UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-3914 (CRC)
APPROXIMATELY 927,155.442 USDT,
Defendant.
OPINION
In this in rem civil forfeiture action, the government has moved for default judgment and
seeks a final order of forfeiture against all persons claiming an interest in digital currency worth
$ 927,155.442 USD, which was recovered through the FBI’s investigation of an international
cryptocurrency investment fraud (“CIF”) scheme colorfully referred to as “pig-butchering.”
Compl. ¶ 30. Despite its crypto angle, the scheme is a classic con job: Criminals contact
potential victims online, seeking to build rapport and often romantic relationships. Id. ¶ 31.
Once trust has been established, the perpetrator suggests that the victim make a virtual currency
investment, typically through a fake online investment platform. Id. ¶ 32. After the victim
makes initial deposits, the platform may show lucrative returns, thereby encouraging further
investment—or the perpetrator may promise to make “investments” of their own alongside the
victim’s. Id. Ultimately, of course, the deposited funds are routed to a virtual currency address
controlled by the perpetrator, and the victim is unable to recover them. Id.
The government has satisfied both the standard for default judgment and the requirements
enumerated in Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset
Forfeiture Actions. Accordingly, the Court will grant its motion for default judgment and issue a
final order of forfeiture.
I. Background
Since 2023, the FBI has been investigating a complex cryptocurrency fraud scheme that
has fleeced over a dozen victims out of a total of over $14 million. Compl. ¶ 1. This particular
shakedown begins with R.M., who connected with a young woman named “Anna Wang” on
Facebook in the summer of 2023. Id. ¶ 35. The two began what R.M. thought was a romantic
relationship. Wang claimed to live in New York City with an aunt who was a cryptocurrency
investment expert with Goldman Sachs. Id. ¶ 36. She persuaded R.M. to invest through her
aunt’s purported cryptocurrency platform, promising outsized returns. Id. ¶ 37. R.M. deposited
funds on the platform, and over time, Wang upped the ante, encouraging R.M. to invest more to
improve his returns and gain Wang’s aunt’s approval for their relationship. Id. ¶ 37. Wang also
claimed that she was investing her own funds in the platform. Id. Eventually, though, R.M.
discovered that he had been locked out of his account and was unable to withdraw his nowsizeable investment. Id. ¶ 39. It was around this time that the FBI contacted him to apprise him
of the CIF scheme to which he had fallen prey. Id. ¶ 40.
By the fall of that year, FBI special agents and forensic accountants began to trace R.M.’s
funds through blockchain analysis. Id. ¶ 42. As is common in crypto-fraud schemes, his
deposits were comingled with other funds and split along different laundering paths to conceal
the precise location of the stolen amount. Id. ¶ 43. Through its forensic analysis, the FBI
identified a set of common cryptocurrency wallet addresses that had been used to defraud several
other victims in roughly the same fashion as R.M. Id. ¶ 47. Each victim met an individual on
Facebook, LinkedIn, a dating portal, or other social media website, who directed them to invest
large sums of money on a fake cryptocurrency platform. When the victim eventually grew
suspicious about the authenticity of the platform and tried to withdraw their deposits, they—like
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R.M.—discovered that their account had been frozen. See generally id. ¶¶ 49–62. Most were
left high and dry, unable to recover the money they had sunk into the scheme. Id. ¶ 63.
Meanwhile, the perpetrators channeled victims’ “investments” through multiple virtual
currency addresses and eventually swapped them into Tether USD (“USDT”), a form of digital
currency pegged to the U.S. dollar. Id. ¶ 43. A total of 927,155.442 USDT in stolen funds
(“Defendant Property”) was ultimately laundered into five “subject addresses” housed on Tether
Ltd., the company that manages the “treasury” for USDT crypto tokens. Id. ¶¶ 42, 28. In
December 2023, pursuant to a law enforcement request, Tether froze the subject addresses and
their balances. Id. ¶¶ 42, 86. Following that freeze, a few individuals contacted Tether to claim
ownership over the funds held within two of the subject addresses. Id. ¶ 86. But when FBI
investigators started to probe the identity of these individuals, they clammed up. Id. ¶¶ 87–91.
On November 13, 2025, the government filed a verified complaint for forfeiture of the
frozen funds, explaining that the Defendant Property should be turned over to the United States
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and (C), as the property constituted the proceeds of a wire
fraud and international money laundering scheme. Pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(4)(a), the
government posted a notice of forfeiture on its official website for at least 30 consecutive days in
early 2026. See Decl. of Publ’n, ECF No. 2-1 at 4. No party filed any claim based on the notice
of publication. The government represents that it has found no person who reasonably appears to
be a potential claimant in this case. Mot. for Default J. ¶ 2; see also Resp. to Order of Court,
ECF No. 9 ¶ 3. And it states that no other party has filed a claim to the Defendant Property in
any other fashion. Mot. for Default J. ¶ 3. The Clerk of Court entered default as to all
potentially interested parties in May. See Clerk’s Entry of Def., ECF No. 5.
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The government now moves for default judgment, seeking a final order of forfeiture. On
August 7, 2026, it followed up with an emergency motion for the forfeiture of property,
explaining that a “victim traceable to the Defendant Property faces imminent foreclosure of their
home,” and the “United States intends to compensate this victim with funds from the Defendant
Property but cannot until there is an order granting forfeiture to the United States.” Emerg’y
Mot. ¶¶ 1–2. After the Court requested clarification as to Plaintiff’s compliance with certain
elements of Supplemental Rule G, see Aug. 10, 2026 Min. Order, the Plaintiff requested the
issuance of an arrest warrant for Defendant Property, which the Clerk of Court granted, see
Warrant, ECF No. 11 at 1–2. Defendant Property is in the government’s possession, custody,
and control. See Compl. ¶ 16; Resp. to Order of Court, ECF No. 9 ¶ 2.
II. Legal Standard
Obtaining default judgment is a two-step process. See Boland v. Cacper Const. Corp.,
130 F. Supp. 3d 379, 382 (D.D.C. 2015). First, a plaintiff must request that the Clerk of the
Court enter default against a party who has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” against the
action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Then, the plaintiff “must apply to the court for a default
judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P 55(b)(2). “Whether default judgment is appropriate is in the
discretion of the trial court.” Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Nat’l Indus. Pension Fund v. Vistacare
LLC, 819 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2026) (citations omitted). “Upon entry of default by the
clerk,” each “well-pleaded allegation in the complaint” is deemed admitted. Id. (cleaned up).
“[T]he defendant’s default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if
the complaint states a claim for relief.” Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27
(D.D.C. 2008).
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III. Analysis
A. Notice
“Before a default judgment is entered pursuant to a complaint for forfeiture in rem, the
government must show that it complied with the notice requirements contained in the
Supplemental Rules.” United States v. $1,071,251.44 of Funds Associated with Mingzheng Int’l
Trading Ltd., 324 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2018). “Supplemental Rule G(4) requires the
government to provide two forms of notice in an [in rem] forfeiture action”: “notice to the public
via publication and notice to potential claimants via direct notice.” United States v. Twenty-Four
Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2020).
The government has satisfied both requirements here. First, it “published notice of the
action within a reasonable time after filing the complaint,” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(4)(a)(i),
“on an official internet government forfeiture site for at least 30 consecutive days,” id. at
G(4)(a)(iii)(B), (iv)(C). That notice properly “describe[d] the property, state[d] the time to file a
claim and answer, and name[d] the government attorney to be served with the claim and
answer.” Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F. Supp. 3d at 5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
R. G(4)(a)(ii)). And second, the government has represented that there are no known potential
claimants for Defendant Property here. See Mot. for Default J. ¶ 2. Although some individuals
apparently reached out to Tether to claim ownership over funds held in two of the five subject
addresses holding Defendant Property, Compl. ¶ 86, they cut off contact after investigators
probed for any identifying information, id. ¶¶ 87–91. Because none of these individuals
“provided credible proof of ownership” over any portion of Defendant Property, the government
has therefore concluded that “there is no person who reasonably appears to be a potential
claimant in this case.” See also Resp. to Order of Court, ECF No. 9 ¶ 3. Based on the available
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representations, the Court agrees and concludes that both of Supplemental Rule G’s notice
requirements are satisfied here.
B. Adequacy of the Complaint
Supplemental Rule G further sets forth the pleading requirements for an in rem civil
forfeiture action. The government must file a verified complaint that states the grounds for
jurisdiction and venue, “describe[s] the property with reasonable particularity,” “identif[ies] the
statute under which the forfeiture action is brought,” and “state[s] sufficiently detailed facts to
support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(2)(a)–(f). This is not an “onerous standard,” but rather sets a “low
bar” appropriate at the default judgment phase “where a court should exercise greater flexibility
in judging factual allegations.” Mingzheng Int’l Trading Ltd., 324 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52.
The verified complaint in this case meets this “low bar.” It states the appropriate bases
for jurisdiction and venue, Compl. ¶¶ 3–5, and describes the Defendant Property in reasonable
detail, including by specific reference to its subject addresses, id. ¶ 15. The complaint further
identifies the statutes under which the action is brought, see id. ¶¶ 6–14, including 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1), which mandates forfeiture of property involved in wire fraud and money laundering.
Finally, the complaint states sufficiently detailed facts to support a belief that the
government could meet its burden of proof (here, a preponderance of the evidence) if this case
were to go to trial. United States v. Sum of $ 70,990,605, 4 Supp. 3d 189, 197 (D.D.C. 2014).
The government alleges that Defendant Property was obtained through CIF schemes that targeted
several individuals through various social networking and social media websites. See generally
id. ¶¶ 30–85. According to the complaint, the fraud and money laundering in this case follows a
familiar pattern of “pig butchering.” The named victims were deceived into thinking that they
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had developed a relationship of trust or romance with the perpetrator, who then encouraged them
to invest in a fake cryptocurrency platform. Id. ¶¶ 35–38, 49–62. When the perpetrator reported
that the initial investment generated a “return,” the victims continued to invest, whether because
they understood the platform to be a genuine money-making opportunity or because they wished
to develop their relationship with the perpetrator. Id. And across the board, the victims were
eventually locked out of the fake platform or otherwise prevented from retrieving their funds,
leading to a collective loss of millions of dollars. Id. ¶¶ 38–41, 49–63. The stolen funds were
then comingled and laundered through numerous cryptocurrency wallets within a matter of days,
id. ¶ 73, “essentially scattering” the sums “on the blockchain” to conceal their location. Id. ¶ 43.
In short, the “pig butchering” scheme detailed in the government’s complaint defrauded a
slew of victims and then attempted to wash the stolen funds by passing them through a series of
intermediary crypto wallets. The allegations support a reasonable belief that the government
would be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Property is traceable
to wire fraud and money laundering, rendering it forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1).
IV. Conclusion
Because the verified complaint states a claim for forfeiture in rem under Supplemental
Rule G, the government has complied with the requisite procedural requirements (including
adequate noticed), and no claimant has appeared to challenge the forfeiture, the Court will grant
the government’s motion for default judgment. A separate Order shall accompany this Opinion.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: August 21, 2026
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