[Cite as State v. Rehard, 2026-Ohio-3276.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA0027
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case
No. 2025CR0002
HUNTER REHARD
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: August 21, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: CHRISHANA L. CARROLL, for Plaintiff-Appellee; GEORGE
URBAN, for Defendant-Appellant.
King, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Hunter Rehard appeals the November 21, 2025 judgment
of conviction and sentence of the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas. PlaintiffAppellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On February 13, 2025, the Coshocton County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging Rehard with one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs, a felony of the
second degree. The charge arose when Rehard was intercepted by law enforcement as he
transported more than 80 grams of methamphetamine from Columbus, Ohio to Coshocton,
Ohio with the intent to resell the drugs.
{¶ 3} Following plea negotiations with the State, on September 2, 2025, Rehard
opted to enter a plea of guilty in exchange for the State taking no position on completion of a
presentence investigation, the continuation of bond, or sentencing. The trial court accepted
Rehard's plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and set the matter over for sentencing.
{¶ 4} Rehard appeared for sentencing on November 14, 2025. Counsel for Rehard
advocated for an indefinite term of four to six years of incarceration. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the State advanced no argument as to sentencing. After discussing the contents of
the presentence investigation and noting that Rehard had recently received a minimum
sentence for a similar offense, the trial court sentenced Rehard to an indefinite prison term of
seven to ten and a half years.
{¶ 5} Rehard timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises one assignment of error as follows:
I
{¶ 6} "REHARD WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW REHARD'S PLEA
AFTER THE COURT IMPOSED A SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER SENTENCE THAN
ANTICIPATED BY THE DEFENSE, THEREBY DEPRIVING REHARD OF THE
OPPORTUNITY TO TIMELY PRESENT A MANIFEST INJUSTICE ARGUMENT."
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error Rehard argues his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when counsel failed to immediately move to withdraw Rehard's plea when the trial
court imposed a greater sentence than that suggested by counsel. He argues that because counsel did not immediately make the motion, he is now prejudiced by the passage of time in
any apparent future attempt to withdraw is plea. We disagree.
Applicable Law
{¶ 8} Crim.R. 32.1 provides: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest
may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his
or her plea."
{¶ 9} Although "a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and
liberally granted," a defendant is not afforded an "absolute right" to withdraw his or her plea
before sentencing. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). "A defendant who seeks to
withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the
existence of manifest injustice." State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977). Although no precise
definition of "manifest injustice" exists, in general, "manifest injustice relates to some
fundamental flaw in the proceedings which result in a miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent
with the demands of due process." State v. Walsh, 2015-Ohio-4135, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.), citing State
v. Wooden, 2004-Ohio-588 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 10} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors prejudiced the
defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984);
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.
"Reasonable probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland at 694. Judicial scrutiny of a lawyer's performance must be highly deferential. State
v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673 (1998).
{¶ 11} A defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel
"fails to act on his request to withdraw his plea when the possibility that he would have been
allowed to withdraw his plea is not insubstantial." State v. Strutton, 62 Ohio App.3d 248, 252
(2d Dist.1988). Trial counsel is not ineffective when the defendant fails to set forth a
"reasonable or legitimate basis for the withdrawal of his plea." State v. Jones, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3463, *19 (8th Dist. 1995).
{¶ 12} Ineffective assistance of trial counsel can form the basis for a claim of manifest
injustice to support withdrawal of a guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. See State v. Dalton,
2003-Ohio-3813, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). However, under the "manifest injustice" standard, a postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases. State v. Aleshire, 2010-Ohio-2566 ¶ 60 (5th Dist.). Furthermore, ". . . if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease
after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential
punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. . ." State v.
Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 213 (1980), quoting Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667
(C.A.9, 1963).
Analysis
{¶ 13} We first note that Rehard's argument is speculative. There is no evidence
contained in the record that Rehard had any desire to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed
to trial, nor does he make that argument here on appeal. Additionally, there was no jointly
recommended sentence in this matter. Rather, counsel for Rehard argued for a minimum
sentence and Rehard received a greater sentence than counsel requested.
{¶ 14} Further, the record reflects Rehard's understanding of the potential penalties.
During his change-of-plea hearing Rehard indicated he understood the range of potential
sentences, that he would receive a mandatory prison term, and further indicated that no one
had promised him anything in regard to sentencing. Change of plea hearing at 4-8. Then,
when imposing sentence, the trial court made its reasoning abundantly clear; Rehard had
received a minimum sentence in the recent past for aggravated possession of drugs, a felony
of the second degree, and demonstrated no evidence of rehabilitation as a result. Transcript
of sentencing at 6-8. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence within the statutory
range for a second-degree felony and Rehard does not argue otherwise. Rehard's argument
appears to be nothing more than a change of heart after receiving a longer sentence than he
anticipated.
{¶ 15} That being the case, even if counsel had immediately moved to withdraw
Rehard's plea, and even if we were to analyze the matter through the more liberal presentence
lens, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Barns,
2022-Ohio-4486, ¶ 22; State v. Sampsel, 2022-Ohio-1809, ¶¶ 10, 16 (3d Dist.). In regard to a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea this court has held, "a change of heart or
mistaken belief about pleading guilty is not a reasonable basis that requires a trial court to
permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea." State v. Davison, 2008-Ohio-7037, ¶ 45 (5th
Dist.). So too in regard to a post-sentence motion. State v. Evans, 2021-Ohio-829, ¶ 35 (5th
Dist.) citing State v. Meade, 2018-Ohio-3544, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.) Rehard could not, therefore,
demonstrate a manifest injustice as required under the post-sentence standard. We therefore
reject Rehard's argument.
{¶ 16} Based on the record in this case, we find Rehard has failed to demonstrate the
performance of his trial counsel was deficient or that he suffered prejudice as a result.
Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 17} The judgment of the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to Appellant.
By: King, P. J.
Montgomery, J. and
Popham, J. concur.