[Cite as State v. Dallas, 2026-Ohio-3259.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 30740
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2025 CR 02431
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
TAMARA DALLAS : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 21, 2026, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30740
CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Tamara Dallas appeals from the sentence she received in the Montgomery
County Common Pleas Court after pleading guilty to having weapons while under disability,
domestic violence, and aggravated assault. Dallas argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by rejecting her indigency claim and ordering her to pay court costs as part of her
sentence. For the reasons outlined below, we disagree with Dallas and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On November 18, 2025, Dallas entered negotiated guilty pleas to single counts
of having weapons while under disability, domestic violence, and aggravated assault. The
trial court accepted Dallas’ guilty pleas and found her guilty of those offenses. In preparation
for sentencing, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which
included information about Dallas’ education, employment history, and health status.
{¶ 3} At the sentencing hearing, Dallas’ counsel moved the trial court to waive any
fines and costs, claiming that Dallas was indigent. The trial court indicated that it had
reviewed the PSI, found that Dallas had the ability to pay court costs, and ordered her to
pay those costs as part of her sentence. The trial court also sentenced Dallas to an
aggregate term of 54 months in prison. Dallas now appeals from her sentence and raises a
single assignment of error for review.
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Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} Under her assignment of error, Dallas claims that the trial court erred by denying
her motion to waive court costs, because she was indigent. We disagree.
{¶ 5} “R.C. 2947.23 governs the trial court’s authority to impose costs on a defendant
convicted of a felony.” State v. Dennis, 2023-Ohio-3815, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). Section (A)(1)(a) of
the statute provides: “In all criminal cases, including violations of ordinances, the judge or
magistrate shall include in the sentence the costs of prosecution . . . and render a judgment
against the defendant for such costs.” R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a). The Supreme Court of Ohio
has explained that under R.C. 2947.23, the imposition of court costs on all convicted
defendants is mandatory, whether “indigent or not.” State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-3514, ¶ 6;
State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, ¶ 231 (“R.C. 2947.23 requires a trial court to assess costs
against all criminal defendants, even if the defendant is indigent.”), citing State v. White,
2004-Ohio-5989, ¶ 8.
{¶ 6} R.C. 2947.23(C), however, provides that a trial court “retains jurisdiction to
waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution . . . at the time of
sentencing or any time thereafter.” So, “[w]hile the imposition of those costs is mandatory,
the court may waive the payment of all costs when the defendant is determined to be
indigent.” State v. Davis, 2020-Ohio-309, ¶ 13, citing White at ¶ 14. Although waiver of costs
is permitted if a defendant is indigent, it is not required. Taylor at ¶ 7, citing White at ¶ 14.
{¶ 7} When assessing a motion to waive, suspend, or modify court costs under
R.C. 2947.23, a trial court is not required to consider the defendant’s ability to pay. Id. at
¶ 16. In fact, R.C. 2947.23(C) “provides no explicit criteria that a court should use in deciding
whether to waive, suspend, or modify costs.” Id. at ¶ 8. The trial court’s decision simply “must
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not be arbitrary and cannot be based on considerations wholly unrelated to the decision it is
tasked with making.” Id. at ¶ 16.
{¶ 8} “Where a defendant moves to waive costs at the time of sentencing, the trial
court’s decision will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Dennis, 2023-Ohio3815, at ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Joseph, 2010-Ohio-954, ¶ 12, citing State v. Threatt,
2006-Ohio-905, ¶ 23. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is
unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34, citing
State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). “Abuse-of-discretion review is deferential
and does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court.” Id., citing State v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14.
{¶ 9} In this case, Dallas does not identify anything unreasonable, unconscionable,
or arbitrary about the trial court’s decision to not waive court costs. Dallas’ only point of
contention is that the trial court made that decision despite her trial counsel advising the
court that she was indigent. She claims that one of the factors establishing her indigence
was that she was appointed counsel in the trial court proceedings and on appeal. However,
we have previously explained that “[a] finding that Defendant is indigent for purposes of
appointment of counsel does not shield a defendant from paying court costs which are
required by law.” State v. Ayers, 2005-Ohio-44, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.), citing White, 2004-Ohio5989; accord State v. Felder, 2006-Ohio-2330, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.) and Dennis at ¶ 11.
{¶ 10} The trial court was vested with the discretion to waive court costs, and it was
not required to consider indigency or ability to pay when exercising its discretion. Despite
this, the record indicates that the trial court did consider Dallas’ ability to pay court costs.
Specifically, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the PSI, which provided information
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about Dallas’ education, employment history, and health status, and it found that Dallas had
the ability to pay court costs.
{¶ 11} According to the PSI, Dallas reported graduating from Foss High School in
Seattle, Washington in 2008. The PSI indicated that during previous PSI examinations,
Dallas had reported discontinuing her education at the eighth grade level, when she was 17
or 18 years old, due to her impending termination from foster care. Dallas also reported that
she was never placed on an Individualized Education Plan and that she participated in track,
volleyball, swimming, and basketball.
{¶ 12} Regarding employment history, the PSI indicated that Dallas had reported
working at the Princess Hair Store from November 2022 until the time of her 2025 arrest.
Dallas also reported being previously employed at Mahle, BDS Packaging, and various
factories. In addition, Dallas reported receiving $200 a month in SNAP benefits and $771 in
Social Security Income, which was for various mental health issues.
{¶ 13} In a prior PSI, Dallas reported that in 2013, she was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anti-social stress disorder, for
which she engaged in counseling until 2018. Relative to this case, Dallas underwent a
psychological evaluation while in jail, where she was described as acutely agitated, hyper
verbose, and animated when vocalizing about issues with cellmates. During the evaluation,
Dallas displayed affective dysregulation (tearfulness and anger), which prevented the
evaluation from being completed. The PSI indicates that Dallas had CareSource medical
insurance and was prescribed various medications. The PSI examiner reported that Dallas
stated that she was in fair mental and physical health.
{¶ 14} Given the information in the PSI, particularly Dallas’ prior employment history,
we find that it was reasonable and not unconscionable or arbitrary for the trial court to find
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that Dallas had the ability to pay court costs. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Dallas’ motion to waive court costs on that basis.
{¶ 15} Dallas’ assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 16} Having overruled Dallas’ assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
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