Zachary C. Thompson v. North Bay Village, Etc.

2026-08-21

Summary · law.co

Holding. The state statute requiring that a candidate's qualifying fee be paid by check drawn on the candidate's campaign account applies to municipal elections in North Bay Village because the Village Charter contains no provision specifically addressing the payment method or account source for such fees. The trial court's order denying Thompson relief was affirmed.

Zachary Thompson sought to run as a commissioner in North Bay Village and submitted his qualifying fee about an hour before the deadline. However, he paid the fee using a cashier's check issued by his bank rather than a check drawn from his campaign account, as required by state law. The Village Clerk, after consulting with the Village attorney, disqualified Thompson based on this non-compliance with the statutory requirement.

Thompson filed suit seeking an order to place him on the ballot, arguing that the state statute governing qualifying fee payments applied only to federal and state elections, not municipal elections. He contended that the Village Charter, which requires only that a qualifying fee be deposited with the clerk but does not specify the payment method, superseded the state law requirement. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the state statute applies to municipal elections when no local charter or ordinance provision addresses the same subject matter. Since the Village Charter is silent on the source or method of payment, the state statute's requirement controls.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether state election law governing qualifying fee payment methods applies to municipal elections
Whether municipal charter silence on payment methods allows deviation from state statutory requirements
Proper interpretation of the relationship between state election code and municipal charter provisions

Procedural posture

Thompson appealed the trial court's final judgment denying his emergency complaint seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus to compel the Village Clerk to place him on the ballot after his disqualification for improper qualifying fee payment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed August 21, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D26-1785

Lower Tribunal No. 26-16195-CA-01

Zachary C. Thompson,

Appellant,

vs.

North Bay Village, etc., et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Antonio Arzola, Judge.

The Burton Firm, P.A., and Marc A. Burton, for appellant.

Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., and Richard B.

Rosengarten, for appellees North Bay Village and Alba L. Chang.

Before SCALES, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

Appellant Zachary C. Thompson, the plaintiff below, appeals the trial

court’s August 19, 2026 final order (“Order”) entering final judgment for

Appellees,1 the defendants below, on Thompson’s August 11, 2026

Emergency Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief,

and Writ of Mandamus (“Complaint”). Because no preliminary basis for

reversal has been demonstrated, we summarily affirm the Order pursuant to

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a).

I. Relevant Facts

Seeking to run for office as a commissioner in North Bay Village (the

“Village”), Thompson, approximately one hour before the end of the

qualifying period, tendered his $313 qualifying fee to the Village Clerk.

Thompson, though, submitted a bank-issued cashier’s check, instead of a

check drawn upon Thompson’s campaign account, as required by section

99.061(7)(a)1., of the Florida Statutes (2026) (the “Statute”). In pertinent

part, the Statute requires that a candidate’s qualifying fees must be paid via

"[a] properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign

account[.]” Id.

Appellees are: North Bay Village; Alba L. Chang, in her official capacity as North Bay Village Clerk; Jorge Gonzalez; and Alina Garcia, in her official capacity as Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections.

After consulting with the Village attorney, the Village Clerk disqualified

Thompson as a candidate because the qualifying fee was not paid in the

manner required by the Statute. Thompson then filed the Complaint in the

Miami-Dade County circuit court seeking an order compelling the Village

Clerk to place Thompson on the November 2026 ballot for the Village’s

municipal election. The trial court conducted expedited proceedings on the

Complaint, resulting in the rendition of the challenged Order denying

Thompson relief.

II. Analysis2

Thompson argues that the Statute governs federal and state elections,

but not municipal elections. Thompson further argues that section

100.3605(1) of the Florida Statutes (2026)3 authorizes municipalities to enact

specific provisions that conflict with the Statute, and the Village has done so.

Specifically, Thompson posits that because section 5.07 of the Village

Charter requires merely that the nonrefundable qualifying fee be deposited

The purely legal issue before us (as it was in the trial court) is whether the Statute is applicable to the Village’s municipal elections. We review pure questions of law de novo. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Glenville, 252 So. 3d 1120, 1126 (Fla. 2018).

In relevant part, this statutory provision provides that the Florida Election Code governs municipal elections “in the absence of an applicable special act, charter, or ordinance provision.” § 100.3605(1), Fla. Stat. (2026).

with the Village Clerk, section 5.07’s silence on the source of such fees

supplants the express requirement of the Statute.

But, as the trial court concluded in its detailed Order: (i) the Statute

applies “in the absence of an applicable special act, charter, or ordinance

provision,” § 100.3605(1), Fla. Stat. (2026); and (ii) the Village has enacted

no provision that, unlike the Statute, specifically delineates the account from

which the qualifying fee must be paid.4 Similarly, observing that section 5.03

of the Village Charter requires that all Village municipal elections be

conducted consistent with the applicable law of Florida, the trial court

reasoned that allowing payment of a qualifying fee via a cashier’s check

would be inconsistent with the Statute. Thus, because the Statute expressly

addresses the account upon which a qualifying fee must be drawn, and no

Village Charter or ordinance provision concerns that same subject, the trial

court found that the Statute applies to the Village’s municipal elections. We

agree with the trial court.

In the Order, the trial court explained:

While Charter Section 5.07 identifies the amount – and in fact,

changes the amount that needs to be paid from the minimum

prescribed by statute – the Charter remains silent as to where

the payment must come from (i.e., the method of payment to be

used).

III. Conclusion

The trial court held that, pursuant to the applicable statutes and

provisions of the Village Charter, a Village candidate’s qualifying fee must be

paid by a properly executed check drawn on the candidate’s campaign

account. On our de novo review of the Order, we agree with the trial court’s

construction of the relevant statutory and Village Charter provisions.

Because Thompson has demonstrated no preliminary basis to reverse the

Order, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.315(a), we summarily affirm the Order.

Affirmed.