SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case Nos. 6D2025-0624, 6D2025-0623
CONSOLIDATED
Lower Tribunal No. 2023-CA-002712
THE WATERFRONT IN NAPLES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Appellant,
v.
REYNOLDS VENTURES, INC.,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County.
Lauren L. Brodie, Judge.
August 21, 2026
BROWNLEE, J.
The Waterfront in Naples Condominium Association, Inc. (the “Association”)
appeals the final judgment entered in favor of Reynolds Ventures, Inc. (“Reynolds”),
and the denial of the motion to vacate that judgment. 1 The trial court entered the
final judgment after sua sponte striking the Association’s motion and request for trial
de novo and unsealing an arbitration award. Because we find the Association
1
The Association separately appealed the denial of its motion to vacate, and this court consolidated the two appeals for all purposes.
complied with the applicable statute and rule, we reverse and remand for a trial on
the merits.
THE RELEVANT FACTS
The Association owns a condominium complex that sustained damage after
Hurricane Ian. It hired Reynolds to perform water and mold remediation and
restoration services. After Reynolds believed it had completed its services, it sent a
final invoice to the Association, recorded a Claim of Lien, and served the
Association with the Contractor’s Final Payment Affidavit. The Association,
however, refused to pay, and Reynolds filed suit for breach of contract, foreclosure
on the construction lien, and unjust enrichment. Shortly thereafter, Reynolds
amended the complaint to reflect a reduced balance owed.
The parties eventually proceeded to non-binding arbitration. Twenty days
after the arbitrator’s decision, the Association filed a Motion and Request for Trial
De Novo, which stated the following:
Defendant, THE WATERFRONT IN NAPLES CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, INC., (“Defendant”), by and through its undersigned
counsel, and in accordance with Section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes,
and Florida rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h), hereby moves for and
requests a trial de novo from the Non-Binding Arbitration Award dated
September 24, 2024, as to all claims.
After the Association requested a trial de novo, Reynolds filed an amended
complaint, and the Association filed six counterclaims, as well as an exhibit list and
a pretrial statement. Reynolds moved to strike the counterclaims.
2
But something curious happened at the hearing on the motion to strike. The
trial judge explained that, before she addressed the motion set for hearing, she
wanted to alert everyone that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) had changed
two months before the arbitration took place in this case, and that the Association’s
motion and request for trial de novo did not comply with the new rule. She then read
the amended rule into the record and explained she had no choice but to deny the
Association’s motion and enter judgment pursuant to the arbitration award because
the rule “says that it has to be called a rejection of the arbitration decision, and a
request for trial de novo.” The trial court then found there was no reason to address
the merits of the motion that was set for hearing and asked Reynolds to prepare an
order stating that “the Court sua sponte is denying the motion pursuant to
noncompliance with the new rule.” She then explained that she would “have the
clerk unseal the arbitration ruling and enter judgment in conformance with the ruling
of the arbitrator.”
At that point, the Association interjected. It made an ore tenus motion to
continue the hearing and the ruling so that it could research the issue and respond. It
asked for an opportunity to provide “some sort of briefing to the Court and [to] have
a separate hearing” on the issue. The trial court responded that there would be no
hearing but that the Association could have forty-eight hours to submit something
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on point. She then directed Reynolds to prepare the order previously discussed and
concluded the hearing.
Two days later, the Association filed two documents: a memorandum in
opposition to the court’s ruling and a motion to vacate the court’s ruling or,
alternatively, a notice of rejection and request for trial de novo. Without a hearing,
the trial court entered an order that concluded as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing information and evidence
before the Court, the Court’s own Motion to unseal the Arbitration
Award and Entry of Final Judgment, is hereby GRANTED and
Defendant’s Motion to Vacate and Notice of Rejection of Arbitration
Decision and Request for Trial De Novo filed February 14, 2025 is
untimely and cannot and will not be considered by the Court.
She then directed the clerk of court to unseal the arbitration award, and directed
whichever party prevailed under the award to prepare a final judgment. The court
later entered its final judgment in accordance with the non-binding arbitration award.
The Association moved for rehearing, raising substantially the same arguments as it
did in the memorandum of law and motion to vacate. The trial court summarily
denied that motion.
The Association now appeals. It raises six issues, arguing it is entitled to a
trial on the merits because: (1) it complied with section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes;
(2) it substantially complied with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h); (3) rule
1.820(h) violates the separation of powers because, as amended, it conflicts or adds
to the substantive provisions of section 44.103(5); (4) the trial court violated the
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Association’s due process rights when it deprived it of a full and fair opportunity to
be heard; (5) Reynolds waived strict compliance with rule 1.820(h) when it engaged
in litigation and prepared for trial; and (6) the final judgment should have been set
aside under rule 1.540(b) because any omission in the Association’s notice and
request for trial was due to excusable neglect.
While we do not agree with the Association on every argument raised, we
nonetheless find it was entitled to a trial de novo based on the motion and request
filed and that the trial court erred in sua sponte striking that document. We therefore
address only the dispositive issue and remand for a trial on the merits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When a party timely requests a trial de novo following nonbinding
arbitration, this Court reviews the denial of the request de novo.” Dungarani v.
Benoit, 312 So. 3d 126, 128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing Bacon Fam. Partners, L.P.
v. Apollo Condo. Ass’n, 852 So. 2d 882, 887 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)).
ANALYSIS
The Statute, the Rule, and the Recent Cases
“Together, section 44.103 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820 govern
court-ordered nonbinding arbitration.” Dungarani, 312 So. 3d at 128. Section
44.103, Florida Statutes, “prescribes the substance,” id. at 129, and simply requires
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a timely request for trial de novo in order to avoid the finality of the arbitration
decision:
An arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is
not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court. The decision shall not be made known to the judge who may
preside over the case unless no request for trial de novo is made as
herein provided or unless otherwise provided by law. If no request for
trial de novo is made within the time provided, the decision shall be
referred to the presiding judge in the case who shall enter such orders
and judgments as are required to carry out the terms of the decision,
which orders shall be enforceable by the contempt powers of the court,
and for which judgments execution shall issue on request of a party.
§ 44.103(5), Fla. Stat. (2024).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) “prescribes the procedure for
requesting a trial de novo,” Dungarani, 312 So. 3d at 129, and was amended two
months before the arbitration award in this case. When amending the rule, the Florida
Supreme Court retitled subsection (h) “Notice of Rejection of the Arbitration
Decision and Request for Trial” and changed it “to clarify the process for rejecting
an arbitrator’s decision and requesting a trial de novo.” In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ.
P., 386 So. 3d 876, 878 (Fla. 2024). The amended rule provides:
To reject the arbitration decision, within 20 days of service of the
arbitrator(’s)(s’) written decision, any party must file a notice of
rejection of the arbitration decision and request for trial in the same
document. No action or inaction by any party, other than the filing
of the notice, will be deemed a rejection of the arbitration decision.
. . . If a notice of rejection of the arbitration decision and request for
trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the decision,
the decision must be referred to the presiding judge, who must enter
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such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of
the decision as provided by section 44.103(5), Florida Statutes.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h) (emphasis added).
The Florida Supreme Court also cautioned that, “[u]nder the amended rule, an
arbitration decision will be deemed rejected only if a ‘notice of rejection of the
arbitration decision and request for trial’ is filed with the court within 20 days of
service of the arbitrator’s written decision.” In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P., 386 So.
3d at 878.
This amended rule—and the question of whether a party is entitled to a trial
on the merits when it requests a trial de novo but does not expressly state that it is
providing notice of its rejection of the arbitration decision—was recently the subject
of two cases in Florida’s district courts of appeal: People’s Trust Insurance Co. v.
Hernandez, 413 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), reh’g denied, (May 8, 2025), and
Sanchez v. People’s Trust Insurance Co., 434 So. 3d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
The Fourth District decided the issue first. In Hernandez, it found the trial
court erred in denying the insurer’s motion to enforce the non-binding arbitration
decision, because the homeowners’ notice demanding a trial de novo did not also
expressly reject the arbitration decision. 413 So. 3d at 127–28. In doing so, it rejected
the homeowners’ argument that a party cannot request a trial de novo without also
necessarily rejecting the arbitration decision. Id. at 129. Nor was the court persuaded
by the homeowners’ argument that they were entitled to relief because they had
7
substantially complied with rule 1.820(h). Id. Instead, the court refused to apply any
substantial compliance test and explained the Florida Supreme Court amended the
rule “to require that a party rejecting the arbitration decision ‘must file a notice of
rejection of the arbitration decision and request for trial in the same document. No
action or inaction by any party, other than the filing of the notice, will be deemed a
rejection of the arbitration decision.’ Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h) (2024) (emphases
added).” Id. That language left no room for “legal wiggling,” as Judge Gross put it.
Id. at 131 (Gross, J., concurring specially).
The Third District likewise considered an argument for substantial
compliance in Sanchez. There, Sanchez argued the trial court erred in entering a final
judgment adopting the arbitrator’s decision because she substantially complied with
the statute and rule, despite failing to include an express notice of rejection of the
arbitrator’s decision. Sanchez, 434 So. 3d at 156. The Third District followed the
Fourth and rejected Sanchez’s argument “[b]ecause rule 1.820(h) requires, without
exception, that a notice of rejection and a motion for trial de novo must be filed
within 20 days of service of the arbitrator’s decision, and Sanchez failed to do so.”
Id. Employing the supremacy-of-text principle, the court rejected Sanchez’s
argument that there could be no doubt as to the purpose of her motion for trial de
novo, because her argument was contrary to the language of the amended rule and
would “render powerless [its] command that ‘[n]o action or inaction by any party,
8
other than the filing of the notice [of rejection], will be deemed a rejection of the
arbitration decision.’” Id. at 158–59 (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h)). The court
acknowledged rule 1.820(h) was strict but offered that it “is strict for a reason.” Id.
at 158.
Finally, the court concluded that requiring both a request for trial de novo and
a notice of rejection of the arbitrator’s decision is consistent with the plain text of
both the statute and rule. Id. at 159 (citing Koppel v. Ochoa, 243 So. 3d 886, 891
(Fla. 2018) (citation omitted) (“It is well settled that the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure are construed in accordance with the principles of statutory
construction.”); Nader + Museu I, LLLP v. Miami Dade Coll., 307 So. 3d 140, 142
(Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (holding that two rules of procedure “must be construed in
harmony”); CPI Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Industrias St. Jack’s, S.A. De C.V., 870 So. 2d 89,
92-93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (citations omitted) (“As in statutory construction, the
rules must be read as a cohesive whole, and a rule should not be construed in such a
way as to render another rule meaningless. In addition, a more specific statutory
provision governs over a more general provision.”)).
This Case
As textualists, we agree with the Third District’s use of the supremacy-of-text
principle, along with its application of the canons of statutory construction to guide
its thoughtful analysis. And we acknowledge that these tools are critical when
9
interpreting both the text of section 44.103 and rule 1.820(h). But, in our view, the
application of those principles to the language of rule 1.820(h) and the facts of this
case requires a different result. Consequently, we decline to follow Hernandez and
Sanchez.
Like the Third District, we are guided by the supremacy-of-text principle,
“namely, the principle that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount
concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.’” USAA Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Mikrogiannakis, 342 So. 3d 871, 873 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (quoting
Forrester v. Sch. Bd. of Sumter Cnty., 316 So. 3d 774, 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)).
And “[w]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear
and definite meaning, it must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. (quoting
Weightman v. State, 990 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)).
We also consider the goal of interpretation. That goal is to “arrive at a ‘fair
reading’ of the text by ‘determining the application of [the] text to given facts on the
basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have
understood the text at the time it was issued.’” Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.
3d 318, 323–24 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308
So. 3d 942, 947 (Fla. 2020)). The “fair reading method” considers “the purpose of
the text, ‘gathered only from the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of its
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context.’” Mikrogiannakis, 342 So. 3d at 874 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (1st ed. 2012)).
It does not, however, “countenance a hyperliteral reading of a legal text.” Id.
(citing Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 33). Similarly, Justice Scalia has explained
that a “good textualist is not a literalist.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law 24 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Rather, a textualist
knows that “[a] text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed
leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.” Id.
at 23.
In this case, Reynolds defends the trial court’s sua sponte decision to strike
the Association’s motion for trial de novo and urges us that the Association failed to
comply with the amended rule. It argues, “it is without question that [the
Association’s] Request for Trial De Novo did not contain a notice of rejection of the
arbitration decision within it.” And, at oral argument in this case, counsel for
Reynolds argued the Association “had to include that they were rejecting the
arbitration decision” and “needed” the word “rejection” in the notice. That argument
is consistent with the trial court’s finding that “[the document] has to be called a
rejection of the arbitration decision, and a request for trial de novo.”
We decline to adopt this magic-words test. In our view, Reynolds asks us to
interpret the language of rule 1.820(h) in a strict, overly narrow, or hyperliteral way.
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Consistent with the principles above, however, we must give the words their plain
and obvious meaning, in context, considering the structure of the rule, just as we
would if we were interpreting a statute. See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid,
930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006) (“It is well settled that the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure are construed in accordance with the principles of statutory construction.”
(citing Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1998) (“Our courts have long
recognized that the rules of construction applicable to statutes also apply to the
construction of rules.”))).
In doing so, we first consider the text of rule 1.820(h) as set forth above. The
first sentence of that rule provides: “To reject the arbitration decision, within 20 days
of service of the arbitrator(’s)(s’) written decision, any party must file a notice of
rejection of the arbitration decision and request for trial in the same document.” Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). There is no dispute that the Association’s document was timely
filed, or that the document properly contained a request for trial. The parties’ dispute
focuses instead on the requirement that the Association file “a notice of rejection of
the arbitration award.” And so, we examine those words.
First, we find it significant that the rule requires filing a notice, rather than the
notice. As Justice Grosshans recently explained, “the use of an indefinite article,
such as ‘a,’ does not denote a specific noun, but merely a member of a class.” Brito
v. Salas, 434 So. 3d 39, 48 (Fla. 2025) (citing Myers v. State, 696 So. 2d 893, 900
12
(Fla. 4th DCA 1997), quashed on other grounds, 713 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1998); State
v. Crose, 378 So. 3d 1217, 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (“A or an goes before a word
or phrase denoting a person or thing (noun) but not a specific one. . . .” (quoting Paul
W. Lovinger, The Penguin Dictionary of American English Usage and Style 1, 426
(2000)))). Conversely, “grammar and usage establish that ‘the’ is ‘a function word .
. . indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been
previously specified by context.’” Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 408 (2019)
(quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005)); see also
Work v. United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200, 208 (1923)
(Congress’s “use of the definite article [in a reference to “the appraisement”] means
an appraisement specifically provided for”); Myers, 696 So. 2d at 900 (“[T]he
definite article, ‘the’ . . . before a noun specifies a definite and specific noun, as
opposed to any member of a class.”).
The Florida Supreme Court’s use of the indefinite article before the word
“notice” supports the argument that no specific form of notice is required. Sure, the
notice has to do a particular thing—provide notice of rejection of the arbitration
decision—but the use of the indefinite article cuts against Reynolds’s claim that a
specific notice containing the precise words “notice of rejection” are required. We
note, too, that the words “notice of rejection” are not in quotation marks within the
rule, or even capitalized. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h).
13
Because no specific or previously identified notice of rejection is required,
and because the rule does not define or announce what it means by a “notice of
rejection,” we look to the dictionary definition of the words to discern their plain and
ordinary meaning. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “notice” as a “[l]egal notification
required by law or agreement,” the “condition of being so notified, whether or not
actual awareness exists,” or a “written or printed announcement.” Notice, Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It defines “rejection” as a “refusal to accept a
contractual offer.” Rejection, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here, the
Association’s filing was a written or printed document that announced the
Association wanted a trial de novo “from the Non-Binding Arbitration Award dated
September 24, 2024, as to all claims.” That language provided notice that the
Association refused to accept the non-binding arbitration decision. We can see no
other way to read that language, and tellingly, Reynolds offers no other interpretation
for our consideration.
Rather, Reynolds glosses over the language of the document and insists
nothing short of the words “notice of rejection” will do. It argues that, because the
Association’s filing does not contain that express language, it was properly stricken
under rule 1.820(h). But that’s not how we interpret legal texts. See Scalia, A Matter
of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law at 23 (“[A] text should not be
construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed
14
reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”); Smith v. Smith, 224 So. 3d 740, 754
(Fla. 2017) (Polston, J., dissenting) (“[C]onstruing the plain meaning of a statute is
not a magic words test.”); Spurlock v. State, 420 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. 1982)
(considering whether petitioner’s objection satisfied Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.390(d) and finding “[t]he missing ‘magic words’ do not concern us
because the necessary substance was present”).
When we construe the words “notice of rejection of the arbitration decision”
reasonably, to contain all that the words fairly mean, we conclude that filing a
document under rule 1.820(h) and section 44.103—that provides notice that the
Association is requesting a trial de novo, challenging a particular arbitration award—
satisfies that requirement. To interpret it as Reynolds suggests would be to exalt
form over substance and to narrowly construe the words to mean less than what they
fairly mean.
Our consideration of this text in context also requires us to face the following
sentence and consider its impact on the language at issue: “No action or inaction by
any party, other than the filing of the notice, will be deemed a rejection of the
arbitration decision.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). While we acknowledge the language
in that sentence is mandatory and straightforward, we have already found that the
document in this case constituted the required notice. The Association is not relying
15
on any “other action or inaction” to satisfy rule 1.820(h). That sentence, therefore,
does not change the outcome here.
It does, however, compel us to explain that, in interpreting rule 1.820(h) in
this way, we do not revive the concept of “substantial compliance” rejected by recent
cases interpreting rule 1.820(h). Those substantial compliance cases routinely
resolved the question of whether one party requested a trial de novo based on that
party’s conduct, not the sufficiency of a document expressly filed under rule
1.820(h) and section 44.103.
For example, in Nicholson-Kenny Capital Management, Inc. v. Steinberg, the
Fourth District reversed a final judgment on an arbitration award, even though the
appellant never filed a motion for trial as required by rule 1.820, because the
appellant filed a notice to set the pretrial conference, in accordance with the order
setting trial, and appellees’ “words, actions, and conduct led [appellant] to believe
that they assented to its request for a trial de novo.” 932 So. 2d 321, 322–23, 326
(Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
Similarly, in de Acosta v. Naples Community Hospital, Inc., the Second
District found the appellant substantially complied with the requirement for moving
for a trial de novo and reversed the final judgment. 300 So. 3d 264, 265 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2019). Although the court acknowledged the appellant did not “technically
comply” with rule 1.820(h), it nonetheless concluded appellant’s identification of
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disputed facts and an issue of law contained in a pending motion in limine somehow
satisfied rule 1.820(h). Id. at 267.
The Second District did this again in Beyond Billing, Inc. v. Spine &
Orthopedic Center, P.C., 362 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). There, it denied a
petition for writ of mandamus, asking the court to compel the circuit court to enter a
final judgment on the arbitration award. Id. at 257. The court denied that request, not
based on the language of the rule, but because “the parties indicated a mutual
intention to proceed to trial by executing a joint stipulated motion to amend the case
management order.” Id. at 257–58. It justified that decision by relying on what it
believed to be the “purpose” of rule 1.820(h). See id. at 258 (“The purpose of filing
a motion for trial under rule 1.820 is to give the other side ‘notice that it should be
prepared for trial.’”).
This case is unlike Nicholson-Kenny, de Acosta, and Beyond Billing. Our
focus is not on the conduct of any party or the nature of other documents filed
pursuant to other rules and court orders. Rather, our conclusion flows from the plain
language of rule 1.820(h) and a consideration of whether the statements made in a
document timely and expressly filed under section 44.103 and rule 1.820(h)
constituted a notice of the Association’s rejection of the arbitration decision and a
17
request for trial. Neither Nicholson-Kenny, de Acosta, nor Beyond Billing considered
such a document or tracked the plain language of the rule.2
Finally, we note there can be no doubt the Association complied with section
44.103(5). That subsection instructs that an arbitration decision “shall be final if a
request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court.” The Association filed a request for trial de novo within
twenty days, and “nothing” in the statute suggests that “the trial court has the
discretion to deny a party’s timely motion for trial” after arbitration. Dungarani, 312
So. 3d at 131. Thus, under the statute, the Association was entitled to a trial de novo.
Insofar as the rule may have required something additional from the
Association notwithstanding its compliance with the statute, we note that “[a]
procedural rule should not be strictly construed to defeat a statute it is designed to
2
Interestingly, the Fourth District did find substantial compliance with the prior version of rule 1.820(h) based on the language of a timely motion for trial de novo in Vitesse, Inc. v. MAPL Associates LLC, 358 So. 3d 437, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), and the Hernandez court reaffirmed that holding. See Hernandez, 413 So. 3d at 131. Vitesse relied on Nicholson-Kenny and explained “the intention of rule 1.820(h) is to send ‘some notice to the opposing party that its adversary is rejecting an arbitration award and renewing its demand for trial.’” Vitesse, Inc., 358 So. 3d at 439 (citing Nicholson-Kenny, 932 So. 2d at 324). And in finding the motion substantially complied with the prior version of rule 1.820(h), the Vitesse court reasoned: “[A]ny scrivener’s error in the operative motion was trivial and did not substantially impair either appellee or the lower court from having reasonable notice of [the] appellants’ desire to proceed to trial.” Id. at 440.
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implement.” Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Ala., LLC., 202 So. 3d 391, 396 (Fla.
2016). The procedural “tail” should not be allowed to wag the substantive “dog.” Id.
CONCLUSION
Because the Association complied with the requirements of section 44.103(5)
and rule 1.820(h), we find the trial court erred in sua sponte striking its motion and
request for trial de novo. We therefore reverse the final judgment confirming the
non-binding arbitration award and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion, after the issuance of our mandate. Finally, we certify conflict with People’s
Trust Insurance Co. v. Hernandez, 413 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), reh’g
denied, (May 8, 2025), and Sanchez v. People’s Trust Insurance Co., 434 So. 3d 155
(Fla. 3d DCA 2026).
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
SMITH, J., concurs.
PRATT, J., concurs with opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISP OSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
PRATT, J., concurring.
I fully concur in the majority’s decision. I write separately to emphasize that
our reading of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) has two benefits. First, it is
consistent with a fair reading of the text of the rule and the text of section 44.103(5),
19
Florida Statutes. And second, it avoids unnecessarily reading the text of the rule as
containing a requirement that does not implement a substantive requirement of the
text of the statute. That being said, if we were to read the text of the rule as containing
a requirement that does not implement a substantive requirement of the text of the
statute, we would be required to give effect to the statute’s substantive requirement
and excuse noncompliance with the rule’s non-implementing requirement. See
generally, e.g., Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen, 51 Fla. L. Weekly S197c, 2026
WL 1901612, at *4 (Fla. July 2, 2026); Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Ala., LLC,
202 So. 3d 391, 395-96 (Fla. 2016).
Lenore T. Brakefield, F. Scott Pauzar, III, and Cameron G. Woodward, of Woodward, Pires, & Lombardo, P.A., Naples, for Appellant.
Lori L. Moore, of Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Fort Myers, for Appellee.
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