Rel: August 21, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
CR-2026-0034
Anthony Theo Wallace, Jr.
v.
State of Alabama
Appeal from Lawrence Circuit Court
(CC-21-70.71 and CC-22-196.71)
WINDOM, Presiding Judge.
Anthony Theo Wallace, Jr., appeals from an order of the Lawrence
Circuit Court revoking his community-corrections sentence.
On September 11, 2025, Wallace was arrested for third-degree
domestic violence (harassment). A delinquency report was subsequently
CR-2026-0034
filed, charging Wallace with violating the terms and conditions of his
community-corrections sentence by committing the new offense of thirddegree domestic violence (harassment).
On December 2, 2025, the circuit court conducted a revocation
hearing at which only one witness, Deputy Clinton Taylor, testified. Dep.
Taylor testified that, on September 7, 2025, the Lawrence County
Sheriff's Department received a call that Wallace was "dragging" his
wife, Hannah, across the street by her hair. (R. 7.) Dep. Taylor and other
law-enforcement officers responded to Wallace's residence. Initially, the
officers could not locate Wallace or Hannah; however, a search of nearby
roadways led the officers to find Hannah walking barefoot along the road.
Dep. Taylor and other officers on the scene were familiar with Wallace
and Hannah. The officers spoke extensively with Hannah about her
remaining in an abusive relationship and Wallace's conduct, and they
encouraged her to permanently separate from Wallace in the interest of
her safety. Hannah was reluctant to disclose any physical abuse by
Wallace. However, when an officer asked her why her eyes were red, she
admitted that Wallace had sprayed her with pepper spray the previous
night but that he had claimed it was an accident. The interaction was
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CR-2026-0034
captured on Dep. Taylor's body camera and admitted into evidence at the
hearing. After leaving the scene, Dep. Taylor filed a report of the
incident.
Dep. Taylor testified that a mere three days later, on September 10,
2025, the sheriff's department received another call regarding Wallace
and Hannah. The caller reported that he had observed Wallace on top of
Hannah, striking her in her face. Dep. Taylor responded to the Wallace
residence but, again, could not locate Wallace or Hannah upon arrival.
Deputies on the scene searched the area around the house, where they
eventually found Wallace and Hannah hiding in an animal stall inside a
horse stable. The deputies separated Wallace and Hannah, placing them
in separate police vehicles. When questioned, Hannah was, again,
reluctant to implicate Wallace. Hannah did, however, eventually disclose
that Wallace had struck her in the face while she was on the ground.
This disclosure was captured on Dep. Taylor's body camera and admitted
into evidence at the hearing.
Wallace did not offer any evidence or testimony in his own defense.
Instead, Wallace's counsel argued that his community-corrections
sentence should not be revoked because the only evidence against him
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CR-2026-0034
was hearsay evidence. After hearing the above testimony from Dep.
Taylor and reviewing the videos, the circuit court found that Wallace had
violated the terms of his community-corrections sentence by committing
the new offense of third-degree domestic violence (harassment). The
circuit court issued a written order that same date memorializing its
decision to revoke Wallace's community-corrections sentence based on his
committing the new offense of third-degree domestic violence
(harassment).
On appeal, Wallace argues that the circuit court erred by revoking
his community-corrections sentence based solely on hearsay evidence.
" '[T]he revocation of a sentence served under a
community-corrections program is treated the same as a
probation revocation.' Ex parte Hill, 71 So. 3d 3, 8 (Ala. 2009).
" ' " 'A probation-revocation hearing is a
bench trial and the trial court is the sole
fact-finder.' " Smiley v. State, 52 So. 3d 565, 568
(Ala. 2010) (quoting Ex parte Abrams, 3 So. 3d
819, 823 (Ala. 2008)).
" ' " 'Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a
reviewing court will not disturb a trial
court's conclusions in a
probation-revocation proceeding,
including the determination whether to
revoke, modify, or continue the
probation. A trial court abuses its
discretion only when its decision is
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CR-2026-0034
based on an erroneous conclusion of
law or where the record contains no
evidence on which it rationally could
have based its decision.' "
" 'McCain v. State, 33 So. 3d 642, 647 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2009) (quoting Holden v. State, 820 So. 2d
158, 160 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (citations
omitted)). Furthermore, we review de novo those
cases that involve only issues of law and the
application of the law to the undisputed facts. Ex
parte Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 262 (Ala. 2005).'
"Walker v. State, 294 So. 3d 825, 829 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).
" 'To determine whether the evidence
presented at a probation-revocation hearing is
sufficient to revoke a defendant's probation for
committing a new offense, the Alabama Supreme
Court has set out the following standard:
" ' " ' "Probation or
suspension of
sentence comes
as an act of
grace to one
convicted of, or
pleading guilty
to, a crime. A
proceeding to
revoke
probation is not
a criminal
prosecution, and
we have no
statute
requiring a
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CR-2026-0034
formal trial.
Upon a hearing
of this character,
the court is not
bound by strict
rules of
evidence, and
the alleged
violation of a
valid condition
of probation
need not be
proven beyond a
reasonable
doubt.' "
" ' " 'Martin v. State, 46 Ala.
App. 310, 312, 241 So. 2d
339, 341 (Ala. Crim. App.
1970) (quoting State v.
Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 154
S.E.2d 53 (1967) (citation
omitted)). Under that
standard, the trial court
need "only be reasonably
satisfied from the evidence
that the probationer has
violated the conditions of
his probation." Armstrong
v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 103,
312 So. 2d 620, 623 (1975).
Absent a clear abuse of
discretion, a reviewing
court will not disturb the
trial court's conclusions.
See Moore v. State, 432 So.
2d 552, 553 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983), and Wright v. State,
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CR-2026-0034
349 So. 2d 124, 125 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1977).'
" ' "Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So. 2d [240] at
242 [(Ala. 2000)]. See Rule 27.6(d)(1),
Ala. R. Crim. P. (providing that at a
revocation hearing the 'court may
receive any reliable, relevant evidence
not legally privileged, including
hearsay,' and the court must be
reasonably satisfied from the evidence
that a violation of probation occurred
before revoking probation). Whether to
admit hearsay evidence at a
probation-revocation hearing is within
the discretion of the court. Puckett v.
State, 680 So. 2d 980, 981 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996). However,
" ' " '[i]t is well settled that
hearsay evidence may not
form the sole basis for
revoking an individual's
probation. See Clayton v.
State, 669 So. 2d 220, 222
(Ala. Cr. App. 1995);
Chasteen v. State, 652 So.
2d 319, 320 (Ala. Cr. App.
1994); and Mallette v.
State, 572 So. 2d 1316, 1317
(Ala. Cr. App. 1990). "The
use of hearsay as the sole
means of proving a violation
of a condition of probation
denies a probationer the
right to confront and to
cross-examine the persons
originating the information
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CR-2026-0034
that forms the basis of the
revocation." Clayton, 669
So. 2d at 222.'
" ' "Goodgain v. State, 755 So. 2d 591,
592 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
" ' "To summarize, at a
probation-revocation hearing a circuit
court must examine the facts and
circumstances supporting each alleged
violation of probation. The court may
consider both hearsay and nonhearsay
evidence in making its determination.
The hearsay evidence, however, must
be reliable, and it cannot be the sole
evidence supporting the revocation of
probation. Thus, a circuit court must
assess the credibility of the particular
witnesses at the probation-revocation
hearing, the reliability of the available
evidence, and the totality of the
evidence in each individual case to
determine whether it is reasonably
satisfied that the probationer has
violated a term of his or her probation
and that revocation is proper.
Moreover, an appellate court will
disturb a circuit court's decision only if
the record establishes that the circuit
court exceeded the scope of its
discretion.
" 'Sams v. State, 48 So. 3d 665, 667-68 (Ala. 2010)."
" 'Recently, in Ex parte Dunn, 163 So. 3d
1003 (Ala. 2014), the Supreme Court refined this
standard, explaining that, when the State
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CR-2026-0034
presents a mixture of hearsay and nonhearsay
evidence to show that a defendant violated his
probation by committing a new offense, the circuit
court cannot revoke a defendant's probation for
that violation unless the nonhearsay evidence
connects the defendant to the alleged offense. In
that case, the Supreme Court reversed this Court's
decision upholding the circuit court's revocation of
Dunn's probation for committing a new offense
because "the State [had] not corroborated by
nonhearsay evidence the hearsay evidence
connecting the pants, and by extension Dunn, to
the burglary." 163 So. 3d at 1006. See also Wright
v. State, [292 So. 3d 1136] (Ala. Crim. App. 2019)
(reversing the circuit court's revocation of Wright's
probation for committing a new offense because
the nonhearsay evidence that Wright was merely
present at a party at the time a shooting occurred
did not sufficiently connect him to the alleged
murder); and Miller v. State, [273 So. 3d 921] (Ala.
Crim. App. 2018) (reversing the circuit court's
revocation of Miller's probation because "the State
failed to present any nonhearsay evidence
indicating that Miller had, in fact, committed the
alleged arson").
" 'In sum, Sams and Dunn establish that
hearsay is admissible at a probation-revocation
hearing to show that a defendant committed a new
offense and that the circuit court can rely on
hearsay to revoke a defendant's probation. But
those cases warn that hearsay cannot serve as the
sole basis for revoking a defendant's probation,
and instruct that, although the State does not have
to prove every element of the alleged new offense
with nonhearsay evidence, the State must present
sufficient nonhearsay evidence connecting the
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CR-2026-0034
defendant to the commission of the alleged new
offense.'
"Walker, 294 So. 3d at 831-32 (footnotes omitted)."
Knight v. State, 337 So. 3d 1223, 1225-27 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021).
"Under the Alabama Rules of Evidence, hearsay is defined as a
'statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'
Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid." Mead v. State, 271 So. 3d 860, 864 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2018).
In this case, the State presented only hearsay evidence to support
its finding that Wallace had violated the terms and conditions of his
community-corrections sentence by committing the new offense of thirddegree domestic violence (harassment). As set forth above, Dep. Taylor
testified to his encounters with Hannah, during which she disclosed that
Wallace had assaulted her. The recordings of the encounters were
admitted into evidence. Hannah's statements to Dep. Taylor and in her
statements in the recordings were hearsay.1 Contrary to the State's
1 The State argues on appeal that Hannah's statements, as recorded
by Dep. Taylor's body camera, should be construed as excited utterances.
See Rule 803(2), Ala. R. Evid. This Court has reviewed the recordings
and finds no merit in the State's argument.
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CR-2026-0034
assertion, the State did not present any nonhearsay evidence
corroborating the hearsay evidence or connecting Wallace to the offense.
See Knight, supra (holding that, when the only evidence at a revocation
hearing consisted of detective's testimony as to what witnesses had told
him and what the victim had stated in a recording, the State presented
only hearsay evidence that defendant committed the new offense of
domestic-violence-assault); Mead, supra (holding that the circuit court
erred in revoking Mead's probation when the State failed to offer
nonhearsay evidence to prove that Mead committed a domestic-violence
offense – the State offered only hearsay statements of victim relayed by
a sheriff's deputy), and Glasscock v. State, 381 So. 3d 514 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2023) (finding that the State did not present sufficient nonhearsay
evidence at revocation hearing to corroborate law-enforcement officers'
testimony regarding information they were told by the victim and her
mother)
Because the State failed to present nonhearsay evidence to
establish that Wallace had violated the terms and conditions of his
community-corrections sentence, the circuit court erred in revoking
Wallace's community-corrections sentence. Accordingly, this Court
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CR-2026-0034
reverses the circuit court's order revoking Wallace's communitycorrections sentence and remands this cause for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur. Anderson, J., concurs in the
result.
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