive of substance use
disorder recovery." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 17, § 18A(a).
As a result, we conclude that the plaintiffs' unlawful
search and seizure claims against Officer Curtis arising out of
the October 26 entry fail on the merits, under both federal and
state law.
2. December 2019 Entries
Hurley, Nicholas, and Catanese also challenge the
district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers
pertaining to "the entries, searches, detentions and
interrogations on December 4[]." On the day in question, the
police entered Genesis House three separate times: (1) to search
for Andrade pursuant to the arrest warrant; (2) to arrest Newcomb;
and (3) to search for Andrade again. The plaintiffs challenge
various actions during the first and third entries.
- 20 -First, Hurley, Nicholas, and Catanese allege that
Detectives Bartolomei and Carpenter unlawfully searched the
premises during the first entry. The only fact they highlight in
support of their unlawful search claim, however, is that "a State
Trooper pointed a gun at Ms. Hurley[] and then rifled through her
dresser and night stand." Carpenter and Bartolomei are not state
troopers. Thus, we conclude that the plaintiffs have not shown a
genuine dispute of material fact that would support finding these
FPD officers responsible for an illegal search during the first
entry. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 16
(1st Cir. 2011) ("Public officials may be held liable . . . for a
constitutional violation only if a plaintiff can establish that
his or her constitutional injury 'resulted from the direct acts or
omissions of [that] official, or from indirect conduct that amounts
to condonation or tacit authorization.'" (quoting Rodríguez-García
v. Miranda-Marín, 610 F.3d 756, 768 (1st Cir. 2010))).
Second, Nicholas argues that he was "taken into custody
after being detained, without a warrant, without consent and
against his will, for almost thirty minutes." This claim shares
the same fatal flaw as the search claim we just analyzed. Even
accepting, for the purposes of this appeal, that Nicholas was
seized, the plaintiffs do not point to any record evidence
identifying Detectives Bartolomei or Carpenter as the officers who
seized him. In fact, Nicholas testified that after Bartolomei
- 21 -"said hello" to him, "another police officer" told him to go to
the living room where he was later arrested by unidentified
officers. (Emphasis added.) Thus, Nicholas has failed to show a
genuine dispute of material fact that would support his unlawful
seizure claim against these officers. See Ocasio-Hernández, 640
F.3d at 16; Rivera-Corraliza v. Puig-Morales, 794 F.3d 208, 224-25
(1st Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment on due process claim
because the plaintiffs presented only "allegation[s] in their
brief," which were not "competent evidence").
Third, Hurley and Catanese contend that Detectives
Bartolomei and Carpenter's final entry and subsequent search in
the cellar for Andrade were unlawful. Bartolomei decided to return
to Genesis House on December 4 with multiple officers, including
Carpenter, based on Newcomb's statement that Andrade had been
hiding under the stairs in the cellar earlier that day. But
according to the plaintiffs, Newcomb was unreliable and her
statement was "utter[ly] absurd[]." The plaintiffs make this
argument in a footnote, however, and cite no caselaw to support
the contention that, based on the facts known to Bartolomei at the
time, it was objectively unreasonable for him to rely on Newcomb's
statement. Thus, we find this argument waived. See United States
v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to
in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.").
- 22 -Lastly, Hurley argues that Detective Bartolomei
unlawfully seized her. In attempting to create a factual dispute
about her seizure claim, Hurley points only to her interrogatory
answers that "the Detective" threatened "to lock [her] up if [she]
didn't tell him what he wanted to hear about Joe Catanese" and
that police officers asked, "where's Joe[?]". But in her
subsequent deposition, Hurley testified that she "can't remember
stuff" and could not recall any details about this third entry,
including whether there even was a third entry.
Hurley's inconsistent testimony is insufficient to
create a genuine dispute of material fact about her seizure claim.
Hurley's interrogatory answers fail to identify Detective
Bartolomei as the one who questioned her, and there is nothing
else in the record to support the claim that he interrogated Hurley
and the residents. And even if he did, the only argument that the
plaintiffs put forth as to why such questioning would be unlawful
is that Hurley "had a right to remain silent during [this] criminal
investigation, and to be so warned before being interrogated."
But they make no developed argument that a reasonable person would
understand that they were "not free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter," such that this
questioning amounted to a seizure. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439. And
to the extent the plaintiffs argue that Hurley was entitled to a
Miranda warning, they likewise fail to develop any argument that
- 23 -she was in custody. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Padson v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 2005)
(explaining that an individual who is "not 'in custody' at the
time of the questioning . . . [is] not entitled to Miranda
warnings"). Ultimately, they offer no persuasive argument about
why it would be objectively unreasonable, given the circumstances,
for law enforcement to inquire about Catanese's location.9 As a
matter of law, then, Hurley's seizure claim cannot succeed.
Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Detectives Bartolomei and Carpenter.
3. January 2020 Entries
Catanese and Skeffington challenge the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Detective Capenter as to his entry,
seizure of Skeffington, and search on January 23.10 The court
The plaintiffs argue that Detective Bartolomei's actions
9
may still be deemed unlawful if undertaken in bad faith, relying on a case that does not involve the Fourth Amendment. (Citing Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Mass. 1987).) But "the subjective motivations of [an] individual officer[]" have "no bearing on whether a particular
seizure is 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
Officer Martin is a defendant, but the plaintiffs concede
10
that her initial entry and search were lawful. The only action by Martin that the plaintiffs meaningfully contest is her interrogation of a resident who is not a party in this case. But the plaintiffs cannot show a violation of their constitutional
rights based on the allegedly unlawfully seizure of another person. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) ("Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted." (citation modified)). Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Martin.
- 24 -rejected the claims against Carpenter on qualified immunity
grounds. See Hurley, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 284. Under the qualified
immunity standard, "officers are immune from suit under § 1983
unless '(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional
right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly
established at the time.'" Hill v. Walsh, 884 F.3d 16, 21 (1st
Cir. 2018) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
62-63 (2018)).
Catanese and Skeffington begin by challenging the ruling
as to Detective Carpenter's entry. They argue that because Officer
"Martin had already conducted a reasonable search, and interviewed
both Skeffington and [the resident who called 911]," any emergency
had ended before Carpenter arrived on the scene and thus his entry
could not be justified by the emergency aid exception. The
district court concluded that, under the first prong of the
qualified immunity standard, Carpenter's entry was legal because
he arrived soon after Martin, the overdose victim (Plante) was
still at Genesis House at the time, and the residents had consented
to Martin's entry. See Hurley, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 283. In denying
the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court also held
that their claims would fail at the second prong in any event,
because the plaintiffs "cite[d] no controlling precedent clearly
establishing that a consent-based or exigent entry becomes
unlawful merely because a second officer arrives shortly after or
- 25 -because a brief amount of time passes following the original 911
call."
On appeal, the plaintiffs do not develop any argument
that the district court erred in its legal analysis or assessment
of the undisputed summary judgment record. As the court explained,
that record indicated that Plante was transported to the hospital
about five minutes after Detective Carpenter's arrival. See
Hurley, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 281. The plaintiffs do not point to
any evidence in the record that indicates otherwise, and
Skeffington even admitted that she does not know when Carpenter
arrived. And on that timeline, it was objectively reasonable for
Carpenter to believe that there was still an individual in need of
emergency aid at Genesis House when he entered. See Giambro, 126
F.4th at 54-55.
Next, Skeffington asserts that she was unlawfully
seized, because she was required to stay at Genesis House while
Detective Carpenter questioned her about "where [Plante] got his
drugs, specifically whether it was from . . . Catanese." The
district court rejected these arguments, concluding that it was
"objectively reasonable" and "consistent with the exigency" for
Carpenter to "ask[] questions about which drugs were ingested and
from whom they came." Hurley, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 284. And as the
court noted, "an 'officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant'
- 26 -in the Fourth Amendment's emergency aid analysis." Id. (quoting
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404).
Once again, the plaintiffs offer no developed argument
as to why Carpenter's questions were objectively unreasonable, nor
do they grapple with the district court's decision. We therefore
decline to disturb the dismissal of Skeffington's seizure claim.
See Best Auto Repair Shop, Inc. v. Universal Ins. Grp., 875 F.3d
733, 736-37 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding challenge to ruling dismissing
federal claim on summary judgment waived because the appellants
did not address the district court's "substantial analysis" in
their opening brief); Díaz-Colón v. Fuentes-Agostini, 786 F.3d
144, 149 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of summary judgment
because the appellants' opening brief offered "conclusory
assertions" and "fail[ed] to develop any argument . . . for why
the district court erred").
Skeffington and Catanese also argue that Detective
Carpenter conducted an unlawful search because Officer Martin had
already completed a protective sweep. The district court held,
however, that the plaintiffs "present[ed] no evidence that
Carpenter conducted a second search," and we agree. Hurley, 786
F. Supp. 3d at 284. In their opening brief, the plaintiffs do not
point to any record evidence of a second search by Carpenter; they
point only to a subsequent search by the MSP troopers. Thus, we
affirm the district court's ruling on this claim. See
- 27 -Besosa-Noceda v. Torres, 164 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2026)
(affirming summary judgment to the defendants on a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim because the plaintiff "point[ed] to no evidence"
and only to "unsupported conjecture").
B. Conspiracy Claim
Finally, we turn to Catanese's state law civil
conspiracy claim against Detectives Bartolomei and Carpenter.
Massachusetts recognizes two forms of civil conspiracy: "concerted
action" and "power of coercion." Thomas v. Harrington, 909 F.3d
483, 490 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2018). Catanese appears to base his
conspiracy claim on the first theory. Under that theory,
"liability is imposed on one individual for the tort of another."
Id. at 490 (quoting Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1998)). "[T]his type of civil conspiracy requires an
underlying tort and the conspiracy consists in agreeing to, or
assisting in, this underlying tort." Id. (citation modified)
(quoting Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16, 35 (1st
Cir. 2009)).
To succeed on this claim, Catanese would have to show
that Detectives Bartolomei and Carpenter "either (1) acted 'in
concert with or pursuant to a common design with' the tortfeasor
or (2) 'gave substantial assistance to' the tortfeasor's conduct."
Id. (quoting Kyte v. Philip Morris Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1027
(Mass. 1990)). Catanese claims that the officers acted together
- 28 -to repeatedly unlawfully search the house for incriminating
evidence and threaten the residents to cooperate with their
investigations. He also contends that Bartolomei's December 4
phone call threatening to put him out of business was tortious.
Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Catanese, however, he has failed to point to an underlying tort.
The district court granted summary judgment on each underlying
tort claim, and Catanese does not meaningfully challenge the
court's ruling on those claims. See supra note 5. Thus, we
conclude that Catanese's conspiracy claim must fail as a matter of
law. See Finamore v. Miglionico, 15 F.4th 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2021)
(affirming summary judgment to defendants on civil conspiracy
claim because "[w]ithout an underlying tort, there can be no
actionable civil conspiracy").
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we affirm the district court's
rulings granting summary judgment to the defendants.
- 29 -