IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00721-SCT
JOHNNY LEE HOUSE, JR. a/k/a JOHNNY
HOUSE, JR. a/k/a JOHNNY HOUSE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/22/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BARRY W. FORD
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: ROBERT THOMAS RICH
TOMMY RAY SAVANT
BRANDI LINDSAY BROWN
DANA P. SIMS
DANA HELENE EVANS
AKILLIE MALONE OLIVER
GLYNNIS DANIELLE PLEASANT
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: YAZOO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM ANDY SUMRALL
THOMAS P. WELCH, JR.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: AKILLIE MALONE OLIVER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/20/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE COLEMAN, P.J., ISHEE AND BRANNING, JJ.
COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A Yazoo County jury convicted Johnny Lee House Jr. of manslaughter and aggravated
assault. For manslaughter, the court sentenced House to twenty years. For aggravated
assault, the trial court sentenced him to twenty years, with ten years to serve and ten years
suspended. He now appeals his convictions.
FACTS
¶2. On November 20, 2022, a shooting occurred during a trail ride and bonfire event at
Wells Ranch in Bentonia, Mississippi. The event included around two hundred participants.
Tykeria Butler testified that during the event, she saw her uncle Christopher Turnage and
Johnny House get into a verbal altercation. During the altercation, House turned and walked
away from Turnage. Turnage followed until House turned back toward Turnage, pulled a
gun from his backpack, and shot Turnage. House only fired once.
¶3. Butler testified that, after House’s shot, several bystanders also fired guns. She
explained that she remained on the ground for several minutes to avoid being shot. Yazoo
County Police testified that nearly one hundred shell casings were found at the scene. One
.38 caliber round was recovered from Turnage’s torso, and one .30 caliber round was
recovered from Turnage’s forearm. The shot to Turnage’s torso was the fatal shot. During
the ensuing mass shooting, Amanda Gatlin was shot in the head; Gatlin survived her injury.
¶4. At trial, the defense offered Isaiah Carter, who had been a host of the event, as a
witness. He testified that he saw House at the beginning of the party but did not see him
again. He also testified that he saw an unknown man dressed in black firing into the crowd.
Upon hearing that part of the testimony, the State objected, claiming that, despite having
talked to Carter, he had not previously informed the State of the man in black firing into the
crowd. Defense counsel confirmed that he had not supplemented discovery with Carter’s
account of the man dressed in black. The trial court sustained the objection and did not allow
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the defense to question him further about the man dressed in black.
¶5. The jury returned a guilty verdict of manslaughter for killing Turnage and aggravated
assault for Gatlin’s injury.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court “view[s] the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonably
drawn inferences, to determine if any rational juror could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Henderson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1020, 1028 (¶ 26)
(Miss. 2021) (citing Martin v. State, 214 So. 3d 217, 222 (Miss. 2017); Hughes v. State, 983
So. 2d 270, 275-76 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2008)). The Court will “reverse and render only if the facts
and inferences ‘point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient
force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty.’” Hughes, 983 So. 2d at 275-76 (¶ 10) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting
Brown v. State, 965 So. 2d 1023, 1030 (Miss. 2007)). “The evidence will be deemed
sufficient if ‘having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard,
reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions on every element of the offense[.]’” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted)
(quoting Brown, 965 So. 2d at 1030). “The relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown, 965 So. 2d at 1030).
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¶7. The Mississippi Supreme Court reviews a trial court’s discovery ruling under an abuse
of discretion standard, and decisions are reversed only in situations of manifest injustice.
Blakeney v. State, 236 So. 3d 11, 22 (¶ 37) (Miss. 2017) (citing Fulks v. State, 18 So. 3d
803, 805 (Miss. 2009)).
¶8. The issuance of a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Flowers v.
State, 51 So. 3d 911, 912 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2010). “In determining whether error exists in granting
or refusing jury instructions, the instructions must be read as a whole; if the instructions fairly
announce the law and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Jones v. State,
962 So. 2d 1263, 1272 (¶ 33) (Miss. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Martin v. State, 854 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Miss. 2003)).
ANALYSIS
I. Was House’s aggravated assault conviction supported by sufficient
evidence?
¶9. Mississippi’s aggravated assault law is broadly written. Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(2)(a) reads:
(2)(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she (i) attempts to cause
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life; (ii) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death
or serious bodily harm; or (iii) causes any injury to a child who is in the
process of boarding or exiting a school bus in the course of a violation of
Section 63-3-615; and, upon conviction, he or she shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or sentenced to
the custody of the Department of Corrections for not more than twenty (20)
years.
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Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a) (Rev. 2020). Specifically, House was indicted and charged
under subsection (2)(a)(i), which the Court has held has elements distinct from subsection
(2)(a)(ii). Jackson v. State, 594 So. 2d 20, 23 (Miss. 1992). The aggravated assault
indictment for count II alleges that House “willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause[d]
serious bodily injury to Amanda Gatlin by shooting a firearm into a crowd and initiating a
shootout which resulted in Amanda Gatlin being shot in the head, thereby manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”
¶10. The indictment tracks the reckless prong of the crime described in subsection (2)(a)(i).
The State was required to prove that House:
(1) caused;
(2) serious bodily injury to Gatlin;
(3) by acting recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.
Accordingly, the broad aggravated assault statute does not require the State to prove that
House’s bullet was the one that injured Gatlin, only that there was a causal relationship
between House’s reckless actions and Gatlin’s injury. The lax requirements of the language
of Section 97-3-7(2)(a)(i) are distinguishable from other criminal statutes that require the
State to prove that the defendant was the shooter. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)
(Rev. 2020). Additionally, the Court has held that the statute does not require specific intent.
McGowan v. State, 541 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Miss. 1989).
¶11. House’s brief addresses whether House personally fired the shot that struck Gatlin.
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Based on the statute, the indictment, and the jury instruction, however, the jury was charged
with answering whether House, by his own individual act of shooting a firearm into a crowd
and thereby initiating a shootout, caused serious bodily injury to Gatlin by acting recklessly
with extreme indifference to human life. The statute does not require that House’s bullet hit
Gatlin.
¶12. According to Section 97-3-7(2)(a)(i), “a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he
. . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life[.]” The statute requires the defendant’s purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct to cause serious bodily injury to another. Id.
¶13. While the Court has not applied proximate cause principles to the exact present
scenario, in Conner v. State, 179 Miss. 795, 177 So. 46, 47 (1937), the Court held that a
defendant is criminally liable for the proximate cause of injuries flowing from a chain of
events his wrongful act set in motion. In Conner, the defendant struck the victim, causing
him to become dazed and stagger into a third party, Tubb, who then pushed the victim “in
the effort to straighten him up.” Id. The victim, was “still in a dazed and staggering
condition” when he “took a few steps and fell against a projection on an iron post,” dying
from that injury. Id. The defendant argued that Tubbs’s action of pushing the victim was
an independent and intervening cause of the victim’s death. Id. The Court rejected that
argument, holding that the “wrongful force” set in motion by the defendant “had not lost its
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identity or continuity” through to “the final injury” and affirmed Conner’s conviction. Id.
¶14. Here, House and Turnage were arguing by the dice table. When House turned to walk
away from Turnage, Turnage followed House. House then turned back toward Turnage,
pulling a gun from a backpack he was wearing and shooting Turnage. In doing so, House
fired toward a crowd of around two hundred people, and in response, nearly one hundred
shots rang out from the crowd, striking Gatlin in the head, Turnage a second time in the
forearm, and several other event-goers.
¶15. House’s act of firing into a large crowd, which initiated responsive gunfire, displayed
an extreme indifference to the value of human life. House’s actions were the proximate
cause of Gatlin’s injury. Additionally, the responsive gunfire was not an independent and
intervening cause of Gatlin’s injury because House’s actions initiated the series of events that
led to Gatlin’s injury.
¶16. Furthermore, when denying the directed verdict, the trial court correctly observed that
“to pull a handgun or any other gun in a crowded area like [that] and start firing[,] the
expected outcome is somebody is going to be hurt or injured.”
¶17. Since House intentionally shot into a large crowd—an action that is expected to put
people in danger—House’s actions caused Gatlin’s injury. The aggravated assault statute
criminalizes conduct that causes serious bodily injury under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life, and the jury was correctly tasked with
determining whether House caused serious bodily injury to Gatlin by firing into a crowd and
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starting a shootout. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence was thus sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated assault.
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by limiting a defense
witness’s testimony when the defense counsel admitted that he had
personally learned additional facts from the witness before trial but
failed to supplement discovery?
¶18. The Court reviews a trial court’s discovery ruling under an abuse of discretion
standard; decisions are reversed only in situations of manifest injustice. Blakeney, 236 So.
3d at 22 (citing Fulks, 18 So. 3d at 805).
¶19. Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.3 requires the defense to disclose, for each
witness in chief, “the substance of any oral statement made by any such witness[.]” MRCrP
17.3(1). Rule 17.8 also requires the defense to “timely . . . supplement discovery” disclosures
when “a party discovers additional material or information which is subject to disclosure[.]”
MRCrP 17.8. Rule 17.9(b)(2) provides that if a party introduces evidence that has not been
timely disclosed, the Court may exclude evidence from the trial. MRCrP 17.9(b)(2).
¶20. In Williams v. State, 54 So. 3d 212 (Miss. 2011), Williams was convicted of killing
Calvin Younger at a bar in Hinds County. Id. at 214. At trial, Williams called a bouncer,
Anthony Herrington, to testify that Younger possessed a firearm earlier that night. He was
allowed to testify he had heard the victim cursing at Williams prior to the shooting, but he
was not allowed to testify that the victim had a gun earlier because the trial court found that
the defense’s discovery responses had not mentioned that Williams possessed a firearm. Id.
at 213. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but the Supreme Court granted
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certiorari and reversed and remanded, holding that the exclusion of the bouncer’s testimony
was error. Id. at 216.
¶21. Here, the defense called Isaiah Carter as a witness. Initially, defense counsel
mistakenly provided the State with the witness’s name as they knew it, Isaiah Thompson, but
with accurate contact information and a synopsis of his testimony, which provided that Carter
“[w]as at the event when the shooting occurred and he testified that there was a big crowd.
Has known Defendant for a couple of years. Never known him to be armed. Heard shots
fired. But didn’t see the shooting.”
¶22. However, at trial, Carter’s testimony extended beyond the synopsis. In addition to his
testimony about House and the large crowd at the event, Carter testified that he saw a man
dressed in black firing into the crowd. The State objected, claiming that despite talking to
Carter, it didn’t have his complete testimony. The court asked Carter what he told the State.
So basically then what I told her, I give her the information, but I didn’t give
her all of the information, because I really didn’t know who she was, really to
be honest with you because when they called me I didn’t give her all the
information, to be honest. Because when they called me they didn’t say who
they was. You know I got a number calling from Yazoo. I know that wasn’t
Mr. Tommy.
He further said the State had called while he was at work, and the wind was blowing and the
phone was going in and out.
¶23. During the trial, defense counsel acknowledged that he had personally spoken with
Carter before trial and learned additional facts about the shooting that were not disclosed in
discovery. Defense counsel also acknowledged that he “did not supplement the discovery”
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with Carter’s updated testimony. The court asked: “You didn’t have that in your report that
Isaiah Thompson saw somebody shooting; did you?” Defense counsel responded: “I did
not.” The Court ruled that Carter was not allowed to testify to anything not listed in the
synopsis given to the State by the defense. Limiting a witness’s testimony is within the trial
court’s discretion and is an appropriate remedy to a discovery violation. MRCrP 17.9(b).
¶24. Our case is differentiated from Williams because in Williams, the defense discovered
“an additional fact” from a witness during trial and “quickly disclosed [the information] to
the State.” Williams, 54 So. 3d at 215. Here, the defense counsel knew prior to trial that
Carter planned to testify about a man dressed in black shooting into the crowd and defense
counsel failed to supplement discovery in violation of Rule 17.8.
¶25. Additionally, the State argues that if the trial court erred by limiting Carter’s
testimony, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “This Court will deem
harmless an error where ‘the same result would have been reached had [it] not existed.’”
Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 235 (¶ 71) (Miss. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
Tate v. State, 912 So. 2d 919, 926 (Miss. 2005)). “The exclusion of evidence ‘cannot
amount to reversible error unless it effects a substantial rights of a party.’” Quinn v. State,
424 So. 3d 311, 323 (¶ 47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Jordan v. State, 211 So. 3d 713,
717 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)).
¶26. The excluded testimony was consistent with the State’s account of the case that there
were several responsive shooters at the event. Also, Carter testified that he did not see House
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for about an hour before the shooting. Therefore, Carter’s testimony would not have
exculpated House. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Carter’s testimony,
but even if it had, any alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting the State’s
aiding and abetting jury instruction over the defense’s objection
when the verdict did not depend on aiding and abetting?
¶27. The issuance of a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Flowers, 51 So.
3d at 912. “In determining whether error exists in granting or refusing jury instructions, the
instructions must be read as a whole; if the instructions fairly announce the law and create
no injustice, no reversible error will be found.” Jones, 962 So. 2d at 1272 (quoting Martin,
854 So. 2d at 1009).
¶28. In Pulphus v. State, 782 So. 2d 1220 (Miss. 2001), Pulphus argued that the trial court
erred by giving jury instructions S-3 and S-4 to the jury because they instructed the jury on
elements of aiding and abetting a crime and conspiracy. Id. at 1223. Pulphus asserted that
the jury instructions substantively amended the indictment. Id. The Court held that the trial
court did not err by allowing the two jury instructions. Id. The error was harmless because
the other instructions correctly informed the jury of the State’s burden of proof and required
it to find every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby eliminating
any prejudicial effect. Id. at 1225.
¶29. Here, the State offered Jury Instruction S-8 which stated, “One who aids and abets
another in the commission of a crime is guilty as a principal. To aid and abet the commission
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of a felony, one must do something that will incite, encourage, or assist the actual perpetrator
in the commission of the crime.” The defense objected to S-8 and offered D-10, which was
taken from Milano v. State, 790 So. 2d 179, (Miss. 2001). Jury Instruction D-10 stated:
The guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be established without proof
that the defendant personally did every act constituting the offense alleged.
The law recognizes that, ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself may
also be accomplished by him through the direction of another person as his or
her agent, or by acting in concert with, or under the direction of another person
or persons in a joint effort or enterprise.
If another person is acting under the direction of the defendant or if the
defendant joins another person and performs acts with the intent to commit a
crime, then the law holds the defendant responsible for the acts and conduct
of such other persons just as though the defendant had committed the acts or
engaged in such conduct.
Before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others,
it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself in some way with
the crime and participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime.
Mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being
committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or
aided and abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was a participant and not merely a knowing spectator.
In other words, you may not find any defendant guilty unless you find beyond
a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these
instructions was committed by some person or persons, and that the defendant
voluntarily participated in its commission with the intent to violate the law.
House argues that issuing jury instruction S-8 instead of D-10 “allowed the State to gloss
over the fact that it failed to produce any evidence that House was in any way a part of the
aggravated assault on Gatlin.”
¶30. The State argues that House’s actions support the individually prong of the charge,
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and therefore the aiding and abetting instruction was superfluous. The indictment read:
JOHNNY HOUSE, on or about the [sic] November 20, 2022, in Yazoo
County, Mississippi, individually or while aiding and abetting others and/or
acting in concert with others did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause
serious bodily injury to Amanda Gatlin by shooting a firearm into a crowd and
initiating a shootout which resulted in Amanda Gatlin being shot in the head,
thereby manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
(Emphasis added.) The State was not required to prove that House aided and abetted anyone.
Any deficiency in S-8 could not have impacted the verdict. Furthermore, a similar argument
was made and rejected by the Court in Pulphus. Pulphus, 782 So. 2d at 1225.
¶31. House’s actions satisfied the individually prong of the indictment, and therefore the
aiding and abetting instruction was an unnecessary addition. House’s verdict was not
impacted by the jury instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION
¶32. Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the convictions of Johnny Lee House Jr.
¶33. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN, BRANNING
AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.
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