[Cite as State v. Nelson, 2026-Ohio-3266.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-54
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 0525
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
JANEL M. NELSON : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 21, 2026, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-54
ADAM J. ARNOLD, Attorney for Appellant
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Janel M. Nelson appeals from her conviction of murder.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On August 22, 2024, the body of M.S. was discovered in his home in Greene
County, Ohio. It was determined that M.S. had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back
of his head. Following an investigation, Nelson was identified as a suspect, but it was
determined that she had left Ohio and traveled to Nebraska. Detective John Bondy of the
Beavercreek Police Department contacted Omaha Police Department Detective Ryan
Hinsley and asked him to help locate Nelson. Bondy provided a photograph of Nelson and
a list of Nelson’s family contacts in the Omaha area. He also advised that Nelson might be
located at a homeless shelter in the area. Bondy indicated that Nelson might be driving a
silver car with Wisconsin license plates.
{¶ 3} On August 26, 2024, Hinsley and another detective went to a local shelter,
where they observed a sedan matching the description provided by Bondy. A woman
matching Nelson’s photograph was observed walking out of the shelter and approaching the
sedan. Hinsley called out the name “Janel Neson” and the woman acknowledged that was
her name. Hinsley advised her that another agency wanted to speak to her concerning an
investigation, and he asked whether she would come to the Omaha Police Department to
meet with investigators. Nelson agreed.
2
{¶ 4} A uniformed Omaha officer arrived to transport Nelson. Nelson was informed
that police department policy granted the officer the discretion to place her in handcuffs for
the transport. Nelson indicated that she understood the policy and stated that she was willing
to proceed. Nelson was placed in handcuffs. Her cell phone, purse, and car keys were taken
from her prior to transport.
{¶ 5} At the police department, Nelson was uncuffed and placed in an interview room.
Hinsley informed Nelson of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). An
interview ensued, which was recorded.
{¶ 6} On October 25, 2024, Nelson was indicted on one count of murder in violation
of R.C. 2903.02(B) and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).
Both counts carried a three-year firearm specification and a forfeiture specification. She was
extradited and returned to Ohio.
{¶ 7} In December 2024, Nelson filed a motion to suppress all statements made
during her interaction with the Omaha detectives. The motion was overruled.
{¶ 8} Following plea negotiations, Nelson agreed to plead no contest to the charge of
murder and its attendant firearm and forfeiture specifications. She further agreed to pay
restitution and the cost of extradition. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charge and specifications. The plea agreement contained an acknowledgement that the trial
court was required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole
after 18 years of imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Nelson as set forth in the plea
agreement.
{¶ 9} Nelson appeals.
3
II. Suppression
{¶ 10} Nelson asserts the following two assignments of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. NELSON’S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS OF HER UNLAWFUL SEIZURE BY
OFFICER.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING MS. NELSON’S
STATEMENTS WERE VOLUNTARY.
{¶ 11} Nelson argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing the statements she
made during her interview at the Omaha police station. She claims that the “encounter
between [herself] and law enforcement ceased to be consensual when officers handcuffed
her and transported her to the police station for investigative questioning,” and the interview
thus constituted a custodial interrogation necessitating warnings in accordance with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). She further claims that her statements to the police were
not voluntary, because the detectives engaged in deceptive practices during the interview.1
{¶ 12} When deciding a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the
trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592 (2d Dist. 1994);
State v. Knisley, 2010-Ohio-116, ¶ 30 (2d Dist.). Accordingly, when this court reviews
suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported
by competent, credible evidence. Retherford at 592. “Accepting those facts as true, we must
1. We note that on appeal Nelson asserts for the first time that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress, because she was subjected to a de facto arrest when she was handcuffed, and also that the police lacked probable cause for her arrest. We need not address this argument as it was not raised before the trial court and thus not preserved for appellate review.
4
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id.
{¶ 13} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition against compelled self-incrimination.” State v. Strozier, 2007-Ohio-4575, ¶ 16
(2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986). However, “police are not
required to give [Miranda] warnings to every person they question, even if the person being
questioned is a suspect.” State v. Hatten, 2010-Ohio-499, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.), citing State v.
Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440 (1997). Miranda warnings are required only for custodial
interrogations. Strozier at ¶ 16. Miranda defined custodial interrogation as “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda at 444. Such an inquiry
“focuses upon how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood
the situation.” State v. Ferguson, 2017-Ohio-7930, ¶ 70 (2d Dist.), citing Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). “[N]either the subjective intent of the officer, nor the
subjective belief of the defendant is relevant.” State v. Hatten, 2010-Ohio-499, ¶ 50
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 14} We have reviewed the transcript of the suppression hearing and the videotape
and transcription of the interview at the Omaha police department and conclude that
Nelson’s arguments lack merit. Irrespective of whether she was in custody for purposes of
Miranda, the record unequivocally demonstrates that she was properly advised of her
Miranda rights before she was interrogated. Nelson indicated that she understood each right
and that she was familiar with Miranda warnings, having been apprised of them in the past.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Nelson was incapable of understanding the
warnings, or that she was under the influence of anything that may have impaired her ability
5
to understand the warnings. In short, the record supports a finding that Nelson knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived her rights under Miranda.2
{¶ 15} Nelson also contends that her statements were not voluntarily made, because
the police engaged in deceptive acts during the interview.
{¶ 16} A defendant’s statements to police after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his or her Miranda rights are presumed to be voluntary. E.g., State v. Porter, 2008-Ohio-4627, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.) (discussing Miranda). However, “[t]he Miranda presumption
applies to the conditions inherent in custodial interrogation that compel the suspect to
confess. It does not extend to any actual coercion police might engage in, and the Due
Process Clause continues to require an inquiry separate from custody considerations and
compliance with Miranda regarding whether a suspect's will was overborne by the
circumstances surrounding his confession.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
{¶ 17} “In deciding whether a defendant’s confession is involuntarily induced, the
court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior
criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the
existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or
inducement.” State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus,
rev’d on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
{¶ 18} After Nelson was transported to the police station, she was placed in an
interview room and the handcuffs were removed. She was advised that she was not under
2. While Nelson correctly notes that she was asked questions for a few minutes prior to the administration of the warnings, those questions were merely preliminary background questions such as name, address, and age. Such routine background questioning is not required to be prefaced by Miranda warnings. State v. Hale, 2008-Ohio-3426, ¶ 33.
6
arrest and was free to leave. She was in the unlocked room alone for approximately
30 minutes before the detectives entered. After being advised of her Miranda rights, Nelson
indicated that she was there voluntarily and agreed to speak with the detectives. Nelson said
that she understood her rights and even indicated that she had been provided her Miranda
rights on a prior occasion. The interview, which lasted for approximately three hours, was
conversational in nature. During that time, Nelson was provided with food and drinks,
permitted to go to the restroom, and allowed to take a break to smoke a cigarette. There are
no claims that the detectives made any false promises of leniency or that they made any
threats that would have caused Nelson to make statements against her will.
{¶ 19} We find no basis for concluding that any actions by the Omaha police
improperly induced Nelson to make any statements during the interview. Thus, we conclude
that the record does not support her claim that her statements were involuntary.
{¶ 20} Nelson’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 21} Both of Nelson’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
7