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James D. Hatfield v. State of Alabama

2026-08-21

Summary

Holding. The court reversed and remanded the circuit court's probation revocation order because the State relied solely on hearsay evidence to establish the probation violation, without presenting sufficient nonhearsay evidence to connect Hatfield to the underlying criminal offenses.

James Hatfield was arrested on charges of leaving the scene of an accident and first-degree assault after a head-on collision that injured another driver. The State moved to revoke his unsupervised probation based on these new charges. At the revocation hearing, the State presented testimony from a trooper who had no direct involvement in the accident and relied entirely on hearsay—including an accident report from another officer, witness statements given to other officers, and data extracted from the vehicle's infotainment system—to establish that Hatfield committed the new offenses.

The circuit court revoked Hatfield's probation, but the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The court recognized that while hearsay is admissible in revocation proceedings, it cannot be the sole basis for revocation. When hearsay and nonhearsay evidence are mixed, any nonhearsay evidence must actually connect the probationer to the crime itself, not merely to the scene. Here, the only nonhearsay evidence—information about the victim's injuries, the vehicle's contents, and the distance from Hatfield's home to the accident site—placed Hatfield at the scene but did not connect him to having committed the collision itself.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether hearsay evidence alone can support probation revocation
  • Whether nonhearsay evidence connecting defendant to accident scene is sufficient to connect defendant to the crime
  • Confrontation rights in probation revocation proceedings

Procedural posture

The appeal was from the Elmore Circuit Court's order revoking Hatfield's probation based on new criminal charges.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Rel: August 21, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

CR-2026-0212

James D. Hatfield

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court

(CC-23-567.70)

KELLUM, Judge.

The appellant, James D. Hatfield, appeals from the Elmore Circuit

Court's revocation of his probation.

The limited record before us indicates that Hatfield was on

unsupervised probation when he was arrested on new criminal charges

CR-2026-0212

of felony leaving the scene of an accident and assault in the first degree

on February 10, 2026. Following Hatfield's arrest, the State moved to

revoke Hatfield's probation based on the new criminal charges.

On February 26, 2026, the circuit court conducted a probationrevocation hearing at which Hatfield was present and represented by

counsel. At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of one

witness, Senior Trooper Thomas Nash with the Alabama Law

Enforcement Agency. Trooper Nash was not working on the day of the

traffic accident but later took over the investigation at the request of his

supervisor. In describing the accident, Trooper Nash testified that a

"black Chevy Silverado [pickup truck] crossed over the center line into

the opposite lane and hit head on with a Hyundai Elantra." (R. 6.)

According to Trooper Nash, the truck was registered to Hatfield, but

Trooper Nash testified that he was not at the scene of the accident and

did not know if the registration information was known at the time of the

accident. Trooper Nash testified that, "as far as [he was] aware," the

female driver of the Hyundai Elantra suffered "severe bodily injuries,"

including two broken femurs, broken ribs, a broken pelvis, and a

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CR-2026-0212

collapsed lung. (R. 6.) The victim remained in the hospital for a couple

of months before she was transferred to a rehabilitation facility.

Trooper Nash testified that, two days after the accident, Hatfield

went to the Elmore County Sheriff's Office. Trooper Nash was not

present when Hatfield went to the sheriff's office, but he learned from a

witness who was present that day that Hatfield had inquired about the

location of his truck and had asked if there were any warrants out for his

arrest. Hatfield "had several scratches and bruises" and "looked like he

had been injured." (R. 9.) Trooper Nash testified that there was a witness

at the scene of the accident who "told the on scene trooper that he

observed a male, doesn't know what race, but a male [got] out of the

vehicle, grab[bed] something out of the truck, out of the tool box, and then

took off [into the woods]." (R. 9.)

After the accident, law-enforcement officers secured a search

warrant for the truck and a "Berla download," which, according to

Trooper Nash, "is the info center where you plug your car in the like

Apple car play, Android auto, things like that where we can download

information where like contacts, what phone was connected to the truck.

It gives you kind of time stamps." (R. 10.) Trooper Nash testified that a

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CR-2026-0212

lieutenant with the State Bureau of Investigations ("the SBI") performed

the Berla download. While conducting a search of the truck, Trooper

Nash observed a bottle of vodka and a firearm inside the truck. The

airbags had been deployed, but law-enforcement officers were unable to

locate any blood on the airbags.

Trooper Nash testified that, "according to the SBI lieutenant" who

had extracted the data from the Berla download,

"an Apple iPhone with a specific serial number was connected

to the truck at approximately 2:50. But it's universal standard

time, so you have to convert it. When you convert that time,

it marks it as 8:57 p.m. The crash happened at approximately

-- it's always approximate. They have it down on the crash

report at 8:55."

(R. 11.) Further, Trooper Nash testified:

"It says in here, the contact record with the serial number

shows the name of Dillon Hatfield with a registered number

of, and it gives the phone number, and e-mail address. The

number is registered to James Hatfield, who is James Dillon

Hatfield, the registered owner of the vehicle."

(R. 12.) Based on the SBI lieutenant's report, Trooper Nash testified that

Hatfield's cellular telephone was connected to the truck "two minutes,

give or take, around the crash." (R. 12.)

Thereafter, Trooper Nash continued his investigation and "spoke[]

to several witnesses who [came] forward and [gave him] sworn

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CR-2026-0212

statements and also recorded statements." (R. 12.) According to Trooper

Nash, "[o]ne witness advised that [Hatfield] had -- when asked why -- you

know, why have we not picked [Hatfield] up yet because he almost killed

the girl on that wreck the other day." (R. 12.) Trooper Nash testified

that that witness spoke to another law-enforcement officer who then

contacted Trooper Nash. Trooper Nash testified that he had not spoken

to anyone who had direct contact with Hatfield.

Trooper Nash secured a warrant for Hatfield's arrest and a search

warrant for Hatfield's cellular telephone. Trooper Nash testified that the

cellular telephone had been turned over to the SBI but, at the time of the

revocation hearing, the SBI had not been able to gain access to the

cellular telephone and that no connection had been established between

Hatfield's cellular telephone and the one that was connected to the Berla

system in the truck at the time of the accident.

On cross-examination, Trooper Nash testified that he did not see

the accident, was not present at the scene following the accident, and he

admitted that his testimony was "based off of what other people [had]

told [him]." (R. 15.) Specifically, Trooper Nash based his testimony on

an accident report produced by another trooper who had responded to the

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CR-2026-0212

accident scene, a signed written statement by a witness, and an

investigation of the Berla system an SBI lieutenant conducted. Trooper

Nash testified that he had driven by the scene of the accident and that

the accident site was approximately 1.7 to 1.8 miles from Hatfield's

house.

At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, defense counsel argued

that the evidence presented in support of the revocation of Hatfield's

probation was solely hearsay. The circuit court disagreed, and, on March

3, 2026, the circuit court entered an order revoking Hatfield's probation.

This appeal followed.

Hatfield's sole contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred

when it revoked his probation based solely on hearsay evidence. The

State concedes that the circuit court relied on hearsay evidence alone to

revoke Hatfield's probation. We agree.

"It is well settled that hearsay evidence may not form

the sole basis for revoking an individual's probation. See

Clayton v. State, 669 So. 2d 220, 222 (Ala. Cr. App. 1995);

Chasteen v. State, 652 So. 2d 319, 320 (Ala. Cr. App. 1994);

and Mallette v. State, 572 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Ala. Cr. App.

1990). 'The use of hearsay as the sole means of proving a

violation of a condition of probation denies a probationer the

right to confront and to cross-examine the persons originating

the information that forms the basis of the revocation.'

Clayton, 669 So. 2d at 222."

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CR-2026-0212

Goodgain v. State, 755 So. 2d 591, 592 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).

However, "hearsay evidence is admissible in a revocation

proceeding," Beckham v. State, 872 So. 2d 208, 211 (Ala. Crim. App.

2003), and a combination of both hearsay and nonhearsay evidence may

be sufficient to warrant revocation. See, e.g., Askew v. State, 197 So. 3d

547, 548-49 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). "[W]hen the State presents a mixture

of hearsay and nonhearsay evidence to show that a defendant violated

his probation by committing a new offense, the circuit court cannot

revoke a defendant's probation for that violation unless the nonhearsay

evidence connects the defendant to the alleged offense." Walker v. State,

294 So. 3d 825, 832 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).

In this case, the State presented only hearsay evidence to support

a finding that Hatfield had violated the terms and conditions of his

probation by committing two new criminal offenses. At the revocation

hearing, the State presented the testimony of one witness, Trooper Nash,

who had no firsthand, personal knowledge of Hatfield's alleged

violations. Indeed, Trooper Nash stated at the revocation hearing that

his testimony was "based off of what other people [had] told [him]." (R.

15.) Specifically, Trooper Nash based his testimony on an accident report

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CR-2026-0212

prepared by another law-enforcement officer, statements given by

witnesses to other law-enforcement officers during the investigation, and

data an SBI officer collected from a Berla download. Trooper Nash was

not present at the scene of the crash and did not speak directly to any

witnesses. The State's nonhearsay evidence -- Trooper Nash's testimony

regarding the victim's injuries, the contents of Hatfield's truck, and the

distance between Hatfield's house and the accident scene -- merely

connected Hatfield to the scene of the crime but did not connect Hatfield

to the crime itself. That evidence was insufficient to sustain the circuit

court's revocation of Hatfield's probation. See Washington v. State, 369

So. 3d 686, 690 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) (nonhearsay evidence from officer

regarding surveillance footage and the contents of Washington's

statement to officer connected Washington to scene of the robbery but

was insufficient to connect him to the robbery itself); see also Wright v.

State, 292 So. 3d 1136, 1139 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (nonhearsay evidence

indicating Wright was merely present at a party at the time a shooting

occurred did not sufficiently connect him to alleged murder).

Because the State did not present sufficient nonhearsay evidence

indicating that Hatfield had committed new criminal offenses, the circuit

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CR-2026-0212

court erred in revoking Hatfield's probation. Accordingly, we reverse the

circuit court's order revoking Hatfield's probation and remand this case

to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.

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